ANTI-PRAGMATISM 


ALBERT  SCHINZ 


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ANTI-PRAGMATISM 


ANTI-PRAGMATISM    '^ 

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AN  EXAMINATION  INTO  THE  RESPECTIVE  |  ^ 

RIGHTS   OF   INTELLECTUAL   ARIS- 
TOCRACY  AND    SOCIAL 
DEMOCRACY 


BY 

ALBERT    SCHINZ,    Ph.D. 

ASSOCIATE-PROFESSOR  OF  FRENCH  LITERATURE  IN  BRYN  MAWR 

COLLEGE;    FORMERLY   "  PROFESSEUR-AGREG^   DE    PHI- 

LOSOPHIE"   AT  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  NEUCHAtEL 

Sapere  aude.  —  Horace. 


BOSTON 

SMALL,  MAYNARD  AND  COMPANY 
PUBLISHERS 


Copyright,   1909 

JBg  Small,  /iBa^nar&  &  Company 

(ikcoepobatbd) 
Entered  at  Stationers'   Hall 


THE   UNIVHRSITV    PRESS,  CAMBRIDGE,  U.S.A. 


to 


TO 
M.    THEODORE    RIBOT 

OF  THE  INSTITUTE  OF  FRANCE 


1r 


CONTENTS 


FAGB 


Warning  to  the  Readers  of  this  Edition    ....       ix 
Introduction xv 

PART  I 
PRAGMATISM  AND  INTELLECTUALISM 

CHAP. 

I  The  Principles  of  Pragmatism 21 

II     The  Dewey  Case 88 

PART  II 
PRAGMATISM  AND  MODERNISM 

I     Social    Phenomena    Explaining    the    Appearance 

of  a  Pragmatic  Philosophy no 

II  Pragmatism   of   the  Middle   Ages    and   Modern 

Scholasticism 165 

PART  III 

PRAGMATISM  AND  TRUTH 

I     The  Triumph  of  Pragmatism 207 

II     Salvation   from    Pragmatic   Philosophy   Possible 

BUT  NOT  Probable 223 

III     Is  William  James  a  Pragmatist? 238 

Conclusion 252 


viii  CONTENTS 

APPENDICES  y^^^ 

Appendix  A     Answers    to  Some  Criticisms  ....  253 

Appendix  B     Literature  and  the  Moral  Code     .     .  269 

Appendix  C     Common  Sense  and  Philosophy     .     .     .  280 

Index 315 


WARNING   TO   THE   READERS    OF 
THIS   EDITION 

The  author  of  this  book  never  feared  that  any 
serious-minded  reader  would  fail  to  appreciate  the 
sincerity  and  earnestness  of  his  efforts.  And  indeed 
he  has  not  been  deceived.  He  has  rather  occasion  to 
be  grateful  for  the  courteous  tone  of  the  criticisms 
directed  against  some  of  his  ideas  which  are,  he  is 
well  aware  of  it,  opposed  to  those  of  most  people 
in  our  generation.  To  speak  only  of  this  country, 
reviewers,  in  such  papers  and  journals  as  The  New 
York  Times,  The  Nation,  and  Evening  Post,  the 
Boston  Transcript,  The  Bookman,  and  Current  Lit- 
erature, have  made  it  a  point  to  give  a  very 
fair  account  of  what  he  said  regarding  America, 
and  of  his  views  regarding  democracy  and  aristoc- 
racy of  the  intellect;  they  did  so  without  suggest- 
ing interpretations  which  would  favor  prejudiced 
appreciations. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  only  two  exceptions  could 
be  quoted,  and  they  were  articles  emanating  from 
the  pen  of  two  American  pragmatists.  Still  it  was 
enough  to  show  that  there  were  some  statements 
which  might  be  misinterpreted  if  the  book  was  trans- 
lated and  got  a  wider  circulation  in  this  country; 


X     WARNING  TO   READERS   OF  THIS  EDITION 

therefore  it  will  not  be  superfluous  to  take  precau- 
tion and  warn  once  more  —  I  say  "  once  more  "  for 
warning  is  found  even  in  the  original  French  edi- 
tion —  against  the  inclination,  which  some  may  feel, 
to  ascribe  to  the  author  ideas  for  which  he  is  not 
responsible. 

With  regard  to  statements  concerning  America, 
it  will  be  enough  to  recommend  careful  reading  of 
the  whole  Introduction  and  to  underline  especially 
the  following  passage : 

Note  that  I  have  no  reproach  to  urge  against 
society  for  being  pragmatic,  that  is  to  say,  for  watch- 
ing over  its  own  interests.  On  the  contrary,  I  think 
it  is  perfectly  legitimate  that  it  should  do  so.  And, 
besides,  the  word  ''  interests  '^  may  be  taken  in  the 
widest,  or,  if  you  please,  most  elevated  sense.  But 
I  do  reproach  a  school  of  modern  philosophers  for 
wishing  to  force  impersonal  philosophy,  a  moral 
science,  indifferent  nature,  to  speak  the  same  lan- 
guage as  our  aspirations  and  our  passions  and  even, 
I  grant,  our  generous  aspirations,  our  noble  pas- 
sions. Our  innate  and  psychic  tendencies  (in  the 
moral,  social,  and  religious  realms)  are  phenomena 
for  science  to  record  and  authenticate,  not  to  justify 
or  legitimize. 

Thus  let  it  be  clearly  understood :  against  a  prag- 
matic conception  of  life  I  do  not  protest,  but  only 
against  pragmatic  philosophers. 


WARNING  TO  READERS  OF  THIS  EDITION    xi 

With  regard  to  my  opinions  concerning  democ- 
racy, I  only  wish  —  until  the  time  comes  when  I  can 
explain  my  ideas  more  fully  than  was  possible  within 
the  limits  of  this  volume  —  to  benefit  by  those  words 
of  the  sage  Renan :  One  can  love  the  people  in  hold- 
ing an  aristocratic  philosophy,  and  not  love  it  in 
loudly  advertising  democratic  principles.  {Dia- 
logues philosophiqties,  p.  i6.) 

The  remark  has  been  made  by  several  reviewers 
that  almost  no  technical  terms  were  used  in  this 
book  and  thus  that  it  could  be  understood  also  by 
those  who  are  no  specialists  in  philosophy.  Mr. 
Schiller  (Mind,  July,  1909)  has  probably  voiced  the 
opinion  of  several  critics  in  calling  this  way  of  pro- 
ceeding "  a  curious  theoretical  inconsistency."  His 
idea  was  evidently  that,  with  my  opinion  that  scien- 
tific truth  ought  to  be  kept  out  of  reach  of  the  gen- 
eral public,  I  violated  my  own  principles  in  writing 
in  non-technical  style.  I  am  not  altogether  surprised 
that  the  objection  should  be  made,  but  I  answer  as 
follows : 

In  the  first  place  the  book  is  still  philosophical 
enough  so  as  not  to  become  popular  with  the  masses. 

Besides,  in  using  abstract  and  technical  terms  the 
way  pragmatists  do  (and  they  do  more  than  their 
opponents  rather  than  less,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
they  never  tire  of  accusing  others  of  doing  it;  ^   and 

*  As  a  good  example  of  philosophical  obscurity  brought  about  by 
technical  terms,  see  the  first  pages  of  Mr.  Schiller's  essay  on  "  Faith, 
Reason,  and  Religion  "  in  Studies  on  Humanism. 


xii   WARNING  TO  READERS  OF  THIS  EDITION 

I  do  not  except  Professor  James  himself  from  this 
statement),  one  leads  astray  not  only  the  masses,  but 
a  good  many  readers  who,  although  not  university 
people,  belong  decidedly  to  the  intellectual  aristoc- 
racy. I  will  say  more;  several  university  scholars 
who  were  not  especially  philosophers,  but  mathe- 
maticians, scientists,  linguists,  even  psychologists, 
were  deceived  by  the  obscurity,  or,  rather,  confusion 
of  pragmatist  writings;  and  this  confusion  which 
did  not  a  little  contribute  to  the  success  of  which 
pragmatism  can  boast,  was  achieved  by  using  always 
at  the  critical  places  some  technical  terms  covering 
risky  theories.  In  my  criticism  I  had  in  mind  just 
those  people ;  it  was  enough  to  tell  in  plain  language 
what  pragmatism  was,  to  expose  it.  Indeed,  as  I 
have  pointed  out  often,  both  in  the  text  and  in  notes, 
many,  and  of  course  the  most  important  objections 
to  pragmatism  have  been  made  by  others,  —  I  refer 
especially  to  such  excellent  criticisms  as  those  of 
Professor  Creighton,  Philosophical  Review,  XIII, 
p.  3;  XV,  p.  5;  XVII,  p.  6;  Professor  Hibben, 
Philosophical  Review,  XVII,  p.  4;  Dr.  Carus, 
Monist,  XVIII,  p.  3 ;  XIX,  p.  i ;  Professor  Bake- 
well,  Philosophical  Review,  XVII,  p.  6,  to  speak 
only  of  American  critics,^  —  and  if  I  had  wanted  to 
write  only  for  a  strictly  philosophical  public,  my 
book  would  have  been  in  many  places  a  mere  repeti- 
tion of  criticisms  which  had  been  made  already. 

*  Professor  Pratt's  book  What  is  Pragmatism?    came  out  after 
A  nti-Pragm^tism, 


WARNING  TO  READERS  OF  THIS  EDITION  xiii 

I  have  not  any  desire  to  ignore  various  criticisms 
directed  against  Anti-Pragmatism  up  to  the  present 
time.  If  I  have  not  thought  it  advisable  to  make 
considerable  alterations  or  add  many  notes  in  the 
text  itself  of  this  edition,  answers  to  several  objec- 
tions will  be  found  in  Appendix  A. 

A.  S. 

October,  1909. 


INTRODUCTION 

"  Pragmatism  "  is  only  a  new  term  to  designate 
"  Opportunism  "  in  philosophy.  As  a  doctrine  it 
does  not  make  good.  But  pragmatism  as  revealing 
a  certain  state  of  mind  in  our  present  generation  has 
a  profound  significance. 

We  declare  pragmatism  to  be  bad,  not  indeed  in 
its  moral  consequences  (which,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
ought  not  to  count  in  philosophy),  but  because  it 
introduces  into  our  fashion  of  thinking  a  degrading 
sophistry.  Pragmatism,  in  its  modern  systematized 
form,  would  scarcely  have  been  possible  in  earlier 
times.  It  has,  however,  become  so  since  erudite 
scholars  and  original  thinkers  have  deemed  it  fit  to 
cater  to  a  public  incapable  of  taking  a  genuine  inter- 
est in  their  researches  and  their  speculations,  a  pub- 
lic which  in  the  last  resort  wishes  simply  to  amuse 
itself  with  these  as  it  amuses  itself  with  everything 
else,  —  the  public  of  our  modern  democracies.  We 
feel  flattered  by  the  plaudits  of  the  crowd,  and  to 
procure  these  we  are  satisfied  to  get  down  to  the 
level  of  those  whom  as  thinkers  we  should  disdain. 
Popular  science,  popular  art,  popular  theology  — 
only  one  thing  was  lacking  —  popular  philosophy. 


xvi  INTRODUCTION 

And  now  they  give  that  to  us.  What  a  triumph  for 
a  weak  cause ! 

Another  thing.  The  complexion  of  thought  in 
our  times,  our  so-called  tolerance,  holds  back  the  arm 
when  we  ought  to  strike  the  blow ;  and  our  nervous 
anxiety  to  do  justice,  which  we  call  scientific,  makes 
us  too  fearful  altogether  of  protesting  vigorously 
against  certain  ideas  in  the  air  about  us.  Let  any 
kind  of  a  so-called  philosophic  concoction  be  served 
out  to  us  and  we  accept  it  with  such  respect  that  we 
almost  seem  to  approve  it.  However,  there  are 
theories  which,  for  the  sake  of  our  philosophic  pro- 
bity, we  ought  not  to  tolerate.  Pragmatism  is  one 
of  these.  It  ought  to  be  smothered  in  its  cradle. 
In  dealing  with  it,  we  misinterpret  a  principle  of 
modern  criticism  not  in  itself  false,  "  this  thing  is, 
therefore  it  ought  to  be." 

But  pragmatism,  while  fain  to  draw  us  far  from 
the  forthright  way,  is  perhaps  going  to  save  us, 
after  all.  It  may  serve  as  the  last  drop  of  water  to 
cause  an  overflow  in  the  vase  of  philosophic  mis- 
understandings. We  have  been  going  astray  long 
enough.  Thanks  to  pragmatism  the  blind  will 
perhaps  end  by  seeing  the  bad  road  over  which 
we  have  been  travelling,  the  deaf  at  last  hear  the 
cacophony  of  "  democratic  thought,"  and  those  who 
have  become  paralytic  through  the  desperate  confu- 
sion due  to  our  indulgence  as  scholars  will  be  freed 
from  their  ankylosis  and  will  walk  again. 

Professor  William  James  himself,  in  discussing 


INTRODUCTION  xvii 

the  importance  of  the  revolution  which  pragmatism 
must  introduce,  has  ventured,  in  the  way  of  com- 
parison, to  recall  the  Reformation  of  the  sixteenth 
century.  If  he  means  by  this  to  suggest  the  conver- 
sion of  the  public  at  large,  to  pragmatic  ideas,  I 
would  submit  that  this  has  taken  place  long  ago, 
and  that  our  age  is  as  pragmatic  as  it  is  possible  for 
it  to  be.  If  he  had  in  mind  a  reform  in  philosophy, 
he  is  perhaps  not  wrong.  But  one  would  like  to 
hope  that,  in  the  case  of  thinking  people  at  least, 
pragmatists  be  not  regarded  as  modern  Luthers  and 
Calvins,  but  rather  as  the  venders  of  philosophic 
indulgences  who  have  preceded  the  true  reformers 
and  made  them  necessary.^ 

Note,  however,  that  I  have  no  reproach  to  urge 
against  society  for  being  pragmatic ;  that  is  to  say, 
for  watching  over  its  own  interests.  On  the  con- 
trary, I  think  it  is  perfectly  legitimate  that  it  should 
do  so.  And,  beside,  the  word  "interests"  may  be 
taken  in  the  widest,  or,  if  you  please,  most  elevated 
sense.  But  I  do  reproach  a  school  of  modern  phi- 
losophers for  wishing  to  force,  so  to  speak,  imper- 
sonal philosophy,  a  moral  science,  indifferent  nature, 
to  speak  the  same  language  as  our  aspirations  and 
our  passions  —  even,  I  grant,  our  generous  aspira- 
tions, our  noble  passions.  Our  innate  and  psychic 
tendencies    (in    the    moral,    social,    and    religious 

*  Before  Mr.  Schiller's  modest  prophecy:  "It  is  .  .  .  quite  true 
that  the  undertaking  of  the  new  philosophy  may  be  regarded  as  in 
some  ways  the  most  stupendous  in  the  history  of  thought "  (Preface 
to  the  Studies  in  Humanism,  p.  viii),  one  remains  speechless. 

b 


xviii  INTRODUCTION 

realms)  are  phenomena  for  science  to  record  and 
authenticate,  not  to  justify  or  legitimize.  The  epoch 
of  scholasticism  ought  to  be  left  behind  for  good 
and  all. 

And  this  leads  me  to  add  a  few  words  rwore  to 
this  Introduction.  If  any  one  should  be  inclined  to 
see  in  these  pages  attacks  on  America,  the  country 
of  pragmatism;  and  if,  especially,  certain  journal- 
ists should,  in  accordance  with  their  custom,  make 
it  their  pleasure  to  seek  out  in  my  book  subjects  for 
sensational  and  malignant  articles,  they  are  hereby 
informed  in  advance  that  they  have  not  understood 
the  book.  To  be  sure,  since  the  pragmatist  philos- 
ophy is  rooted  in  the  pragmatic  tendencies  of  man, 
it  was  difficult  for  me  not  to  occupy  myself  with  the 
last  mentioned,  and  it  is  almost  inevitable  that  the 
superficial  reader  should  imagine  that  I  would  ex- 
tend my  criticism  of  a  philosophic  theory  to  a  prag- 
matic conception  of  life  itself.  But  I  affirm  nothing 
of  the  kind.  I  do  not  blame  America  in  the  least 
for  its  pragmatic  ideas,  any  more  than  I  do  any  other 
country.  I  have  insisted  repeatedly  on  the  distinc- 
tion to  be  drawn  (between  criticism  of  a  philosophy 
and  criticism  of  life)  in  such  a  way  that  those  who 
know  hoiv  to  read  will  certainly  not  be  deceived.^ 

Therefore  let  no  one  gratuitously  ascribe  to  me 
opinions  about  America.    I  have  not  expressed  any ; 

*  I  have  even  approved  of  these  pragmatic  traits,  both  in  this 
volume  and  elsewhere.  See,  for  example,  my  article  MercantUisme 
et  esthetique  en  Amerique  in  La  Revue  (ancienne  Revue  des  Revues) 
June,  1906. 


INTRODUCTION  xix 

and  any  one  who  should  attempt  to  divine  such 
would  almost  surely  be  deceived.  The  following 
pages  contain  merely  opinions  on  pragmatism  as 
a  philosophic  doctrine.  Moreover,  the  problem  that 
I  am  discussing  —  namely,  the  respective  rights  of 
intellectual  aristocracy  and  of  modern  democracy  — 
is  infinitely  too  large  to  be  reduced  to  the  proportion 
of  an  estimate  of  the  intrinsic  worth  of  American 
civilization.  All  that  it  behooves  me  to  say  at  pres- 
ent is  this :  If  I  have  spoken  more  of  American  than 
of  other  countries  when  the  subject  under  discussion 
was  the  relation  of  pragmatism  to  life,  it  was  be- 
cause I  was  not  entirely  free  in  my  choice.  In  the 
first  place  it  is  in  America  that  pragmatism,  as  a 
philosophy,  has  been  formulated  in  its  boldest  and 
most  logical  form.  This  alone  would  justify  my 
action.  But  there  was  at  the  same  time  another 
more  decisive  reason :  Although,  of  course,  the 
pragmatic  habit  of  thought  is  found  in  every  coun- 
try, I  yet  felt  impelled  to  borrow  my  illustrations 
from  America,  very  much  as  a  geologist  who  wishes 
to  study  certain  minerals  scattered  over  the  entire 
surface  of  the  earth  would  not  necessarily  go  where 
he  would  find  the  largest  number  of  specimens,  but 
where  he  could  obtain  the  most  varied  and  the  most 
characteristic.  America,  less  trammelled  than  other 
countries  by  social  traditions  of  all  kinds,  exhibits 
more  distinctly  —  that  is,  with  less  alloy  of  hetero- 
geneous elements  —  the  pragmatic  spirit,  which  is 
the  modern  spirit. 


XX  INTRODUCTION 

The  central  theme,  or  ground  idea,  of  this  volume 
—  namely,  that  there  exists  a  conflict  between  intel- 
lectual truth  and  moral  truth,  a  conflict  that  all  the 
ratiocinations  of  the  world  will  not  suppress  (for 
reconcilement  is  impossible),  a  conflict  that  it  would 
be  better  to  accept  once  for  all,  without  subterfuge, 
as  a  fact  for  which  moreover  no  one  is  responsible, 
this  idea,  I  say,  has  been  more  than  once  discussed 
by  me,  especially  in  the  form  of  articles  in  Euro- 
pean and  American  periodicals.  For  some  of  these 
articles  I  have  deemed  the  present  volume  to  be  the 
proper  place,  and,  in  closing,  I  wish  to  thank  Messrs. 
Ribot,  of  the  Revue  philosophique,  Woodbridge,  of 
the  Journal  of  Philosophy,  and  Burns  Weston,  of 
the  International  Journal  of  Ethics,  for  permission 
to  reproduce  them  here. 

A.  S. 


PART  I 

PRAGMATISM    AND    INTELLECTUALISM 

Une  science  ne  pent  etre  normative  en  tant 
que  theorique  (Levy-Bruhl). 

CHAPTER   I 

THE   PRINCIPLES   OF   PRAGMATISM 

I.  The  end  and  aim  of  pragmatism :  to  reverse  the  traditional 
conception  of  the  relations  of  life  and  philosophy;  the  pur- 
pose of  the  latter  should  not  be  to  ascertain  and  verify  the 
truth  but  to  decree  it.  —  II.  The  three  fundamental  argu- 
ments of  pragmatism :  a.  The  intellectual,  rationalistic 
philosophies  have  not  been  able  to  satisfy  us;  this  creates 
a  presumption  in  favor  of  pragmatism,  b.  As  a  matter  of 
fact  man  is  always  pragmatic  in  his  thought;  hence  prag- 
matism is  the  most  natural  philosophy  and  the  only  one  of 
which  we  are  capable,  c.  Pragmatism  claims  to  possess  in 
its  criterion  of  "the  expedient"  a  basis  of  agreement  for  all 
the  philosophies,  "the  expedient"  being  a  principle  which 
is  common  to  all  of  them.  —  III.  Refutation  of  these  three 
arguments :  a.  All  the  intellectualist  philosophies  may  be 
false,  but  that  forms  no  presumption  in  favor  of  the  prag- 
matic method,  b.  From  the  fact  that  all  the  philosophers 
think,  by  nature,  subjectively  like  the  pragmatists,  there 
would  not  result  any  superiority  of  pragmatism  in  principle, 
bnt  there  would  result  this,  —  dther  that  the  other  philos- 
ophies are  worth  as  much  as  pragmatism,  considered  as  a 
philosophy,  or  that  pragmatism  is  not  worth  more  than 
they.  c.  To  decide  whether  pragmatism  offers  a  scientific 
principle  of  unity  we  must  distinguish  at  the  outset  the 
principle  of  the  pragmatic  "expedient"  from  that  of  the  scien- 
tific "expedient"    of   thinkers   like    Poincar^,   whom    the 


22  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

pragmatists  attempt  in  vain  to  claim  as  one  of  themselves; 
one  of  these  principles,  the  latter,  is  an  intellectual  ''expedi- 
ent" ;  the  other  is  really  (although  it  is  not  so  called)  a  "moral 
or  social"  expedient.  E.  g.,  the  geocentric  system,  which, 
according  to  scientific  pragmatism  always  has  been  and 
always  will  be  false;  whereas,  according  to  moral  (Anglo- 
Saxon)  pragmatism,  it  would  have  been  correct  in  the  mid- 
dle ages,  but  would  be  false  to-day.  The  gist  of  the  ques- 
tion is  the  principle  of  contradiction  to  be  accepted  or  not? 
If  it  is,  then  pragmatism  is  no  longer  to  be  distinguished 
from  intellectualism  and  the  pragmatic  movement  is  naught. 
If  it  is  not,  then  we  deny  the  possibility  of  any  philosophy 
at  all,  pragmatism  of  course  included.  —  Attempts  of  the 
pragmatists  to  escape  from  this  impasse:  Suicidal  argu- 
.  .  ments  of  Schiller;  James's  theory  of  "Truth,"  which,  when 
you  consider  the  spirit  of  it  and  not  the  letter,  ends  by  hand- 
ing over  pragmatism,  bound  hand  and  foot,  to  the  mercies 
of  intellectualism. 

The  real  basis  of  pragmatism,  and  what  explains  the  possibility 
of  a  theory  with  so  slight  a  chance  of  life  per  se:  Our  science 
is  limited  by  the  laws  of  knowledge  and  even  in  the  domains 
accessible  to  our  faculties  it  is  incomplete.  Pragmatism 
profits  by  these  lacunae.  Everywhere,  that  intellectualism 
does  not  bar  the  way,  pragmatism  is  allowed  to  propose  its 
theories  of  social  or  moral  expediences  (or  opportunism). 
Conclusion :  pragmatism  begins  where  philosophy  ends. 

Significant  variations  in  the  expression  of  the  pragmatistic 
thought  of  William  James  from  1897  to  1907.  —  IV.  Exam- 
ination of  certain  applications  of  the  pragmatic  method : 
Theories  of  a  punitive  God  and  a  God  of  love  equally  legiti- 
mate from  a  pragmatic  point  of  view;  speaking  precisely, 
alone  this  very  intellectualism  so  scorned  by.  pragmatists 
can  offer  a  criterion  to  determine  the  superiority  of  one  over 
the  other.  —  V.  The  pragmatic  method  is  by  its  nature  in- 
capable of  being  applied  systematically.  Examples  of 
three  different  and  incompatible  applications  of  the  so-called 
"philosophical  method"  by  William  James:  a.  In  discuss- 
ing the  problem  of  substance  and  that  of  moral  conscious- 
ness, he  condemns  the  employment  of  metaphysics  and  of 


THE  PRINCIPLES    OF   PRAGMATISM        23 

anthropomorphism;  b.  In  discussing  the  respective  claims 
of  idealism  (or  theism)  and  materialism,  he  himself  has  re- 
course to  metaphysics ;  c.  Finally,  when  he  comes  to  examine 
the  question  of  evil,  he  neither  rejects  nor  admits  it,  but 
adopts  a  third  appHcation  of  the  method;  that  is  to  say,  he 
calmly  mixes  the  metaphysical  potion  in  the  most  convenient 
way  for  solving  the  problem  according  to  "expediency." 
Refutation  of  the  objection  that  pragmatism  has  no  desire  to 
become  a  system :  Pragmatism  having  philosophic  preten- 
sions must  be  systematic;  a  philosophy  (or  a  method)  is 
either  systematic  or  it  is  not. 


Pragmatism  ^  would  invert  the  traditional  rela- 
tions established  between  philosophy  and  life.  In 
place  of  regulating  our  practical  conceptions  of  the 
world  by  our  theoretical  conceptions,  it  would  have 
us  regulate  our  theoretical  conceptions  by  our  prac- 
tical conceptions.  That  is  to  say,  in  place  of  ap- 
proaching the  study  of  phenomena  from  a  point  of 
view  purely  objective,  it  proposes  to  make  teleology, 
or  the  doctrine  of  final  causes,  the  corner-stone  of 
our  philosophical  edifices.  "  Pragmatism,"  says 
Schiller,  consists  in  ''  the  thorough  recognition  that 

*  It  is  my  purpose  to  give  an  account  of  the  doctrines  of  pragmatism 
in  the  following  pages,  but  only  for  the  purpose  of  refuting  them. 
For  the  shades  of  difference  beween  the  various  chiefs  of  the  school 
—  from  Peirce,  who  is  regarded  as  the  father  of  modem  pragmatism, 
down  to  certain  recent  thinkers  in  Europe  —  the  reader  is  referred 
to  the  little  monograph  of  Marcel  Hebert  (Le  Pragmatisme.  Etude 
de  ses  diverses  Formes,  etc.  Paris,  1908.  105  pages.  See  also  certain 
interpretatioas  in  Boutroux,  Science  et  Religion.  Paris,  1908.  Part 
II),  and  two  articles  of  Lalande  in  the  Revue  philosophique  (Febru- 
ary, 1906  and  January,  1908). 


24  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

the  purposive  character  of  mental  life  generally 
must  influence  and  pervade  also  our  most  remotely- 
cognitive  activities."  (Humanism,  p.  8.)  "  One  of 
the  maxims  dearest  to  the  pragmatists  is  this :  that 
the  meaning  of  theories  consists  entirely  in  the  con^ 
sequences  which  their  followers  may  expect  from 
them."  (Papini,  Popular  Science  Monthly,  Octo- 
ber, 1907,  p.  352.^)  ''Truth,  for  the  pragmatist, 
becomes  a  class-name  for  all  sorts  of  definite  work- 
ing values  in  experience."  (James,  Pragmatism,  p. 
68;  cf.  p.  102.)  And  in  place  of  adopting  as  a 
criterion  of  truth  an  intellectual  or  rational  principle, 
wholly  impersonal,  the  pragmatist  frankly  adopts 
the  principle  of  a  philosophy  that  agrees  with  our 
needs  and  aspirations.  Pragmatism  "  is,  in  reality, 
only  the  application  of  Humanism  to  the  theory  of 
knowledge."  (Schiller,  Humanism,  p.  xxi.)  Our 
endeavor  to  learn  the  truth  "  is  necessarily  inspired 
by  the  conception  of  some  good  at  which  it  aims." 
{Ihid.  p.  10.)  "  On  pragmatic  principles  we  cannot 
reject  any  hypothesis  if  consequences  useful  to  life 
flow  from  it."  (James,  Pragmatism,  p.  273.) 
"  *  The  true,'  to  put  it  very  briefly,  is  only  the  expe- 
dient in  the  way  of  our  thinking,  just  as  *  the  right ' 
is  only  the  expedient  in  the  way  of  our  behaving." 
(Ihid.  p.  222.) 

In  other  words,  an  idea  is  not  true  or  false  in  it- 
self :    it  becomes  so  if  it  is  "  expedient."     "  The 

^  Originally  written  in  Italian.     I  have  seen  only  the  English 
translation. 


THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   PRAGMATISM       25 

truth  of  an  idea  is  not  a  stagnant  property  inherent 
in  it.  Truth  happens  to  an  idea.  It  becomes  true, 
is  made  true  by  events.  Its  verity  is  in  fact  an 
event,  a  process :  the  process,  namely,  of  its  verify- 
ing itself,  its  \tn-fication.  Its  validity  is  the  process 
of  its  YdiW-dation."  (James,  Pragmatism,  p.  201,  who 
here  gives  a  gloss  on  Schiller,  Humanisniy  p.  xv.) 
That  is  to  say,  in  place  of  ascertaining  and  verify- 
ing the  truth,  philosophy  decrees  it.  ''  We  receive, 
in  short,  the  block  of  marble,  but  we  carve  the  statue 
ourselves."     {Pragmatism,  p.  247.) 


II 

Upon  what  do  they  ground  their  reasoning  that 
they  thus  propose  to  revolutionize  our  ideas  on  the 
nature  of  the  true? 

The  arguments  of  the  pragmatists  may  be  re- 
duced to  three,  as  follows : 

I.  All  philosophical  systems  that  are  based  on  a 
principle  purely  intellectual  have  failed  to  give  satis- 
faction. Should  not  that  create  a  presumption  in 
favor  of  a  philosophy  that  does  not  select  an  intel- 
lectual principle  as  the  fundamental  characteristic  of 
truth  ?  William  James  recognizes  that  all  philosoph- 
ical theories  have  their  value,  of  one  sort  or  another, 
were  it  only  that  of  making  straight  the  way  for  a 
better  ("  any  one  of  them  may  from  some  point  of 
view  be  useful,"  he  says),  and  in  this  practical  and 
relative  application  it  is  worthy  of  esteem.     But 


26  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

(and  this  is  more  and  more  recognized  by  all)  "  no 
theory  is  absolutely  a  transcript  of  reality."  (Prag- 
matism, p.  57.)     And  he  concludes  as  follows: 

"  Ought  not  the  existence  of  the  various  types  of 
thinking  which  we  have  reviewed,  each  so  splendid 
for  certain  purposes,  yet  all  conflicting  still,  and  neither 
one  of  them  able  to  support  a  claim  of  absolute  ve- 
racity, to  awaken  a  presumption  favorable  to  the  prag- 
matistic  view  that  all  our  theories  are  instrumental, 
are  mental  modes  of  adaption  to  reality,  rather  than 
revelations  or  gnostic  answers  to  some  divinely  insti- 
tuted world-enigma?"     (Ibid.  pp.  193-194.) 

2.  The  second  argument  may  be  summed  up  thus : 
All  of  our  philosophical  theories,  whether  we  suspect 
it  or  not,  are  inspired  by  practical  reasons  that  look 
toward  pragmatic  ends.  Pragmatism  is  really  the 
only  philosophy  of  which  man  is  capable;  so  he 
should  resign  himself  to  the  fate  of  either  not  being 
a  philosopher  or  else  being  a  pragmatist.  ''  In  reality 
our  knowing  is  driven  and  guided  at  every  step  by 
our  subjective  interests  and  preferences,  our  desires, 
our  needs,  and  our  ends."  (Schiller,  Humanism,  p. 
10.)  ''Whenever  we  observe  a  struggle  between 
two  rival  theories  of  events  we  find  that  it  is  ulti- 
mately the  greater  conduciveness  of  the  victor  to 
our  use  and  convenience  that  determines  our  pref- 
erence and  its  consequent  acceptance  as  true." 
(Ibid.  p.  59.)  "Human  motives  sharpen  all  our 
questions,  human  satisfactions  lurk  in  all  our  an- 


THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   PRAGMATISM       27 

swers,  all  our  formulas  have  a  human  twist." 
(Pragmatism,  p.  242.)  "In  every  genuine  meta- 
physical debate  some  practical  issue,  however  con- 
jectural and  remote,  is  involved."  (Ibid.  p.  100.) 
For  example  (says  Mr.  Schiller,  Humanism,  pp.  xi- 
xii),  let  us  consider  two  opposite  theories  or  modes 
of  reasoning : 

The  world  is  so  bad  that  there  must  be  a  better. 
The  world  is  so  bad  that  there  cannot  be  a  better. 

The  second  argument  alone  is  strictly  logical,  not 
allowing  any  non-rational  or  non-intellectual  ele- 
ment of  desire  or  volition  to  intervene.  Indeed  if 
we  conceive  of  a  creator  who  has  the  power  of  mak- 
ing a  better  world  it  is  (intellectually)  unthinkable 
that  he  should  not  have  taken  advantage  of  his  power 
to  do  so  at  once;  and  after  such  a  world  we  admit 
that  there  would  be  no  necessity  of  trying  another. 
But  it  is  precisely  because  this  reasoning  is  simply 
intellectual  that  men  have  not  adopted  it,  and  have 
preferred  the  first  theory,  in  which  there  is  that  idea 
of  desire  and  that  element  of  volition  which  convince 
humanity  of  the  truth  of  a  theory.  It  is  a  fact  that 
we  reason  and  decide  thus,  a  fact  that  nobody  can 
oppose.  Mr.  Schiller  adds  that  he  who  declares  he 
prefers  the  second  theory  probably  deceives  himself, 
believing  that  disinterested  and  intellectual  consid- 
erations have  guided  him  in  his  choice.  But  "  it  may 
have  been  a  pessimist's  despair  that  clothed  itself  in 
the  habiliments  of  logic  or  it  may  have  been  merely 
stupidity  and  apathy,  a  want  of .  imagination  and 


28  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

enterprise  in  questioning  nature."  On  close  exam- 
ination we  should  probably  find  that  reasonings  of 
the  second  type  (purely  intellectual)  "  never  really 
occur." 

Professor  James  carries  even  farther  than  Mr. 
Schiller  this  argument  that  temperament  decides 
opinion.  He  likes  constantly  to  oppose  monistic 
rationalism  to  empiricism :  *'  And  let  me  say  that  it 
is  impossible  not  to  see  a  temperamental  difference 
at  work  in  the  choice  between  the  two  philosophies." 
{Pragmatism,  p.  259.)  Again,  elsewhere:  "  To  in- 
terpret absolute  monism  worthily,  be  a  mystic." 
And  he  adds  instances  from  Hindoo  Vedantists: 
"  You  do  not  reason,  but  after  going  through  a 
certain  discipline,  you  see,  and  having  seen,  you  can 
report  the  truth."  {Ihid.  p.  151.)  In  a  more  gen- 
eralizing way :  "  The  history  of  philosophy  is  to  a 
great  extent  that  of  a  certain  clash  of  human  tem- 
peraments. .  .  .  Temperament  is  no  conventionally 
recognized  reason;  so  a  philosopher  urges  imper- 
sonal reasons  only  for  his  conclusions.  Yet  his 
temperament  really  gives  him  a  stronger  bias  than 
any  of  his  more  strictly  objective  premises."  {Ihid. 
pp.  6,  7.)  He  cites,  as  examples  of  great  thinkers 
by  temperament,  Plato,  Hegel,  Spencer. 

Now  starting  from  the  fact  that  it  is  not  possible 
for  the  thing  to  be  otherwise  than  just  stated,  Wil- 
liam James  passes  to  the  second  affirmation,  —  that 
there  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  truth  must  sub- 
stantially correspond  to  our  aspirations: 


THE   PRINCIPLES   OF   PRAGMATISM       29 

*'  Surely  you  must  admit  this,  that  if  there  were  no 
good  for  life  in  true  ideas,  or  if  the  knowledge  of  them 
were  positively  disadvantageous,  and  false  ideas  the 
only  useful  ones,  then  the  current  notion  that  truth 
is  divine  and  precious,  and  its  pursuit  a  duty,  could 
never  have  grown  up  or  become  a  dogma.  .  .  .  What 
would  be  better  for  us  to  believe!  This  sounds  very 
like  a  definition  of  truth.  It  comes  very  near  to  saying 
*  what  we  ought  to  believe ' ;  and  in  that  definition 
none  of  you  would  find  any  oddity.  Ought  we  never 
not  to  believe  what  it  is  better  for  us  to  believe  ?  And 
can  we  then  keep  the  notion  of  what  is  better  for 
us,  and  what  is  true  for  us,  permanently  apart?" 
(Pragmatism,  pp.  76-77.) 

And  here  is  the  way  Mr.  Schiller  for  his  part 
(Humanism,  p.  xiii)  passes  from  the  just-mentioned 
opinion  —  that  our  theories  are  always  inspired  by 
pragmatic  considerations  —  to  the  other,  that  it  is 
philosophically  legitimate  that  it  should  be  so ;  "  that 
the  canons  of  right  Thought  must,  even  from  the 
most  narrowly  logical  of  standpoints,  be  brought 
into  some  relation  to  the  procedures  of  actual  think- 
ing; that  in  point  of  fact  the  former  are  derived 
from  the  latter ;  that  if  so,  our  first  mode  of  reason- 
ing must  receive  logical  recognition  because  it  is  not 
only  usual,  but  useful  in  the  discovery  of  truth,  that 
a  process  which  yields  valuable  results  must  in  some 
sense  be  valid.  .  .  ."  ^ 

^  Perhaps  I  ought  to  cite  here  Prof.  Dewey,  who  devotes  the  first 
part  of  his  essay,  Logical  Conditions  of  a  Scientific  Treatment  of  Moral- 
ity (University  of  Chicago  Press,  1903),  to  the  task  of  assimilating 


30  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

3.  Pragmatism,  while  in  agreement  with  the  facts 
—  and  in  this  they  tell  us  it  differs  from  intellec- 
tualist  systems  —  furnishes  us  a  unifying  principle 
for  the  co-ordination  of  our  philosophical  specula- 
tions. It  did  this  in  the  past,  unknown,  to  us. 
"  There  is  absolutely  nothing  new  in  the  pragmatic 
method.  Socrates  was  an  adept  at  it.  Aristotle  used 
it  methodically.  Locke,  Berkeley,  and  Hume  made 
momentous  contributions  to  the  truth  by  its  means. 
Shadworth  Hodgson  keeps  insisting  that  realities  are 
only  what  they  are  ^  known  as.'  "  (Pragmatism,  p. 
50.)  But  it  was  only  employed  sporadically  by  cer- 
tain philosophers,  within  certain  limits  and  upon  cer- 
tain subjects.  If  it  is  now  applied  consciously,  me- 
thodically, and  constantly,  the  philosophical  value 
of  the  principle  will  be  revealed ;  it  will  be  found  to 
contain  the  element  common  to  all  the  doctrines  of 
the  past,  the  present,  and  the  future,  that  which  may 
serve  as  a  common  bond  between  them  all. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  this  rather  negative  argument 
amounts  to  this :  The  pragmatic  idea,  being  the  spon- 
taneous, human  conception  —  a  conception  even  nec- 
essary since  it  is  inevitable  —  is  to  be  looked  for 

(on  logical  ground)  scientific  judgments  to  moral  judgments,  both  one 
and  the  other  (a)  being  inspired  by  the  desire  to  solve  some  special 
problem,  "individual  case";  and  (b)  being  acts  by  which  the  scientist 
or  the  philosopher  focusses  his  judgment  (upon  those  "individual 
cases").  Although  expressed  in  very  technical  scholastic  terminology 
this  is  at  bottom  the  same  doctrine  as  that  above  indicated  in  the 
text  In  its  ulterior  developments  the  doctrine  of  Prof.  Dewey  is  dis- 
tinct from  that  of  Messrs.  James  and  Schiller.  The  two  last  named 
seem  to  me  to  be  the  only  pragmatists  who  are  dyed  in  the  grain. 
We  shall  encounter  Dewey  elsewhere  in  this  volume. 


THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   PRAGMATISM       31 

everywhere,  and  a  philosophy  which  should  make  it 
its  starting  point  would  never  be  in  conflict  with  any 
truth.  The  pragmatists  themselves  usually  formu- 
late this  argument  negatively :  "  Pragmatism  does 
not  stand  for  any  special  results  "  (Pragmatism,  p. 
51)  ;  but  neither  does  it  by  any  means  reject  any  of 
them-  a  priori:  "  It  agrees  with  nominalism  for  in- 
stance, in  always  appealing  to  particulars ;  with  util- 
itarianism in  emphasizing  practical  aspects;  with 
positivism  in  its  disdain  for  verbal  solutions,  useless 
questions,  and  metaphysical  abstractions."  (Ibid. 
PP-  53»  54-)  ''On  pragmatic  principles  we  cannot 
reject  any  hypothesis  if  consequences  useful  to  life 
flow  from  it.  .  .  .  But  if  they  have  any  use  they 
have  that  amount  of  meaning.  And  the  meaning 
will  be  true  if  the  use  squares  well  with  life's  other 
uses."  (Ibid.  p.  273.)  The  pragmatists  further 
recognize  that  a  philosophic  unity  such  as  that  so 
long  dreamed  of  by  thinkers  is  not  peradventure 
within  the  scope,  or  range,  of  their  method.  Yet 
without  claiming  to  furnish  a  principle  of  absolute 
cohesion,  they  boast  of  having  adroitly  avoided  the 
usual  clashings  between  different  doctrines. 

Ill 

Let  us  now  take  up  again  the  three  foregoing 
arguments. 

I.  Why  should  the  fact  that  the  intellectualist 
applications  of  rationalism  and  of  empiricism  are 


32  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

unsatisfactory  create  a  presumption  in  favor  of 
pragmatism?  If  we  are  unable  to  put  our  trust  in 
Peter  or  John,  does  that  create  a  presumption  in 
favor  of  James?  In  order  to  give  the  argument 
weight  and  pith,  pragmatists  ought  to  have  proved 
to  us,  first,  that  these  three  are  the  only  possible  phi- 
losophies, and,  secondly,  that  one  of  the  three  must 
be  true.  Now  there  is  absolutely  nothing  in  the 
world  that  justifies  this  restriction  to  rationalism, 
empiricism,  or  pragmatism.  And  even  supposing  it 
were  justified,  ought  we  to  believe  that  the  failure 
of  the  first  two  is  an  established  thing?  To  set 
about  doing  that,  our  opponents  might  base  their 
arguments  on  two  kinds  of  proof :  (a)  ^  posteriori, 
by  demonstrating  the  insufficiency  of  the  doctrines, 
so  far  presented  under  the  names  "rationalism"  and 
"  empiricism."  But  that  is  a  different  thing  from 
proving  that  all  the  possibilities  of  these  two  meth- 
ods have  been  exhausted;  that  could  never  be 
proved  a  posteriori,  (b)  If  the  method  of  attack 
were  a  priori  they  would,  it  is  true,  have  in  that  a 
substantial  argument  against  intellectualism  in  all  its 
forms.  For,  the  laws  of  thought  —  of  pure  reason, 
as  Kant  says  —  lead  us  into  contradictions.  Sup- 
pose we  take,  for  instance,  the  idea  of  space :  to  the 
intellect  it  contains  contradictions.  The  intellect  is 
always  obliged  to  think  of  space  in  general  as  a 
juxtaposition  of  finite  spaces.  Now  the  addition  of 
as  many  finite  spaces  as  you  please  will  never  give 
you  anything  but  finite  space.     On  the  other  hand, 


THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   PRAGMATISM       33 

since  we  cannot  conceive  of  the  possibility  of  a  limit 
to  these  finite  spaces,  space  must  be  infinite ;  the  two 
ideas  impose  themselves  on  the  mind  with  equal 
force,  and  they  are  irreconcilable.  Three  at  least 
of  the  antimonies  of  Kant  are  irreducible  (time, 
space,  and  first  cause) ;  they  never  have  been  and 
never  will  be  refuted;  at  the  very  utmost  they  can 
only  be  explained ;  but  to  explain  is  not  to  suppress. 
The  result  of  all  this  is  that  a  philosophy  based  on 
pure  reason  can  never  a  priori  claim  to  be  true,  since 
we  cannot  conceive  of  the  true  as  contradictory. 
Mr.  Schiller  somewhere  alludes  to  this  fact.  He  is 
right,  however,  in  not  insisting  upon  it,  because  the 
pragmatists  would  gain  nothing  by  it.  Like  all 
other  philosophers  they  are  in  search  of  a  truth,  and 
it  is  very  evident  that,  to  get  it,  "  the  liberty  of  their 
spirits  "  is  subjected  to  the  same  yoke  that  we  wear, 
the  same  laws  of  thought.  In  fact  they  subject 
themselves  to  these  laws  in  so  far  as  they  compare 
and  contrast  pragmatism  with  empiricism  and  ra- 
tionalism. Things  are  only  compared  and  con- 
trasted when  they  have  some  point  of  contact.  The 
basis  of  comparison  of  the  three  philosophies  of 
which  we  are  speaking  is  their  respective  ability  to 
gratify  the  demands  of  the  intellect.  What  the 
pragmatists  can  do,  and  what  we  all  do,  is  to  seek 
out  hypotheses  and  explanatory  principles  that  sat- 
isfy our  reason  (within  the  limits  of  the  laws  of 
knowledge)  better  and  more  completely  than  pres- 
ent systems  and  hypotheses. 

3 


34  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

Some  one  may  say :  But  suppose  you  have  elabo- 
rated a  system  intellectually  perfect,  one  that  in- 
cludes all  the  phenomena,  still  can  we  always 
conceive  that  there  may  chance  to  be  another  expla- 
nation which  would,  intellectually,  account  for  every- 
thing; now,  when  you  have  these  two  explications 
you  could  never  be  absolutely  sure  which  is  the 
truth.  I  reply :  Pragmatism  is  in  the  same  predica- 
ment. It  is  useless  to  tell  us  that,  besides  the  intel- 
lectual criterion,  pragmatism  possesses  a  practical 
criterion ;  for  this  satisfaction  of  our  practical  aspi- 
rations by  a  philosophy  may  itself  be  only  the  result 
of  chance. 

Thus  compared  with  former  philosophical  concep- 
tions, pragmatism  has  in  itself  nothing  that  a  priori 
can  more  commend  it  to  the  favor  of  the  devotee  of 
pure  thought. 

2.  The  thing  upon  which  the  pragmatists  rely  — 
that  there  is  always  underneath  our  reasonings 
some  practical  consideration,  and  that  even  the  sys- 
tems of  the  great  philosophers  are  only  the  result  of 
the  temperament  of  their  authors  —  may  be  true. 
Yet  the  conclusion,  that  therefore  philosophic  truth 
is  to  be  found  in  reasonings  modified  and  colored  by 
the  practical  and  the  temperamental,  that  the  crite- 
rion of  truth  is  "  that  which  we  ought  to  believe  " 
for  pragmatic  reasons  —  this  conclusion  is  notori- 
ously illegitimate. 

In  order  to  get  it  accepted  they  are  obliged  to  have 
recourse  to  a  confusion  of  ideas  which  itself  rests 


THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   PRAGMATISM       35 

upon  the  double  meaning  of  the  verb  must:  (a)  we 
"  must "  think  pragmatically  in  this  sense,  that  we 
are  so  made  by  nature  that  practical  considerations 
direct  our  thoughts;  (b)  we  "must"  think  prag- 
matically in  the  sense  that,  philosophically  speaking 
(logically  or  even  morally),  it  is  well  for  us  so  to 
think.  The  first  meaning  is  readily  proved,  and 
then,  for  further  deductions,  the  second  is  quietly 
substituted  for  it.  The  sleight-of-hand  trick  is  not 
our  invention.  Let  us  recall  the  words  of  Mr. 
Schiller : 

"  The  canons  of  right  thought  must  ...  be  brought 
into  some  relation  to  the  procedures  of  actual  think- 
ing; in  point  of  fact  the  former  are  derived  from 
the  latter  [first  meaning]  ;  if  so,  our  first  mode  of 
reasoning  must  receive  logical  recognition  [substitu- 
tion of  logic  for  psychology :  second  meaning] ;  .  .  . 
a  process  which  yields  valuable  results  must  in  some 
sense  be  valid  [second  meaning]."  (Humanism, 
p.  xiii.) 

Elsewhere  it  is  the  word  can  that  is  juggled  with : 

"  Our  interests  impose  the  conditions  under  which 
alone  Reality  can  be  revealed.  .  .  .  Neither  the  ques- 
tion of  fact,  therefore,  nor  the  question  of  knowledge 
can  be  raised  without  raising  also  the  question  of 
value."     {Hiimanisniy  p.  10.) 

First  meaning:  It  is  impossible,  because  of  our 
nature,  to  conceive  of  reality  independently  of  our 
interests;    hence  (second  meaning)  it  is  impossible 


36  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

to  raise  —  that  is,  we  ought  not  to  raise  —  the 
question  of  fact  or  knowledge  without  that  of  prac- 
tical value.  Mr.  Schiller  may  in  vain  try  to  defend 
himself;  the  discussion  always  returns  to  the  sub- 
stitution of  the  logical  this  ought  to  be  for  the  psy- 
chological this  is. 

One  could  be  less  pessimistic  than  the  pragmatists 
and  still  think  that  it  is  not  impossible  to  be  imper- 
sonal in  philosophic  thought.  But  they  have  their 
reason  for  being  categorical  on  this  point ;  we  shall 
observe  this  presently.  For  the  moment  I  will  only 
remark  that  even  if  they  had  thoroughly  established 
the  assertion  that  the  subjective  element  is  always 
present  in  intellectualist  and  scientific  theories,  they 
would  be  deceived  if  they  thought  the  battle  of  prag- 
matism thereby  won.  This  assimilation  of  the  two 
classes  of  theories  (the  logical  and  the  psychologi- 
cal) would  prove,  to  any  independent  thinker,  not 
as  pragmatists  would  like  to  have  it,  that  the  latter 
(psychological  theories)  are  worth  as  much  as  the 
former  (logical),  but  rather  that  the  former  are 
worth  as  little  as  the  latter.  The  two  things  are 
quite  different.  And  thus  pragmatists  could  not 
claim  in  the  least  to  have  laid  the  foundations  of  a 
new  philosophic  structure  beside  the  structures  of 
the  intellectualist  philosophy,  but  in  overthrowing 
existing  structures  they  would  have  buried  them- 
selves beneath  the  ruins.  As  Professor  Creighton 
says  so  well :   "  If  the  nature  of  a  large  whole  does 


THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   PRAGMATISM       37 

not  function  constitutively  within  it  in  the  form  of 
universal  principles,  then  all  tests  of  truth  are  im- 
possible,   practical    tests   no    less    than    theoretical. 

.  .  ."  {Philosophical  Reviezv,yilll,^o,  2i^^' ^9^-) 
Finally,  let  us  even  admit  that  in  imposing  the 
subjective  element  to  scientific  reasoning,  they  have 
not  thereby  ruined  the  logical  value  of  the  latter; 
we  should  still  only  have  as  a  result  the  equality  of 
intellectualism  and  pragmatism;  while  the  point  at 
issue  is  the  establishing  of  the  superiority  of  the 
latter  over  the  former.  This  leads  us  to  the  third 
argument : 

3.  Pragmatism,  by  bringing  forward  a  principle 
that  co-ordinates  all  true  theories,  thereby  fulfils  the 
conditions  of  a  philosophy.  The  pragmatists  may 
have  erred  in  the  two  preceding  arguments;  it 
would  matter  little  if  it  were  found  that  they  are 
right  in  this. 

What  is  this  principle?  The  principle  of  "  expe- 
diency." The  definition  of  truth  being  "  the  expe- 
diency in  the  way  of  our  thinking  "  {Pragmatism, 
p.  222),  pragmatism  will  not  come  into  collision 
with  any  hostile  force  or  obstruction  (intellectual- 
ist  or  other)  —  and  it  will  not  recognize  any  other 
—  except  that  of  the  inexpedient.  To  quote  again 
the  words  of  Professor  James  I  cited  a  few  pages 
back,  "  On  pragmatic  principles  we  cannot  reject 
any  hypothesis  if  consequences  useful  to  life  flow 
from  it."  {Pragmatism,  p.  273.)  "We  receive 
the  block  of  marble  but  we  carve  the  statue  our- 
selves."    {Ibid.  p.  247.) 


38  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

This  is  a  very  remarkable  thing!  So  it  is  out  of 
this  very  subjectivity  of  which  I  was  just  speaking 
that  the  fundamental  principle  can  be  formed.  It 
it  easy  to  understand  now  why  the  pragmatists  per- 
sisted in  finding  it  everywhere.  If  they  gave  them- 
selves so  much  trouble  to  point  it  out  constantly,  it 
was  surely  not  because  they  wanted  to  make  no  use 
of  it  whatever.  Only,  while  heretofore  they  had 
excused  themselves,  so  to  speak,  for  admitting  it 
into  philosophy  (laying  stress  upon  our  dependence 
on  it  as  regards  the  laws  of  thought,  or,  again  re- 
ferring to  the  logical  value  of  the  subjective  even  in 
the  scientific  hypothesis,  and  limiting  themselves  to 
saying  that  therefore  we  should  not  reject  pragma- 
tism on  the  pretext  that  it  presupposes  subjectivity), 
they  now  suddenly  change  their  tactics,  and  pass 
from  the  defensive  to  the  offensive.  This  subjective 
element  in  philosophy  not  only  is  not  illegitimate,  or 
an  obstruction  or  a  nuisance;  and  not  only  should 
we  refrain  from  asking  pardon  for  giving  it  recogni- 
tion in  science,  but  it  is  affirmed  that  really  it  alone 
gives  value  to  our  theories;  that  where  it  is  not 
there  is  death;  and  that  the  fact  that  pragmatism 
makes  it  the  corner-stone  of  its  philosophical  edifice 
is  just  that  which  gives  it  superiority  over  intellec- 
tualism.  From  the  condition  of  a  poor  pariah,  in 
which  it  existed  but  yesterday,  this  subjectivity  is 
suddenly  raised  to  royal  rank. 

It  will  readily  be  perceived  that  we  have  reached 
the  critical  point  of  the  pragmatic  doctrine.     How 


THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  PRAGMATISM        39 

can  this  ''  expediency ''  or  this  ''  subjectivity  "  so 
suddenly  change  roles?  Is  it  really  the  same  sub- 
jectivity as  that  of  yesterday,  or,  indeed,  has  the 
value  of  the  term  changed  in  passing  from  intellec- 
tualism  to  pragmatism?  It  is  to  be  observed  that 
it  is  precisely  at  this  point  of  the  demonstration  of 
their  doctrine  that  the  defenders  of  pragmatism 
grow  less  clear  and  less  precise,  that  they  no  longer 
operate  on  the  fighting-line  of  their  proper  specula- 
tions but  are  fain  to  fall  back  on  a  line  of  thought 
in  the  philosophy  of  science  recently  created  by 
Poincare  and  certain  other  French  scientists  (cf. 
Pragmatism,  pp.  55-57).^  These  savants  seem  to 
have  come  just  in  the  nick  of  time.  Among  other 
things  they  insist  on  the  relative  and  subjective  char- 
acter of  science.  They  affirm  that  a  scientific  theory 
is  nothing  in  itself,  and  takes  its  value  solely  from 
the  results  that  we  derive  from  it  in  our  verification 
of  phenomena ;  that  the  ultimate  aim  of  the  scientist 
is  not  at  all  the  discovery  of  laws  as  the  world  has 
been  so  long  affirming,  but  the  explanation  of  the 
fact;   we  call  a  law  "true"  when,  and  because,  it 

^  For  an  enumeration  of  scholars  and  thinkers  who  are,  with  or 
without  consent,  pointed  out  to  the  world  as  pragmatists,  see  Mr. 
Schiller's  Preface  to  Studies  in  Humanism.  In  this  volume  I  never 
speak  of  Bergson,  an  authority  constantly  referred  to  by  pragmatists. 
After  all  the  merit  of  Bergson  consists  chiefly  in  having  battered 
down  modern  dogmatism  in  philosophy.  What  will  come  out  of  it 
all  is  not  very  clear  as  yet,  but  so  far  his  work  seems  rather  nega- 
tive. In  a  recently  published  volume,  one  reads  the  following  inter- 
esting statement  by  Wm.  James:  "I  have  to  confess  that  Bergson's 
originality  is  so  profuse  that  many  of  his  ideas  baflSe  me  entirely" 
{A  Pluralistic  Universe,  p.  226). 


40  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

gives  practical  results  in  its  application,  but  not  at 
all  because  it  may  be  true  or  not  per  se;  for,  of  that 
we  can  know  nothing;  and,  in  fact,  when  we  find  a 
law  and  a  phenomenon  that  absolutely  contradict 
each  other,  it  is  not  the  phenomenon  that  we  are 
in  a  position  to  modify  but  the  law. 

It  is  easy  to  see  what  fascination  lay  for  the  prag- 
matists  in  these  ideas,  and  they  were  not  long  in 
seeking  an  alliance  with  the  French  thinkers.  This 
is  exactly  what  we  wish,  they  say :  to  judge  a  theory 
by  results ;  the  true  is  that  which  yields  results,  and 
we  do  not  adopt  any  other  criterion  than  that ;  if  cer- 
tain philosophical  doctrines  enter  into  conflict  with 
life,  it  is  the  philosophical  theory  we  ought  to  reject 
and  not  the  claims  of  life. 

This  is  very  clever,  and  at  first  glance  seems 
plausible.  But  appearances  are  deceiving.  As  a 
matter  of  fact  there  is  nothing  more  different,  more 
fundamentally  irreconcilable,  than  the  ideas  of  the 
French  school  of  Poincare  and  those  of  pragmatism. 
The  possibility  of  the  deceptive  association  and  fra- 
ternization of  the  two  comes  simply  from  the  indefi- 
nite meaning  of  certain  terms,  such  as  "  expedient," 
"useful,"  "result."  To  be  convinced  of  this  we 
need  only  extend  the  definitions  a  little,  to  express 
the  sub-meanings,  the  thought  underneath  the  writ- 
ten words.  We  will  then  see  that  by  the  French 
school,  Poincare  for  example,  a  law  is  declared  to  be 
true  when  it  gives  scientific  results;  that  is  to  say 
(speaking  briefly),  when  it  serves  to  explain  natural 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  PRAGMATISM        41 

phenomena.  By  the  Anglo-Saxon  pragmatists  a 
theory  or  a  law  is  declared  to  be  true  when  it  gives 
results  that  are  desirable  from  a  moral  point  of  view, 
when  it  is  socially  useful  or  expedient.  The  differ- 
ence between  the  two  theories  is  now  at  once  evident 
—  and  at  the  same  time  one  sees  the  subtlety  of  the 
representatives  of  moral  pragmatism  who  suggest 
this  astonishing  identification  of  utility  in  the  sense 
of  scientific  expediency  and  utility  in  the  sense  of 
moral  expediency.  The  formulating  of  theories  ser- 
viceable in  explaining  facts  —  such  is  scientific  prag- 
matism (if  you  will  call  it  so)  ;  the  formulating  of 
theories  to  justify  a  moral  ideal  —  such  is  the  prag- 
matism of  the  philosophers  who  cultivate  what  we 
may  call  moral  pragmatism.  In  other  words,  the 
latter  will  not  simply  accept  or  reject  scientific  laws 
or  theories  because  they  give  account  of  reality 
(which  would  be  a  very  legitimate  thing),  but  be- 
cause they  do  or  do  not  render  an  account  of  reality 
as  we  wish  it  to  he.  The  subjectivism  of  modern 
thinkers  amounts  simply  to  this,  that  it  reaffirms 
what  Hume  and  Kant  had  firmly  established,  but 
which  had  of  late  dropped  out  of  sight  for  a  little, 
owing  to  the  too  broad  interpretations  of  modern 
positivism;  —  namely,  that  the  laws  are  within  us 
and  not  outside  of  us,  and  that,  so  far  from  these 
laws  inhering  in  phenomena,  we  make  them  our- 
selves, after  a  fashion,  since  in  order  to  comprehend 
them  we  have  to  adapt  them  to  our  knowing  facul- 
ties.   There  is  no  discussion  by  scholars  of  the  Poin- 


42  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

care  type  of  subjectivity  in  the  sense  that  the  thinker 
may,  as  seems  "  expedient,"  adopt  this  or  that  doc- 
trine or  law;  the  subjectivity  of  the  savant  is 
as  predetermined  in  its  elements,  and  as  prede- 
termined by  phenomena  in  its  judgments,  as  of 
yore;  and  it  is  a  mere  piece  of  pleasantry  to  wish 
to  make  use  of  this  epistemological  subjectivism  to 
form  the  basis  of  a  philosophy  which  claims  that 
with  it  "  human  arbitrariness  has  driven  divine  ne- 
cessity from  scientific  logic."  (Pragmatism,  p.  57.) 
So  far  from  corroborating  each  other,  the  two  sub- 
jectivisms exclude  each  other.  For  instance,  Wil- 
liam Jamics  observes  (Pragmatism,  p.  115  ff.)  that, 
in  order  to  admit  the  sense  of  responsibility,  if  we 
stand  by  the  rationalistic  or  intellectualistic  point  of 
view,  we  have  need  at  once  of  determinism  and  free- 
dom of  the  will ;  pragmatic  subjectivism  allows  then 
to  intervene  and  impose  on  us  the  belief  in  the  free- 
dom of  the  will.  A  scientific  pragmatist  will  never 
admit  that,  and  precisely  because  of  his  personal  sub- 
jectivism, he  submits  to  laws  of  thought  which  for- 
bid him  to  conceive  of  the  coexistence  of  moral 
responsibility  (which  presupposes  determinism)  and 
the  freedom  of  the  will.  If  you  should  tell  him 
there  are  facts  which  compel  us  to  admit  this  co- 
existence he  will  deny  the  facts,  —  in  this  sense,  that 
the  facts  in  themselves  do  not  exist  for  us ;  what  we 
call  facts  are  just  interpretations  of  facts,  and  the 
intellectualist  would  declare  that  the  facts  are  not 
acceptable  to  him  unless  interpreted  in  such  a  way 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  PRAGMATISM        43 

as  to  satisfy  subjectivism,  or,  let  us  say,  scientific 
pragmatism ;  that  is  to  say,  the  laws  of  thought  and 
of  logic.  "  Everything  that  is  not  thought,"  says 
Poincare  (Valetir  de  la  science,  p.  276),  is  pure 
nothingness.  Inasmuch  as  we  can  only  think 
thought,  and  all  the  words  we  employ  in  speaking 
of  things  can  only  express  thought  [this  is  what 
I  have  called  ''  interpretations  of  facts  "],  to  say  that 
there  is  anything  else  than  thought  is  therefore  an 
affirmation  devoid  of  sense."  ^ 

*  It  must  be  admitted,  however,  that  certain  French  philosophers 
have  sometimes  encouraged  the  confusion  between  moral  pragmatism 
and  scientific  pragmatism.  Le  Roy,  for  example,  and  with  an  aim 
which  implies  the  same  prepossessions  as  those  of  James.  But  (need 
it  be  said  ?)  that  does  not  render  the  confusion  more  acceptable. 

I  am  not  aware  that  Poincare  has  ever  explicitly  stated  his  posi- 
tion with  regard  to  his  unsolicited  pragmatist  friends;  but  here  are 
a  few  lines  from  an  article  "The  Choice  of  Facts"  which  he  published 
recently  in  the  Monist  (April,  1909)  and  which  are  of  interest  at  this 
point  of  our  discussion.  "The  scientist,"  he  says,  ''does  not  study 
nature  because  it  is  useful ;  he  studies  it  because  he  delights  in  it.  .  .  ." 
(pp.  236-237.)  Or  again:  "The  people  whose  ideal  most  conformed  to 
their  highest  interest  ,  .  .  pursued  their  ideals  without  reference  to 
consequences,  but  while  the  quest  led  some  to  destruction,  to  others 
it  gave  empire.  .  .  ."  (p.  238.)  No  possible  doubt  remains  here 
that  Poincare  wants  to  distinguish  between  pragmatic  consequences 
and  scientific  consequences;  even,  to  moral  consequences  he  remains 
quite  indifferent. 

The  confusion  I  have  pointed  out  in  the  preceding  pages  has  also 
been  admirably  emphasized  in  the  luminous  article  of  Professor  J.  G. 
Hibben,  "The  Test  of  Pragmatism"  {Philosophical  Review,  July, 
1908).  "The  whole  modern  spirit  of  research  is  most  emphatically 
opposed  to  the  pragmatist's  suggestion  that  we  should  endeavor  to 
make  the  phenomena  of  the  universe  bend  to  our  will.  Indeed  it 
insists  above  all  things  that  the  investigator,  in  whatever  field,  should 
seek  by  patient  laborious  observation  to  know  the  nature  of  the  given 
phenomena  as  they  actually  are  in  all  of  their  essential  and  character- 
istic features.  ,  ,  ."    (p.  380.)    "The  fact  is  that  whenever  there  is 


44  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

The  key  to  the  confusion  of  thought  is  so  plainly- 
right  here,  that  I  do  not  hesitate  to  give  one  more 
concrete  illustration  in  order  that  the  reader  may 
put  his  finger  on  the  difference  between  modern 
scientific  subjectivism  and  pragmatic  subjectivism, 
Poincare  shows  that  we  can  very  properly  maintain, 
scientifically,  the  two  ideas  that  the  earth  revolves 
about  the  sun  and  that  the  sun  revolves  about  the 
earth,  —  the  first  of  the  two  theories  by  placing  our- 
selves, so  to  speak,  outside  of  the  solar  system  and 
observing  what  takes  place.  We  then  see  the  tiny 
earth  circling  about  the  vast  sun ;  it  is  the  simplest 
and  most  normal  way  of  regarding  the  matter.  But 
the  inhabitant  of  the  earth  rightly  maintains  that 
from  his  point  of  view,  the  sun  revolves  about  the 
earth,  and  he  proceeds  to  demonstrate  it.  He  is 
obliged  to  have  recourse  to  calculations  and  demon- 
strations much  more  complex;  that  is  the  only  dif- 
ference. In  truth,  he  proves  the  same  thing  as  the 
first.     Here  we  have  scientific  subjectivism.     Both 

a  demand  for  cash  value,  then  the  real  [logical]  value  is  always  sub- 
jected to  some  discounting  process."    (p.  369.) 

Then  again  the  papers  by  Professor  J,  E.  Creighton  in  the  Phil- 
osophical Review  ought  to  be  recalled  here.  As  early  as  1904  he 
called  the  attention  of  philosophers  to  the  inadmissible  confusion, 
saying:  "The appeal  is  to  experience  .  .  .  but  to  experience  as  system- 
atized by  thought"  (XIII,  No.  3,  p.  291);  and  more  precisely  still 
he  refers  to  "the  ambiguity  that  in  this  use  attaches  to  the  word 
'practical,'  as  well  as  to  the  terms  'end'  and  'purpose.'  These 
words  seem  to  be  employed  by  this  theory  to  cover  two  modes  of 
consciousness  that  are  usually,  at  least,  regarded  as  essentially  dif- 
ferent. .  .  ."  (p.  295.)  (Cf.  also  "Experience  and  Thought"  by  the 
same.    Philosophical  Review,  XV,  No.  5,  pp.  482-483.) 


THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  PRAGMATISM        45 

positions  or  arguments  are  true.  So  a  child  is  not 
(subjectively)  wrong  in  saying,  while  he  is  aboard 
a  moving  train,  that  he  is  standing  still  and  the 
fields  and  trees  are  passing  along  before  him,  while 
for  us  (objectively)  it  is  rather  the  child  and  the 
train  that  are  passing.  You  do  not  choose  between 
one  theory  or  another,  you  simply  choose  the  method 
of  presenting  one  and  the  same  idea.  Moral  prag- 
matism, on  the  other  hand,  is  pluralist;  it  talks 
about  truths  in  the  plural."  (Pragmatism,  p.  67.) 
Let  us  in  imagination  transport  ourselves  to  the  six- 
teenth century  and  examine  the  same  theme  —  the 
movement  of  the  earth  and  the  sun  —  from  the 
pragmatic  point  of  view.  At  that  epoch  any  one 
contesting  the  orthodox  belief  in  the  current  geomet- 
ric or  cosmological  system  would  shake  the  power 
of  the  church,  and  the  church  of  that  time  was  try- 
ing very  hard  to  civilize  Europe.  To  unsettle  this 
civilizing  force  might  have  terrible  consequences, 
replunge  the  masses  into  a  barbarism  from  which 
they  were  "  still  pawing  to  be  free."  It  was  there- 
fore pragmatically  expedient  that  for  some  time  yet 
the  sun  should  continue  to  revolve  around  the  earth 
—  absolutely  so,  of  course,  and  not  in  the  relative 
sense  of  Poincare's  second  case.  Whatever  we 
might  think  about  the  matter  to-day,  in  the  sixteenth 
century,  in  order  to  conform  to  its  principles,  prag- 
matism would  have  been  obliged  to  sustain  a  theory 
in  contradiction  with  science  and  also  in  contradic- 


46  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

tion  with  the  pragmatism  of  the  nineteenth  century. 
There  you  have  pragmatic  subjectivism.^ 

I  have  purposely  referred  to  an  instance  that  Pro- 
fessor James  himself  had  chosen  (among  others)  to 
prove  his  conception  of  pragmatism.  Did  he  choose 
it  in  a  kind  of  defiant  spirit  of  knightly  challenge  to 
rightly  and  duly  show  that  he  did  not  fear  for  his 
philosophy  the  most  difficult  of  tests?  I  know  not. 
But  in  any  case  he  presents  the  matter  from  an  en- 
tirely wrong  angle  or  point  of  view.  Nothing  is 
better  adapted  to  imparting  confusion  to  the  dis- 
cussion than  his  amphibological  method  of  express- 
ing himself.  Not  only  does  he  profit  by  the  fact 
that  an  unforewarned  person  would  not  suspect  this 
confusion  of  the  intellectualist  and  pragmatistic 
subjectivism  which  I  have  carefully  distinguished: 
he  suggests  and  provokes  the  confusion  in  the  reader 
in  whom  it  did  not  previously  exist.  In  brief,  he 
obscures  (he  is  obliged  to  obscure),  for  the  require- 
ments of  his  argument,  what  was  before  clear. 
Listen  to  his  statement : 

"  Ptolemaic  astronomy,  Euclidean  space,  Aristo- 
telian logic,  scholastic  metaphysics,  were  expedient 
for  centuries,  but  human  experience  has  boiled  over 
those  limits  and  we  now  call  these  things  only  rela- 
tively true  or  true  within  those  borders  of  experience." 
(Pragmatism,  p.  223.) 

*  It  is  probably  superfluous  to  add  that  the  argument  here  pur- 
sued would  not  be  refuted  should  some  one  take  it  into  his  head  to 
try  to  prove  that  the  church  was  not  a  civilizing  power  in  the  six- 
teenth century. 


THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  PRAGMATISM        47 

This  means  that,  although  to-day  the  Ptolemaic 
theory  is  left  behind,  it  might  be  true  for  the  learned 
men  of  the  middle  ages,  who  did  not  possess  the 
great  and  overwhelming  body  of  facts  that  we  now 
have.  It  is  clear  that  the  idea  of  "  opportunism  "  or 
''  expediency  "  involved  here  is  to  be  taken  in  the 
intellectualist  sense.  James  adds  further :  "  'Abso* 
lutely  '  they  (these  theories)  are  false;  for  we  know 
that  those  limits  (of  experience)  were  casual,  and 
might  have  been  transcended  by  past  theorists  just 
as  they  are  by  present  thinkers."  And  all  this  is 
perfectly  evident.  Only  now,  if  James  has  employed 
the  word  "  expedient  "  in  the  intellectualist  or  sci- 
entific sense,  he  no  longer  has  the  right  to  use  it  in 
the  pragmatic  or  moral  sense.  But  this  is  just  what 
he  does ;  it  is  precisely  what  he  is  obliged  to  do  if  he 
wishes  to  draw  conclusions  and  make  inferences 
from  scientific  relativism  or  opportunism  to  the 
pragmatic  relativism  or  opportunism  that  he  intro- 
duces into  philosophy.  Here  is  a  passage  that  shows 
the  adroit  way  in  which  he  suggests  the  substitution : 
''  We  say  this  theory  solves  a  problem  on  the  whole 
more  satisfactorily  than  that  theory ;  but  that  means 
more  satisfactorily  to  ourselves,  and  individuals  will 
emphasize  their  points  of  satisfaction  differently." 
(Pragmatism,  p.  61.)  It  is  evidently  no  longer  a 
satisfaction  purely  intellectual  of  which  he  is  here 
speaking. 

Of  course  James  was  too  clever  to  state  the  helio- 
centric theory  in  terms  of  moral  pragmatism  after 


48  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

he  had  expressed  it  in  those  of  the  intellectualist 
pragmatism,  for  that  would  have  been  to  let  the  cat 
out  of  the  bag.  Now,  since  that  is  just  what  I  want 
—  to  let  the  cat  out  of  the  bag  —  I  will  take  the 
liberty  once  more  of  speaking  for  him  as  follows, 
in  words  that  moral  pragmatism  would  have  to  use. 
In  the  middle  ages  the  heliocentric  theory  was  not 
only  not  true  intellectually  for  the  scholastic  phi- 
losophers, for  their  scientific  experience  was  limited, 
but  it  was  not  true,  morally,  —  and  this  is  the  essen- 
tial point,  —  for  it  was  baneful  in  the  special  condi- 
tions of  society  existing  at  that  time.  To-day  the 
true  progress  of  humanity  is  not  affected  one  way 
or  the  other  by  the  heliocentric  theory,  so  it  may  be 
correct.  In  scientific  opportunism  it  is  the  intel- 
lectual criterion  alone  that  counts  and  this  criterion 
is  always  the  same;  in  moral  opportunism  it  is  the 
ethical  point  of  view  that  counts,  both  to-day  and 
in  the  middle  ages,  and  this  criterion  is  different 
according  to  circumstances. 

And  so  true  is  it  that  Professor  James  aims  ulti- 
mately and  exclusively  at  meliorism  (which  is  of 
moral  nature),  that  he  finally,  without  hesitation, 
admits  metaphysical  pluralism  (which  is  of  intel- 
lectual nature),  a  doctrine  he  had  just  denied; 
"  *  absolutely '  they  (these  theories)  are  false  .  .  . 
and  might  have  been  transcended  by  past  theorists 
just  as  they  are  by  present  thinkers."  Only  by  ad- 
mitting several  different  philosophical,  or  logical,  or 
metaphysical,  or  intellectual  principles,  can  he  main- 


THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   PRAGMATISM       40 

tain  the  rights  of  the  expedient  in  the  "  mehorist " 
sense  in  a  way  to  give  more  satisfaction  to  us,  —  a 
satisfaction  that  individuals  will  each  express  in  a 
different  way.     And  that  is  what  he  wants. 

Thus  it  is  clear  that  "  the  expedient,"  as  the  cri- 
terion of  our  method  of  thought  either  signifies 
nothing,  or  else  it  signifies  that  the  pragmatists  de- 
clare themselves  independent  of  every  intellectual 
principle,  among  others  of  the  principle  of  contra- 
diction. If  this  is  not  so,  in  what  would  consist  the 
quarrel  they  pick  with  intellectualism  ?  Why  all  this 
agitation  and  the  creation  of  a  whole  philosoph- 
ical movement  which  is  likely  to  "  equal  in  impor- 
tance the  Reformation  of  the  sixteenth  century " 
if  it  is  not  going  to  reform  anything  at  all?  The 
pragmatists,  besides,  are  profuse  in  their  assertions 
that  they  have  come  forward  for  the  purpose  of  pro- 
testing against  the  postulates  of  intellectualism, 
against  "  those  cramping  rules  and  regulations  by 
which  the  Brahmins  of  the  academic  cast  are 
tempted  to  impede  the  free  expansion  of  human 
life"  (Humanism,  p.  xvi),  against  that  tyranny 
that  has  hindered  us  from  taking  cognizance  of  facts 
and  has  given  the  finishing  touch  in  its  deplorable 
"  monistic  music."  To  all  this  the  thing  to  do  is  to 
oppose  the  "  expedient  "  or  "  opportunism."  The 
pragmatic  motives,  says  Mr.  Schiller,  that  dictate  the 
philosophic  question,  "  What  is  reality?  "  being  dif- 
ferent, their  bearing  or  application  is  also  different, 


50  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

and  different  must  be  the  replies."  (Humanism,  p. 
II.)  Mr.  Schiller  says  ''different,"  not  contradic- 
tory, but  this  is  implied.  He  knows  it  very  well,  for 
he  has  said  some  lines  above :  "  If  one  had  to  choose 
between  Irrationalism  and  Intellectualism,  there 
would  be  no  doubt  that  the  former  would  have  to  be 
preferred."  ^  (Ibid.  p.  6.)  In  fact,  even  supposing 
there  are  at  the  present  time  no  contradictory  the- 
ories in  the  affirmations  of  the  pragmatists,  how  are 
you  going  to  prove  there  never  will  be?  and  since  it 
is  admitted  that  the  replies  may  be  really  different 
according  to  the  way  the  question  is  asked,  it  is  quite 
necessary  to  admit  also  that  these  replies  will  some- 
times not  be  in  accord.  If  "  different  "  simply  signi- 
fies, as  in  scientific  subjectivism,  that  one  refers 
to  the  same  theory  presented  under  a  different 
form,  why  employ  this  term  "  different  "  in  speaking 
of  the  theory  ?    Papini  is  still  more  explicit :   "  Prag- 

*  Mr,  Schiller  denies  me  the  right  to  interpret  this  passage  literally 
in  Mind,  July,  1909  (p.  426),  on  the  ground  that  he  says  a  few  lines 
farther  on  that  he  can  hold  all  his  pragmatic  theories  "without  losing 
faith  in  the  intellect."  Now,  if  only  Mr.  Schiller  had  proved  that  he 
could  do  that  instead  of  simply  saying  that  he  did.  Our  ears  are  still 
ringing  with  the  anathemas  of  pragmatists  against  metaphysicians, 
who,  to  use  the  term  of  Renan,  are  hopelessly  trying  to  do  such  an 
absurd  thing  as  "to  define  the  infinite."  But  I  do  not  think  meta- 
physicians ever  uttered  such  suicidal  statements  of  their  position  as 
Mr.  Schiller,  who  calmly  says  that  Pragmatism  "vindicates  the  ra- 
tionality of  Irrationalism,  without  becoming  irrational";  and  how 
proud  he  is  of  this  jewel  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  he  quotes  it  him- 
self in  his  criticism  in  Mind,  underlining  carefully  the  last  part. 
Not  only  did  he  not  appreciate  my  kindness  in  not  making  use  of 
the  phrase  in  my  book,  but  he  reproaches  me  for  it.  Indeed,  I  am 
glad  to  give  him  satisfaction  in  this  English  edition  —  surprised, 
however,   at  such  candor. 


THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  PRAGMATISM        51 

matism  is  less  a  philosophy  than  a  method  of  doing 
without  a  philosophy."     {Popular  Science  Monthly y 

p.  354.) 

Undoubtedly  it  requires  courage  to  speak  as 
Mr.  Schiller  does,  and  Mr.  Papini  leaves  us  in  a 
meditative  mood.  For,  after  all,  how  shall  we  rep- 
resent to  ourselves  this  fashion  of  putting  ourselves 
above  all  logic?  It  is  absolutely  consistent  with 
pragmatist  principles,  one  cannot  too  often  repeat. 
But  how  could  it  be  possible?  We  know  very  well 
that  it  could  n't ;  but  let  the  pragmatists  themselves 
speak. 

If  any  one  could  have  untied,  or  even  cut,  this 
Gordian  knot  it  would  have  been  William  James. 
He  would  not  have  imprudently  burned  his  vessels 
behind  him  like  Papini.  He  claims  to  observe  the 
postulates  of  a  philosophy,  and  the  truths  of  pragma- 
tism ought  not  to  contradict  each  other.  But  listen : 
"If  there  be  any  life  that  it  is  really  better  we 
should  lead,  and  if  there  be  any  idea  which,  if  be- 
lieved in,  would  help  us  to  lead  that  life,  then  it 
would  be  really  better  for  us  to  believe  in  that  idea, 
unless  indeed  belief  in  it  incidentally  clashed  with 
other  greater  vital  bene  fits  J'  (Pragmatism,  p.  76.) 
The  italics  are  Professor  James's. 

That  is  the  language  of  a  man  who  is  not  anxious 
to  violate  the  principle  of  contradiction.  It  only 
remains  for  us  to  find  out  whether  he  can  reconcile 
such  a  sentiment  with  ideas  such  as  these :  "On 
pragmatic  principles  we  cannot  reject  any  hypothe- 
sis  if   consequences   useful  to  life   flow   from   it " 


52  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

(Pragmatism,  p.  273);  or,  "Human  arbitrariness 
has  driven  divine  necessity  from  scientific  logic." 
(Ibid.  p.  57.) 

The  relations  between  pragmatism  and  intellec- 
tualism  are  examined  in  the  sixth  lecture  on  prag- 
matism "  The  Conception  of  Truth."  Let  us  follow 
the  authors  argument  very  closely. 

James  waives  aside  the  conception  of  truth  that  it 
is  a  copy  of  reality,  and  also  the  conception  that  it 
is  what  God  wants  us  to  believe.  These,  and  all 
other  conceptions  of  a  rationalistic  and  intellectual- 
istic  character,  even  if  they  were  intellectually  main- 
tainable, have  the  common  defect  of  being  "  indiffer- 
ent " ;  truth  so  conceived  is  something  "  inert," 
without  result  or  consequence.  Pragmatism  has 
other  needs  or  demands  which  it  expresses  by  asking 
its  usual  question :  "  Grant  an  idea  or  belief  to  be 
true,  what  concrete  difference  will  its  being  true 
make  in  any  one's  actual  life?"  (Pragmatism,  p. 
200.)  In  good  sooth  we  might  go  no  farther  than 
this  sentence,  "  grant  such  or  such  an  idea  or  belief 
to  be  true.  ..."  Does  n't  this  mean  that  before 
an  idea  can  be  true  pragmatically  it  ought  to  be  true 
rationally?  and  thus  every  one  be  forced  to  recog- 
nize that  the  traditional  relations  between  practical 
and  theoretical  cannot  be  overturned?  that  prag- 
matism ought  to  follow  intellectualism  and  not  the 
contrary  ?  ^    According  to  this  the  relations  between 

*  Professor  J.  G.  Hibben,  in  the  article  already  mentioned,  "The 
Test  of  Pragmatism"  (in  Philosophical  Review,  July  15,  1908),  com- 


THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  PRAGMATISM        53 

the  two  methods  or  philosophies  might  be  compared 
somewhat  closely  with  those  existing  in  a  parliament 
in  which  the  Lower  Chamber  proposes  laws  and  the 
Upper  Chamber  either  accepts  or  refuses  to  ratify 
them.  But  the  Upper  Chamber  could  not  adopt  any 
law  which  had  not  previously  been  declared  practi- 
cable by  the  Lower  Chamber.  Similarly,  if  a  theory 
is  declared  correct  by  intellectualism,  pragmatism 
reserves  the  right  to  sanction  it  or  not,  but  it  might 
not  propose  any  theories  of  its  own. 

Yet  as  a  matter  of  fact,  pragmatism  does  not  rest 
content  with  so  little ;  it  claims  to  dictate,  on  its  own 
responsibility,  that  which  it  is  right  or  expedient  that 
the  truth  should  he.  To  the  question  cited  above, 
"  Grant  an  idea  or  belief  to  be  true,  what  concrete 
difference  will  its  being  true  make  in  any  one's  actual 
life?"  it  does  not  simply  reply,  "That  would  be 
good,"  or  "  That  would  be  bad,"  but  answers  by  a 
definition  of  the  true  which  implies  a  totally  different 
question;  namely,  "  A  certain  idea  or  a  certain  be- 
lief being  given  (remark  that  the  premises  no  longer 
contain  anything  about  the  "  true "  or  the  "  un- 
true"), what  difference  would  that  make  in  prac- 
tice and  which  could  we  declare  to  be  true?" 
Ignoring  what  looks  very  much  like  a  new  feat 
of  prestidigitation,  let  us  ask  if  this  fashion  of  rele- 

ing  to  examine  the  pragmatist  claim  that  truth  must  fit  not  only  the 
"concrete  situation  of  facts"  but  also  "do  no  violence  to  the  funda- 
mental laws  of  our  logical  nature,"  says:  "Verification  of  this  kind, 
however,  concedes  in  its  very  statement  the  consideration  of  a  higher 
standard  to  which  the  simple  pragmatic  test  must  conform"  (p.  371). 


54  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

gating  intellectualism  to  the  second  place  can  be 
realized.  Here  is  James's  reply  to  the  question  asked 
by  him  and  reproduced  above,  and  his  definition  of 
the  true : 

"  True  ideas  are  those  that  we  can  assimilate,  vali- 
date, corroborate,  and  verify.  False  ideas  are  those 
that  we  cannot,"  etc.     {Pragmatism,  p.  201.) 

Let  us  look  again  at  these  terms.  Those  that  we  can 
assimilate;  that  is  to  say,  the  truth  is  measured  by 
our  standard,  not  solely  in  the  sense  of  Protagoras 
(cf.  James,  p.  223)  and  of  Kant  (that,  being  per- 
ceived by  us  intellectually,  it  must  take  the  forms 
that  our  knowing  faculties  impose  upon  it),  but  that 
it  must  in  addition  be  reduced  to  the  form  which  our 
needs  and  desires  impose  upon  it,  —  in  a  word,  our 
pragmatic  faculties.  (Mr.  Schiller  develops  this 
thesis  by  referring  it  directly  to  Kant,  who  has  estab- 
lished the  first  standard  and  who  must  be  completed 
by  accepting  this  second  standard.)  {Humanism, 
pp.  9,  10.) 

Those  that  we  can  validate  or  turn  to  account; 
that  is  to  say :  this  is  true  which  is  useful.  "  You 
can  say  of  a  truth  (which  from  being  indifferent  be- 
comes at  a  given  moment  useful)  either  that  it  is 
useful  because  it  is  true,  or  that  it  is  true  because  it 
is  useful,'^  {Pragmatism,  p.  204.)  "Our  account 
of  truth  is  an  account  of  truths  in  the  plural,  of  pro- 
cesses of  leading,  realized  in  rebus,  and  having  only 
this  quality  in  common,  that  they  pay/'  {Ibid. 
p.  218.) 


THE   PRINCIPLES   OF  PRAGMATISM         55 

This  apprises  us  of  nothing  new ;  but  what  is  the 
value  of  the  other  terms,  corroborate  and  verify, 
coming  after  the  foregoing?  Either  they  are  a 
simple  repetition  of  those  first  ones  under  a  new 
form  (that  is  to  say,  our  criterion  being  our  power 
of  thinking  and  our  utility,  verify  would  be  a  repeti- 
tion of  assimilate  and  corroborate  would  repeat  vali- 
date) ;  or  else  these  two  terms  introduce  surrepti- 
tiously something  new  that  was  not  contained  in 
assimilate  and  validate.  In  that  case,  what  can  this 
something  new  be?  It  can  only  be  intellectualism, 
that  very  intellectual  criterion  that  pragmatism 
would,  if  not  suppress,  at  least  subordinate  to  its 
own  authority.  But  then  it  is  easy  to  see  that, 
whether  you  place  the  intellectual  postulates  after 
or  before  the  others,  is  of  very  little  consequence  so 
long  as  you  agree  to  satisfy  them  all  the  same.  And 
in  this  simple  transposition  in  the  order  of  mention 
consists,  in  the  last  resort,  the  attempt  of  Professor 
James  to  give  pragmatism  the  precedence  over  in- 
tellectualism in  the  question  "What  is  truth?  "^ 

And  the  continuation  of  Professor  James's  lecture 
shows  us  that  the  matter  in  hand  is  indeed  this  intel- 
lectualist  element,  and  not  the  mere  addition  of  two 
synonyms  to  the  preceding  verbs.     We  had  well 

*  Not  only  do  you  not  save  anything  by  this  plan  of  precedence, 
but  you  run  the  risk  of  complicating  things  most  decidedly.  Suppose 
you  have  completed  your  pragmatic  argument  on  some  point,  and 
that  passing  next  to  verification  by  intellectualism  you  should  find  a 
contradiction  which  should  force  you  to  abandon  your  theories,  you 
would  then  have  heavy  work  on  hand  which  you  could  have  spared 
if  you  had  proceeded  according  to  the  traditional  order. 


S6  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

understood  that  of  two  philosophical  theories  the 
more  useful  should  be  preferred.  Yet  all  of  a  sud- 
den Professor  James  bethinks  himself  that  there  are 
"  realities  "  where  notions  of  "  true  and  false  beliefs 
obtain  "  independently  of  every  philosophical  theory 
even  of  pragmatism  "  and  here  the  beliefs  are  ab- 
solute 'or  unconditional."  (Pragmatism,  p.  209.) 
These  are  "  ideas  purely  mental,"  such  as  2  -|-  4  = 
6;  and,  pragmatically,  this  gets  us  into  difficulties. 
Just  before,  he  had  assured  us  that  we  can  say,  "  It 
is  useful  because  it  is  true,"  or,  ''  It  is  true  because 
it  is  useful."  Now,  then,  this  criterion  of  utility  is 
only  true  within  certain  limits ! 

There  are  cases  —  the  case  of  a  creditor,  for  ex- 
ample—  where  it  would  be  useful  to  have  2  +  4 
=  7,  or,  on  the  other  hand  —  for  the  debtor  —  to 
have  2  +  4  =  5.  So  we  have  to  admit  that  we 
sometimes  come  up  against  ''  realities  "  in  which  the 
principles  of  the  expedient  and  the  inexpedient  can- 
not be  applied.  Worse  still,  "  our  ideas  must  agree 
with  realities,  be  such  realities  concrete  or  abstract, 
be  they  facts  or  be  they  principles,  under  the  penalty 
of  endless  inconsistency  and  frustration."  (Prag- 
matism, p.  211.)  Pitiable  avowal  of  the  impotence 
of  pragmatism !  for  here  "  to  agree "  means  to 
agree  intellectually.  In  other  words,  when  pragma- 
tism is  in  conflict  with  intellectualism  —  and  we  have 
just  seen  that  there  are  such  conflicts  —  far  from 
pragmatism  compelling  intellectualism  to  yield,  it  is 
the  former  that  lays  down  its  arms. 


THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  PRAGMATISM        57 

That  Professor  James  himself  recognizes  and  is 
the  first  to  point  out  that  there  are  facts  that  impose 
limits  in  pragmatism  does  not  render  the  facts  less 
embarrassing.  At  the  confessional  a  sinner  who 
confesses  may  be  pardoned;  in  philosophy  he  can- 
not be.  It  is  not  sufficient  for  the  philosopher  to  rec- 
ognize the  difficulty ;  he  must  remove  it.  Now  it  is 
impossible  for  James  to  dream  of  doing  so.  While 
recognizing,  then,  that  pragmatism  is  obliged  to  take 
cognizance  of  what  Kant  has  well  called  *'  synthetic 
judgments  a  priori''  (it  matters  very  little,  by  the 
way,  whether  these  judgments  are  irreducible  by 
analysis  or  not),  James  recognizes  at  least  that 
pragmatism  shares  with  intellectualism  the  empire 
of  philosophy,  —  intellectualism  not  as  the  repre- 
sentative of  some  system,  if  you  please,  but  intellec- 
tualism as  a  method;  for  we  must  not  allow  our- 
selves to  be  taken  in  by  this  cunning  ruse  de  guerre 
of  the  pragmatists  by  which  they  would  fain  make 
us  believe  that  every  time  people  speak  of  intellec- 
tualism they  speak  of  a  rigid  system. 

This  is  not  all.  In  addition  to  the  sphere  of  prag- 
matic "  realities  "  (in  which  we  judge  in  accordance 
with  the  criterion  of  the  expedient),  and  that  of 
"  realities  "  furnished  by  the  synthetic  a  priori  judg- 
ments which  are  independent  of  pragmatism.  Pro- 
fessor James  is  obliged  to  add  a  third  sphere  of 
"  realities,"  namely,  "  the  whole  body  of  other  truths 
already  in  our  possession.  {Pragmatism,  p.  212.) 
And  in  order  that  a  pragmatic  theory  be  valid,  it 


S8  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

must  not  only  be  expedient,  not  only  not  contradict 
the  synthetic  a  priori  judgments,  but,  further,  not  be 
found  in  contradiction  with  other  theories  previously 
adopted.  (This,  however,  does  not  hinder  our  occa- 
sionally preserving  a  new  theory  and  rejecting  an 
old  one  with  which  it  is  not  in  agreement  —  only 
there  must  be  no  logical  incompatibility  in  the  body 
of  accepted  theories.)  Here  we  have  it,  ipsissimis 
verbis: 

"  To  '  agree '  in  the  widest  sense  with  a  reality  can 
only  mean  to  be  guided  either  straight  up  to  it  or  into 
its  surroundings,  or  to  be  put  into  such  working  touch 
with  it  as  to  handle  either  it  or  something  connected 
with  it  better  than  if  we  disagreed.''  {Pragmatism, 
pp.  212,  213.) 

This  intricate  and  subtle  definition  (purposely 
made  so,  in  order  that,  by  the  terms  *'  working 
touch  "  and  "  handle,"  some  few  fragments  of  prag- 
matic elements  might  be  saved)  simply  means  that 
a  theory  in  order  to  be  pragmatically  true  must  not 
be  in  (intellectual)  disagreement  with  any  "  reality" 
whatever,  or  with  any  truth  in  the  same  group  or  in 
any  other  group.  And  Professor  James  himself 
adds,  as  an  after  thought  to  his  definition,  "  better 
either  intellectually  or  practically "  (!)  Yet  not- 
withstanding this  he  had  written  a  few  lines  before, 
"  Here  it  is  that  pragmatism  and  intellectualism 
begin  to  part  company."  But  it  is  just  the  opposite 
that  is  true ;  it  is  here  they  show  that  they  can  never 
part  company;   there  is  not  the  shadow  of  a  differ- 


THE   PRINCIPLES    OF   PRAGMATISM       59 

ence  left  between  them.  A  pragmatic  theory  is  only 
acceptable  when  it  agrees  with  other  pragmatic  theo- 
ries, or  with  the  principles  of  pure  reason,  or  with 
every  logical  theory  derived  from  these.  So  be  it, 
but  this  is  a  conception  of  the  true  that  any  intellec- 
tualist  philosopher  would  adopt,  for  the  precise  rea- 
son that  all  trace  of  pragmatism  has  been  removed. 

Five  lines  farther  down  Professor  James  again 
tries  to  waive  aside  intellectualism.  "  To  copy  a 
reality  is,  indeed,  one  very  important  way  of  agree- 
ing with  it,  but  it  is  far  from  being  essential.  The 
essential  thing  is  the  process  of  being  guided."  But 
Professor  James's  intellectualist  honesty  is  stronger 
than  his  pragmatism,  and  he  resumes :  "  Any  idea 
that  helps  us  to  deal,  whether  practically  or  intellec- 
tually (note  again  that  "or  intellectually'')  with 
either  the  reality  or  its  belongings,  that  does  n't  en- 
tangle our  progress  in  frustrations,  that  fits,  in  fact, 
and  adapts  our  life  to  the  reality's  whole  setting, 
will  agree  sufficiently  to  meet  the  requirement." 

x\nd  again  three  pages  farther  on :  we  must  have 
a  theory  that  "  works,"  with  no  capricious  logic ; 
a  theory  "  must  derange  common  sense  and  previous 
belief  as  little  as  possible,  and  it  must  lead  to  some 
sensible  terminus  or  other  that  can  be  verified  ex- 
actly. To  *  work  '  means  both  these  things ;  and  the 
squeeze  is  so  tight  that  there  is  little  loose  play  for 
any  hypothesis.  Our  theories  are  wedged  and  con- 
trolled as  nothing  else  is."  (Pragmatism,  pp.  216, 
217.) 


6o  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

Behold,  then,  pragmatism,  by  James's  own  avowal, 
bound  hand  and  foot  and  delivered  over  to  the 
mercies  of  intellectualism ! 

It  is  undoubtedly  possible  for  the  theories  of  prag- 
matism to  form  a  natural  and  homogeneous  abode 
intellectually,  and  not  come  into  logical  collision 
with  each  other  at  any  point.  But  we  should  then 
have  to  say  that  one  of  two  things  would  be  true: 
either  (a)  we  should  accept  the  pragmatist  philos- 
ophy as  true  independently  of  the  pragmatic  method ; 
that  is  to  say,  not  because  it  is  pragmatic,  but  because 
it  satisfies  the  postulates  of  intellectualism ;  the  world 
would  be  explained  (intellectually)  from  the  teleo- 
logical  point  of  view,  and  there  would  be  no  need 
of  submitting  philosophy  to  the  method  extolled  by 
James;  or  (b)  the  agreement  of  pragmatism  and 
intellectualism  would  have  to  be  regarded  as  the 
result  of  chance.  But  what  an  unimaginable  accu- 
mulation of  unheard-of  fortuities  would  be  neces- 
sary in  order  that  a  philosophy  the  field  of  which  is 
all  phenomena,  past,  present,  future,  scientific,  ethi- 
cal, social,  political,  etc.,  etc.,  and  which  is  con- 
structed on  a  certain  principle,  should  coincide  down 
to  the  minutest  details  with  the  postulates  of  a  phi- 
losophy conceived  on  a  principle  wholly  different  if 
not  incompatible!  And  then  again  this  imaginary 
coincidence  would  have  no  more  value  from  a  prag- 
matist point  of  view  than  if  it  did  not  exist,  for,  as 
we  have  seen,  it  is  precisely  what  the  pragmatists  are 


THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  PRAGMATISM        6i 

trying  to  claim,  that  the  simple  fact  of  being  in 
agreement  with  the  postulates  of  intellectualism  is 
not  a  sufficient  sanction  for  a  philosophy.  The  intel- 
lectualists  alone  could  conscientiously  adopt  the  sys- 
tem, for  they  limit  themselves  to  the  endeavor  to  ex- 
plain the  world  theoretically ;  they  believe  they  would 
accomplish  not  a  little  if  they  could  find  a  universal 
principle  giving  account  of  all  phenomena,  even  if 
they  could  not  prove  that  this  principle  corresponds 
accurately  to  the  truth  per  se.  Anyway,  such  a  dem- 
onstration is  beyond  the  power  of  human  faculties. 

Summarizing  now  the  discussion:  The  position 
of  the  pragmatists  is  this:  they  would  have  liked 
to  discard,  and  ought  to  have  discarded,  intellectual- 
ism in  favor  of  pragmatism;  but  that  is  impossible, 
for  pragmatism  would  be  an  unrestricted  fancy  if 
not  watched  over  and  controlled  by  intellectualism. 
No  pragmatism  without  intellectualism!  On  the 
other  hand,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  intellectualism  can 
very  well  dispense  with  pragmatism ;  and,  moreover, 
it  deals  with  reality  as  much  as  its  opponent ;  ^  not 
in  the  pragmatic  sense,  it  is  true,  but  it  can  only  be 
reproached  for  that  when  it  is  proved  that  it  is  illegit- 
imate to  deal  with  it  in  any  other  way  than  the  prag- 
matic.   Professor  James  says  that  Spencer  would  be 

^  "Now,  in  order  to  carry  on  this  'ancient  quarrel'  on  equal  terms, 
it  is  necessary  at  the  present  time  to  begin  with  an  emphatic  protest 
against  the  pragmatist's  assumption  that  he,  and  he  alone  speaks  in 
the  name  of  experience."  (J.  E.  Creighton,  Experience  and  Thought. 
Philosophical  Review,  XV,  No.  5,  p.  484.) 


62  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

an  excellent  pragmatist  if  philosophy  only  had  to  do 
with  the  past ;  but  since  it  deals  also  with  the  future, 
his  system  is  worthless.  It  is  possible  that  the  sys- 
tem of  philosophy  thus  accused  is  worthless,  but  it  is 
absurd  to  maintain  that  Spencer  does  not  take  into 
account  the  future.  How  could  he  be  said  not  to 
take  any  account  of  it  when  he  formulates  relations 
of  laws  between  phenomena?  He  does  not  take  it 
into  account  in  the  spirit  of  pragmatism ;  but  that  is 
a  very  different  matter. 

I  beg  leave  to  open  here  a  parenthesis : 
It  ought  in  justice  to  be  stated  that  the  confusion 
between  what  I  have  called  scientific  pragmatism  and 
ethical  pragmatism  is  not  a  thing  of  recent  date.  It 
has  always  more  or  less  vaguely  existed  in  the  minds 
of  men.  It  was  particularly  strong  in  the  seven- 
teenth and  eighteenth  centuries,  and  especially  in 
England  was  the  philosophy  of  this  epoch  encum- 
bered with  errors  of  this  kind.  One  could,  however, 
make  good  this  difference,  that  in  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury the  thinking  world  was  not  yet  wholly  freed 
from  the  theologico-social  spirit  of  scholasticism, 
whereas  to-day  in  the  twentieth  century,  after  we 
have  pretty  well  rid  ourselves  of  this  in  the  world  of 
thought,  pragmatism  wants  to  plunge  us  into  it 
anew. 

I  shall  treat  in  another  chapter  of  Rousseau  as 
precursor  of  modem  pragmatism.  M.  Texte,  in  his 
book  Rousseau  et  le  cosmopolitisme  litteraire  studies 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  PRAGMATISM        63 

the  precursors  of  Rousseau.     I  borrow  the  three 
following  citations  from  him : 

*'  Those  who  seriously  apply  themselves  (says  Locke, 
in  his  De  Arte  Medico)  to  displaying  and  arranging 
abstractions  give  themselves  a  good  deal  of  trouble  for 
little  result  and  would  be  just  as  well  employed  al- 
though they  are  grown  men,  in  playing  with  their  child- 
hood's dolls.  .  .  .  There  are  no  intellectual  require- 
ments worthy  of  name  except  those  that  lead  to  some 
new  and  useful  invention,  that  teach  us  to  do  something 
better,  quicker,  and  more  easily  than  before.  Any 
other  kind  of  speculation,  though  curious  and  refined 
and  seemingly  profound,  is  only  a  vain  and  idle  phi- 
losophy, the  occupation  of  idlers." 

Elsewhere  he  says : 

"  Our  business  in  this  world  is  not  to  know  all  things, 
but  those  which  concern  the  conduct  of  life." 

Dr.  Johnson,  in  The  Rambler,  No.  24,  writes: 

"  When  a  man  employs  himself  upon  remote  and  un- 
necessary subjects,  and  wastes  his  life  upon  questions 
which  cannot  be  resolved,  and  of  which  the  solution 
would  conduce  very  little  to  the  advancement  of  hap- 
piness ;  when  he  lavishes  his  hours  in  calculating  the 
weight  of  the  terraqueous  globe,  or  in  adjusting  suc- 
cessive systems  of  worlds  beyond  the  reach  of  the 
telescope;  he  may  be  very  properly  recalled  from  his 
excursions  by  this  precept  ('Know  thyself)  and  re- 
minded that  there  is  a  nearer  being  with  which  it  is 
duty  to  be  more  acquainted,  and  from  which  his  atten- 
tion has  hitherto  been  withheld  by  studies  to  which  he 
has  no  other  motive  than  vanity  or  curiosity." 


64  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

Similar  passages  abound  in  the  writers  of  this 
epoch.  They  are  contained  in  germ,  in  Bacon's 
aphorism,  "  Knowledge  is  power  "  (to  be  contrasted 
with  "  Knowledge  is  foresight "  of  contemporary 
science).  Like  the  pragmatists  of  to-day,  these 
thinkers  did  not  care  for  science  as  science,  and  when 
we  admire  them  for  having  attained  to  the  imper- 
sonal and  disinterested  study  of  nature,  we  really 
praise  them  for  something  they  cultivated  hy  acci- 
dent and  not  out  of  deliberate  foresight.  The  ulti- 
mate aim  of  scientific  speculations  was,  as  the  cita- 
tions just  given  show,  the  well-being  of  humanity  in 
the  broad  sense  of  that  word.  And  from  this  point 
of  view  there  is  not  so  very  much  difference  between 
their  spirit  and  that  of  the  middle  ages.  It  consists 
above  all  in  taking  a  different  view  of  the  destiny  of 
man ;  but  the  end  is  the  same.  In  the  scholastic  phi- 
losophy, happiness  in  the  religious  sense  is  the  aim; 
that  is  to  say,  in  the  sense  of  the  renunciation  of 
earthly  life  for  the  life  celestial.  After  the  Renais- 
sance religion  took  on  a  utilitarian  character  in  the 
earthly  sense,  or  at  any  rate  all  happiness  was  not 
deferred  till  the  future,  and  suffering  was  no  longer 
the  absolute  condition  of  entering  heaven.  If  there 
was  any  need  of  renunciation  it  was  not  at  all  that 
enjoyment  was  bad  in  itself,  but  because  it  was  nec- 
essary to  respect  the  rights  of  others  in  our  enjoy- 
ment, as  they  were  under  obligation  to  respect  ours. 

Now  it  is  this  new  conception  (new  in  Christian 
civilization)    of  the  right   to  terrestrial  happiness 


THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  PRAGMATISM        65 

which  has  indirectly  brought  science  into  favor  in 
place  of  the  scholastic  philosophy.  The  latter,  whose 
task  it  was  to  prove  in  the  last  resort  the  truth  of  the 
Christian  doctrine  of  renunciation,  is  useless,  and 
therefore  bad,  for  it  diverts  our  energies  from  sci- 
entific speculations,  and  these  are  useful.  Indeed, 
in  order  to  live  we  must  know  the  conditions  of  ex- 
istence in  the  world,  we  must  study  nature.  Al- 
though it  be  studied  for  a  utilitarian  purpose,  it  must 
be  studied  as  it  is,  scientifically,  to  make  of  it  an  in- 
strument for  our  pleasures  or  our  comfort.  To  be 
willing  to  be  deceived  through  slothful  ignorance  is 
to  become  bewildered  a  thousand  times.  It  is  just 
as  in  business  in  which  honesty  is  the  best  policy; 
the  most  useful,  the  best  thing  to  do  is  to  know  and 
follow  nature  as  she  is.  But,  once  more,  men  do 
not  care  for  science  for  the  sake  of  science. 

Hence,  the  terms  "  useful,"  "  valid,"  or  "  good  " 
are  employed  at  that  epoch  in  the  two  different 
senses  I  have  pointed  out  in  modern  pragmatism, 
—  in  the  moral,  or  social  sense  of  the  word  "  prag- 
matism," and  from  the  more  restricted  point  of 
view  of  the  development  of  science.  And  now, 
what  interests  us  is  that  there  can  be  conflict  between 
the  two  senses,  and  that  science  may  show  itself  to 
be  very  anti-social  as  well  as  social,  in  its  results, 
owing  to  the  fact  that  the  truth  may  be  hostile  to 
man;  for  example,  certain  laws  of  heredity,  which, 
once  known,  suggest  to  certain  persons  to  give  up 
the  struggle  against  the  baneful  tendencies  within 

5 


66  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

them.  In  such  cases  knowledge  (or  science)  is  bad 
and  can  only  be  regarded  as  useful  in  the  scientific 
sense. 

So  we  see  that  ethics  and  science  could  be  in  con- 
flict in  the  eighteenth  century  just  as  to-day  science 
and  pragmatism  can.  I  shall  take  up  this  problem  in 
the  next  chapter,  and  only  remark  here  that  the 
mere  fact  of  the  existence  of  the  utilitarianism  of  the 
eighteenth  century  or  that  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
and  of  the  pragmatism  of  the  twentieth  century,  in- 
dependently formulated  all  three,  proves  in  itself 
not  merely  that  there  may  be  conflicts,  but  that  they 
in  fact  exist.  If  science  and  ethics  agreed  naturally, 
divergences  would  not  occur,  at  least  in  so  persistent 
a  way;  or,  as  Hebert  remarks,  apropos  of  pragma- 
tism, "  the  ends  would  always  seem  to  justify  the 
means.''  {Le  Pragmatismej  Paris,  1908,  p.  56.)  In 
sooth  we  ought  to  congratulate  ourselves  that  the 
confusion  between  scientific  validity  and  ethical  or 
social  validity  has  for  some  time  been  in  exist- 
ence. Without  this  confusion  of  the  two,  social  val- 
idity would  evidently  not  have  looked  with  favor  on 
scientific  validity  —  that  is  to  say,  science  —  but  it 
would  have  slain  this  last  or  at  least  obstructed  its 
progress.  This  danger  no  longer  exists ;  science  for 
the  sake  of  science  has  taken  too  deep  root  among  us. 


But  to  return  from  this  digression  to  our  argu- 
ment.   If  there  were  really  nothing  behind  pragma- 


THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  PRAGMATISM        67 

tism  it  would  be  astonishing  that  it  could  have  been 
accepted  by  anybody.  What  is  it  then  ?  Trailed  up 
and  ousted  from  all  its  strongholds  (or  rather  Pro- 
fessor James  himself  recognizes  them  as  untenable 
and  abandons  them)  pragmatism  is  now  taking 
refuge  in  its  last  entrenchment.  After  the  passage 
cited  above,  "  our  theories  are  wedged  and  controlled 
as  nothing  else  is,"  Professor  James  continues :  "  Yet 
sometimes  alternative  theoretic  formulas  are  equally 
compatible  with  all  truths  we  know  and  then  we 
choose  between  them  for  subjective  reasons." 

These  words  give  the  key  to  the  enigma.  The 
mountain  has  brought  forth  its  mouse.  When  two 
theories  are  equally  uncertain,  intellectually  speak- 
ing, then  pragmatism,  profiting  by  the  uncertainty, 
may  slip  in  the  "  expediency "  theory ;  or,  when 
there  exist  departments  of  thought  of  which  intellec- 
tualism  cannot  take  possession  (such  as  religion), 
pragmatism  claims  the  right  to  install  itself  there. 
In  short,  when  that  severe  guardian,  intellectualism, 
is  not  at  hand  to  oppose,  and  only  then,  pragmatism 
can  give  free  reign  to  its  "  temperament."  To  con- 
ceal the  meagreness  of  this  final  outcome,  William 
James  covers  it  with  flowers  of  rhetoric :  "  We 
choose  the  kind  of  theory  to  which  we  are  already 
partial ;  we  follow  '  elegance '  or  '  economy.'  Clerk- 
Maxwell  somewhere  says  it  would  be  *  poor  scientific 
taste  '  to  choose  the  more  complicated  of  two  equally 
well-evidenced  conceptions;  and  you  will  all  agree 
with  him.     Truth  in  science  is  what  gives  us  the 


68  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

maximum  possible  sum  of  satisfactions,  taste  in- 
cluded; but  considering  both  with  previous  truth 
and  with  novel  fact  is  always  the  most  imperious 
claimant."     (Pragmatism,  p.  217.) 

Nobody  will  deny  that  there  are  still  vast  hori- 
zons open  to  pragmatic  speculations  thus  conceived 
(leaving  out  of  the  account  their  encroachments) ; 
but  to  call  this  philosophy,  when  the  proper  place 
for  it  is  just  where  philosophy  ends,  is  not  ad- 
missible. 

James  did  not  at  first  think  of  doing  so,  for  rea- 
sons which  I  shall  not  at  present  attempt  to  fathom ; 
he  was  led  into  it  gradually.  Indeed,  originally,  his 
pragmatism  was  not  presented  as  a  philosophic 
method,  but  simply  as  a  method  that  might  serve  as 
a  guide  in  the  practical  life,  apropos  of  certain  ques- 
tions that  philosophy  cannot  claim  to  solve,  or  which 
are  still  pending.  As  a  philosophic  method  he 
frankly  admitted  intellectualism.  It  will  not  be  a 
loss  of  time  to  compare  his  method  of  expressing 
himself  in  his  famous  essay  The  Will  to  Believe,  and 
in  his  recent  Pragmatism,  the  two  books  having  an 
interval  of  ten  years  between  them. 

In  the  1897  essay  we  read: 

"  The  position  that  I  defend  is,  in  brief,  this :  Our 
passional  nature  not  only  lawfully  may  hut  must  decide 
an  option  between  propositions,  whenever  it  is  a  gen- 
uine option  that  cannot  by  its  nature  be  decided  on 


THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  PRAGMATISM        69 

intellectual  grounds;  for  to  say,  under  such  circum- 
stances,  ^ Do  not  decide,  hut  leave  the  question  open* 
is  itself  a  passional  decision,  —  just  like  deciding  yes 
or  not,  —  and  is  attended  with  the  same  risk  of  losing 
the  truth"  (p.  11). 

The  italics  are  Professor  James's.  On  page  30  the 
same  subject  is  resumed. 

"  In  concreto,  the  freedom  to  believe  can  only  cover 
living  options  which  the  intellect  of  the  individual  can- 
not by  itself  resolve.  .  .  ."  We  must  avoid  as  much 
as  possible  (he  says)  these  passional  decisions  —  "as 
much  so  as  the  facts  will  allow.  Wherever  the  option 
between  losing  truth  and  gaining  it  is  not  momentous, 
we  can  throw  the  chance  of  gaining  truth,  and  at  any 
rate  save  ourselves  from  any  chance  of  believing  false- 
hood, by  not  making  up  our  minds  at  all  till  objective 
evidence  has  come"  (pp.  19,  20). 

That  is  to  say,  in  certain  questions  —  those  of 
ethics  and  of  faith  for  example  —  if  the  intellect 
cannot  make  a  decision,  choice  becomes  necessary, 
for  life  does  not  wait. 

This  is  perfectly  clear;  it  means  that  when  sci- 
ence fails  us,  we  need  not  renounce  the  will  to  live 
on  that  account ;  let  us  live  on  our  beliefs.  Now,  no 
one  would  object  to  that.  James  has  not  said  more 
than  that  in  Pragmatism.  He  has  said  it  in  a  differ- 
ent way,  said  it  less  clearly,  and  he  has  claimed 
much  more.     He  has  tried  to  make  a  philosophic 


70  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

method  out  of  what  was  a  rule  of  life;  and  then, 
conscious  of  the  difficulties  of  his  enterprise,  he  has 
tried  to  dissemble  them ;  that  which  was  very  clear 
has  become  very  obscure.  And  this  is  the  reason 
why  the  English  and  American  reviews  are  full  of 
articles  by  certain  authors  who,  while  generally  ap- 
plauding pragmatism,  enter  upon  long-winded  dis- 
cussions to  find  out  just  what  it  means.  They  are 
seeking  a  philosophic  method  in  it,  which  is  not 
there  at  all,  because,  I  repeat,  pragmatism  begins 
where  philosophy  ends. 

IV 

It  would  ill  become  me  to  limit  myself  to  these 
theoretical  considerations  on  pragmatism.  To  see  if 
my  criticisms  are  well  founded  let  us  examine  the 
method  in  operation. 

It  is  evident  that  a  method,  if  it  has  any  value,  and 
if  it  is  logically  applied,  must  finally  lead  different 
seekers  to  the  same  philosophy.  Undoubtedly  there 
are  great  divergences  of  opinion  in  many  systems; 
but  then,  these  divergences  can  be  discussed,  for 
they  are  only  more  or  less  consistent  applications  of 
principles  which,  even  though  they  may  be  false,  are 
sure,  for  they  are  constant  and  impersonal;  thus, 
one  monism  is  truer,  or,  let  us  rather  say,  more  con- 
sistent, than  another  monism;  one  materialism  than 
another  materialism.  But  with  pragmatism  it  is  dif- 
ferent; the  application  of  the  principle  of  the  expe- 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  PRAGMATISM        71 

dient  is  not  methodical  or  impersonal,  but,  naturally 
of  course,  subjective.  They  tell  us  and  tell  us  again, 
that  the  aim  of  pragmatism  is  to  deliver  philosophy 
from  the  coercion  of  system  and  to  give  freer  play 
to  what  is  called  "  temperament " ;  now,  of  course, 
the  more  play  you  give  it,  the  surer  you  are  of  not 
agreeing  with  others.  It  is  a  fact  (and  not  a  chance 
one;  I  shall  explain  why  elsewhere)  that  all  pragma- 
tists  are  akin  by  "  temperament " ;  they  all  incline 
in  a  very  marked  manner  to  idealism ;  and  yet,  even 
under  these  conditions,  disagreements  abound.  It 
would  be  only  too  easy  for  me  to  pick  out  instances 
and  make  use  of  them.  M.  Lalande,  in  his  consciea- 
tious  article  in  the  Revue  philosophique  (February, 
1906),  has  pointed  out  some.  By  choosing  a  con- 
crete example  from  among  them  I  wish  to  show,  in 
order  to  confirm  my  theoretical  refutation,  that  the 
pragmatists,  if  they  want  to  reach  a  philosophical 
entente,  are  obliged  not  only  to  have  recourse  to  a 
non-pragmatic  method,  but  that  this  method  is  that 
of  the  very  intellectualism  against  which  they  are 
undertaking  to  wage  war. 

Pragmatism  has  been  enthusiastically  adopted  by 
Protestant  theologians.  By  a  method  of  procedure 
dear  to  the  disciples  of  William  James,  Mr.  Irwin- 
King  supposes  two  cases  opposed,  the  one  to  the 
other;  neither  metaphysics  nor  intellectualism  being 
capable,  they  say,  of  deciding  between  them,  the  op- 
portunist method  must  be  called  in.  "Let  us  suppose 
two  contradictory  propositions :  *  It  is  proper  that  the 


72  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

wicked  should  be  punished  in  the  other  world*  — 
'  It  is  repugnant  to  our  feelings  that  the  wicked 
shoidd  receive  punishment  hereafter'  Furthermore, 
suppose  it  to  be  impossible  to  prove  one  of  these 
propositions  in  such  a  way  as  to  render  the  other 
untenable ;  let  us  then  permit  the  metaphysicians  to 
discuss  it  together,  and  let  us  come  to  the  results. 
In  turn  we  shall  assume  the  first  proposition  to  be 
true  and  then  the  second.  It  is  evident  that  the 
conduct  of  life  of  people  would  be  different,  given 
universal  belief  in  the  first  proposition,  from  what 
it  would  be  if  everybody  confessed  to  a  feeling  of 
repugnance  toward  punishment  in  the  life  beyond. 
It  is  also  clear  that  the  conduct  of  those  who  believed 
in  such  a  punishment  would  be  much  more  exem- 
plary than  that  of  people  who  did  not  believe  in  it 
at  all.  From  ivhich  it  follozvs  that  the  first  proposi- 
tion, being  good  in  its  effects,  is  true.''  (Cited  by 
Lalande,  Revue  philosophique,  p.  141.)  On  the 
other  hand.  Professor  James,  in  discussing  the  prob- 
lem of  free  will,  and  concluding  for  pragmatic 
reasons  in  favor  of  freedom,  pronounces,  most  em- 
phatically, against  this  idea  of  a  punitive  God : 

"  God  alone  can  know  our  merits  if  we  have  any. 
The  real  ground  for  supposing  free-will  is  indeed  prag- 
matic, but  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  this  contemptible 
right  to  punish  which  has  made  such  a  noise  in  past 
discussions  of  the  subject."     {Pragmatism,  p.  118.) 

Now  we  must  admit  either  that  the  differences  of 
the  two  theories  are  a  priori  irreducible,  or  else  that 


THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  PRAGMATISM         73 

one  is  preferable  to  the  other.  In  the  first  case  the 
pragmatists  themselves  will  agree  that  their  philos- 
ophy is  rather  adapted  to  the  sowing  of  discord  than 
the  creation  of  harmony  among  thinkers.  In  the 
second  case,  which  of  the  theories  is  preferable  to 
the  other  and  how  determine  it?  Have  Mr.  King 
and  Mr.  James  just  different  "  temperaments,"  or 
can  we  explain  their  disagreement  otherwise  than 
by  this  word  ? 

I  note  this,  in  the  first  place,  that  Mr.  King  —  a 
theologian  and  perhaps  pastor  —  takes  into  consider- 
ation the  moral  needs  of  the  masses.  With  the  people 
the  old  ethics  of  fear  is  always  the  most  effective; 
let  us  not  suppress  it.  Professor  James,  for  his  part, 
moving,  as  he  does  in  a  circle  of  cultivated  persons, 
superior  to  the  masses  morally  as  well  as  intellectu- 
ally, is  much  less  inclined  to  look  at  humanity  in  its 
vulgar  or  degraded  aspect;  he  would  be  glad  to 
hold  fast  by  belief  in  the  natural  goodness  of  hu- 
manity; men  sin  only  through  ignorance;  a  puni- 
tive God  would  be  useless  in  the  case  of  those  so 
situated.^  Thus  each  of  these  thinkers,  starting  from 
unlike  experiences,  arrives  by  unconscious  reasoning 
at  his  theory. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  the  pragmatist  doctrine, 

*  In  his  Pluralistic  Universe  (1909)  William  James  writes,  p.  29: 
"The  theological  machinery  that  spoke  so  livingly  to  our  ancestors, 
with  ...  its  judicial  morality  and  eschatology,  its  relish  for  rewards 
and  punishments,  its  treatment  of  God  as  an  external  contriver  and 
an  intelligent  moral  governor  sounds  as  odd  to  most  of  us  as  if  it 
were  some  outlandish  savage  religion." 


74  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

the  two  series  of  observations  and  the  two  courses 
of  reasoning  that  follow  them  are  absolutely  and 
equally  correct.  There  are  people  for  whom  a  retrib- 
utive God  w^ould  be  "  expedient,"  others  for  whom 
he  would  not  be.  Strictly  speaking,  then,  a  prag- 
matist  should  reject  neither  one  God  nor  the  other, 
since  both  are  "  expedient,"  or  "  opportune."  But 
this  would  be  too  simple,  and  would  turn  out  to  be 
compromising.  Moreover,  the  problem  which,  it  was 
claimed,  was  accurately  solved,  is  not  solved  at  all. 
We  must  go  on  then.  To  arrive  at  a  solution  the 
next  query  would  be  necessary :  *'  Which  opinion 
shall  we  choose  ?  Shall  we  choose  the  God  who  cor- 
responds to  the  needs  of  the  majority  or  the  one  cor- 
responding to  the  needs  of  the  superior  class?  "  It 
is  not  at  all  evident  that  pragmatism  can  elucidate 
this  question  any  better  than  the  former.  To  sacri- 
fice the  masses  who  can't  help  their  inferiority  is 
unjust ;  to  sacrifice  the  elite  is  stupid. 

Whichever  way  you  look  at  it,  pragmatism  does 
not  reach  the  goal. 

Intellectualism,  claim,  would  serve  the  purpose 
better.  Ceasing  to  ask,  *'  What  is  most  expedient 
for  man  to  believe?  "  (a  question  that  leads  to  con- 
tradictory answers)  it  would  ask,  "  Which  God 
would  be  superior,  the  punitive  God  or  the  non- 
punitive  God?"  This  leads  us  into  the  domain  of 
metaphysical  speculation,  which  pragmatism  would 
like  to  avoid ;  but  the  man  who  is  asking  a  reply  to 
the  problem  as  stated  by  the  pragmatists  is  driven  to 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  PRAGMATISM        75 

this  kind  of  speculation  perforce,  through  the  bank- 
ruptcy of  pragmatism.  And,  in  fact,  he  will  find  in 
metaphysics  a  sure  criterion  to  decide  between  the 
theory  of  James  and  that  of  King,  as  to  which  is  the 
superior.  Let  us  examine  the  matter  then,  —  sum- 
ming up,  however,  solely  the  ideas  of  the  past.  The- 
ology passed  on  from  a  God  of  vengeance  to  a  God 
of  love.  What  was  its  reason?  Not  the  pragmatic 
reason,  since  religion  is  for  the  masses  as  well  as 
for  superior  souls,  and  since  even  yet  the  church  and 
certain  pragmatists  admit  that  the  punitive  God  is 
more  useful  than  the  other.  The  reason  is  that  to 
the  theologian  or  to  the  philosopher,  reflecting  inde- 
pendently of  all  pragmatic  consideration,  it  appeared 
that  the  punitive  God  was  a  God  mtellectually  infe- 
rior. In  fact,  just  in  proportion  as  philosophy 
turned  away  more  from  the  study  of  the  macrocosm 
to  that  of  the  microcosm,  the  more  it  realized  how 
every  act  of  a  man  is  the  inevitable  result  of  circum- 
stances plus  his  character.  To  render  responsible 
and  to  punish  for  an  act  that  cannot  be  helped  is 
foolish.  On  the  contrary,  the  more  one  comprehends 
a  person  the  more  one  becomes  charitable  in  one's 
judgments,  the  more  one  becomes  just.  To  condemn 
an  irresponsible  man  is  not  moral  because  it  is  intel- 
lectually false,  because  it  is  a  logical  mistake.  A 
retributive  God  would  be  an  intellectual  monster. 
The  fear  of  divine  punishment  may  undoubtedly  be 
a  motive  of  action;  but  yet  it  is  a  motive  behind 
which  may  or  may  not  be  found  a  reality.     If  this 


76  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

reality  actually  exists,  it  would  point  to  a  God  pun- 
ishing men  for  acts  which  they  could  not  help  com- 
mitting. 

The  man  who  has  made  such  reflections  as  these 
cannot  or  will  not  any  longer  believe  in  a  God  of 
vengeance;  or  if,  for  reasons  of  another  kind,  he 
nevertheless  believes  in  him,  he  will  refuse  to  regard 
him  as  a  superior  being,  he  will  refuse  him  his  ado- 
ration. According  to  his  "  temperament  "  he  will 
be  abject  or  haughty  toward  him. 

We  have  thus  found  a  criterion,  which  pragma- 
tism did  not  furnish,  for  estimating  the  relative 
value  of  the  respective  opinions  of  King  and  James. 
It  is  an  intellectualist  criterion.  From  which  it 
results  that  the  pragmatism  of  a  man  is  worth  just 
as  much  as  his  intellect. 


V 

Such  assistance  as  this  —  forced  and  really  anti- 
pragmatic,  —  intellectualism  cannot  bestow  except 
in  the  case  of  an  isolated  problem.  When  we  con- 
sider pragmatism  as  a  philosophical  whole  then  in- 
tellectualism can  intervene  only  to  bring  out  in  full 
light  a  failure.  What  becomes  of  the  application  of 
the  pragmatic  method  when  it  is  delivered  over  to 
its  own  proper  resources  ?  This  is  the  next  and  last 
question. 

Pragmatists  make  the  needs  of  man  their  starting 
point;    but  they  don't  give  themselves  the  trouble 


THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  PRAGMATISM        77 

even  to  set  these  needs  in  order ;  they  just  take  them 
as  they  come,  never  troubhng  themselves  about  their 
relative  value  or  their  relations  with  each  other. 
They  have  sometimes  vague  ideas  about  the  beauti- 
ful, the  good,  and  universal  progress ;  but  these  are 
mere  zvords;  squeeze  them  a  little  and  nothing  re- 
mains. It  is  in  this  that  pragmatism  is  inferior  even 
to  eclecticism.  The  latter,  starting  from  psychologi- 
cal data,  at  least  made  the  attempt  to  constitute  a 
system  of  needs  or  of  faculties  —  idealistic,  sensa- 
tional, sceptic,  and  mystic  —  the  ensemble  of  which 
made  the  human  being  one.  This  unity  could  be 
contested;  but  there  was  at  least  something  to  dis- 
cuss about.  But  you  can't  get  a  grip  on  pragmatism ; 
when  you  try  to  seize  it,  it  slips  through  your  fingers. 
Under  pretext  of  doing  the  generous  thing  by  indi- 
vidualism, by  life,  and  inspired  by  a  suspicious  dread 
of  everything  that  savors  of  system  and  order,  they 
cleave  fast  to  chaos;  the  lack  of  co-ordination  is 
raised  to  the  height  of  a  principle.^     When  there  is 

^  Read  this  passage  by  William  James  (p.  148  of  his  Pragmatism)'. 
"The  world  is  One,  therefore,  just  so  far  as  we  experience  it  to  be 
concatenated,  one  by  as  many  definite  conjunctions  as  appear.  But 
then  also  not  one  by  just  as  many  definite  Jwjunctions  as  we  find. 
The  oneness  and  the  manyness  of  it  thus  obtain  in  respects  which 
can  be  separately  named.  It  is  neither  a  universal  pure  and  simple 
nor  a  multiverse  pure  and  simple.  And  its  various  manners  of  being 
one  suggest,  for  their  accurate  ascertainment,  so  many  distinct  pro- 
grams of  scientific  work.  Thus  the  pragmatic  question,  'What  is 
the  oneness  known  as?  What  practical  difference  will  it  make?' 
saves  us  all  from  feverish  excitement  over  it  as  a  principle  of  sub- 
limity and  carries  us  forward  into  the  stream  of  experience  with  a 
cool  head."  What's  the  use  of  talking  any  more  about  philosophy, 
seeking  relations  between  phenomena,  between  ideas,  between  sciences  ? 


78  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

no  unity  at  the  starting  point,  how  should  there  be 
such  anywhere?  With  this  "method"  every  want 
that  your  "  temperament "  invites  you  to  satisfy  be- 
comes the  point  of  departure  and  the  nucleus  of  a 
little  system  by  itself,  and  it  would  be  very  surpris- 
ing if  all  these  little  systems  built  up  at  random  out 
of  all  the  experiences  and  inspirations  of  the  famous 
"  temperament "  should  go,  of  themselves  and  judi- 
ciously, fit  themselves  together  to  form  a  grand  phil- 
osophic whole  (that  is  a  co-ordinated  whole).  At 
the  beck  of  that  enchanter's  wand  shall  ideas  mutu- 
ally contradictory,  when  in  different  historical  sys- 
tems, cease  to  contradict  each  other  when  they  are 
introduced  pell-mell  into  pragmatism  ?  That  is  what 
we  should  like  to  know.  Every  one  understands  that 
in  adopting  any  portion  of  a  theory  we  implicitly 
adopt  the  premises  on  which  it  is  based.  In  order 
to  get  the  constituent  parts  of  pragmatism  to  hold 
together  requires,  under  these  conditions,  prodigies 
of  skill,  subtlety,  mental  acrobatism.  Intellectualism, 
the  simple  reason,  no  longer  suffices.  After  every 
theory  that  you  have  established  you  have  to  refo- 
cus  your  instrument  or  your  method  upon  the  next 
problem  you  tackle.  Professor  James  himself  shall 
furnish  us  luminous  examples  of  this  "  method." 
Let  us  pass  rapidly  in  review  three  of  his  theories.^ 

If  we  see  a  relation,  very  well;  if  we  don't  see  it,  it  is  very  well  again; 
in  fact  it 's  better,  for  it  saves  us  a  little  of  that  thought  which  weighs 
so  heavy  on  M.  Papini's  mind.     (Article  cited,  p.  356.) 

*  I  know  that  my  readers  will  understand  that  if,  by  preference,  I 
make  William  James  my  antagonist  it  is  not  thereby  to  facilitate  my  task 


THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  PRAGMATISM        79 

In  the  third  lecture  on  "  Pragmatism "  James 
adopts  Berkeley's  method  of  treating  the  problem 
of  substance.  Per  se  it  makes  no  difference  whether 
substance  or  matter  exists  or  not;  all  that  is  neces- 
sary is  the  sensation  of  substance.  God  can  impart 
to  us  this  sensation  without  matter  really  existing  at 
all.  Provided  only  all  takes  place  as  if  it  did  exist, 
what  matters  it  to  us  to  know  anything  more  on  the 
subject?  It  is  a  useless  problem.  Away  with  it! 
Nevertheless,  some  philosopher  with  a  Cartesian 
temperament  might  appear  and  say,  "  Pardon  me, 
this  problem  does  concern  me,  for  certain  conse- 
quences depend  on  the  idea  that  I  form  to  myself 
of  God.  This  theory  of  Berkeley  embarrasses  me 
very  much;  for,  in  fine,  either  God  has  created  a 
substance  which  is  useless  (and  it  is  quite  unworthy 
of  him  to  create  useless  things),  or  else  he  deceives 
me  in  making  me  think  it  is  matter;  and  even 
though  it  should  be  a  thing  of  little  importance  for 
my  material  existence  w^hether  matter  exists  or  not, 
the  whole  affair  troubles  me  in  my  moral  life.  I  do 
not  relish  a  God  who  imposes  on  me,  and  I  wish  he 
were  vindicated  from  the  accusations  contained  in 
the  terms  of  this  dilemma."  To  this  Professor  James 
will  reply:  Leave  alone  your  anthropomorphic  no- 
tions of  God ;  the  idea  of  God  is  pragmatically  useful, 

but  because  he  is  the  ablest  representative  of  pragmatism.  In  spite 
of  the  modesty  with  which  he  always  conceals  himself  behind  others 
it  is  certain  that,  without  James,  pragmatism  would  not  exist;  and 
if  he  had  only  had  as  champions  such  dilettantes  as  Papini  and  cer- 
tain others,  this  whole  movement  would  have  been  still-born. 


8o  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

and  it  must  be  admitted  without  regard  to  certain 
''residual  difficulties"  outside  of  the  pragmatic 
domain  properly  so  called.     (Pragmatism,  p.  299.) 

The  same  problem  appears  apropos  of  the  moral 
consciousness.  William  James  recalls  Locke,  who 
shows  that  we  know  nothing  of  the  moral  conscious- 
ness except  its  effects,  nothing  of  its  real  existence. 
But  belief  in  its  real  existence  is  useful  to  the  prog- 
ress of  humanity;  let  us  therefore  believe  in  it, 
and  not  embarrass  ourselves  with  metaphysics  and 
anthropomorphisms. 

In  the  same  (the  third)  lecture  William  James 
proposes  "  another  problem."  The  topic  on  the  tapis 
now  is  to  decide  between  the  two  hypotheses  about 
the  creation  of  the  world,  —  the  materialistic  and  the 
idealistic.  In  a  few  luminous  pages  James  shows 
that,  from  the  rationalistic  point  of  view  (premising 
that  the  result  will  be  the  same  in  either  case,  and 
assuming  besides  that  the  two  theories  render 
account  of  the  facts  equally  well),  it  matters  very 
little  whether  the  world  be  a  material  or  a  divine 
product.  But,  he  adds,  it  matters  a  good  deal  prac- 
tically. "  Theism  and  materialism,  so  indifferent 
when  taken  retrospectively,  point,  when  we  take 
them  prospectively,  to  wholly  different  outlooks  of 
experience."  (Ibid.  p.  103.)  Which  is  it  better  for 
us  to  accept?     Pragmatism  answers:    "Theism." 

"  The  notion  of  God,  however  inferior  it  may  be  in 
clearness  to  those  mathematical  notions  so  current  in 


THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  PRAGMATISM        8i 

mechanical  philosophy,  has  at  least  this  practical  supe- 
riority over  them,  that  it  guarantees  an  ideal  order  that 
shall  be  permanently  preserved."     (Ibid.  p.  io6.) 

Very  v^ell.  But  where  now  are  the  eloquent  dis- 
courses of  the  pragmatists :  "  No  more  metaphysics, 
no  more  anthropomorphism  "  ?  What  is  Mr.  James 
doing  here  if  not  that  which  he  has  just  condemned? 
Doubtless  many  will  not  perceive  it,  for  when  we 
speak  of  God  in  this  day  we  mean  naturally  the 
Christian  God,  whom  we  naturally  conceive  as  all 
powerful,  all  wise,  and  all  good.  But  this  power, 
this  wisdom,  and  this  goodness  are  far  from  being 
contained  a  priori  in  the  idea  of  spiritual  deity  in 
opposition  to  matter.  Before  God  acquires  prag- 
matic value  he  must  have  certain  "  attributes."  ^ 
Now  the  history  of  religions  swarms  with  examples 
of  gods  inferior  in  power  to  other  gods,  who,  them- 
selves subordinate  to  fate,  are  intellectually  brutes 
and  morally  detestable.  The  God  postulated  by 
William  James's  pragmatism  is  anthropomorphic 
like  the  others,  except  that  the  man  who  conceived 
it  is  superior  (I  considered  this  point  a  moment 
ago),  and  consequently  he  conceives  a  superior  God. 

So,  then,  anthropomorphism  and  metaphysics  are 
out  of  place  in  such  and  such  a  discussion;  beware 
of  having  recourse  to  them.  But  they  are  indis- 
pensable in  this  other;    do  not  deprive  yourself  of 

^  An  observation  analogous  to  that  expressed  in  the  text  by  the 
writer  inspired  the  critiques  of  Hoeffding  and  of  Boutroux  upon  the 
conception  of  religion  that  appears  in  William  James's  writings. 

6 


;45Ht 


82  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

their  help.  Really  now,  is  not  this  an  admirable 
method?    Long  live  pragmatism! 

But  wait;  here  is  a  third  theory  proposed  by 
James.  God  must  be  conceived  as  having  benevo- 
lent intentions  toward  man  and  "  guaranteeing  an 
ideal  order  that  shall  be  permanently  preserved  " ; 
without  that,  he  would  be  useless  and  not  true.  Yet 
the  spectacle  of  nature  and  of  society  makes  us 
ponder,  and  it  is  one  of  the  claims  of  the  pragmatists 
that  they  take  facts  more  fully  into  consideration 
than  did  former  philosophers;  now  some  believed 
they  had  given  a  true  account  of  the  facts  here  to 
be  taken  into  consideration  by  declaring  that  the 
world  does  not  reveal  a  good  God  (any  more  than 
it  does  a  bad  God).  But  James  and  the  pragmatists, 
considering  the  idea  of  God  as  expedient,  cannot 
abandon  it.  Here  then  arises  a  conflict  between 
facts  and  expediency,  and  neither  of  the  two  ele- 
ments can  be  sacrificed.  What  are  we  going  to  do 
about  it  ?  —  It  is  a  very  simple  thing :  merely  re- 
adjust the  focus  of  your  philosophical  apparatus. 
Facing  out  a  poor  play  with  a  bold  and  cheerful 
face,  the  pragmatists  will  hold  forth  very  much  as 
follows : 

God  is  good,  and,  undoubtedly,  in  this  there  lies 
an  anthropomorphic  notion  indispensable  to  us.  But 
one  must  not  be  too  anthropomorphic;  why  should 
God  be  wholly  good?  After  all,  a  God  who  would 
make  everybody  happy  —  let  us  leave  such  a  dream 
to  the  Hindoos,  or  other  metaphysicians  of  their 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  PRAGMATISM        83 

stamp,  who  are  afraid  of  life.^  As  for  us,  on  the 
other  hand,  we  have  no  objection  to  a  God  who  lets 
men  flounder  about  a  Httle  in  a  dangerous  world 
and  gives  them  the  opportunity  of  vanquishing  ac- 
cumulated obstacles.  (See  Pragmatism,  pp.  295- 
297.)  It  is  true  that  the  innocent  suffer  and  that 
the  unworthy  often  triumph.  It  is  true  that,  as  in 
a  battle,  the  bullets  hit  or  miss  as  chance  directs; 
but  never  mind  the  carnage,  the  disasters,  the  strange 
madness  of  men,  since  some  have  the  joy  of  merited 
triumph  and  thus  human  "  dignity  "  is  safeguarded. 
"  Meliorism,"  this  is  our  doctrine,  as  opposed  to  an 
optimism  which  the  facts  contradict.  In  brief,  we 
have  no  use  for  a  God  who  could  have  conceived  and 
created  a  world  in  which  justice  and  dignity  should 
both  be  perfectly  satisfied;  and  even  if  you  should 
chance  not  to  be  convinced  by  our  reasoning,  yet  we, 
for  our  part,  love  our  pragmatic  God  better  as  he  is. 
This  strangely  recalls  the  history  of  a  certain  fox, 
who,  after  having  lost  his  tail,  gave  an  elegant  ad- 
dress to  his  fellow  foxes  on  the  ridiculousness  of 
continuing  to  carry  about  a  thing  so  evidently  useless 
as  the  appendage  of  which  an  annoying  accident  had 

*  "The  Hindoo  and  the  Buddhist,  for  this  is  essentially  their  atti- 
tude, are  simply  afraid,  afraid  of  more  experience,  afraid  of  life.  And 
to  men  of  this  complexion,  religious  monism  comes  with  its  consoling 
words:  'All  is  needed  and  essential  —  even  you  with  your  sick  soul 
and  heart.  All  are  one  with  God,  and  with  God  all  is  well.  .  .  .' 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  when  men  are  reduced  to  their  last  sick 
extremity  absolution  is  the  only  saving  scheme.  Pluralistic  monism 
(which  James  opposes  to  monism,  cf.  Pragmatism,  p.  i6o)  simply 
makes  their  teeth  chatter,  it  refrigerates  the  very  heart  in  their 
breast."     {Ibid.  pp.  292,  293,) 


84  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

deprived  him.  However,  never  mind  that.  What 
I  wish  to  insist  on  is  the  arbitrariness  of  what  is 
called  the  pragmatic  ''  method."  Let  us  rapidly  re- 
capitulate. We  have  just  seen  that  the  same  phi- 
losophy at  one  time  condemned  metaphysics  and 
anthropomorphism  (the  problem  of  substance  and 
of  conscience)  ;  and  at  another  itself  made  use  of 
metaphysical  speculation  outright  (the  problem  of 
spiritualism  and  materialism)  ;  then,  when  certain 
logical  consequences  of  its  metaphysical  premises 
became  troublesome  (for  they  clashed  with  *' reali- 
ties") it  quickly  admitted  the  propriety  of  dosing 
its  metaphysics  according  to  the  needs  of  the  case 
(the  problem  of  evil  and  suffering  in  the  world). 

Some  one  may  here  exclaim  again :  "  But  prag- 
matism has  always  denied  that  it  is  a  system;  its 
adherents  have  carefully  avoided  this  term  and  have 
replaced  it  by  '  philosophic  movement,'  ^  attitude,' 
'  genetic  method,'  or  what  not."  Precisely ;  these 
are  the  measures  they  take  to  extricate  themselves 
from  embarrassment.  The  device  is  inspired  either 
by  shrewd  cunning  or  by  consciousness  of  the  weak- 
ness of  their  position,  and  cannot  be  tolerated  in  a 
serious  discussion.  "  A  door  must  be  either  open  or 
closed,"  and  a  philosophy  must  either  be  a  systematic 
philosophy  or  not  be  at  all.  Call  pragmatism  by 
whatever  name  you  please,  if  the  thing  itself  does 
not  stand  for  ideas  having  some  relation  to  each 
other,  then  why  are  they  grouped  together?     Is  it 


THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  PRAGMATISM        85 

so,  that  we  ask  method  of  a  banker,  a  grocer,  a 
laundress,  and  do  not  dare  to  ask  it  of  a  philosopher? 
One  does  not  like  to  put  up  with  this  kind  of  jesting. 
What  the  pragmatists  would  really  like  is  that  people 
should  benevolently  consider  their  philosophy  as  a 
system  but  not  regard  them,  the  pragmatists,  as 
bound  to  fulfil  the  conditions  requisite  in  the  case. 
The  criticism  of  pragmatism  made  on  every  hand, 
that  it  is  an  exaggerated  individualism,  authorizing 
all  kinds  of  fantastic  vagaries,  is  perfectly  justified.^ 
By  warrant  of  w^hat  authority,  or  in  the  name  of 
what,  shall  we  limit  the  claims  of  any  individual 
desire  or  need  whatever?  Professor  James  himself 
insists  strongly  on  the  rights  of  "  temperament " : 

"  Pragmatism  is  willing  to  take  anything,  to  follow 
either  logic  or  the  senses,  and  to  count  the  humblest 
and  most  personal  experiences.  She  will  count  mysti- 
cal  experiences   if  they  have  practical  consequences. 

^  What  ought  to  be  said  regarding  that  phase  of  the  discussion  has 
been  well  expressed  and  concisely  in  the  excellent  article  of  Professor 
J.  E.  Creighton,  "  The  Nature  and  Criterion  of  Truth  "  {Philosophi- 
cal Review,  XVII,  No.  6):  "As  a  protest  against  the  attitude  of  the 
free  lance  who  asserts  his  right  to  make  his  own  standpoint  and 
method,  I  am  insisting  that  no  such  individual  or  arbitrary  procedure 
offers  any  hope,  or  has  any  genuine  title  to  the  name  of  philosophy  " 
(p.  596).  And  again:  "The  view,  then,  which  I  am  endeavoring  to 
state,  and  which  I  think  has  been  established  by  the  historical  develop- 
ment of  philosophical  conceptions,  maintains  that  the  relation  between 
the  mind  and  reality  is  essentially  inner  and  organic.  Experience 
throughout  all  its  modes  is  the  expression  of  this  unity  in  difference." 
The  function  of  thought  is  "to  determine  concretely  and  still  in  uni- 
versal terms  the  real  world''  (p.  600).  (Italics  are  mine.)  See  also 
"  Experience  and  Thought "  by  the  same  author  {Philosophical 
Review^  XV,  No.   5),  especially  pp.   488  and  489. 


86  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

She  will  take  a  God  who  lives  in  the  very  dirt  of  pri- 
vate fact  if  that  should  seem  a  likely  place  to  find  him." 
{Pragmatism^  p.  80;  cf.  also  pp.  71,  y2,  153,  etc.) 

Why,  then,  do  they  speak  of  "  impudent  slander," 
and  vehemently  protest  when  others  do  no  more 
than  accept  their  own  statements?     (Ibid.  p.  233.) 

There  is  one  misunderstanding,  however,  that 
must  be  avoided ;  it  is  a  mistake  to  think  that  prag- 
matism favors  more  the  gratification  of  our  low 
desires  than  it  does  our  superior  ones.  Since  it  is 
said  that  pragmatism  justifies  everything  without 
discrimination,  many  persons  have  taken  pleasure  in 
believing  that  it  particularly  favors  the  gross  appe- 
tites. This  is  evidently  unjust.  William  James  de- 
votes all  of  his  final  lecture  to  the  refutation  of  cer- 
tain bewildered  minds,  and  to  showing  that,  as  for 
him,  it  has  led  him  to  religion.  Of  course  no  one 
believes  that  pragmatism  could  ever  direct  William 
James  to  any  but  lofty  and  generous  aims;  more- 
over, those  who  are  fond  of  practising  the  principles 
of  a  low  and  vile  philosophy  are  not  often  those  who 
enjoy  writing  discussions  about  their  doctrines.  But 
it  is  none  the  less  true,  and  may  be  used  as  a  weapon 
against  pragmatism,  that  you  cannot  find  in  it  any 
principle  that  forbids  a  priori  a  mean  inferior  tem- 
perament from  cultivating  with  good  show  of  right 
an  inferior  pragmatism  and  exalting  its  merits. 
Pragmatism  is  a  little  in  the  same  predicament,  in 
this  respect,  as  epicureanism,   which  as  lived  and 


THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  PRAGMATISM        87 

practised  by  an  Epicurus,  or  a  Lucretius,  has  nothing 
offensive  about  it;  or  as  utilitarianism,  which  the 
pen  of  John  Stuart  Mill  renders  noble  and  refined. 
Yet  of  both  these  systems  others  may  make  a  differ- 
ent use.  We  are  led  once  more  to  the  opinion  ex- 
pressed a  few  pages  previously:  a  pragmatism  is 
worth  just  what  the  man  who  formulated  it  is  worth. 
Now  a  philosophy  ought  to  be  judged  from  an  imper- 
sonal point  of  view.  But  of  all  philosophies  prag- 
matism fulfils  this  condition  with  least  satisfaction. 
Indeed,  epicureanism  with  its  principle  of  "the  great- 
est amount  of  pleasure  possible,"  still  afforded  mat- 
ter for  discussion ;  and  in  utilitarianism  you  have  the 
principle  "  the  greatest  happiness  possible  for  the 
greatest  number,"  which  still  more  limited  the  im- 
agination. Neither  the  one  system  nor  the  other  was 
characterized  by  precision ;  but  there  was  an  attempt 
at  it;  its  necessity  was  recognized.  Pragmatism 
has  none  of  these  formulas ;  "  the  expedient,"  "  the 
opportune,"  that  is  all.  As  I  have  already  observed, 
Mr.  James  confesses,  in  his  eighth  lecture  —  on  the 
whole  the  only  one  in  which  he  stops  constructing 
the  theory  of  pragmatism  in  order  to  offer  us  prag- 
matic theories  —  that  he  speaks  only  for  himself. 

Of  all  the  philosophies  up  to  this  time  proposed 
to  men,  pragmatism  is  the  least  philosophic. 


CHAPTER    II 

THE   DEWEY    CASE  ^ 

Among  the  representatives  of  pragmatism  in 
America,  there  is  one  whose  position  is  not  very 
clearly  defined.  Pragmatists  have  good  reasons  to 
claim  him  as  being  one  of  them,  while  he  himself 
has  good  reason  for  keeping  somewhat  on  the  de- 
fensive. He  has  reiterated  his  hesitations  once  more 
in  his  criticism  of  William  James's  book.  {The 
Journal  of  Philosophy,  February  13,  1908.  See  es- 
pecially p.  96.)  The  "Dewey  case"  is  interesting 
and  characteristic.  It  is  worth  while  to  devote  one 
chapter  to  a  close  examination  of  it. 

Professor  Dewey  is  not  exactly  obscure,  but  from 
a  French  point  of  view,  at  least,  he  is  certainly  neither 
simple  nor  easy.  I  have  wondered,  at  times,  whether 
the  endless  windings  of  his  philosophical  thought 
have  not  contributed  much  to  gain  for  him  the  envi- 
able reputation  of  being  "  the  most  scientific  "  rep- 

^  I  am  aware  that  Professor  Dewey  and  his  disciples  claim  that 
he  was  misunderstood  in  this  chapter.  As,  however,  they  have  so 
far  refused  to  prove  it,  I  am  not  able  to  make  any  changes.  What- 
ever few  precise  accusations  they  have  consented  to  formulate,  I  have 
answered  in  The  Journal  of  Philosophy  in  reply  to  Mr.  Moore's  Dis- 
cussion of  May  27,  1909.  Moreover,  in  Appendix  A  of  this  volume, 
I  have  added  a  few  words  regarding  the  "Argument  of  Silence." 


THE    DEWEY    CASE  89 

resentative  of  pragmatism.  In  studying  more  closely 
his  theories,  one  understands  that  Professor  Dewey 
hesitates  —  whether  consciously  or  unconsciously  I 
would  not  venture  to  say  —  between  two  ways  of 
thinking  which  fundamentally  contradict  each  other, 
and  that  he  devotes  a  great  part  of  his  strength  to 
conciliate  them ;  thus  the  real  meaning  of  his  "  tours, 
detours,  et  retours  "  becomes  apparent. 

There  is  very  distinctly  at  the  bottom  of  his  spec- 
ulations a  preoccupation  similar  to  that  which  one 
finds  in  his  brothers  in  pragmatism;  namely,  to 
bring  nearer  ethics  and  scientific  truths  on  the  do- 
main of  logic.  The  title  of  his  long  and  famous 
essay.  Logical  Conditions  of  a  Scientific  Treatment 
of  Morality  (Chicago,  1903),  is  a  complete  pro- 
gram by  itself.  Only,  instead  of  demonstrating  that 
moral  judgments  have  the  same  characteristics  as  the 
scientific  judgments  (as  one  would  have  expected, 
and  as  every^  one  else  would  have  done,  it  seems, 
who  wanted  to  show  that  moral  judgments  can 
really  be  ''  scientifically  treated  "),  Professor  Dewey 
chooses  to  do  just  the  reverse;  the  first  part  of  his 
essay  is  destined  to  show  that  scientific  judgments 
have  the  characteristics  of  the  moral  judgments. 

His  conception  of  the  "  moral  judgment "  — 
which  might,  perhaps,  sound  somewhat  old- 
fashioned  to  some  of  us  —  is  the  one  he  finds  pre- 
vailing all  around  him  in  the  Anglo-Saxon  world, 
namely : 

I.  Moral  judgments  are  individual,  i.  e.,  aim  at 


90  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

solving  particular  cases,  and  since  each  case  is  indi- 
vidual, the  value  of  those  judgments  is  absolute,  not 
relative;  as  opposed  to  scientific  judgments,  which 
are  usually  considered  as  being  universal,  i.  e.,  good 
to  solve  not  only  individual  cases,  but  any  other  simi- 
lar cases :  in  science  there  are  universal  cases,  people 
think,  not  in  ethics.  Now,  says  Professor  Dewey 
(anxious,  I  repeat  it,  not  to  reduce  moral  judgments 
to  scientific  judgments,  but,  on  the  contrary,  scien- 
tific judgments  to  moral  judgments),  this  is  erro- 
neous. A  scientist  is  looking  for  general  laws,  it  is 
true;  but  at  the  same  time  he  wants  to  solve  indi- 
vidual cases  or  problems ;  laws  are  not  science,  but 
only  a  means  to  get  science;  and  if  a  law  does  not 
solve  a  specific  problem,  the  scientist  will  change  the 
law  and  not  the  problem.  Thus  science,  like  ethics, 
aims  at  the  individual  case. 

2.  As  applied  to  practical  life,  moral  judgments 
imply  the  intervention  of  the  personality  of  the  one 
who  judges,  as  one  factor  in  the  judgment.  And 
here  again,  scientific  judgments,  if  one  only  studies 
them  closely  enough,  are  like  moral  judgments; 
they  imply  a  personal  intervention,  or  action,  on  the 
part  of  the  one  who  judges,  (a)  in  the  classification 
of  possible  predicates,  (b)  in  the  selection  of  the 
individual  cases  to  be  studied  to  solve  a  problem, 
(c)  in  the  choice  of  the  means  for  verifying  an 
hypothesis,  either  by  experience  or  by  demonstration. 
In  those  three  operations  the  personality  of  the 
judger,  or,  as  Dewey  says,  his  "  character,"  modifies 


THE   DEWEY   CASE  91 

the  judgment,  guides,  suggests.  Thus:  "  If  the  use 
of  scientific  resources,  of  technique  of  observation 
and  experiment,  of  systems  of  classification,  etc.,  in 
directing  the  act  of  judging  (arid  thereby  fixing  the 
content  of  the  judgment),  depends  upon  the  interest 
and  disposition  of  the  judger,  we  have  only  to  make 
such  dependence  explicit,  and  the  so-called  scientific 
judgment  appears  definitely  as  a  moral  judgment '' 

(p.  14).^ 

All  this  can  be  expressed  in  the  following  formula : 
The  so-called  scientific  judgments,  or  purely  objec- 
tive judgments,  being  an  abstraction  without  real 
existence,  it  is  not  possible  to  speak  of  scientific  judg- 
ments which  have  not  at  the  same  time  the  charac- 
ters of  the  moral  judgments.  Or,  still  more  briefly : 
Scientific  judgments  exist  only  as  moral  judgments. 
And  the  conclusion  would  be :  Since  scientific  judg- 
ments have  the  fundamental  characters  of  moral 
judgments  —  aim  at  individual  cases  and  imply  the 
intervention  of  personality  —  moral  judgments  are 
as  good,  as  scientific,  as  are  scientific  judgments. 

So  far  the  spirit  is  altogether  the  same  as  the  one 
prevailing  in  Messrs.  James  and  Schiller :  man  can- 
not not  be  subjective  in  his  judgments  and  opinions. 
Thus,  if  his  moral  judgments  are  subjective,  they 

^  Except  when  otherwise  stated,  I  quote  from  the  essay  on  Logical 
Conditions  of  a  Scientific  Treatment  of  Morality.  I  add  that  the 
complete  and  somewhat  subtle  demonstration  which  has  just  been 
summarized,  in  order  to  render  clearer  the  following  pages,  will  be 
found  on  p.  9  ff.  and  p.  26. 


92  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

are  worth  as  much  as  his  scientific  judgments  (which 
latter  are  as  a  matter  of  course  scientific).  Only 
the  way  of  expressing  things  is  more  scholastic  with 
Professor  Dewey. 

But  once  this  point  has  been  reached,  the  ground 
becomes  slippery ;  for  there  is  only  a  short  distance 
to  go  before  one  feels  like  saying,  Since  the  sub- 
jective element  really  creates  our  judgments  (scien- 
tific or  moral),  since  it  is  the  unavoidable  condition 
of  judgment,  it  is  therefore  indispensable,  and  it  is 
therefore  the  really  important  element.  And  then, 
one  takes  still  another  step :  but  then  the  moral 
judgment,  in  which  the  subjective  element  is  more 
marked,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  than  in  the  scientific 
judgment,  ought  therefore,  in  case  of  conflict  or 
hesitation,  to  be  considered  superior  to  the  scientific 
judgment.  There  is  the  explanation  of  Mr.  Schil- 
ler's paradox,  that  in  case  one  has  absolutely  to 
choose  between  irrationalism  and  intellectualism,  the 
first  shall  have  the  preference  with  the  pragmatist. 
{Humanism,  p.  5.)  Those  arguments  are  obviously 
false.^  Scientific  judgments  are,  perhaps,  all  sub- 
jective, but  it  does  not  follow  that  they  will  be  better 
for  it.  To  maintain  that  subjectivism  being  una- 
voidable is  indispensable,  and  thus,  that  the  more 
there  will  be  of  it,  the  better  for  our  judgments, 
holds  still  less.  But  all  this  is  ''  indispensable  "  for 
pragmatism,  which  proposes  to  confer  upon  man  the 
right  to  choose  or  to  give  out  what  truth  shall  be 

*  This  is  discussed  in  detail  in  the  first  chapter  of  this  volume. 


THE   DEWEY    CASE  93 

according  to  what  is  opportune,  instead  of  simply 
ascertaining  it. 

To  come  back  now  to  Professor  Dewey :  as  far  as 
I  have  summarized  his  paper  he  has  not  decided  yet 
for  pragmatism ;  he  has  only  reduced  scientific  judg- 
ments to  moral  judgments,  thus  the  logic  of  science 
to  the  logic  of  ethics.  But  will  he  stay  there?  It 
seems  that  he  ought  to;  for,  to  reduce  the  logic  of 
science  to  the  logic  of  ethics,  or  the  logic  of  ethics 
to  the  logic  of  science,  is  it  not  practically  the  same? 
Is  not,  in  both  cases,  the  logic  of  ethics  incorporated 
into  the  logic  of  science?  It  seems  that  the  only 
thing  that  remains  to  do,  for  a  logician  in  the  strict 
sense  of  the  word,  would  be  to  show  that  this  sub- 
jectivism, pointed  out  by  Mr.  Dewey  in  scientific  and 
moral  judgments,  does  not  impair  their  value,  be- 
cause (one  must  be  well  aware  of  the  fact)  scientific 
and  moral  judgments  can  be  equally  bad,  as  well 
as  equally  good. 

But  Professor  Dewey  does  not  care  about  that. 
Consciously  or  unconsciously,  he  ignores  this  big 
question.  He  has  something  else  in  view.  Let  it 
be  recalled  once  more  that  the  title  of  his  essay  is 
Logical  Conditions  of  a  Scientific  Treatment  of 
Morality.  From  the  wording  of  this  title  we  must 
infer  that  in  his  mind  there  exist  special  logical 
conditions  for  ethics  (or  "morality"  —  I  confess 
that  the  reason  for  the  selection  of  this  word  is  not 
clear  to  me),  for  nobody  would  dream  of  writing 
about  special  logical  conditions  for  physics  or  chem- 


94  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

istry.  There  are,  of  course,  in  each  domain  of  sci- 
ence, special  conditions  for  scientific  researches,  but 
no  special  "  logical  "  conditions.  Professor  Dewey, 
therefore  —  in  view  of  a  purpose  which  he  does 
not  render  clear  —  does  not  wish  to  affirm  logical 
identity  between  scientific,  and  moral  judgments,  but 
only  equivalence  in  value.  In  fact,  he  is  going  to 
follow  in  the  steps  of  pragmatists  like  Messrs. 
James  and  Schiller ;  after  having  made  great  efforts 
to  bring  nearer  together  science  and  ethics  (or  mo- 
rality), he  is  going  to  devote  his  efforts  now  to  draw- 
ing a  sharp  distinction  between  them.  Only,  he  is 
more  clever,  or  more  cautious,  than,  for  example, 
Mr.  Schiller;  he  is  not  going  to  risk  and  claim  a 
superiority  of  moral  judgments  over  scientific  judg- 
ments, for  this  drives  one  to  a  corner,  namely,  that 
the  irrational  —  or  a-rational  —  is  superior  to  the 
rational;  moreover,  the  argument  of  Mr.  Schiller 
is  altogether  too  easily  seen  through.  No,  when 
Professor  Dewxy  crosses  the  Rubicon  in  his  turn  he 
will  cross  it  elsewhere;  taking  it  for  granted  that 
he  has  proved  the  equivalence,  he  will  claim  further 
nothing  more  but  the  independence  of  moral  judg- 
ments with  regard  to  scientific  judgments. 

This  cleverness,  however,  will  not  go  a  very  long 
way.  Thanks  to  a  bold  trip  to  logic,  Mr.  Schiller 
had  gotten  rid  of  the  latter  and  run  away;  he  was 
now  free.  But  Professor  Dewey,  who  conscientiously 
refuses  to  part  company  with  logic  —  a  praiseworthy 
attempt,  after  all  —  will  soon  find  out  that  logic  is 


THE   DEWEY    CASE  95 

stronger  than  he  is,  and  that  the  dangerous  partner 
whom  he  has  chosen  is  simply  going  to  prevent  him 
from  ever  reaching  his  goal,  a  morality  which  is 
logically  independent  from  science.  He  wdll  finally 
do  exactly  the  reverse  of  what  he  intended,  namely, 
he  will  reduce  the  logic  of  ethics  to  the  logic  of 
science. 

This  is  the  way  he  establishes  a  difference  be- 
tw^een  the  two  logics :  While  the  intrusion  of  the 
personal  element  (or  "  character")  is  without  prac- 
tical results  in  the  scientific  judgments,  in  the  moral 
judgments,  on  the  contrary,  this  personal  element 
"  qualitatively  colors  the  meaning  of  the  situation  " ; 
it  has  an  actual  bearing  on  conduct ;  a  moral  judg- 
ment is  almost  an  act.  Thus,  thinks  Dewey,  since, 
owing  to  circumstances,  the  personal  element  = 
zero  in  the  scientific  judgments,  it  is  useless,  "  logi- 
cally "  speaking,  to  take  it  into  account,  while  it  is 
impossible  to  ignore  it  in  moral  judgments  when  we 
know  it  to  be  a  fact  that  it  does  play  an  important 
part :  "  Character  as  a  practical  condition  becomes 
logical  when  its  influence  is  preferential  in  effect  — 
when  instead  of  being  a  uniform  and  impartial  con- 
dition of  any  judgment  it  is,  if  left  to  itself  (or 
unstated),  a  determinant  of  this  content-value  of 
judgment  rather  than  that  "  (p.  161). 

Is  not  all  this  rather  extraordinary?  If  subjec- 
tivism (or  "character")  =  zero,  logically,  in  the 
scientific  judgments,  what  is  the  meaning  of  those 
long  pages  and  elaborate  arguments  of  the  first  half 


96  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

of  the  essay  in  order  to  prove  that  subjectivism  is 
there  and  acts  in  the  same  manner  as  in  the  moral 
judgments? 

One  of  two  things  must  be  true:  Either  Mr. 
Dewey  means  to  say  that  in  the  moral  judgments 
there  is  something  which  is  not  to  be  found  in  the 
scientific  judgments,  namely,  subjectivism;  but,  in 
this  case,  he  flatly  contradicts  himself,  since  the  first 
part  of  his  essay  is  written  to  prove  that  there  is  sub- 
jectivism in  the  scientific  judgments  as  well  as  in 
the  moral  judgments.  He  tells  us  now  that  when  the 
action  of  "  character  "  (or  of  subjectivism)  becomes 
"  preferential "  in  its  effect,  then  the  judgment  by 
this  fact  becomes  logical.  But  what  then  ?  As  this 
action  of  character  is  not  "  preferential "  in  the  sci- 
entific judgment,  have  we  to  believe  that  the  scien- 
tific judgment  is,  perhaps,  no  longer  "  logical "  ? 
Unless  one  means  to  make  fun  of  logic,  such  affir- 
mations cannot  be  taken  seriously. 

Or  Mr.  Dewey  means  to  say  that  there  is  a  mini- 
mum of  subjectivism  in  scientific  judgments,  while 
the  proportion  is  simply  greater  in  moral  judgments; 
but  then  we  have  to  deal  with  a  mere  differ- 
ence in  quantity,  not  in  quality,  not  a  difference  in 
the  nature  of  the  judgment;  if  the  action  of  the 
"  character  "  is  simply  more  complex  in  the  moral 
judgments  than  in  the  scientific  judgments,  this  is 
not  enough  to  differentiate  them  "  logically."  And 
then  moral  judgments  are  reduced  to  scientific  judg- 
ments. —  One  must  choose. 


THE   DEWEY    CASE  97 

Now,  on  the  other  hand,  Professor  Dewey  cannot 
choose  the  second  alternative,  since  he  started  with 
the  idea  of  proving  the  opposite.  On  the  other  hand, 
Dewey  cannot  not  choose  the  second  alternative, 
since  he  speaks  of  *'  logical  conditions  of  a  scien- 
tific treatment  of  morality " ;  unless  one  adopts 
in  ethics  the  same  logic  which  is  adopted  in  sci- 
ence, one  cannot  speak  of  a  "  scientific  "  treatment 
of  morality. 

Professor  Dewey  has  finally  accepted  the  second 
alternative  —  and  he  sticks  to  it.  The  second  half  of 
his  essay,  therefore,  contradicts  the  first ;  as  was  to 
be  expected.  Here  is  his  definition  of  "  character  " 
—  everything  depends  on  this  definition :  "  The 
term  *  character  '  denotes  this  complex  continuum 
of  interactions  [i.  e.,  interactions  of  natural  dispo- 
sitions, of  technique,  of  knowledge,  of  habits  of 
thought,  etc.]  in  its  ofiice  of  influencing  final  judg- 
ment"  (p.  14).  This  plainly  indicates  that  for  Mr. 
Dewey  "  character  "  is  an  effect  before  being  a  cause, 
a  product  (determined  by  considerations  concerning 
the  future  as  well  as  by  circumstances  in  the  past), 
and  which  acts  only  as  a  product  strictly  determined ; 
"  character  "  can  be  treated  "  logically  "  in  the  same 
sense  as  any  factor  in  any  scientific  judgment.  All 
attempts  to  differentiate  between  moral  and  scien- 
tific judgments  are  doomed  to  failure  after  that. 

To  convince  ourselves  that  such  is  really  the  point 
of  view  adopted  by  Professor  Dewey  in  the  end,  we 

7 


98  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

need  only  summarize  the  end  of  his  essay.  It  is  true 
that  here  and  there  the  author  seems  to  hesitate  in 
developing  his  ideas;  it  is  the  pleading  of  a  de- 
terminist,  who  is  embarrassed  by  free-will  reminis- 
cences. Professor  Dewey,  at  times,  even  takes 
advantage  of  terms  having  a  double  meaning;  es- 
pecially when  he  considers  the  "scientific  treatment" 
as  serving  "  to  control  the  formation  of  judgment  " 
(p.  14).  "To  control"  may  mean  to  interfere  in 
an  active  fashion,  independently  of  the  scientific  fac- 
tors taken  into  consideration  or  it  may  mean  simply 
that,  knowing  the  factors  which  may  enter  into  the 
determination,  i.  e.,  being  conscious  of  them,  this 
consciousness  only  adds  a  new  factor  (just  as  deter- 
mined as  the  others)  in  the  formation  of  the  judg- 
ment. Professor  Dewey  proves  the  second  sense  to 
be  true,  hut  then  speaks  as  if  he  had  demonstrated 
the  first.  It  seems  clear,  therefore,  to  one  who  judges 
from  the  spirit  and  not  from  the  letter,  that  Professor 
Dewey,  in  his  conception  of  morality,  finally  adopts 
the  traditional  scientific  conception  of  judgment. 

He  wants  to  prove  this:  That  an  ethical  judg- 
ment "  effects  an  absolutely  reciprocal  determina- 
tion of  the  situation  judged,  and  of  the  character 
or  disposition  which  is  expressed  in  the  act  of 
judging"  (p.  17). 

To  appreciate,  or  to  form,  or  to  control,  moral 
judgments,  three  conditions  are  required:  (i)  One 
must  classify  them,  (2)  one  must  know  exactly  the 
psychological  conditions,  the   "  character "    of   the 


THE   DEWEY   CASE  99 

judger,  and  also  know  (3)  the  social  conditions  in 
which  the  judgment  takes  place,  "  the  situation 
judged." 

(i)  To  classify:  Mr.  Dewey  wishes  to  define 
clearly  the  domain  of  ethics;  he  proposes  to  have  a 
sort  of  system  of  ethical  "  categories  "  correspond- 
ing to  the  categories  of  time,  space,  matter,  etc.,  in 
physics.  One  must,  for  instance,  agree  on  the  mean- 
ing of  the  term  "  moral  standard,"  whether  it  has 
any  connection  with  happiness,  or  with  the  ideal  of 
perfection;  thanks  to  this  we  might  then  discuss 
profitably  questions  of  ideal,  of  obligation,  of  re- 
sponsibility, and  of  others.  The  writer  confesses 
that  he  does  not  see  very  well  the  bearing  of  such 
theoretical  discussions.  What  does  Professor  Dewey 
exactly  mean  with  those  categories  anyway?  Does 
he  wish,  after  all,  to  persuade  us  that  there  remains 
somewhere  an  essential  difference  between  the  logic 
of  science  and  that  of  morality;  or  does  he  simply 
mean  to  point  out  the  fact  that  the  domain  of  moral 
researches  is  different  from  that  of  physics,  for  ex- 
ample, or  other  sciences?  In  the  second  case,  it  is 
rather  useless  to  write  a  chapter  to  prove  so  evident 
a  thing ;  in  the  first  case,  those  "  logical "  connections 
between  ethics  and  science,  which  precisely  he  wanted 
to  bring  out,  are  not  made  clear.  The  only  example 
offered,  that  of  the  "  moral  standard,"  gives  no 
light;  one  does  not  see  whether  he  speaks  of  an 
absolute  and  imperative  standard,  or  of  a  relative 
and  changing  one.     If  the  "  absolute  "  standard  is 


loo  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

meant,  where  does  it  come  from?  is  it  metaphysi- 
cal ?  is  it  the  old  "  moral  sense  "  ?  But,  then,  what 
is  the  use  of  a  "scientific"  treatment  of  morality? 
Psychological  factors  and  social  factors  cannot  af- 
fect it  in  the  least.  And  if  the  "  relative  "  standard 
is  meant,  if  the  standard  depends  on  the  milieu  and 
on  character  as  determined  by  contingencies,  how 
can  we  define  the  "  category  "  of  standard  otherwise 
than  by  the  mere  attribute  of  existence  ?  Then,  here 
again,  we  have  a  very  superfluous  chapter.  One 
thing  seems  clear  to  me  in  all  this :  Mr.  Dewey  wants 
to  bring  ethics  nearer  to  physical  sciences,  to  prevent 
arbitrariness  in  definitions  and  concepts;  in  short, 
to  confer  upon  ethics  the  logical  qualities  of  natural 
sciences.  But  "  categories "  are  useless  for  that 
purpose;  even  in  physics,  the  categories  of  space, 
time,  matter,  are  of  secondary  importance.  No 
professor  of  physics,  as  far  as  we  know,  discusses 
them  as  an  indispensable  introduction  to  his  special 
subject.  They  are  questions  pertaining  to  the  theory 
of  knowledge,  or,  possibly,  to  psychology,  rather 
than  to  physics.  In  the  same  manner  "  moral  cate- 
gories "  would  have  only  a  distant  relation  with 
ethics,  even  if  conceived  as  scientifically  as  physics. 
If  not  conceived  in  this  way,  things  may  be  diflfer- 
ent;  but  then  the  parallelism  between  moral  cate- 
gories and  scientific  categories,  which  Professor 
Dewey  has  in  mind,  exists  no  longer. 

(2)    Professor  Dewey's  demonstration  becomes 
much  more  satisfactory  when  he  deals  with  the  psy- 


THE   DEWEY    CASE  loi 

chological  conditions  of  moral  judgment.  The  in- 
trinsic logic  of  his  premises  prevents  him  from  going 
astray :  "  Since  character  is  a  fact  entering  into  any 
moral  judgment  passed,  ability  of  control  depends 
upon  our  power  to  state  character  in  terms  of  generic 
relation  of  conditions,  which  conditions  are  detach- 
able from  the  pressure  of  circumstance  in  the  par- 
ticular case.  Psychological  analysis  is  the  instru- 
ment by  which  character  is  transformed  from  its 
absorption  in  the  values  of  immediate  experience 
into  an  objective,  scientific  fact.  It  is,  indeed,  a 
stat-ement  of  experience  in  terms  of  its  modes  of 
control  of  its  own  evolving"  (p.  19).  Thus,  if  we 
isolate  by  analysis  the  factor  of  "  character,"  we  are 
able  to  show  that  it  is  determined  in  its  essence,  and 
determined  also  in  its  determination,  i.  e.,  in  its 
manner  of  judging.  We  cannot  conceive  of  it  in 
any  other  way.  Dewey  even  proposes  to  make  an 
"  inventory  "  of  the  manners  in  which  the  different 
psychological  dispositions  do  influence  our  judg- 
ment; and  the  results  thus  obtained  "  if  true  at  all, 
have  exactly  the  same  logical  validity  that  is  pos- 
sessed by  any  '  physical  law  '  "  (p.  20). 

If,  after  that  —  be  it  that  he  does  not  realize  the 
consequences  of  his  premises  or  be  it  that  he  does 
not  want  to  see  them  —  Professor  Dewey  declares 
that  this  analysis  applied  to  experience  allows  us  to 
"  control  "  judgments  "  instead  of  merely  indulging 
in  them  "  (p.  21),  this  is  of  no  importance;  we  have 
pointed  out  above  the  double  meaning  of  the  term 


I02  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

"  to  control."  Supposing  that  Professor  Dewey  take 
it  here  in  the  sense  of  active  intervention,  indepen- 
dently of  the  scientific  conditions  in  judgment,  no- 
body else  will  be  deceived  by  this  amphibology  after 
the  words  which  we  have  just  quoted  from  Mr. 
Dewey's  own  demonstration.  Again,  if  Professor 
Dewey  claims  that,  while  psychology  shows  to  us 
that  the  moral  judgment  is  determined  by  contin- 
gencies, psychology  tells  us  nothing  of  the  content 
of  the  moral  ideal,  nor  that  ''  consequently  there 
must  be  recourse  to  transcendental  considerations  — 
to  metaphysics"  (p.  21),  this  alters  in  no  way  the 
scientific  problem;  the  idea  of  an  ideal  may  be  a 
factor,  to  be  sure,  but  it  becomes  one  only  after  it 
has  entered  the  scientific  or  psychological  net  of 
actions  and  interactions.  Moreover,  how  would  it 
be  possible  to  conciliate  this  appeal  to  metaphysics 
with  the  following  words,  a  few  lines  farther  down : 
**  There  is  no  question  here  of  idea  as  immediately 
experienced.  Only  living,  not  metaphysics  any 
more  than  psychology,  can  '  give '  an  ideal  in  this 
sense  "  (p.  22). 

(3)  Sociological  conditions.  ''  Character,"  we 
have  just  seen,  can  be  scientifically  defined  by  us, 
therefore  it  must  be  scientifically  determined.  Now 
this  factor  of  character.  Professor  Dewey  goes  on  to 
say,  combines  in  an  "  absolute  reciprocal  determina- 
tion "  with  the  factor  of  the  "  situation  judged  " ;  and 
the  scientific  and  determined  nature  of  the  latter  is 
even  more  evident  than  that  of  character.    To  bring 


THE   DEWEY    CASE  103 

about  a  good  moral  judgment  what  do  we  need  ?  In 
reply,  Mr.  Dewey  says :  "  A  social  science  which  will 
analyze  a  content  as  a  combination  of  elements  in 
the  same  way  that  psychological  analysis  determines 
an  act  as  a  set  of  attitudes  "  (p.  2^).  It  is,  more- 
over, impossible  to  observe  very  strictly  the  dis- 
tinction between  psychological  and  sociological  con- 
ditions because  the  social  influences  here  taken  into 
consideration  come  into  action  only  in  as  far  as  they 
influence  the  judger,  i.  e.,  in  as  far  as  they  become 
psychological.  Professor  Dewey,  therefore,  wishes 
here  only  to  emphasize  what  he  calls  the  ''  continuity 
of  the  scientific  judgments,"  namely,  the  interaction 
social,  biological,  physical,  etc.,  phenomena  when 
they  bear  upon  the  moral  judgment.  "  Any  scene 
of  action  which  is  social  is  also  cosmic  or  physical. 
It  is  also  biological.  Hence  the  absolute  impossi- 
bility of  ruling  out  the  physical  and  biological  sci- 
ences from  bearing  upon  ethical  science.  If  ethical 
theory  require,  as  one  of  its  necessary  conditions, 
ability  to  describe  in  terms  of  itself  the  situation 
which  demands  moral  judgment,  any  proposition, 
whether  of  mechanics,  chemistry,  geography,  physiol- 
ogy, or  history,  which  facilitates  and  guarantees  the 
adequacy  and  truth  of  the  description,  becomes  in 
virtue  of  that  fact  an  important  auxiliary  of  ethical 
science  "  (p.  24) .  Professor  Dewey  opposes  this  con- 
ception to  that  of  materialists  and  of  transcenden- 
talists.  Materialists,  like  those  described  there,  exist 
no  longer,  so  we  may  ignore  them.     Transcenden- 


I04  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

talists  are  more  interesting  for  us.  It  has  been 
shown  that  in  discussing  the  psychological  condi- 
tions of  moral  judgments  Mr.  Dewey  still  hesitated 
whether  or  not  metaphysics  had  to  be  given  up  alto- 
gether. This  time  he  no  longer  hesitates :  "  The 
fact  that  advance  of  physical  and  biological  science 
so  profoundly  modifies  moral  problems,  and  hence 
moral  judgments,  and  hence  once  more  moral  val- 
ues, may  serve  as  an  argument  against  transcen- 
dental ethics  —  since,  according  to  the  latter,  such 
obvious  facts  would  be  impossibilities"  (p.  24). 

Where  now,  in  all  this,  is  there  any  room  left  for 
a  pragmatic  element?  where  the  thinnest  crack  by 
which  it  might  slip  in?  Since  a  moral  judgment  is 
the  result  of  an  "  absolutely  reciprocal  determina- 
tion "  of  the  judger  and  of  the  situation  judged,  the 
moral  ideal  itself  is  only  a  product  of  this  combina- 
tion and  must  vary  from  epoch  to  epoch ;  and  in  its 
variations  it  depends  strictly  upon  the  circumstances 
in  which  the  judger  happens  to  be  with  regard  to 
the  situation  judged.  A  metaphysical  ideal  which 
would  not  be  determined  in  the  scientific  sense  of 
the  word,  is  both  impossible  and  useless;  there  is 
no  room  for  it.  The  moral  ideal  is  brought  about 
"  naturally  "  by  the  combination  of  the  two  above- 
mentioned  factors;  the  ideal  of  to-morrow  will  be 
formed  necessarily  from  the  ideal  of  to-day.  Now, 
if  I  become  conscious  of  this  mechanism,  I  may  see 
where  the  ethics  of  to-morrow  is  aiming,  and  I  may 
favor  (or  thwart)  its  course;  but  in  this  very  action 


THE   DEWEY    CASE  105 

of  favoring  (or  thwarting),  the  element  of  "  recip- 
rocal determination,"  which  can  be  scientifically 
foreseen,  is  far  from  lacking. 

If  the  method  proposed  by  Mr.  Dewey  is  conscien- 
tiously applied,  the  results  reached  will  be  the  same 
as  those  of  Levy-Briihl  in  his  La  morale  et  la  science 
des  moeurs,  he  himself  following  in  the  steps  of 
Durkheim's  Methode  sociologique.  It  is  not  a  mat- 
ter of  mere  chance  if  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic, 
and  without  seeming  to  know  of  each  other,  those 
men  agree  so  well  on  a  theory  which  precludes  prag- 
matism. Is  it  not  as  if  one  were  reading  Dewey  — 
only  in  a  style  more  direct,  more  transparent  — 
when  one  comes  across  these  words  of  Levy-Briihl : 
"  La  conception  nouvelle  des  rapports  de  la  pratique 
et  de  la  theorie  morale  implique  qu'il  y  a  une  realite 
sociale  objective,  comme  il  y  a  une  realite  physique 
objective,  et  que  I'homme,  s'il  est  raisonnable,  doit 
se  comporter  a  I'egard  de  la  premiere  comme  de 
I'autre,  c'est  a  dire  s'efforcer  d'en  connaitre  les 
lois  pour  s'en  rendre  maitre  autant  qu'il  lui  sera 
possible."  {La  morale  et  la  science  des  moeurs,  2d 
ed.,  p.  24.) 

Only  Levy-Briihl  is  more  determined,  more  con- 
scious of  the  bearing  of  his  method :  "  D'une  fagon 
generale,  notre  conception  de  la  nature  s'agrandit  et 
s'enrichit  chaque  fois  qu'une  portion  de  la  realite  qui 
nous  est  donnee  dans  T  experience  se  '  desubjective ' 
pour  *  s'objectiver.' "  {Pragmatism,  p.  29.)  "Just  like 
Professor  Dewey,  Levy-Briihl  wants  to  complete  the 


io6  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

psychological  anaylsis  of  the  judger  by  the  sociologi- 
cal analysis  of  the  situation  judged :  "  Au  lieu  d'inter- 
preter  les  phenomenes  sociaux  du  passe  a  I'aide  de 
la  psychologic  courante,  ce  serait  au  contraire  la 
connaissance  scientifique  —  c'est  a  dire  sociologique 
—  de  ces  phenomenes  qui  nous  procurerait  peu  a  peu 
une  psychologic  plue  conforme  a  la  diversite  reelle 
de  I'humanite  present  et  passee."  ^ 

Everywhere  Levy-Briihl  very  plainly  expresses  his 
theories  and  his  results,  when  with  Mr.  Dewey  the 
reader  constantly  feels  caution.  The  first  frankly 
states :  "  Une  science  ne  peut  etre  normative  en  tant 
que  theorique"  (p.  14).  And  what  the  second 
wanted  so  much  to  show  was  that  a  science  can  be 
normative  while  theoretical;  but  the  power  of  logic 
finally  carried  him  one  way,  though  his  intention 
was  evidently  the  other  way.  Read  his  note  to 
page  13  (there  are  very  interesting  statements  some- 

*  La  morale  et  la  science  des  mceurs,  p.  79.  There  are  even  cer- 
tain concessions  to  popular  moral  conceptions  which  can  be  found 
in  Levy-Briihl  as  well  as  in  Mr.  Dewey.  Thus  for  instance,  the  first 
says:  "De  meme  que  nous  avons  de  presque  toute  la  realite  donnee 
dans  I'espace  deux  representations  parfaitement  distinctes,  I'une  sen- 
sible et  subjective,  I'autre  conceptuelle  et  objective;  de  meme  que 
le  monde  des  sons  et  des  couleurs  est  aussi  I'objet  de  la  science  phy- 
sique, .  .  .  de  meme  nous  pouvons  posseder  en  meme  temps  deux 
representations  de  la  realite  morale,  I'une  subjective,  I'autre  objec- 
tive" (p.  31).  Such  a  concession  is  useless  as  long  as  we  deal  in  a 
scientific  manner  with  our  topic.  (Levy-Briihl  had  already  adopted 
the  distinction  in  his  first  book.)  The  conception  of  a  morale  con- 
ditionnelle  introduced  by  A.  Naville  in  the  discussion  (Revue  philo- 
sophique,  December,  1906)  sufl&ces  to  clear  the  field,  and  allows  us 
once  for  all  to  ignore  popular  conceptions  of  ethics  in  science.  I 
may  add  that  the  distinction  made  by  Ldvy-Bruhl  does  not  side- 
track the  discussion  at  all  in  his  work. 


THE   DEWEY   CASE  107 

times  in  Professor  Dewey's  notes!)  in  which,  after 
his  attempt  to  reduce  scientific  judgments  to  moral 
judgments,  or,  in  other  words,  the  theoretical  judg- 
ments to  normative  or  pragmatic  judgments,  he  re- 
fuses *'  to  draw  sharp  lines  between  philosophy  (his 
philosophy)  as  merely  normative  and  the  sciences  as 
merely  descriptive."  Why  does  he  refuse?  Is  it 
because  he  sees  the  inevitable  consequences? 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  understand  the  funda- 
mental difference  between  Messrs.  James  and  Dewey 
in  the  problem  under  consideration ;  both  start  with 
the  same  end  in  view,  which  is  to  shake  off  intellec- 
tualism;  both,  again,  when  they  examine  conscien- 
tiously the  problem,  are  forced,  as  they  want  to  re- 
main logical,  to  adapt  their  pragmatic  theories  to  the 
requirements  of  reason.  But  Professor  James  proves 
specially  anxious  not  to  lose  sight  of  the  end  which 
he  had  proposed  to  his  speculations,  and  more  anx- 
ious to  save  the  practical  results  than  to  offer  a  mere 
philosophical  argument ;  thus,  he  remains  true  to  the 
flag  of  pragmatism.  Professor  Dewey,  on  the  con- 
trary, proves  especially  anxious  to  offer  a  fine  and 
smooth  argument,  and  thus  allows  himself  to  be 
driven  away  by  his  speculations  from  the  purpose  he 
had  at  first  in  view;  he  finds  himself,  at  the  end,  to 
be  the  defender  of  a  theory  exactly  opposite  to  that 
which  he  had  intended  to  prove :  and  this  just  because 
he  is  the  more  conscientious  of  the  two. 

From  this  point  of  view,  therefore,  people  are 


io8  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

right  enough  when  they  maintain  that  Mr.  Dewey  is 
the  most  philosophical  mind  among  the  leading 
pragmatists,  only,  his  philosophy  is  at  the  expense 
of  his  pragmatism. 

It  is  well  known  that  Mr.  Peirce  found  himself 
caught  in  the  same  difficulty.  He  has  admitted  it, 
and  the  famous  passage  in  Baldwin's  Dictionary  has 
been  often  quoted,  in  which  he  refuses  to  go  all  the 
way  with  too  buoyant  disciples.  One  ought  now  to 
compare  Peirce's  statement  with  a  curious  note  of 
Professor  Dewey's  —  another  case  where  a  very  sig- 
nificant statement  is  relegated  to  a  foot-note :  "  The 
point  of  view  which  is  here  presented  is,  of  course, 
distinctly  pragmatic.  I  am  not  quite  sure,  however, 
of  the  implications  of  certain  forms  of  pragmatism. 
They  sometimes  seem  to  imply  that  a  rational  or 
logical  statement  is  all  right  up  to  a  certain  point, 
but  has  fixed  external  limits,  so  that  at  critical  points 
recourse  must  be  had  to  considerations  which  are  dis- 
tinctly of  an  irrational  or  extra-logical  order.  .  .  . 
It  is  just  the  opposite  which  I  am  endeavoring  to 
sustain,  vis.  .  .  ."  (p.  lo).  Yes,  of  course.  There 
is  the  dilemma  precisely :  Professor  James  sees  well 
enough  —  without  heralding  it  too  loud  —  that  in 
following  logic  to  the  end,  there  is  no  pragmatism 
left,  and  in  order  to  be  allowed  to  remain  a  pragma- 
tist,  it  is  necessary,  at  one  certain  point  — to  jump.^ 
While  Professor  Dewey,  who  obstinately  persists 

*  "Materialism  and  agnosticism  [read  simply  'determinism'  even 
werie  they  true,  could  never  gain  universal  and  popular  acceptance, 


THE   DEWEY    CASE  109 

in  remaining  true  to  logic,  keeps  of  pragmatism 
nothing  but  the  word,  and  lands  in  the  science  des 
mccurs.  .  .  - 

for  they  both,  alike,  give  a  solution  of  things  which  is  irrational  to  the 
practical  third  of  our  nature"  {Will  to  Believe,  p.  126).  Even  were 
they  true,  a  man  who  would  really  believe  in  the  possibility  of  prov- 
ing logically  that  they  are  not  true,  would  not  have  recourse  to  such 
hypothetical  argumentation. 


PART  II 
PRAGMATISM   AND   MODERNISM 

Quand  la  populace  se  mele  de  raisonner,  tout 
est  perdu.  —  Voltaire. 

CHAPTER    I 

SOCIAL  PHENOMENA  EXPLAINING  THE  APPEARANCE 
OF  A  PRAGMATIC  PHILOSOPHY 

I.  In  a  democratic  country  and  epoch  philosophic  thought  is 

not  free,  for  we  must  take  into  consideration  the  practical 
consequences  of  our  theories.  Philosophy  is  less  free  to-day 
everywhere  than  it  formerly  was ;  but  in  America,  a  country 
without  traditions  of  an  intellectual  aristocracy,  it  is  still 
less  free  than  elsewhere.  Moreover,  in  America,  a  rich 
country,  but  the  wealth  of  which  must  come  chiefly  from 
the  soil,  there  is  need  of  a  philosophy  believing  in  action; 
a  determinist,  or  fatalistic  philosophy  would  not  be  tolerated. 
Proofs  that  this  is  the  case:  The  philosophy  of  William 
James  reflects  exactly  this  way  of  looking  at  things ;  how  he 
seeks  to  justify  it.  —  Special  features  (nuances)  that  distin- 
guish American  from  English  pragmatism:  Prof.  James 
speaks  to  a  whole  people  who  are  already  convinced ;  he  sets 
forth  his  doctrines  with  serenity  well  assured  of  sympathetic 
audiences.  Mr.  Schiller  addresses  a  restricted  audience,  a 
university  and  intellectual  audience,  and  is  obliged  to  assume 
a  more  polemical  attitude  toward  intellectualism.  Prof. 
James  grows  enthusiastic  over  the  idea  of  risks  in  life; 
Mr.  Schiller  rather  points  out  the  danger  of  non-prag- 
matism, etc.;  Mr.  Papini  sings  the  same  tune  as  Mr. 
Schiller,  only  in  a  higher  key. 

II.  On  the  other  hand,  to  counterbalance  the  consequences  that 


SOCIAL   PHENOMENA  iii 

might  follow  this  philosophy  of  success,  which  threatens 
to  lead  to  Hobbes's  homo  homini  lupus,  we  must  have  a 
curb  or  check.  Religion  is  the  only  efficacious  curb.  Ac- 
cordingly, the  obligation  on  pragmatism  is  to  be  religious. 
For  conscience  without  religion,  without  God  to  ratify  the 
voice  of  conscience  by  reward  or  recompense,  is  insufficient; 
men  would  soon  content  themselves  with  the  mere  appearance 
of  virtue.  Fallacy  of  the  theory  which  maintains  that  dogma 
disappears.  There  are  pragmatic  dogmas  and  indififerent 
dogmas;  only  the  latter  are  relegated  to  the  background. 
Facts  which  support  this  view:  Politicians,  magistrates, 
financiers,  manufacturers,  the  intellectual  class,  all  sup- 
port and  countenance  religion.  Ethical  societies  in  their 
role  of  opponents  of  the  churches  are  a  failure.  Illustra- 
tions drawn  from  the  financial  panic  of  1907-1908.  Here 
again  Professor  James  reflects  faithfully  this  aspect  of  the 
pragmatic  spirit;  at  least,  when  he  speaks  as  a  pragmatist, 
this  utilitarian  side  of  religion  is  the  only  one  he  brings  out. 
—  Points  of  difference  between  the  French  and  the  English 
pragmatists  in  this  matter. 

From  all  that  precedes,  we  are  forced  to  con- 
clude that  there  must  be  something  more  at  the 
base  of  the  astonishing  success  of  pragmatism  than 
philosophic  principles.  If,  from  the  point  of  view 
of  thought,  its  worth  is  so  little,  how  explain  its 
triumph  ?  The  answer  is  that  special  and  accidental 
circumstances  have,  so  to  speak,  forced  the  hand  of 
philosophers. 

I 

To  seek  out  these  accidental  occurrences  and  pre- 
sent them  to  view  is  the  object  of  this  chapter. 

I  observe,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  great  strong- 
hold of  pragmatism  is  America ;  it  has  some  friends 


112  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

in  England;  but,  in  spite  of  a  certain  renewal  of 
interest  in  ethical  questions  noticeable  everywhere 
in  these  days,  it  has  not  taken  deep  root  anywhere 
else.  Now  civilization  in  America  is  the  daughter 
of  that  of  Europe,  an  emancipated  daughter,  by  the 
way,  but  who  has  emancipated  herself  very  rapidly 
and  very  normally.  I  say  this  without  any  mental 
reservation  whether  of  blame  or  of  approbation ;  we 
need  not  ask  whether  evolution  has  been  retrogres- 
sive or  progressive.  What  does  interest  us  I  shall 
now  state. 

The  relations  between  philosophy  and  life  have 
changed  during  the  last  few  centuries.  It  is  need- 
less to  say  there  has  always  been  reciprocal  action, 
mutual  influence,  of  the  one  on  the  other.  For  in- 
stance, philosophers  have  always  to  some  extent 
adapted  their  philosophy  to  the  wants  of  the  people. 
But  formerly  all  depended  on  them  (the  philoso- 
phers). Of  their  speculations  only  what  they  wished, 
and  as  they  wished  it,  reached  the  masses ;  they  had 
the  prudence  to  cultivate  in  the  minds  of  said  masses 
a  healthful  —  I  was  going  to  say  "  pragmatic  "  — 
ignorance,  reserving  for  their  own  special  medita- 
tion the  most  considerable  and  the  most  delicate  part 
of  the  domain  of  thought;  they  had  their  special 
language,  the  Latin,  which  screened  them  from  the 
effects  of  their  indiscretions.  To-day,  on  the  con- 
trary, their  books  are  written  in  the  popular  tongues ; 
thanks  to  the  development  of  printing,  compulsory 
education,   journalism,   public  libraries,   etc.,    these 


SOCIAL   PHENOMENA  113 

philosophic  theories  filter  down  to  the  very  dregs 
of  the  populace  of  every  nation;  that  means  that 
they  have  a  much  greater  practical  importance. 
Owing  to  this  the  philosopher  has  a  moral  responsi- 
bility that  he  did  not  formerly  know.  In  other 
words,  by  automatic  action,  the  freedom  of  thought 
granted  to  the  masses  exactly  equals  the  freedom  of 
thought  taken  from  the  philosophers ;  that  is  a  law 
of  nature;  the  degrading  effects  of  it  are  making 
themselves  felt  everyw^here. 

But,  as  I  have  just  said,  there  exist  also  in  a  coun- 
try like  America  special  and  aggravating  circum- 
stances. Among  Europeans,  the  existence  of  deeply 
rooted  traditions  of  life  —  which  are  only  habits 
passed  on  from  generation  to  generation  —  dimin- 
ishes the  influence  of  thought  and  guarantees  still  to 
philosophic  speculation  a  certain  measure  of  free- 
dom. In  America,  a  land  without  traditions,  men 
act  more  as  they  please,  and  philosophic  thought  is 
less  free  in  proportion.  Nay  more,  in  America  we 
have  to  do  with  a  nation  in  a  constant  state  of  cre- 
ation. The  American  with  one  or  two  generations 
of  native  ancestors  back  of  him  does  not  reproduce 
himself;  increase  of  population  is  due  to  immigra- 
tion. This  renders,  therefore,  the  formation  of 
traditions,  even  for  the  future,  extremely  difficult 
if  not  impossible,  —  another  cause  (this)  of  the 
considerable  practical  cast  and  weight  of  philosophi- 
cal ideas  and  the  proportional  diminution  of  freedom 
of  thought.     Finally,  America  has  immense  natural 

8 


114  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

resources  to  develop  and  cultivate;  she  is  rich,  but 
only  on  condition  of  exerting  a  formidable  energy; 
her  climate  is  trying  and  changeable,  and  the  earth 
only  yields  its  foison  of  wealth  (I  mean  mineral 
resources  as  well  as  the  product  of  agriculture)  as 
the  result  of  compulsion. 

Under  such  circumstances  a  people  does  not  choose 
its  conception  of  life,  or  let  us  say  its  philosophy. 
Its  thinkers,  if  it  is  so  fortunate  as  to  be  granted  any, 
will  not  be  able  to  escape  the  influence  of  this  atmos- 
phere. Ideas  and  principles  purely  speculative  will 
be  nothing,  the  consequences  and  the  results  of  the- 
ories will  be  everything.  A  philosophy  which  should 
infer,  in  any  part  whatever  of  its  system,  a  limit  to 
action,  and  which  should  not  at  the  same  time  be  a 
means  of  protection  for  action,  might  as  well  not 
exist :  it  would  be  inoperative.  A  man  who  should 
be  inaccessible  to  considerations  of  practical  life  in 
his  method  of  thinking  would  be  regarded  not  only 
as  a  useless  person,  but  as  a  dangerous  and  even 
noxious  person. 

Such  is  the  attitude  of  the  elite  in  America.  By 
"  elite  "  I  mean  those  who  make  the  nation  what  it 
is,  the  kings  of  industry,  the  great  creators  of  busi- 
ness. (The  word  "elite"  in  history  does  not  have 
one  and  the  same  absolute  meaning  everywhere;  a 
Greek  of  the  elite  resembles  a  Roman  of  the  elite  or 
an  American  of  the  elite  as  a  book  resembles  a  sword 
or  a  piece  of  gold.)  To  realize  this  one  need  only 
know  something  of  the  life  story  of  these  great  ere- 


SOCIAL   PHENOMENA  115 

ators  of  American  civilization  —  who  are  not  the 
Washingtons,  the  Lincolns,  the  Roosevelts,  but  the 
Vanderbilts,  the  Goulds,  the  Carnegies,  the  Rocke- 
fellers, the  Pierpont  Morgans,  and  sometimes  even 
such  men  as  Tweed  and  Croker.  The  latest  of  these 
colossi,  Harriman,  ''  the  Napoleon  of  railroads," 
has  been  very  well  hit  off  by  a  writer  well  known 
in  America,  Lefevre.  (American  Magazine,  June, 
1907.)  "This  man,"  he  says,  "is  efficiency  mad; 
he  wants  results,  and  he  obtains  results.  An  un- 
productive piece  of  work  he  considers  immoral." 
This  is  the  credo  of  all  of  these  men  of  the  elite, 
enterprising,  energetic,  magnificent,  who  represent 
throughout  the  whole  world  the  American  "  type." 

The  intellectual  class  is  just  like  them.  In  the 
July-September  number,  1907,  of  the  American 
Journal  of  Sociology,  the  editor  thereof  (Professor 
A.  W.  Small)  publishes  an  earnest  article  in  which 
he  expresses  fear  that  American  thinkers  go  astray 
into  unproductive  researches.  He  speaks  first  of  all 
especially  of  the  social  sciences  and  shows  that  their 
worth  depends  on  the  reply  they  make  to  this  ques- 
tion :  "  What  is  there  potentially  within  the  self- 
conscious  human  being  and  how  can  he  embody  it 
in  a  practical  value?  "    And  next  he  says : 

"  I  can  see  nothing  but  hysterics  in  any  human 
activity  whatsoever  which  is  not  in  some  way  contrib- 
uting its  quota  toward  answering  this  question.  Sci- 
ences all  seem  to  me  so  many  triflings  with  capricious 
conceits  about  life,  unless  each  in  its  own  way  is  co- 


1 16  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

operating  with  all  other  investigations  of  human  expe- 
rience in  working  out  the  completest  report  possible 
upon  the  main  question  "  (p.  400). 

All  the  sciences  should  be  only  replies  to  the  ques- 
tion "What  should  we  know?"  but  only  in  the 
interest  of  the  question  ''What  should  we  do?" 
(p.  222).  Contempt  for  the  contemplative  or  aes- 
thetic life  is  general.  It  is  superfluous,  however,  to 
insist  on  these  facts,  which  are  pretty  widely  known. 
Nevertheless,  let  me  repeat  here,  as  an  illustration, 
an  incident  in  the  life  of  the  well-known  President 
Harper  of  the  University  of  Chicago.  Upon  his 
death-bed  this  man,  whose  life  was  so  fraught  with 
labor,  uttered  in  a  prayer  these  characteristic  words : 
"  And  Lord,  may  there  be  for  me  a  life  after  this 
life;  and  in  that  life  may  there  he  work  to  do,  tasks 
to  accomplish! "  Contrast  this  ideal  with  the  mo- 
nastic retreats  of  old,  with  the  apocalyptic  paradises 
of  past  ages !  And  do  not  forget  the  effect  of  suc- 
cess upon  men's  minds.  The  role  these  great  men 
of  action  play  in  their  land,  in  fact,  on  the  stage 
of  the  world,  intoxicates  them.  And  the  envy  that 
other  nations  feel  seems  to  still  more  authenticate 
and  ratify  their  opinions  in  their  own  eyes  and  urges 
them  continually  on  in  this  method  of  looking  at  life. 
Approach  such  people  as  these,  now,  and  say  to 
them  that  there  are  men  in  another  hemisphere  who 
do  not  reason  from  the  practical  value  of  a  theory  to 
its  truth,   who  do  not  judge  a  philosophy  by  its 


SOCIAL   PHENOMENA  117 

fruits,  men  who  do  not  dream  of  identifying  truth 
with  utility.     They  will  not  understand  you. 

And  the  pragmatist  philosophers  are  simply  men 
who  formulate  this  cast  of  mind  in  the  technical 
language  of  philosophy. 

Looking  again  into  William  James's  book,  we  see 
there  is  scarcely  a  page  in  which  he  does  not  soundly 
rate  the  traditional  philosophy  of  "  refinement " 
which  will  never  satisfy  minds  of  the  empirical 
temper.  (Pragmatism,  pp.  22,  2^.)  The  tradi- 
tional philosophy  is  considered  dead :  "  Truth  in- 
dependent, truth  that  we  find  merely ;  truth  no  longer 
malleable  to  human  need;  truth  incorrigible,  in  a 
word ;  such  truth  exists  superabundantly  —  or  is 
supposed  to  exist  by  rationalistically  minded 
thinkers ;  but  that  means  only  the  dead  heart  of  the 
living  tree,  and  its  being  there  means  only  that  truth 
also  has  its  palaeontology,  and  its  '  prescription,' 
and  may  grow  stiff  with  years  of  veteran  service 
and  petrified  in  men's  regard  by  sheer  antiquity." 
(Pragmatism,  pp.  64,  65.) 

"If  an  '  incorrigible  '  truth  exists  per  se,  it  ought 
not  to  exist  for  us,  at  any  rate  it  cannot  exist,  it 
does  not  exist."  Mark  this :  "  Never  were  as  many 
men  of  a  decidedly  empiricist  proclivity  in  existence 
as  there  are  at  the  present  day  "  (p.  14) .  And  this : 
"  We  philosophers  have  to  reckon  with  these  feelings 
on  your  part.  In  the  last  resort  it  will  be  by  them 
that  all  our  philosophies  shall  ultimately  be  judged  " 
(p.  38).    This  much  is  clear:  If  the  traditional  con- 


Ii8  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

ception  of  philosophy  does  not  bring  us  satisfaction, 
then  we  must  change  that  conception.  "  When  we 
say  this  theory  solves  a  problem  on  the  whole  more 
satisfactorily  than  that  theory,"  that  means  [and 
that  must  mean]  more  satisfactorily  to  ourselves, 
and  individuals  will  emphasize  their  points  of  satis- 
faction differently.  Pragmatism  agrees  with  nom- 
inalism, with  utilitarianism,  with  positivism,  so  far 
as  these  philosophies  are  *'  anti-intellectualist " ; 
that  is,  don't  generalize,  don't  declare  true  what  is 
not  expedient  and  don't  occupy  themselves  with  the 
idea  for  the  idea's  sake  (pp.  53,  54).  "  Theories  be- 
come instruments,  not  answers  to  enigmas  "  (p.  53). 
Philosophy  takes  account  of  nothing  but  the  prag- 
matic question,  "  In  what  respects  would  the  world 
be  different  if  this  alternative  or  that  were  true?" 
(pp.48,  200). 

We  see  now  why  theories  like  the  materialistic 
theory  and  like  Spencerianism  are  a  priori  abomi- 
nable systems;  they  are  so,  not  on  account  of  their 
principles,  but  on  account  of  their  consequences,  — 
the  one,  more  general,  declaring  mind  incapable  of 
reacting  against  the  determinism  of  the  world  of 
phenomena ;  the  other,  more  specialized,  announcing 
the  final  dissolution  of  things;  both  suggesting  the 
uselessness  of  effort,  both  discouraging,  therefore 
both  false.  "  This  utter  final  wreck  and  tragedy  is 
of  the  essence  of  scientific  materialism  as  at  present 
understood"  (p.  105).  And  if  some  one  should 
object  that  a  healthy  mind  does  not  occupy  itself 


SOCIAL  PHENOMENA  119 

with  consequences  when  the  question  is  solely  that  of 
a  search  for  truth,  "  Well,"  replies  Professor  James, 
"  I  can  only  say  that  if  you  say  this  you  do  injustice 
to  human  nature  "  (p.  108).  "  The  absolute  things, 
the  last  things,  the  overlapping  things,  are  the  true 
philosophic  concerns;  all  superior  minds  feel  seri- 
ously about  them  and  the  mind  with  the  shortest 
views  is  simply  the  mind  of  the  more  shallow  man  " 
(p.  108).  Professor  James  is  admirable  when  it 
comes  to  consistency,  and  he  would  unhesitatingly 
sacrifice  to  pragmatism  —  which  he  deems  to  be  of 
vital  importance  for  the  well-being  of  humanity  — 
the  aspiration  of  the  philosophers  of  all  time,  namely, 
the  finding  of  the  causal  scientific  relations  between 
phenomena,  the  conceiving  (they  are  his  own  words) 
the  "  Multiverse  "  of  the  masses  as  a  "  Universe." 
There  is  no  reason  (he  thinks)  why  man  should  con- 
tinue this  search ;  every  time  one  has  tried  it ;  the  end 
has  been  the  strangling  of  all  spontaneity  in  a  logical 
system  of  causes  and  effects ;  now  this  is  intolerable 
from  the  practical  and  human  point  of  view,  and 
since  it  is  easy  to  see  that  the  same  thing  will  keep 
happening  again  and  again,  let  us  make  a  stand  once 
for  all  for  pluralism.  "  We  can  easily  conceive  that 
every  fact  in  the  world  is  separate  and  singular; 
that  is,  dissimilar  to  every  other,  and  sole  of  its 
kind."  When  we  see  a  relation  we  affirm  a  ''  con- 
catenation " ;  when  we  fail  to  see  one,  never  mind, 
"  it  saves  us  from  all  feverish  excitement "  over  a 
principle  of  sublimity  and  "  carries  us  forward  into 
the  stream  of  experience  with  a  cool  head  "  (p.  148). 


120  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

"  The  true,  to  put  it  very  briefly,  is  only  the  ex- 
pedient in  the  way  of  our  thinking  "  (p.  222).  The 
true  changes  with  reference  to  us,  and  to  keep  on 
conceiving  it  from  this  relative  standpoint  is  our 
philosophic  duty.  "  Truth  this  side  of  the  Pyre- 
nees, error  on  the  other  side,"  wrote  Pascal,  iron- 
ically. Truth  yesterday,  error  to-day,  says  William 
James,  seriously. 

"  Ptolemaic  astronomy,  Euclidean  space,  Aristo- 
telian logic,  scholastic  metaphysics,  were  expedient  for 
centuries ;  but  human  experience  has  boiled  over  those 
limits,  and  we  now  call  these  things  only  relatively 
true,  or  true  within  those  borders  of  experience.  '  Ab- 
solutely '  they  are  false ;  for  we  know  that  those  limits 
were  casual  and  might  have  been  transcended  by  past 
theorists  just  as  they  are  by  present  thinkers  "  (p.  223). 

True,  William  James  is  right :  ''  The  general  tri- 
umph method  would  mean  an  enormous  change  in 
the  'temperament'  of  philosophy''  (p.  51). 

And  once  more  we  ask :  What  reason  for  all  this 
turning  of  things  upside  down?  The  reason  is  be- 
cause logical  pluralism  and  expediency  allow  prag- 
matism and  ethical  meliorism. 

"  For  rationalism  reality  is  ready-made  and  com- 
plete from  all  eternity,  while  for  pragmatism  it  is  still 
in  the  making,  it  awaits  part  of  its  complexion  from  the 
future."     {Pragmatism,  p.  257.) 

Only  those  abandon  themselves  to  rationalism  and 
absolutism  who,  either  because  of  inability  or  wil- 


SOCIAL  PHENOMENA  121 

fulness,  have  no  want  for  a  philosophy  of  action. 
For  others  the  belief  in  meliorism  is  indispensable, 
the  belief  in  "  risk "  is  healthful,  and  Professor 
James  works  his  way  up  finally  to  the  following 
utterances,  so  fraught  with  Yankee  energy: 

*'  Take  the  hypothesis  seriously  and  as  a  live  one. 
Suppose  that  the  world's  author  put  the  case  to  you 
before  creation,  saying :  *  I  am  going  to  make  a  world 
not  certain  to  be  saved,  —  a  world  the  perfection  of 
which  shall  be  conditional  merely,  the  condition  being 
that  each  several  agent  does  its  own  "  level  best."  I 
offer  you  the  chance  of  taking  part  in  such  a  world. 
Its  safety,  you  see,  is  unwarranted.  It  is  a  real  adven- 
ture, with  real  danger.  Yet  it  may  win  through.  It 
is  a  social  scheme  of  co-operative  work  genuinely  to 
be  done.  Will  you  join  the  procession  ?  Will  you  trust 
yourself  and  trust  the  other  agents  enough  to  face  the 
risk?' 

"  Should  you  in  all  seriousness,  if  participation  in 
such  a  world  were  proposed  to  you,  feel  bound  to  reject 
it  as  not  safe  enough?  Would  you  say  that  rather 
than  be  part  and  parcel  of  so  fundamentally  pluralistic 
and  irrational  a  universe,  you  preferred  to  relapse  into 
the  slumber  of  nonentity  from  which  you  had  been 
momentarily  aroused  by  the  tempter's  voice? 

"  Of  course,  if  you  are  normally  constituted,  you 
would  do  nothing  of  the  sort.  There  is  a  healthy- 
minded  buoyancy  in  most  of  us  which  such  a  universe 
would  exactly  fit.  We  would  therefore  accept  the 
offer  — '  Top !   und  schlag  auf  schlag ! '  " 

Verily  this  people  and  this  philosophy  are  made 
the  one  for  the  other. 


122  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

Professor  James  has  thrown  himself  more  and 
more  into  the  work  of  propagating  his  ideas  among 
the  general  public.  He  has  written  several  vigorous 
articles  for  American  magazines,  in  which  it  is  easy 
to  see  that  to  him  pragmatism  is  at  bottom  only  a 
kind  of  philosophical  justification  he  would  like  to 
offer  for  the  happy  dispositions  of  his  contempo- 
raries, and  especially  of  his  compatriots.  One  of 
these  articles  bears  the  expressive  sub-title,  "  The 
Keys  which  unlock  Hidden  Energies."  (American 
Magazine,  November,  1907.)  In  another  one  — 
''The  Social  Value  of  the  College-bred"  (Mc- 
Clure's  Magazine y  February,  1908)  —  we  read  that 
our  universities  ought  to  teach  biographical  history; 
that  is  to  say,  teach  the  virtues  that  have  succeeded 
in  the  world  and  been  admired,  train  college  stu- 
dents to  become  men  and  not  mere  pedants  of 
science  and  literature;    and  the  author  adds: 

"  Democracy  is  on  its  trial  and  no  one  knows  how 
it  will  stand  the  ordeal.  Abounding  about  us  are  pessi- 
mistic prophets.  .  .  ."  Now  who  knows?  They  may 
be  right :  "  Who  can  be  absolutely  certain  that  this 
[failure]  may  not  be  the  career  of  democracy?  Nothing 
future  is  quite  secure;  states  enough  have  inwardly 
rotted;  and  democracy  as  a  whole  may  undergo  self- 
poisoning.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  democracy  is  a  kind 
of  religion  and  we  are  bound  not  to  admit  its  failure. 
Faiths  and  Utopias  are  the  noblest  exercise  of  human 
reason,  and  no  one  with  a  spark  of  reason  in  him  will 
sit  down  fatalistically  before  the  croaker's  picture" 
(pp.  420,  421). 


SOCIAL   PHENOMENA  123 

Still  if  pragmatism  is  the  American  philosophy, 
natural,  necessary,  and  unique,  it  is  not  exclusively 
American.  It  is  also  English,  for  example.  Eng- 
lish, but  note  the  shade  of  difference.  Mr.  Schiller 
is  not  dealing,  as  is  Professor  James,  with  a  public 
pragmatic  already  in  temperament,  with  a  public  of 
converts.  Or,  at  any  rate,  the  English  public  he  ad- 
dresses is  such  to  a  much  less  degree.  Mr.  Schiller, 
it  is  true,  has  passed  through  an  American  univer- 
sity; but  he  is  influenced  in  writing  by  the  Oxford 
University  atmosphere,  and  Oxford  is  much  more 
in  contact  and  in  sympathy  with  the  calm  and  settled 
civilization  of  the  old  world  than  is  an  American 
university.  Professor  James  had  only  to  authenti- 
cate, note  down  and  approve;  while  Mr.  Schiller, 
with  exactly  the  same  ideas,  finds  himself  in  his 
milieu  set  down  as  a  dreamer,  and  has  need  of  all  the 
fiery  enthusiasm  of  an  apostle  to  make  himself  under- 
stood. With  Professor  James  you  never  feel  that 
you  are  listening  to  a  paradox ;  he  always  has  the  ap- 
pearance of  saying  to  his  public  (and  he  is  right)  : 
"  In  your  hearts  you  think  as  I  do,"  and  he  only 
endeavors  to  calmly  remove  misunderstandings  and 
to  prove  that  difficulties  are  only  apparently  such; 
while  Mr.  Schiller  has  to  shake  and  arouse  his 
audiences;  he  stoutly  and  loudly  asseverates  the 
antagonism  that  exists  between  intellectualism  and 
pragmatism.  We  need  ony  recall  his  comparison 
between  two  theories  (Humanisnty  pp.  9-12)  : 
**  There  is  no  future  life  " ;  "  there  is  a  future  life." 


1 24  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

The  first  is  the  more  acceptable  from  the  rationalist 
point  of  view;  but  the  second,  which  appeals  to  our 
needs  and  desires  and  calls  for  the  will  to  believe,  is 
the  true  one.  Mr.  Schiller  does  not  say  ''  still," 
''  nevertheless,"  "  in  spite  of  appearances  " ;  he  says 
that  it  is  precisely  because  the  second  is  the  "  voli- 
tional "  theory  (that  is,  one  in  which  "  our  thought 
is  impelled  and  guided  by  the  promptings  of  de- 
sire ")  that  it  is  the  true  one. 

Again  Professor  James  expatiates  complacently 
upon  the  idea  of  "  risk  "  requisite  to  give  the  true 
joy  of  living ;  he  speaks  with  the  fine  assurance  that 
becomes  the  scion  of  a  race  that  "  is  mewing  its 
mighty  youth,"  of  the  paralytic  and  the  old,  as  if 
those  words  did  not  correspond  to  anything  real  in 
his  thought.  But  Mr.  Schiller  looks  at  the  matter 
from  another  angle;  he  is  a  pessimist,  and  the  first 
merit  of  pragmatism,  in  his  eyes,  would  be  its  deliv- 
ering us  from  "  what  constitutes  perhaps  the  worst 
and  most  paralyzing  horror  of  the  naturalistic  view 
of  life,  —  the  nightmare  of  an  indifferent  universe." 
Note:  Its  delivering  us;  this  means  that  the  evil 
is  already  there;  it  is  not  a  question  of  losing  faith 
in  life;  it  z^  lost;  but  it  is  a  question  of  finding  it 
again,  and  the  second  merit  of  pragmatism  is  that 
"  it  will  prove  a  great  tonic  to  revigorate  a  griev- 
ously depressed  humanity."     {Humanism,  p.  13.) 

When  they  are  treating  of  the  fundamental  diffi- 
culties of  pragmatism  the  language  of  the  two  men  is 
again  characteristic.  Professor  James  placidly  recog- 


SOCIAL   PHENOMENA  125 

nizes  the  fact  that  pragmatism  admits  "  common 
sense  "  as  its  foundation ;  it  is  philosophy  that  has 
passed  through  the  sieve  of  experience  ever  since  the 
time  of  exceedingly  remote  ancestors.  (Pragmatism, 
p.  170.)  Mr.  Schiller  cannot  permit  himself  to  go  so 
far  as  that  in  the  country  of  Bacons,  Humes,  Stuart 
Mills,  and  Huxleys,  who,  indeed,  claim  to  be  above 
"  common  sense."  So  he  says,  more  modestly :  No, 
I  do  not  wish  to  receive  common  sense  as  "  sacro- 
sanct," but  let  us  only  try  "  to  start  from  these  con- 
ceptions, and  see  whether  we  shall  not  get  as  far 
with  them  as  with  any  other  of  the  philosophies  of 
history;  at  any  rate,  see  if  we  shall  not  get  as  far 
with  them  as  we  may  want  to  get."  (Humanism, 
p.  19.)  It  is  easy  to  see  the  nuance  of  difference 
here. 

Shall  I  add  a  word  about  Giovanni  Papini,  the 
Italian  pragmatist  ?  Mr.  Papini  thinks  it  a  frightful 
error,  the  indifference  of  thinkers  of  the  Latin  race 
respecting  the  practical  consequences  of  the  deter- 
minist-creed  of  the  scientists.  If  Mr.  Schiller  vocif- 
erates his  pragmatism,  Mr.  Papini  howls  his  out 
in  violent,  eccentric,  and  incoherent  paradoxes ;  and 
while  Messrs.  Dewey,  James,  and  even  Schiller  wish 
very  much  to  preserve  for  pragmatism  the  decent 
appearance  of  a  philosophy,  to  Mr.  Papini  philos- 
ophy is  the  enemy,  and  pragmatism  "  is  less  a  phi- 
losophy than  a  method  of  doing  without  philos- 
ophy." (Popular  Science  Monthly,  October,  1907, 
p.  354.)     In  the  case  of  others,  the  vain  efforts  of 


126  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

men  to  solve  the  great  problems  of  life  seem  a  good 
argument  to  use  to  get  converts  to  pragmatism 
(compare,  for  example,  Mr.  Schiller's  Humanism, 
p.  xix).  With  Papini  these  are  unnecessary  conces- 
sions; to  him  it  would  apparently  be  mere  play  to 
solve  the  problem  of  the  universe.  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle, Thomas  Aquinas,  and  Albert  the  Great,  Des- 
cartes, and  Spinoza,  Kant,  and  Hegel  are  only  great 
simpletons;  the  truth  is  (he  says)  these  problems 
are  of  no  importance  for  us.  "  The  pragmatists 
are  all  anti-agnostics,  and  maintain  that  it  is  not 
true  that  these  problems  are  too  lofty  for  our  intelli- 
gence, but  too  devoid  of  sense,  too  stupid,  and  that 
our  unwillingness  to  busy  ourselves  with  such  mat- 
ters is  not  a  proof  of  the  impotence,  but  of  the 
power  of  our  mind."  {Popular  Science  Monthly, 
PP-  355>  35^-)  This  recalls  the  American  Chris- 
tian Science  doctors,  who  maintain  they  can  heal 
any  kind  of  a  malady  if  they  only  will  to  do  so; 
the  curious  thing,  though,  is  that  very  frequently 
—  and  almost  always  when  they  might  have  the 
opportunity  of  getting  a  glorious  victory  over  their 
adversaries  —  they  don't  will  to  do  it.  Apparently 
they  also  desire  to  test  their  own  power  of  mind !  ^ 

*  One  can  read,  however,  in  the  Mercure  de  France  (Nov.  i,  1907) 
a  short  story  by  Mr.  Papini  which  does  not  seem  in  the  same  vein. 
He  says  in  The  Devil  Told  Me  ("Le  Demon  m'a  dit " )  that  if  Adam  and 
Eve  had  eaten  all  the  apples  of  the  tree  of  the  knowledge  of  good  and 
evil  they  would  have  become  wise  in  everything,  —  But,  after  all, 
perhaps  the  devil,  when  he  told  Papini  that,  had  in  his  pocket  some 
of  these  apples  of  Eden  which  he  offered  to  his  interlocutor,  and  that 
the  latter  threw  them  disdainfully  away.  Too  bad  for  philosophy; 
if  the  devil  had  only  chosen  another  confidant ! 


SOCIAL   PHENOMENA  127 

It  is  futile  to  dwell  on  considerations  that  are 
only  too  evidently  aside  from  the  main  concern. 
What  have  matters  like  economy  of  time  or  econ- 
omy of  thought  {loc.  cit.  p.  356)  got  to  do  with 
truth?  Nothing,  absolutely  nothing;  still  less,  if 
possible,  than  the  optimistic  or  pessimistic  conse- 
quences of  a  theory,  or  progress,  or  meliorism,  and 
the  theory  of  "  risk." 


n 

But  there  is  something  more.  At  the  same  time 
that  you  exalt  the  power  of  action,  of  energy,  the 
spirit  of  initiative,  you  must  also  think  of  the  out- 
come of  it  all.  Life,  as  it  presents  itself  to  the  aver- 
age man  imbued  with  such  ideas,  is  no  more  than 
a  frantic  race  for  success  and  a  struggle  in  which 
the  strongest  triumphs.  Working  along  such  a  line 
as  that  we  shall  only  arrive  at  the  homo  homini  lupus 
of  Hobbes.  I  do  not  wish  to  be  too  hard  on  human- 
ity. Let  us  concede  that  our  civilization  would  never 
again  be  willing  to  ignore  the  Christian  doctrine 
of  justice  for  the  weak.  Nevertheless,  life  proves 
superabundantly  that,  in  the  world  of  solid  reality 
at  least,  if  we  wish  men  to  hold  in  check  their 
selfish  pursuit  of  happiness,  we  must  have  mo- 
tives more  powerful  than  that  sentimentalism  and 
that  altruism  which  is  instinctive  in  the  human 
heart.    It  is  a  fact  that  we  see  everywhere  men  of 


1 28  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

power  favoring  the  social  conditions  which  guaran- 
tee them  the  exercise  of  their  power,  whereas  it  is 
the  downtrodden  class  who,  when  they  protest,  ask 
for  more  altruism  in  others.  Hence  there  are 
needed,  in  order  to  react  against  human  nature,  cer- 
tain moral  restraints,  which  themselves  amount  to 
nothing  unless  they  borrow  their  sanction  and 
authority  from  a  power  exterior  and  superior  to 
man,  —  in  a  word,  religion.  Laws  punish  crime 
according  to  the  mere  letter  of  their  edicts,  and  even 
ethical  motives  are  only  human,  and,  consequently, 
insufficient.  Let  us  imagine  a  man  who  is  able 
to  get  the  better  of  others  while  preserving  an 
outward  show  of  morality:  there  is  really  no  rea- 
son why  he  should  not  do  it  if  he  wants  to  apply 
strictly  his  philosophy  of  "  results  "  and  of  "  suc- 
cess." As  Fouillee  very  well  says,  in  his  recent 
Morale  des  idees-forces,  in  the  chapter  on  "  Dis- 
interestedness " :  The  appeal  to  ethics,  to  the  gen- 
eral interest  of  society,  as  conceived  by  past  theories 
(utilitarianism  and  socialism  included)  "  is  a  fine 
thing,  provided  I  have  the  will  to  subordinate  my- 
self thereto,  and,  if  need  be,  sacrifice  myself  for  it. 
But,  again,  by  what  reasons  weighty  enough  to  win 
my  assent  can  the  sacrifice  of  interest  be  secured  in 
the  name  of  the  idea  of  interest?"  That  is  the 
point.  .  .  .  Fouillee  himself  proposes  "  a  persuasive 
ideal,  higher  than  which  the  understanding  can  con- 
ceive nothing."  But  here  again  some  one  may  say: 
I  am  abstractedly  persuaded  of  the  grandeur  of  this 


SOCIAL   PHENOMENA  129 

ideal,  but  I  have  strong  special  reasons  that  keep 
me  from  the  desire  I  feel  of  yielding  to  it.  Persua- 
sive ethics  is  a  Utopia  more  noble  than  others,  but 
yet  deceptive.  If  it  is  left  to  man  to  persuade  him- 
self to  such  and  such  actions,  neither  his  fellowmen, 
nor,  I  venture  to  say,  he  himself,  will  dare  to  take 
the  risk  of  building  solidly  on  that  foundation.  We 
can  imagine  occasions  when,  in  order  to  be  morally 
sublime,  a  man  will  think  it  necessary  to  lie,  deceive, 
rob  —  what  then?  Personal  morality  (which  is, 
after  all,  that  of  many  of  the  intellectual  class  in  our 
days)  leaves  morality  entirely  at  the  discretion  of 
each  individual.  From  the  point  of  view  of  social 
order,  given  the  egoistic  nature  of  man,  it  is  a  fatal 
theory ;  and  the  man  moving  constantly  in  the  world 
of  practical  realities  does  not  find  there  the  moral 
restraint  which  society  needs.  The  voice  of  con- 
science without  a  God  back  of  it  is  a  dead  letter. 
Why  should  I  care  about  a  voice  that  speaks  in  the 
name  of  nothing?  or  even  one  (as  some  will  have 
it)  that  speaks  in  the  name  of  humanity?  As  if 
I  were  not  a  part  of  that  humanity!  —  and,  very 
naturally,  that  part  which  most  interests  me,  unless 
some  superior  power  forces  me  to  interest  myself 
in  others  more  than  in  myself,  or  as  much,  at  any 
rate.  Really,  if  you  think  of  it  once,  the  keen,  in- 
telligent, good  man  would  be  very  foolish  to  allow 
himself  to  be  stopped  by  this  obstacle,  by  this  phan- 
tom of   conscience  with   which  agnostic  moralists 


I30  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

have  for  a  long  time  been  trying  (and  still  often 
try)  ^  to  allure  us. 

And  people  reason  thus,  naturally  and  uncon- 
sciously. Hence  the  imperative  necessity  of  reli- 
gion as  a  support  of  morality,  something  absolutely 
imperative  as  a  condition  of  order,  in  every  people 
among  whom  practical  life  is  the  chief  thing  and  the 
contemplative  life  a  luxury.  One  might  well  put  it 
absolutely  and  say  everywhere;  but  it  is  especially 
imperative  in  America  for  this  reason,  that  here  the 
consequences  of  the  lack  of  a  religious  check  would 
be  more  dangerous  because  the  conditions  are  more 
favorable  than  anywhere  else  for  the  development 
of  moral  individualism  (which  means,  be  it  remem- 
bered, less  favorable  than  elsewhere  for  the  devel- 
opment of  intellectual  individualism).  Every  re- 
flecting man  is  keenly  conscious  of  this  in  America, 
—  the  magistrate  and  the  judge  as  well  as  the  busi- 
ness man,  the  writer,  the  philosopher.  There  is  no 
country  where  the  sentiment  of  the  necessity  of  be- 
lief is  so  ardently  fostered,  where  religion  is  so  ener- 
getically maintained  (I  do  not  say  rooted)  through 
the  united  action  of  the  wealthy  class  and  the  intel- 
lectual class.  We  have  here  few  of  those  bold  and 
independent  radicals  who  dare  to  ignore  the  prag- 
matic needs  of  the  nation  and  take  their  position  on 
a  foundation  purely  intellectual. ^     All  those  who 

*  Even  our  American  ethical  culture  societies,  alluded  to  by  me 
elsewhere  in  this  volume,  have  no  other  end  in  view. 

Even  in  American  universities,  instructors  must  be  infinitely 
circumspect;  for  the  proportion  of  young  people  who  are  to  devote 


SOCIAL   PHENOMENA  131 

professionally  or  otherwise  have  a  certain  influence 
on  the  people  or  comprehend  the  social  situation  are 
tacitly  agreed  on  this  point.  Even  the  sceptics  (there 
are  a  few  of  these;  for  as  James  has  well  said,  a 
man  chooses  his  philosophical  belief  according  to 
his  personal  needs)  know  the  social  value  of  reli- 
gion and  never  attack  it.  Not  to  speak  of  religion  is 
in  America  a  question  of  etiquette,  like  taking  off 
one's  hat  to  a  lady,  or  not  using  the  fingers  in  eat- 
ing one's  food.  All  this,  I  hasten  to  say,  is  not  a 
bad  thing.  I  think  it  was  the  great  pagan  Sten- 
dhal who  could  never  go  to  Rome  without  feeling 
himself  become  a  Catholic?  It  is  a  somewhat  anal- 
ogous case.  An  avowed  free  thinker  in  Europe 
will  conceal  his  flag  in  America,  without  hypocrisy, 
and  simply  out  of  respect  for  social  order.  Every- 
thing in  that  country  is  so  different  in  that  respect 
from  European  countries,  —  the  smooth  and  de- 
termined face  of  the  man  of  business,  the  matron 
with  the  bearing  of  a  queen,  the  laborer  with  bold 
and  open  eye  who  seems  always  ready  for  a  fight, 
the  indifferent  and  provoking  shop-girl,  the  preco- 
ciously cunning  bootblack  or  the  "  artful  dodger " 
newsboy  —  everything  in  this  country  of  aspiring 
"  climbers,"  even  to  the  sumptuous  palaces,  the  inso- 

themselves  to  the  liberal  professions  (except  law  and  medicine)  is 
infinitely  small;  in  fact  they  are  the  exception.  Almost  all  are  des- 
tined to  engage  in  commerce  or  manufacturing ;  and  a  conscientious 
professor  cannot  forget  that  the  ideas  laid  before  them  are  not  to 
remain  ideas,  but  will  pass  into  the  moral  and  social  life  of  the 
nation. 


132  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

lent  automobiles,  and  the  mendacious  advertise- 
ments, says :  "If  God  did  not  exist  it  would  be 
necessary  to  invent  him !  " 

On  the  other  hand  it  is  in  this  very  America  that 
one  hears  repeated  high  and  low  and  everywhere 
that  dogmas  are  of  no  account  and  will  in  time  dis- 
appear; in  other  words,  that  religion  is  dying  out 
and  that  morality  alone  will  remain.  Beware  of  be- 
lieving it.  Or  at  any  rate  let  us  make  a  distinction. 
The  philosophers  have  generally  believed  they  would 
be  lost  if  they  explained  the  religious  manifestations 
of  men  otherwise  than  by  a  unique  principle  (either 
fear,  or  the  need  of  perfecting  oneself,  or  the  desire 
of  happiness,  or  the  necessity  of  a  first  cause,  or 
simply  something  impalpable  they  call  religious  sen- 
timent). But  this  single  principle  is  not  at  all  in- 
dispensable. Very  different  causes  produce  effects 
very  similar  in  appearance  or  even  in  reality.  One 
man  may  study  jurisprudence  and  practice  law  in 
order  to  defend  the  weak,  another  for  the  purpose 
of  despoiling  them,  a  third  for  the  simple  pleasure 
of  disentangling  complex  cases;  and  sometimes 
more  than  one  of  these  causes  may  be  operant  at  the 
same  time.  So  it  is  with  religion.  Some  are  led 
to  it  by  pure  speculation;  their  understanding  calls 
for  a  first  cause  of  the  world,  and  they  call  it  God. 
Others  are  led  to  religion  by  their  experience  of 
the  practical  life,  and  either  through  interest  seek 
in  it  the  satisfaction  of  their  desire  for  happiness, 
or  through  disinterestedness  are  anxious  to  see  some 


SOCIAL   PHENOMENA  133 

day  the  injustice  of  destiny  atoned  for  in  heaven. 
Others  see  in  the  fear  of  God  a  powerful  agent  of 
civiHzation,  a  moral  restraint ;  and  so  on.  Although 
we  must  certainly  admit  that  these  different  ele- 
ments very  often  exist  simultaneously  and  thus  on 
occasion  mutually  re-enforce  each  other,  yet  they 
often  exist  separately;  and  being  different  in  their 
origin  they  remain  different  in  their  practical  opera- 
tion. It  is  always  perfectly  possible,  in  fact,  legiti- 
mate, to  analyze,  and  consider  each  one  by  itself. 
I  would  by  no  means  ignore  the  purely  psychological 
or  intellectual  elements  in  the  formation  of  the  reli- 
gious sentiment  (I  defended  their  human  and  so 
probably  indestructible  character  in  an  article  — 
which  in  truth  seems  to  me  to-day  less  clear  and 
precise  than  I  could  wish  —  in  the  Revue  chretienne, 
November,  1903,  Religion  in  Society  in  the  United 
States)  ;  but  just  now  we  are  dealing  with  the  utili- 
tarian element  of  religion. 

And  it  is  in  keeping  in  mind  those  various  sources 
of  the  religious  spirit,  that  we  must  examine  the 
question  of  the  disappearance  of  dogmas.  From  the 
pragmatic  or  utilitarian  point  of  view,  certain  of 
these  (the  Trinity,  the  Immaculate  Conception, 
Transsubstantiation)  are  not  essential;  and  if  we 
were  only  speaking  of  these  perhaps  we  should  not 
go  wrong,  as  M.  Bargy  says  in  his  conscientious 
work.  Religion  in  Society  in  the  United  States,  if 
we  did  not  attach  the  same  importance  to  them  as 
formerly.     Yet   to   infer   from   these   few   mystic 


134 


ANTI-PRAGMATISM 


dogmas  that  all  dogmas  are  of  a  secondary  charac- 
ter in  the  eyes  of  American  Christians,  and  are  in 
process  of  disappearance,  would  be  a  gross  error. 
The  social  utility  of  religion  is  not  yet  a  thing  of 
the  past.  In  order  that  religion  as  a  moral  restraint 
shall  respond  to  what  is  expected  of  it  certain  formal 
dogmas  are  indispensable,  such  as  the  judgment,  im- 
mortality, paradise,  and  a  place  of  expiation  (the 
last,  however,  not  absolutely  requisite).  You  have 
only  to  lay  a  finger  on  those  dogmas  that  affirm  the 
fundamental  dogma  of  God  as  lord  of  the  world, 
in  whose  sight  men  are  held  responsible  for  their 
keeping  of  the  ten  commandments,  and  you  will  find 
that  a  clamorous  protest,  as  if  from  one  voice,  will 
arise  from  every  quarter  of  the  great  continent  to 
excommunicate  and  anathematize  you. 

Some  others  have  tried  to  show  that  dogmas  were 
destined  to  disappear  by  resting  their  argument 
upon  the  development  of  a  certain  kind  of  modern 
theology  and  have  affirmed  —  to  use  the  words  of 
Edouard  Rod  in  his  book  on  Rousseau  —  that, 
"  from  the  Profession  of  Faith  of  the  Savoyard 
Vicar  up  to  the  Sketch  of  a  Philosophy  of  Religion 
by  the  eminent  dean  of  the  Faculty  of  Theology  in 
Paris  (M.  Sabatier),  God  has  finally  been  evapo- 
rated like  an  incense-wafer  that  leaves  behind  it  a 
little  perfume  and  a  great  deal  of  smoke."  But 
America  is  not  a  country  of  speculation  and  theories. 
In  fact,  if  the  people  had  to  choose  between  utilita- 
rian dogmas,  mingled  with  dogmas  purely  specula- 


SOCIAL   PHENOMENA  135 

tive,  and  the  rejection  of  all  dogmas  without  excep- 
tion, the  first  alternative  would  indisputably  win  the 
day  for  a  long  time  yet.  Only  get  men  to  compre- 
hend —  and  it  would  not  be  a  difficult  thing  to  do  — 
that,  theology  once  laid  on  the  shelf  with  metaphysi- 
cal discussions,  religion  would  then  have  to  be  satis- 
fied with  the  God  of  the  deists  or  the  pantheists 
(that  is  to  say,  a  God  absolutely  apart  from  the 
world,  or  an  impersonal  God),  and  such  a  religion 
would  be  repulsed  with  as  much  horror  as  the  crass- 
est materialism.  For,  to  give  up  theism,  the  doc- 
trine of  a  personal  deity  keeping  watch  over  the 
acts  of  men  would  be,  from  the  moral  point  of  view, 
to  abandon  everything.  Hence,  in  order  not  to  be 
deprived  of  theism  men  will  often  retain  more  the- 
ology than  is  necessary  for  their  practical  purposes. 
Do  the  facts  confirm  our  theories?  Absolutely. 
Consider  for  a  moment  sectarianism  in  America, 
which,  far  from  showing  a  tendency  to  disappear, 
resists  stubbornly  the  repeated  and  constant  efforts 
of  those  who  see  in  it  a  source  of  weakness  for  the 
church.  And  it  is  clear  that  it  is  a  weakness.  If 
then  people  can't  make  up  their  minds  to  yield  on 
this  point  of  dogma,  it  is  because,  after  all,  they 
cling  to  dogma.  Let  me  be  permitted  to  cite  at  this 
point  a  few  passages  from  my  article  in  the  Revue 
chretienne  just  referred  to,  written  in  answer  to  the 
book  of  M.  Bargy: 

"  If  it  were  as  M.  Bargy  understands  to  be  true, 
that  doctrine  were  a  *  dead  weight  *  in  the  church,  then 


136  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

the  sect  most  indifferent  to  dogma,  the  Unitarian, 
ought  to  make  a  good  many  recruits  from  year  to  year, 
and  those  in  which  the  creed  is  important  ought  to  lose 
them.  But  in  reaHty  just  the  opposite  is  true.  Uni- 
tarianism  remains  stationary,  while  Episcopalianism, 
and  especially  Catholicism,  are  ever  gaining.  It  may 
be  that  Unitarianism  is  per  se  superior;  but  at  all 
events  the  phenomena  that  I  have  just  recalled  to  the 
minds  of  my  readers  (and  which  are  often  with  good 
reason  recalled)  show  that  the  great  majority  of  Ameri- 
can Christians  do  not  feel  inclined  in  that  direction ; 
they  refuse  to  take  the  last  step;  they  feel  that  they 
ought  not  to  do  so"^  (p  364). 

Mention  should  be  made  also  of  the  failure  of 
the  "  Societies  for  Ethical  Culture "  in  America. 
"  They  represent  still  better  the  ideal  that  M.  Bargy 
attributes  to  Americans.   And  yet  during  the  thirty 

^  This  fact  of  the  numerical  insignificance  of  "Unitarian"  con- 
gregations gave  rise  to  an  interesting  discussion  during  the  first  months 
of  the  year  1908.  Inasmuch  as  one  clergyman  had  sought  the  cause 
of  this  in  the  lack  of  interest  on  the  part  of  said  congregations  in  tem- 
poral things,  another  took  the  opposite  side.  Examining  the  sub- 
ject on  its  ground  merits  he  developed  the  idea,  in  the  New  York 
Sun,  that  it  is  rather  their  indifference  to  dogma  that  injures  Unitari- 
ans, —  a  thing  that  has  often  happened  to  other  churches  in  America. 
He  then  expresses  in  theological  terms  what  I  have  just  stated  in 
philosophical  terms,  saying  among  other  things  that  "to  insist  upon 
works  of  human  welfare  as  the  motive  for  being  of  a  religious  body 
seems  to  us  too  superficial  greatly  to  concern  us.  ...  It  is  to  reverse 
the  true  order  of  cause  and  effect.  .  .  .  When  the  minds  of  men  are 
penetrated  with  a  belief  in  the  reality  of  a  divine  order  in  the  world, 
when  unselfishness  and  mutual  help  are  seen  to  be  obligatory  because 
men  are  children  of  the  one  Father  and  to  be  our  contribution  to 
that  divine  order  which  moves  through  the  world,  then  do  all  works 
of  humanitarianism  proceed  from  a  permanently  operating  cause." 
(Quoted  from  The  Literary  Digest,  April  4,  1908.) 


SOCIAL   PHENOMENA  137 

years  since  they  were  founded,  after  a  brief  period 
of  prosperity  following  upon  the  formation  of  each 
society,  they  have  remained  almost  absolutely  sta- 
tionary "  (p.  365).  The  founder  of  these  societies 
which  preach  the  suppression  of  religious  dogma, 
Professor  Felix  Adler,  is  a  Jew,  a  noble  and  broad- 
minded  man,  but  who  has  followers  of  the  same  race 
who  would  not  be  sorry  if  they  could  neutralize  re- 
ligion entirely.  The  other  fellow-theorists  of  Pro- 
fessor Adler  are  either  semi-cultivated  men  who  like 
to  think  themselves  superior  to  the  crowd,  or  else 
persons  of  excellent  character,  but  without  practical 
good  sense,  believing,  in  all  simplicity  of  heart,  in 
the  natural  goodness  of  man.  There  are,  besides,  a 
few  professors  who  make  a  parade  of  agnosticism 
and  who  are  dreamers  after  all,  —  positivists  in  their 
thinking,  dreamers  in  practical  life,  precisely  the 
opposite  of  the  status  of  those  around  them.  The 
x\merican  people  are  too  wary  to  allow  themselves  to 
be  caught  by  this  Utopia  of  morality  stripped  of  all 
accompaniment  and  support  and  without  other  sanc- 
tion than  the  conscience.  Some  have  been  pleased  to 
say  that  it  is  not  the  fashion  to  belong  to  '*  eth- 
ical societies,"  and  that  in  America  etiquette  rules. 
This  is  true.  Yet  the  fashion  undoubtedly  has  a 
reason-for-being,  good  or  bad;  a  cause  which  I 
pointed  out  above,  namely,  that  morality  vanishes 
without  dogmatic  religion.  We  may  further  note 
the  curious  attitude  that  M.  Bargy  is  obliged  to  take 
to  explain  the  role  that  the  Bible  continues  to  play  in 


138  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

American  churches  and  which  seems  to  him  so  pro- 
digious an  anachronism.  The  biblical  critic  has  re- 
ceived a  good  welcome,  it  is  true  (he  says),  and  yet 
the  holy  volume  retains  all  its  influence.  How  to 
understand  that  ?  "  People  sacrificed  a  part  to  save 
the  whole,"  we  read,  by  way  of  explanation  (on 
page  2y8),  "  It  was  like  the  retreat  of  an  army  in 
covering  which  all  the  members  fall  one  by  one.  It 
arrives  at  last  at  an  inaccessible  place  of  refuge ;  the 
army  has  no  more  men,  but  it  is  safe.  Little  by  little 
parts  of  the  Bible  were  given  up ;  one  by  one,  with- 
out counting,  they  were  abandoned  to  the  scientists, 
but  the  sanctity  of  the  whole  was  maintained."  And 
this  also  on  page  279 :  "  Every  one  works  out  the 
inner  meaning  of  the  Bible  for  himself,  and  people 
now  only  worship  in  common  the  letter  thereof. 
It  is  no  longer  anything  more  than  a  symbol.  Yet 
the  worship  of  one  and  the  same  symbol  is  a  bond 
of  union.  In  an  army  the  flag  excites  as  many 
different  ideas  as  there  are  minds.  There  is  no 
orthodox  comment  on  the  flag ;  it  is  only  an  emblem, 
and  that  is  its  strong  point,  is  what  makes  it  such  a 
source  of  power."  In  common  on  all  this  I  wrote  in 
the  Revue  just  referred  to :  ''  It  is  almost  a  piece 
of  legerdemain.  What!  where  (I  ask  again)  is  that 
practical  American  spirit?  When  the  parts  are 
valueless,  the  whole,  you  maintain,  is  yet  worth 
something?  When  the  soldiers  are  dead,  the  army 
still  exists?  You  take  as  a  symbol  a  document  the 
worthlessness  of  which  you  permit  to  be  asserted 


SOCIAL   PHENOMENA  139 

and  maintained?  No;  there  is  something  in  this 
just  as  in  the  case  of  the  existence  of  sectarianism 
.  .  .  and  of  Unitarianism,  and  of  the  Societies  of 
ethical  culture  .  .  .  something  that  the  conception 
of  the  facts  by  M.  Bargy  does  not  explain"  (p.  366). 

Events  have  recently  taken  place  in  America  as 
if  on  purpose  to  show  how  the  foregoing  observa- 
tions by  the  writer  are  founded  on  reality.  As  early 
as  the  close  of  the  year  1906  premonitory  indications 
of  a  great  panic  were  discerned.  Now  immediately 
before  the  depression  in  values,  in  February,  1907, 
there  appeared  in  the  Wall  Street  Journal,  of  New 
York,  a  financial  paper,  certain  editorial  remarks  in 
which  the  editor-in-chief,  Sereno  S.  Pratt,  discussed 
with  keen  accuracy  the  influence  of  religion  on  busi- 
ness. A  decline  in  religious  faith,  affirms  Mr.  Pratt, 
"  affects  the  basic  conditions  of  civilization,"  and 
among  other  things  "  becomes  a  factor  in  the  finan- 
cial market  "  ;  "  changes  the  standards  and  affects 
the  values  of  things  that  are  bought  and  sold,"  and 
"  concerns  the  immediate  interests  of  those  who 
never  had  such  a  faith  almost  as  much  as  it  does  the 
lives  of  those  who  have  had  their  faith  and  lost  it." 
It  would  be  well  worth  while  for  a  commission  of 
experts,  named  by  the  government,  to  study  at  close 
range  what  is  the  precise  influence  of  a  decline  in 
faith  in  the  United  States  upon  such  phenomena  in 
the  financial  world  and  such  social  unrest  as  we 
have  witnessed  during  the  past  few  months.  It  is 
a  fact  that  every  one  will  admit,  whatever  his  own 


I40  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

personal  ideas  on  religion,  that  "  there  is  no  one 
who  would  not  prefer  to  do  business  with  a  person 
who  really  believes  in  a  future  life."  Consequently, 
if  the  world  holds  fewer  men  of  such  faith,  that  is 
going  to  make  a  great  difference  in  the  way  business 
is  conducted.  It  is  impossible  to  judge  consciences, 
continues  Mr.  Pratt;  we  must  confine  ourselves  to 
external  indications.  Now,  the  churches  are  not 
as  full  as  formerly  on  a  Sunday;  family  worship 
becomes  rarer;  the  weekly  day  of  rest  is  less  ob- 
served, and  people  give  themselves  up  more  to 
worldly  enjoyments  and  labor,  young  people  have 
less  and  less  serious  knowledge  of  the  Bible ;  finally, 
the  churches  have  made  a  failure  of  their  efforts 
to  win  the  confidence  of  the  laboring  people.  If 
these  are  true  indications  of  a  decline  of  faith 
in  the  United  States,  "  then,  indeed,  there  is  no 
more  important  problem  before  us  (it  should 
not  be  forgotten  that  Pratt  was  addressing  the 
world  of  finance)  than  that  of  either  discover- 
ing some  adequate  substitute  for  faith,  or  taking 
immediate  steps  to  check  a  development  that  has 
within  it  the  seeds  of  a  national  disaster."  Two 
measures  might  be  proposed  to  replace  the  factor  of 
faith  in  the  business  world,  —  the  socialism  of  Karl 
Marx,  or  the  concentration  of  finances  (that  is  to 
say,  the  trust  pushed  to  its  last  limits  by  a  man  ca- 
pable of  directing  all).  Discussing  these  two  alter- 
natives, Mr.  Pratt  reaches  the  conclusion  that  neither 
the  one  nor  the  other  is  the  remedy  adequate  to  the 


SOCIAL   PHENOMENA  141 

ill.      His   own   idea   is    couched   in   the   following 
language : 

"  The  supreme  need  of  the  hour  is  not  elastic  cur- 
rency or  sounder  banking,  or  better  protection  against 
panics,  or  bigger  names,  or  more  equitable  tariffs,  but 
a  revival  of  faith,  a  return  to  a  morality  which  recog- 
nizes a  base  in  religion  and  the  establishment  of  a 
workable  and  working  theory  of  life  that  view  man  as 
something  more  than  a  mere  lump  of  matter." 

There  indeed  you  have  expressed  with  admirable 
clearness  and  freedom  the  opinion  of  the  solid  class 
upon  which  rests  the  powerful  American  civilization. 
In  ordinary  times  people  may  drop  hints  and  mask 
their  thought  with  rhetoric.  In  the  hour  of  danger 
every  misunderstanding  is  a  crime,  and  at  the  risk 
of  shocking  certain  over-delicate  ears  it  is  necessary 
to  speak  freely. 

Of  this  same  time,  when  the  storm  was  felt  to  be 
approaching,  let  me  cite  another  characteristic  occur- 
rence, —  probably  one  out  of  a  thousand  that  chance 
brought  to  my  knowledge.  There  is  in  Wall  Street, 
New  York,  a  stockbroker's  ofHce,  at  the  head  of 
which  is  a  lady  named  Mrs.  Gailord.  She  prefaces 
her  daily  work  every  morning  by  a  prayer  in  the 
rooms  of  her  ofifice.  At  the  beginning  of  the  year 
1907  she  determined  to  do  more :  she  arranged  with 
a  clergyman  to  come  every  Wednesday  to  preside 
over  a  religious  service  at  her  place  of  business.  She 
asked  the  great  financiers,  her  neighbors,  with  whose 
religious   prepossessions    she  was   acquainted    (the 


142  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

Rockefellers,  the  Pierpont  Morgans,  the  Schiffs)  to 
co-operate  in  the  work.  Her  assistants  and  guests 
could  thus  pass  directly  from  the  house  of  God  to 
the  temple  of  Mammon,  and  that  was  regarded  as 
quite  natural.^ 

It  was  at  this  time,  also,  that  the  proposal  was 
again  put  forth  to  create  a  new  interest  in  the  Bible 
by  putting  the  sacred  volume  on  the  program  of 
literary  courses.  It  might  seem  as  if  the  putting  of 
the  Bible  on  the  same  footing  as  C  haucer,  Shake- 
speare, and  Milton  would  be  to  lower  it  to  the  level 
of  a  purely  human  work,  deprive  it  of  prestige  in- 
stead of  giving  it  prestige.  But  that  depends  upon 
the  atmosphere  or  environment,  it  seems;  and  cer- 
tainly Professor  Phelps,  and  those  who  had  previ- 
ously broached  the  same  idea,  had  no  other  object 
than  to  cause  the  Bible  to  be  more  widely  read,  in 
order  to  instil  its  moral  teachings  into  the  minds 
of  the  scholars  at  the  schools  and  universities. 

People  recovered,  however,  from  this  first  emo- 
tion, —  the  great  crisis  was  not  to  come  before 
November,  —  but  it  was   felt  that  the  social  and 

*  The  author  did  not  hear  farther  from  this  work.  But  whether 
it  succeeded  or  not  is  of  little  consequence  after  all.  The  interesting 
thing  is  that  some  one  proposed  it.  Let  me  add,  in  order  to  be  at 
the  same  time  exact  and  conscientious,  that  Mrs.  Gailord  seemed  to 
have  also  in  view  another  object,  which  she  thus  expressed:  "There 
are  a  good  many  women  who,  as  a  result  of  foolish  speculation  or  the 
loss  of  money,  find  themselves  in  a  state  of  mind  in  which  a  minister 
would  be  of  the  greatest  help.  I  would  therefore  add  to  the  times  of 
regular  services  moments  when  the  clergyman  would  afiford  spiritual 
consultations.  But  the  counsel  it  is  proposed  to  offer  at  those  special 
times  is  to  be  personal,  not  business,  counsel." 


SOCIAL   PHENOMENA  143 

financial  equilibrium  was  in  an  unstable  condition; 
and  the  ecclesiastical  authorities  were  as  much 
occupied  with  the  menacing  danger  as  were  bank 
directors  and  politicians.  At  the  time  of  church  fes- 
tivals, especially  during  Lent,  there  are  churches  or 
halls  in  which,  outside  of  office  hours,  religious  ser- 
vices for  business  men  are  held.  I  remember  having 
seen  on  a  church  door  in  the  neighborhood  of  Wall 
Street  during  Easter  week  this  notice :  "  Quick  Ser- 
vice for  Business  Men  "  —  a  pendant  of  "  Quick 
Luncheon  for  Business  Men."  In  1906  they  had 
the  idea  of  establishing  in  New  York  regular  open- 
air  noon  meetings,  during  the  pleasant  season,  for 
the  same  public.  There  were  fifteen  hundred  pub- 
lic services  held,  the  number  of  persons  present 
being  estimated  at  four  hundred  sixty-two  thou- 
sand. The  meetings  were  conducted  at  ten  different 
places  simultaneously,  the  most  important  being 
those  in  the  *'  down-town "  region.  In  1907  the 
work  was  resumed  with  more  ardor,  on  account  of 
the  precarious  state  of  business  and  to  serve  as  a 
counteraction  to  the  attempts  at  illegitimate  specu- 
lation. Thirty  thousand  dollars  were  subscribed 
by  the  different  religious  congregations,  well-known 
ministers  were  secured,  sometimes  from  a  distance, 
who,  at  the  mid-day  luncheon  hour,  in  the  heart  of 
summer  and  under  the  torrid  sun  of  New  York  City, 
preached  with  bared  head  to  a  mixed  audience  of 
laborers  and  clerks,  bankers  and  politicians.  En- 
thusiastic persons  wrote,  "  The  days  of  Whitfield 


144  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

and  Wesley  are  here  again."  The  speakers  stood 
on  the  steps  of  City  Hall,  or  a  few  blocks  farther 
down  in  Wall  Street  itself.  Sometimes  they  spoke 
mounted  on  an  office  stool,  or  standing  up  in  an 
automobile.  They  would  take  for  their  text  such 
words  as  "  the  wages  of  sin  is  death."  The  success 
of  these  meetings  was  disputed.  But  at  any  rate 
they  took  place,  and  their  organizers  found  in  them 
a  means  of  inoculating  the  sense  of  responsibility 
in  the  minds  of  those  who,  by  risky  transactions, 
were  in  the  way  of  disturbing  the  financial  equili- 
brium. This  is  the  important  thing  for  us  to  know. 
In  the  autumn  came  the  panic,  and  phenomena 
of  this  kind  multiplied.  It  was  noticeable,  for  ex- 
ample, that  one  of  the  great  manufacturers  of  the 
United  States  put  himself  at  the  head  of  a  move- 
ment, nor  for  converting  —  that  was  not  necessary 
—  but  for  rendering  more  intense  the  religious  life 
of  Fifth  Avenue,  the  street,  as  every  one  knows, 
that  is  lined  with  the  *'  brown-stone  fronts  "  and 
costly  palaces  of  the  kings  of  American  finance. 
Mr.  Converse,  president  of  the  great  Baldwin  Loco- 
motive Works  of  Philadelphia,  is  himself  a  Pres- 
byterian, and  his  initiative  in  this  matter  was  hailed 
as  "  something  that  had  long  been  wanted."  Church 
members  don't  go  to  church  as  they  ought  to  in 
order  to  set  an  example  of  Christian  living  —  this 
was  the  chief  point  insisted  on.  "  When  an  estab- 
lishment like  that "  (said  Mr.  Converse,  speaking 
of  the   sumptuous   Presbyterian   Church   of   Fifth 


SOCIAL   PHENOMENA  145 

Avenue),  "  representing  millions  of  dollars,  is  used 
only  two  or  three  times  a  week  would  it  not  be  a  just 
criticism  that  the  Master  makes  in  saying  that  this 
church  is  not  doing  what  it  can  for  His  glory!" 
Nobody  was  complaining  of  immoral  lives,  in  the 
sense  in  which  this  phrase  is  usually  understood, 
nor  of  lack  of  charity,  —  American  millionaires 
amply  acquit  themselves  of  their  obligations  toward 
the  communities  in  which  they  make  their  money,  — 
but  of  dishonest  speculations,  dirty  commercial 
tricks,  abuses  of  confidences.  Here  is  where  a 
religious  restraint  or  check  is  necessary.  '*  I  con- 
sider this  fact  (said  Mr.  Converse  again),  that  the 
Fifth  Avenue  Presbyterian  Church  of  Nevr  York  is 
undertaking  a  series  of  evangelist  meetings,  to  be 
the  most  important  kind  of  a  movement  for  the 
sending  out  of  a  kind  of  appeal  to  the  churches, 
an  appeal  which  is  to-day  especially  necessary." 
"  A  kind  of  appeal  " ;  it  is  not  necessary  for  him 
to  specify  what  kind.  "  To-day  "  ;  that  is,  at  this 
time  of  financial  paralysis  and  industrial  crisis.^ 

Read  the  American  journals  of  that  time.  Every- 
where the  same  refrain :  "  Our  churches  are  de- 
serted, we  must  fill  them  " ;  "  church  members  are 
becoming  formalists,  their  zeal  must  be  rekindled  " ; 
"  our  sincere  Christians  are  losing  themselves  in 
theological  discussions  in  place  of  living  the  Chris- 
tian life  " ;  "  religion  is  the  salvation  of  society," 

*  It  is  the  same  Mr.  Converse  who  went  to  the  theological  seminary 
of  Princeton  to  urge  the  students  to  cultivate  pulpit  eloquence. 

10 


146  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

etc.,  etc.  At  the  very  moment  in  which  I  am  writ- 
ing these  lines,  in  Philadelphia,  a  city  of  over  a  mil- 
lion and  a  half  of  inhabitants,  a  formidable  cam- 
paign of  revivalist  meetings  is  under  way.  Every 
day  for  six  weeks,  in  twenty-one  churches,  people 
have  been  ceaselessly  at  work  transacting  "  the 
King's  Business."  Three  hundred  congregations 
hold  union  meetings,  and  seventy-five  evangelists 
and  preachers  are  assisted  by  five  thousand  **  per- 
sonal workers  " ;  that  is  to  say,  persons  who  take 
upon  them  to  go  and  talk  privately  with  those  who 
rise  at  the  close  of  the  service  to  declare  their  will- 
ingness  to  march  under  the  banner  of  Christ.  There 
are  two  thousand  choir  members  assigned  every 
evening  to  the  different  churches.  Certain  evangel- 
ists even  enter  the  restaurants  (with  a  portable 
church  organ),  for  the  purposes  of  getting  signa- 
tures and  saving  souls.  A  special  committee  makes 
it  its  work  to  send  messengers  from  door  to  door  to 
ask  people  to  join  in  the  great  movement.  These 
"  bell-pullers  "  must  visit  somewhere  near  twenty- 
five  thousand  houses  in  the  great  "  city  of  homes." 
And  when  Philadelphia  is  conquered  they  will  con- 
quer other  cities.  Please  note  that  in  all  this  there 
is  no  trace  of  fanaticism  or  mysticism.  It  is  simply 
due  to  the  financial  panic.  The  moment  seems 
favorable.  These  evangelists  of  Philadelphia  are 
putting  into  practice,  after  the  crisis  has  passed,  the 
counsels  which  the  editor  of  the  Wall  Street  Jour- 
nal gave  some  time  ago,  and  of  which  I  have  given 
some  account. 


SOCIAL   PHENOMENA  147 

The  country  recovered  rapidly  from  the  panic, 
and  so  to  some  extent  these  efforts  went  to  nothing. 
But  let  there  come  a  permanent  crisis,  as  predicted 
by  some,  and  it  is  easy  to  see  that  if  it  does  not  end 
in  a  social  revolution,  it  will  be  the  signal  for  a  pro- 
found religious  revival. 

I  have  selected  for  a  somewhat  detailed  demon- 
stration the  most  striking  manifestation  of  the  prag- 
matic spirit.  But  it  is  evident  that  it  is  the  same 
in  other  things,  and  that  in  the  field  of  private  mo- 
rality as  well  as  in  the  domain  of  business,  religion 
acting  as  a  moral  restraint  —  and  always  apart  from 
the  satisfaction  of  the  feelings  connected  with  it  — 
is  of  the  highest  importance. 

Voltaire,  with  his  superb  common  sense,  long 
ago  saw  this,  and  admirably  expressed  it.  Although 
he  was  the  great  apostle  of  tolerance,  he  also  showed 
that  an  atheist  "  who  was  a  violent  and  powerful 
reasoner  would  be  as  deadly  a  scourge  as  a  sangui- 
nary bigot"  {Treatise  on  Tolerance).  At  the  be- 
ginning of  the  nineteenth  century  Balzac  took  up 
the  same  theme  again  and  laid  urgent  stress  on  it. 
For  instance,  he  says :  "  Christianity,  and  especially 
Catholic  Christianity,  forming,  as  I  have  said,  in 
Le  Medecin  de  Campagne,  a  complete  system  for 
the  repression  of  the  evil  tendencies  of  men,  is  the 
most  important  element  of  social  order."  (Preface 
to  the  Comedie  Hiimaine,  p.  7.)  And  fifty  years 
later,  Taine  for  his  part  penned  his  famous  demon- 


148  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

stration  that  every  time  that  the  influence  of  reli- 
gion decreases,  as  in  the  time  of  the  Renaissance 
and  during  the  eighteenth  century,  man  becomes 
especially  debauched  and  cruel.  "  We  can  now 
estimate  the  value  of  the  contribution  of  Christi- 
anity to  our  modern  societies,  what  it  gives  us  in  the 
way  of  chastity,  gentleness,  and  humanitarianism ; 
what  it  secures  among  us  in  the  way  of  honesty, 
good  faith,  and  justice.  Neither  philosophic  reason, 
nor  artistic  and  literary  culture,  nor  even  the  insti- 
tution of  feudal,  military,  and  chivalric  honor,  no 
administration,  no  government,  can  take  its  place 
or  do  its  work.  Whether  vested  in  Greek,  Catholic, 
or  Protestant  wrapping,  Christianity  still  furnishes 
for  four  hundred  millions  of  human  beings  the 
broad  vans  by  which  alone  man  can  lift  himself 
above  himself,  above  his  grovelling  life,  and  beyond 
the  limits  of  his  narrow  horizon,  through  patience, 
resignation,  and  hope,  on  and  up  into  serenest  skies ; 
lift  himself  higher  even  than  temperance,  purity, 
and  goodness,  into  the  realm  of  consecration 
and  sacrifice.  It  alone  can  hold  us  back  in  our 
fatal  downward  course,  apply  the  brakes  to  check 
the  insensible  backsliding  by  which,  incessantly  and 
with  all  its  natural  weight  of  imperfection,  our  race 
retrogrades  toward  its  baser  and  lowest  instincts. 
The  old  gospel  is  still  to-day  the  best  aid  to  the 
social  instinct." 

At  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century,  now 
that  democracy  has  had  still  more  time  to  be  tested, 


SOCIAL   PHENOMENA  149 

we  must  still  echo  this  sentiment.  To-day  more 
than  ever,  infinitely  more,  are  there  reasons  for 
feeling  uneasy  as  to  the  effect  of  free  thought  on 
the  masses,  and  as  to  the  effect  of  an  education 
necessarily  superficial,  that  is  to  say,  one  that  does 
not  sink  deep  enough  to  really  do  good,  but  yet 
goes  far  enough  to  work  disaster.  And  if  we  do 
more  than  merely  register  facts  and  instances  with- 
out comment,  we  find  that,  nine  times  out  of  ten, 
it  is  the  decline  in  the  religious  faith  that  is  stated 
(and  rightly  stated)  to  be  the  cause  of  the  decline 
in  morality;  I  have  in  mind  such  things  as  the  in- 
increase  of  divorces,  the  lessening  birth-rate,  and 
drunkenness.  I  could  cite  hundreds  of  examples 
of  this.  Here  is  one  that  happens  to  be  before  my 
eyes  now.  A  certain  Mr.  Tasker,  after  having 
drawn  a  lamentable  picture  (in  Zion's  Herald,  of 
Boston,  January,  1908)  of  the  State  of  New  Hamp- 
shire, lays  the  blame,  at  its  close,  on: 

"  the  encroaching  spirit  of  irreligion.  The  non-church- 
going  element  increases.  In  the  thirty-seven  localities 
of  which  we  have  spoken  the  religious  census  gives 
the  following  results:  out  of  a  population  of  about 
thirty-two  thousand  souls,  eight  thousand,  say  a  quar- 
ter, affirm  that  they  have  no  affiliation  with  the  church, 
and  eighteen  thousand,  more  than  half,  have  never 
been  baptized.  .  .  .  The  church  ought  to  be  the  centre 
of  moral  and  spiritual  life ;  but  it  is  a  fact  that,  in  many 
of  our  communities,  the  church  is  a  decreasing  influ- 
ence in  the  lives  of  the  people.     Congregations  are 


ISO 


ANTI-PRAGMATISM 


small ;   interest  in  the  church  is  but  slender,  and  those 
who  are  outside  look  on  it  with  contempt." 

And  here  is  an  extract  from  a  New  York  period- 
ical, The  Examiner,  apropos  of  the  increase  in  the 
number  of  suicides  which  took  on  the  proportion 
of  an  epidemic,  owing  to  the  financial  panic: 

"  It  may  be  due  to  various  causes :  living  at  a  low 
moral  level,  greed  of  gain,  and  general  indifference 
to  religious  things.  Men  as  a  rule  no  longer  pay  any 
attention  to  God  or  their  fellowmen.  The  law  of  God 
no  longer  has  any  terrors  for  them.  It  is  no  longer  '  a 
terrible  thing  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  living  God.' 
The  desires  of  the  world  must  be  gratified,  must  be 
indulgently  yielded  to  and  the  superior  gifts  of  God 
ignored.  .  .  .  Many  scoff  at  the  rights  of  their  brother 
men,  treat  them  unjustly,  crush  them  under  foot.  In 
the  same  way  they  scoff  at  God.  .  .  .  They  fear  noth- 
ing and  have  become  indifferent  to  the  hereafter.  They 
live  like  the  beasts  and  die  as  if  believing  death  to  be 
the  end  of  all." 

It  is  interesting  to  see  those  who  profess  only 
the  morality  of  laymen  turning  like  the  preachers 
against  unmoral  literature  and  against  a  stage  with 
advanced  ideas.  While  forbearing  to  appeal  in  this 
matter  to  religion  as  a  restraining  force,  they  go  so 
far  as  to  appeal  —  not  to  the  law ;  they  have  n't  the 
courage  to  go  so  far  as  that,  but  —  to  public  opin- 
ion to  react  against  license  of  thought.  I  heard 
Professor  Felix  Adler,  the  founder  of  ethical  socie- 
ties, make  such  a  recommendation  in  a  formal  lecture 


SOCIAL    PHENOMENA  151 

in  Philadelphia.  But  here  is  the  cul-de-sac  in  which 
one  is  caught  in  an  unwise  desire  to  "  emancipate  " 
the  minds  of  the  masses!  One  takes  away  their 
religion  as  being  a  superstition,  but  runs  up  against 
their  incapacity  to  do  without  it.  One  directs  a 
flood  of  light  upon  religion  to  cause  it  to  vanish, 
but  one  does  not  dare  throw  light  on  social  prob- 
lems as  they  present  themselves  to  mediocre-minded 
people,  once  religious  sanction  has  been  removed. 
If  it  were  necessary  to  choose,  the  system  of  the 
church  would  seem  to  be  infinitely  wiser.  I  have 
treated  this  aspect  of  the  subject  —  independently, 
however,  of  any  discussion  of  pragmatism  —  in 
The  International  Journal  of  Ethics,  July,  1906, 
under  the  head  of  Literature  and  the  Moral  Code, 
and  shall  recur  to  it  farther  on.^ 

This  long  introduction  was  necessary  in  order 
to  make  those  who  have  not  lived  in  America  com- 
prehend how  pragmatism  reflects  this  second  phase 
of  modern  thought,  as  it  had  reflected  the  popular 
conception  of  life  considered  from  the  point  of  view 
of  action,  of  struggle  for  success. 

Undoubtedly  we  have  to  interpret  pragmatism 
and  read  between  the  lines,  and  we  may  do  so  by 
recalling  these  words  of  Kant  apropos  of  Plato : 

"  I  observe  that  it  is  not  at  all  extraordinary,  both  in 
oral  discussion  and  in  writing,  that,  by  comparison  of 

*  The  article  from  the  International  Journal  of  Ethics  is  also  re- 
produced in  Appendix  B. 


152  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

the  thoughts  an  author  expresses,  one  can  understand 
him  better  than  he  understands  himself ;  for  he  has  not 
sufficiently  defined  his  idea,  and  for  that  reason  he 
sometimes  speaks,  and  even  sometimes  thinks,  the  very 
opposite  of  v^hat  he  means ;  i.  e.,  contrary  to  the  end 
he  has  in  view."     {Pure  Reason,  ed.  1791,  p.  370.) 

I  further  remark  that  the  pragmatist  philosophers^ 
when  they  approach  questions  of  first  principles, 
always-  maintain  a  certain  reserve,  which  does  not 
lack  dignity,  while  handling  their  subject,  at  the 
same  time  making  a  strong  effort  not  to  lose  contact 
with  solid  reality.  But  it  is  our  right  and  our  duty 
to  hale  out  into  the  broad  daylight  the  premises  of 
their  assertions.  In  fine  it  will  not  be  superfluous  to 
recall  that  the  principal  among  them,  and,  to  tell  the 
truth,  the  man  who  fears  least  the  contact  wnth  con- 
crete reality  has  a  fine  confidence  in  the  nobleness 
of  human  nature.  The  religion  he  claims  for  his 
personal  pragmatism,  and  from  which  he  asks  sanc- 
tion for  his  ideas,  is  an  optimistic  religion  (he,  him- 
self, in  one  of  his  essays,  calls  pessimism  "  a  reli- 
gious disease  "),  and  he  who  holds  to  this  optimism 
insists  constantly  upon  the  recompense  of  the  good 
and  the  courageous,  while  he  relegates  to  the  back- 
ground and  even  affects  to  ignore,  a  punishment  for 
the  base  and  undeserving.  But  the  one  implies  the 
other.  As  we  have  seen  elsewhere,  it  is  in  vain  for 
Professor  James  to  thunder  against  a  punitive  God. 
If  God  really  watches  over  the  moral  order  of  the 
world,  he  must  also  punish  or  at  least  correct,  the 


SOCIAL   PHENOMENA  153 

unjust;  or,  if  not  correct  them,  at  least  allow  them 
to  bear  the  consequences  of  their  acts.  "  God  's  in 
his  heaven ;  all 's  right  with  the  world !  That 's  the 
real  heart  of  your  theology,  and  for  that  you  need 
no  rationalist  definitions."  (Pragmatism,  p.  122.) 
There  are  other  matters,  however,  on  which  it  is 
preferable  not  to  speak  too  loud  for  other  motives 
than  that  dignified  reserve  of  which  I  spoke  just 
now.  Professor  James  knows  very  well  that  few 
true  philosophers  would  overtly  consent  to  estimate 
the  truth  of  an  idea  by  its  moral  consequences.  Now 
it  is  always  useless  to  plant  a  blow  between  the  eyes 
of  very  strong  convictions  (or  call  them  prejudices 
if  you  will)  ;  and  consequently  it  would  not  be  very 
clever  for  him  to  insist  too  ostensibly  upon  this 
matter  of  sanction  on  the  part  of  religion.  Yet  the 
idea,  though  often  veiled,  is  there,  and  forms  the 
rock-foundation  of  William  James's  writings.  We 
must  conciliate  (he  says  incessantly)  and  satisfy  both 
the  empirical  proclivities  of  man  and  his  religious 
proclivities.  Which  means :  we  must  satisfy  his  need 
of  action  and  his  need  of  knowing  that  his  actions 
(and  especially  those  of  others)  are  watched  over 
by  a  superior  power.  "  Never,"  he  says,  "  were  as 
many  men  of  a  decidedly  empirical  proclivity  in  ex- 
istence as  there  are  at  the  present  day.  Our  chil- 
dren, one  may  say,  are  almost  bom  scientific.  But 
our  esteem  for  facts  has  not  neutralized  in  us  all 
religiousness.  It  is  itself  almost  religious.  Our 
scientific    temper    is    devout.  ,  .  ,  A    man    wants 


154  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

facts;  he  wants  science;  but  he  also  wants  a  reli- 
gion." (Pragmatism,  pp.  14,  15.)  And  pragma- 
tism recommends  itself  for  the  very  reason  that  it 
"  may  be  a  happy  harmonizer  of  empirical  ways  of 
thinking  with  the  more  religious  demands  of  human 
beings."     (Pragmatism,  p.  69.) 

Judging  by  the  terms  employed,  one  could  easily 
believe  the  matters  in  hand  here  are  sublime  sci- 
ence, and  religious  needs  purely  relating  to  the  feel- 
ings and  sentiments.  But  no ;  these  "  empirical 
proclivities  "  are,  above  all,  proclivities  for  the  prac- 
tical life  wholly  independent  of  disinterested  philos- 
ophy. And  if  Professor  James  really  intends  to 
include  in  his  "  religious  needs  "  sentimental  religion 
as  well  as  utilitarian  religion,  yet  in  reality,  prag- 
matically, it  is  the  latter  that  is  important  above  all 
else.  It  is  this  which  is  frankly  aimed  at  in  the 
ulterior  developments  of  the  author's  thought  —  al- 
though always  in  such  a  way  as  not  to  offend  our 
ears  by  a  utilitarianism  too  rude.  Professor  James 
himself  —  though  perhaps  without  ever  having  come 
to  a  formal  understanding  with  himself  on  this  point 
—  makes  a  perfect  distinction  between  religion  in 
general  and  "  the  religious  needs  "  in  the  sense  of 
the  need  of  an  ethical  sanction.  It  is  this  latter  con- 
ception which  is  alone  on  the  tapis  in  the  important 
discussion  of  his  third  lecture.  He  is  there  compar- 
ing materialism  and  spiritualism :  "  And  first  of  all 
I  call  your  attention  to  a  curious  fact.  It  makes  not 
a  single  jot  of  difference  so  far  as  the  past  of  the 


SOCIAL   PHENOMENA  iSS 

world  goes,  whether  we  deem  it  to  have  been  the 
work  of  matter  or  whether  we  think  a  divine  spirit 
was  its  author  "  (p.  96).  We  may  suppose  that  the 
two  hypotheses,  materiahst  and  spiritualist,  both  one 
and  the  other  give  an  equally  satisfactory  account  of 
what  is,  and  hence  intellectually,  "  the  two  theories, 
in  spite  of  their  different  sounding  names,  mean 
exactly  the  same  thing,  and  the  dispute  is  purely 
verbal"  (p.  97).  Is  it  a  God  or  atoms?  "The 
God,  if  there,  has  been  doing  just  what  atoms  could 
do  .  .  .  and  earning  such  gratitude  as  is  due  to 
atoms  and  no  more"  (p.  99).  But  let  us  state  the 
pragmatic  question,  "What  difference  would  it  make 
now  whether  the  world  be  the  product  of  matter  or 
of  spirit?  "  then  "  the  alternative  of  materialism  or 
theism  is  intensely  practical"  (p.  loi).  Here  is 
the  whole  thing  in  a  nutshell :  "  Materialism  means 
simply  the  denial  that  the  moral  order  is  eternal, 
and  the  cutting  off  of  ultimate  hopes;  spiritualism 
means  the  affirmation  of  an  eternal  moral  order  and 
the  letting  loose  of  hope.  Surely  here  is  an  issue 
genuine  enough,  for  any  one  who  feels  it;  and,  as 
long  as  men  are  men,  it  will  yield  matter  for  a  seri- 
ous philosophic  debate"  (p.  107).  "This  need  of 
an  eternal  moral  order  is  one  of  the  deepest  needs 
of  our  breast.  And  those  poets,  like  Dante  and 
Wordsworth,  who  live  on  the  conviction  of  such 
an  order,  owe  to  that  fact  the  extraordinary  tonic 
and  consoling  power  of  their  verse,"  etc.,  etc.  But 
this  is  deviation  from  philosophic  debate  into  the 
field  of  eloquence. 


IS6  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

On  the  same  principle  James  ignores  every  philo- 
sophic doctrine,  which,  without  being  materialistic, 
does  not  recognize  a  personal  God,  —  deism,  pan- 
theism, which  ''disdain  empiricism's  needs"  (p.  72). 
And  even  the  God  of  certain  contemporary  theistic 
writers  "  lives  on  as  purely  abstract  heights  as  does 
the  Absolute  (of  the  pantheists)  "  (p.  19).  The 
barbarous  God  of  former  times,  conceived  under  the 
form  of  a  powerful  monarch,  was  not  very  inspir- 
ing, although  it  at  least  "  kept  some  touch  with  con- 
crete realities"  (p.  70).  And  a  little  farther  on: 
"If  theological  ideas  prove  to  have  a  value  for  con- 
crete life  they  will  be  true,  for  pragmatism,  in  the 
sense  of  being  good  for  so  much"  (p.  y2>)y  ^^^ 
pragmatism  "  will  take  a  God  who  lives  in  the  very 
dirt  of  private  fact  —  if  that  should  seem  a  likely 
place  to  find  him"  (p.  80).  God  (he  had  already 
said  in  The  Will  to  Believe)  "  must  be  conceived 
under  the  form  of  a  mental  personality"  (p.  122).^ 

Now  I  ask  whether  this  is  not  the  very  echo  of 
the  convictions  expressed  by  Sereno  Pratt,  by  Mrs. 
Gailord,  by  Mr.  Converse,  and  by  the  preachers  of 
Wall  Street? 

As  soon  as  he  feels  germinating  within  him  the 
idea  of  a  philosophy  of  pragmatism,  William  James 

*  I  am  pleased  to  note  that  the  pragmatists  themselves  have  laid 
stress  upon  the  solicitude  for  religious  utilitarianism  in  Professor 
James's  writings.  Professor  Dewey,  in  the  article  cited  from  the 
Journal  of  Philosophy,  Feb.  13,  1908,  while  pointing  out  that,  with 
the  author  of  Pragmatism,  the  moral  worth  of  an  idea  frequently 
suflSces  to  establish  its  truth  adds,  "  This  is  especially  the  case  when 
it  is  a  question  of  theological  ideas  "  (p.  93). 


SOCIAL   PHENOMENA  157 

betrays  his  conviction  that  the  value  of  religion  in 
the  world  is  to  be  guaged  by  its  utilitarian  side.  Be- 
lief is  measured  by  action,  he  says  in  his  essay  The 
Will  to  Believe,  and  therefore,  "  Since  belief  is  meas- 
ured by  action,  he  who  forbids  us  to  believe  religion 
to  be  true,  necessarily  also  forbids  us  to  act  as  we 
should  if  we  did  believe  it  to  be  true.  The  whole 
defense  of  religions  faith  hinges  upon  action.  If 
the  action  required  or  inspired  by  the  religious  hy- 
pothesis is  in  no  way  different  from  that  dictated 
by  the  naturalistic  hypothesis,  then  religious  faith 
is  a  pure  superfluity,  better  pruned  away,  and  contro- 
versy about  its  legitimacy  is  a  piece  of  idle  trifling, 
unworthy  of  serious  minds  "  (pp.  29,  30).  He  adds 
that,  in  default  of  empirical  proof,  he  is  willing  to 
believe  the  religious  hypothesis  simply  through  con- 
trasting it  with  the  naturalistic  hypothesis ;  and  this 
preference  he  justifies  by  words  like  these :  "  Refuse 
to  believe,  and  you  shall  indeed  be  right,  for  you 
shall  irretrievably  perish.  But  believe,  and  again 
you  shall  be  right,  for  you  shall  save  yourself* 
(p.  59).  The  only  difference  is  that  it  is  all  to  your 
advantage  to  believe.  Elsewhere  in  the  same  vol- 
ume, in  reply  to  the  dictum  that  *'  reflex  action  and 
all  that  follows  from  it  give  the  coup  de  grace  to 
the  superstition  of  God,"  he  declares,  "  that  a  God, 
whether  existent  or  not,  is  at  all  events  the  kind  of 
being  which,  if  he  did  exist,  would  form  the  most 
adequate  possible  object  for  minds  framed  like  our 
own  to  conceive  as  lying  at  the  root  of  the  universe  " 


158  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

(p.   115).     (The  italics  are  mine.)     And,  finally, 
I  will  permit  myself  to  quote  one  more  passage : 

"  Just  as  within  the  limits  of  theism  some  kinds  are 
surviving  others  by  reason  of  their  greater  practical 
rationality;  so  theism  itself,  by  reason  of  its  practical 
rationality,  is  certain  to  survive  all  lower  creeds.  Mate- 
rialism and  agnosticism,  even  were  they  true,  could 
never  gain  universal  and  popular  acceptance,  for  they 
both  alike  give  a  solution  of  things  which  is  irrational 
to  the  practical  third  of  our  nature  and  in  which  we 
can  never  volitionally  feel  at  home  "  (p.  126). 

Are  we  to  infer  from  this  that  "universal  and 
popular  acceptance  "  is  to  be  considered  the  crite- 
rion of  truth?  I  don't  see  how  we  could  interpret 
Professor  James  otherwise. 

Yet  certain  persons  considered  that  Professor 
James  was  preaching  a  doctrine  calculated  to  es- 
trange people  from  religion  and  reproached  him  for 
it.  It  is  easy  to  see  from  what  has  just  been  said 
how  little  foundation  there  is  in  that  accusation; 
nevertheless  he  was  very  sensitive  to  this  criticism, 
and  devotes  a  whole  chapter  of  his  volume  on  Prag- 
matism to  showing  its  worthlessness.  The  reason 
of  the  accusation  lay  in  the  circumstance  that  many 
could  have  wished  there  had  been  more  insistence 
upon  the  character  of  the  God  of  Justice,  in  the  sense 
of  an  avenging  God,  the  punisher  of  the  wicked.  I 
have  already  explained  that  this  notion  is  not  absent 
from  James's  writings,  but  that  he  does  not  like  to 


SOCIAL   PHENOMENA  159 

emphasize  this  result  of  his  theology;  while  exalt- 
ing (as  a  result  of  his  temperament  and  for  the 
sake  of  philosophic  dignity)  the  positive  side  of 
practical  religion,  —  that  is  to  say,  while  assuring 
the  good  and  the  brave  that  their  efforts  are  not 
in  vain  and  their  probity  unheeded,  —  he  implies 
the  converse  or  negative  side,  the  condemnation  of 
the  wicked.  But  it  is  true  that  theoretically  he 
leaves  open  the  question  what  idea  pragmatism 
ought  to  have  of  God :  "  Pragmatism  has  to  post- 
pone dogmatic  answer,  for  we  do  not  yet  know  cer- 
tainly which  type  of  religion  is  going  to  work  best 
in  the  long  run  "  (p.  300).  He  affirms  that  he  has 
spoken  for  himself  alone  in  the  case  of  this  particu- 
lar problem.^ 

We  can  deal  more  briefly  with  the  topic  of  prag- 
matism and  religion  elsewhere  than  in  America. 
I  shall  have  to  do  little  more  than  repeat  what  I  said 
apropos  of  pragmatism  and  the  popular  philosophy 
of  action.  Especially  in  respect  to  other  philoso- 
phies the  same  motifs  are  in  operation  which  give 
its  distinctive  tint  to  the  pragmatism  of  Mr.  Schiller 
compared  with  that  of  Professor  James.  In  a  word. 
Professor  James  has  a  free  field  and  writes  with  a 
calmer  nerve.  The  line  of  demarcation  between  a 
scientist  or  university  professor  and  a  plain  public 
of   cultivated  people  being  scarcely  perceptible  in 

*  For  passages  of  a  pragmatic  cast  in  his  Varieties  0/  Religious 
Experience,  see  pp.  15,  39,  327,  332,  377,  378,  443,  445- 


i6o  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

America,  Professor  James  speaks  to  a  people,  with- 
out concerning  himself  very  much  with  the  opinion 
of  professional  philosophers.^  These,  however,  at- 
tack him  a  good  deal  on  points  of  detail ;  but  prag- 
matism is  not  at  all  affected  or  injured  by  them. 
And  before  the  public,  he  continues  his  plan  of  not 
contending  but  expounding  or  interpreting  in  lec- 
tures and  books;  and  his  ideas  are  such  as  people 
want  to  hear.  In  England  a  philosophic  doctrine  is 
discussed  first  of  all  among  philosophers  or  scien- 
tists, and  the  verdict  depends  on  these,  not  on  the 
public  at  large.  Now  there  exists  in  England  a 
philosophy,  already  a  century  old,  which  in  its  posi- 
tivism is  the  very  antipodes  of  pragmatism.  Among 
its  representatives  are  the  followers  of  such  men  as 
Mill,  Huxley,  and  Spencer.  It  is  they  who  must 
be  reckoned  with,  and  it  is  against  them  that  Mr. 
Schiller  wields  his  lance.  If  we  examine  pragma- 
tism, Mr.  Schiller  says,  in  its  religious  aspect,  "  we 
shall  find  that  it  has  a  most  important  bearing. 
For  in  principle  pragmatism  overcomes  the  old  an- 
tithesis of  faith  and  reason.  It  shows  on  the  one 
hand  that  faith  must  underlie  all  reason  and  per- 
vade it,  nay,  that  at  bottom  rationality  itself  is 
the  supremest  postulate  of  faith.  ...  On  the  other 
hand,  it  enables  us  to  draw  the  line  between  a  gen- 
uine and  a  spurious  faith."     (Humanism,  p.  XIV.) 

*  Yet  he  does  show  some  concern  about  it  in  a  recent  article  in 
the  Philosophical  Review  (XVII,  i).  But  it  was  almost  superfluous, 
for  the  success  of  pragmatism  in  America  does  not  depend  much  on 
the  speculative  thinkers. 


SOCIAL   PHENOMENA  i6i 

Schiller  adds  that  it  is  ''  by  chance  "  that  pragma- 
tism touches  on  this  subject  of  the  relations  between 
faith  and  reason.  Yet  this  is  doubtful;  otherwise, 
why  this  constant  preoccupation  with  the  subject 
even  in  Mr.  Schiller's  own  writings?  In  the  first 
"  essay  "  of  Humanism  he  devotes  many  pages  to 
it.  In  another  essay  (p.  62)  he  refutes  Lotze  by 
taking  the  stand  that  the  theory  of  monism  "  cannot 
be  equated  with  (the  idea  of)  God";  and  the  idea 
of  an  absolute  God  (instead  of  a  personal  God) 
"  aggravates  the  problem  of  freedom,  of  mutation, 
and  of  evil."  Again  in  Studies  of  Humanism  he 
has  one  of  his  most  important  essays  devoted  en- 
tirely to  Faith,  Reason,  and  Religion. 

We  can  equally  surmise  the  importance  of  these 
religious  prepossessions  in  relation  to  pragmatism 
by  a  discussion  with  Bradley  cited  by  Schiller 
(pp.  3,  4).  Bradley  cannot  endure  this  confusion 
between  ethics  and  metaphysics :  "  Render  the  point 
of  view  absolute  and  then  consider  what  you  have 
done.  You  have  not  only  become  irrational  but 
you  have  broken  the  bonds  that  unite  you  with  all 
the  great  religions."  The  inverse  is  true  for 
Schiller;  it  is  Bradley  who  ruins  ethics  in  wanting 
to  make  it  independent  of  metaphysics ;  does  he  not 
say  (p.  13),  "our  metaphysics  must  ...  be  quasi- 
ethical?" 

In  its  attitude  toward  theology,  pragmatism  in 
England  seems  to  hold  a  rather  different  position. 
In  America  all  theologians  do  not  like  this  philos- 

II 


i62  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

ophy  which  replaces  their  own.  In  their  eyes 
pragmatism  borders  on  emancipated  theology;  they 
have  taxed  it  with  impiety  as  we  have  seen.  In 
other  words,  pragmatists  are  really  the  allies  of 
the  theologians,  although  the  latter  do  not  always 
understand  it  so.  In  England,  on  the  contrary, 
where  philosophy  is  far  from  being  always  well 
disposed  toward  theology,  the  theologians  are  only 
too  happy  to  be  able  to  call  to  their  aid  a  William 
James,  author  of  a  great  empirical  Psychology,  and 
yet  a  pragmatist,  that  is,  a  spiritualist.  Mr.  Schiller 
is  already  one  of  them,  a  spiritualist,  so  the  assist- 
ance of  Professor  James  is  much  more  valuable. 
Like  men  in  danger  of  drowning  they  have  shown 
great  alacrity  in  seizing  the  safety  plank  (as  one  of 
them  called  it)  thrown  to  them  by  the  American  psy- 
chologist. Sometimes  they  have  even  been  a  little 
false  to  him.  Such  was  that  champion  of  an  aveng- 
ing God  I  mentioned  in  a  previous  chapter  who  jus- 
tified himself  on  the  authority  of  pragmatism,  in 
supporting  a  doctrine  of  which  James  was  not  at  all 
solicitous  to  be  the  patron.  This  alliance  between 
theology  and  pragmatism  in  England  (and  upon 
the  European  continent,  too,  for  that  matter)  will 
probably  remind  certain  orthodox  Americans  of  the 
treaty  recently  concluded  in  their  country  between 
the  temperance  societies  and  the  beer  brewers  that 
they  might  together  wage  war  on  the  whiskey  dis- 
tillers. The  world  sometimes  sees  fraternizations 
like  that  —  all  pragmatic. 


SOCIAL   PHENOMENA  163 

Let  us  then  conclude  this  chapter  by  saying  that 
pragmatism  is  pre-eminently  the  product  of  a  philo- 
sophic temperament,  to  use  Professor  James's  own 
word.  Indeed,  it  seems  that  his  conception  of 
the  history  of  philosophy  as  a  series  of  systems 
or  methods  constructed  by  different  temperaments 
applies  particularly  well  to  his  own  philosophy.  It 
is  a  curious  thing,  though,  that  he  seems  to  be- 
lieve that  pragmatism,  for  its  part,  is  destined  to 
escape  the  fate  of  other  philosophies  which  have  had 
their  day  as  being  only  accidental  and  personal. 
Pragmatism  (he  says)  "  has  come  to  stay  "  (p.  47). 
This  claim,  at  first  sight,  would  scarcely  seem  to  be 
justifiable.  Yet  Professor  James  may  be  right  to  this 
extent  and  in  this  sense,  that  a  philosophy  making 
use  of  no  other  lamps  and  guiding  stars  than  criteria 
of  a  practical  kind  may  come  to  be  more  and  more 
the  only  one  that  men  will  cultivate.  In  that  case 
it  ought  to  be  understood  that  the  philosophy  of 
the  crowd,  or  one  adapted  to  the  faculties  of  the 
crowd,  is  far  from  being  necessarily  the  true  philo- 
sophy; but  there  are  certain  indications  in  the  his- 
tory of  philosophy  which  favor  James's  opinion  — 
with  the  reservation  pointed  out.  There  is,  at  the 
same  time,  in  the  history  of  pragmatism  —  the 
thing,  not  the  word  —  a  valuable  proof  of  my  argu- 
ments that  the  idea  of  judging  a  theory  by  its  moral 
results  is  a  simple  product  of  circumstances  and  the 
milieu,  —  this  will  be  taken  up  in  our  next  chapter. 

Respecting  Le  Roy,  who  in  his  Dogme  et  Critique 


i64  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

(1907)  examines,  from  a  pragmatic  standpoint,  this 
question  of  the  value  of  reHgious  dogma,  at  bottom 
he  is  in  absokite  agreement  with  the  ideas  of  James 
in  the  matter.  He  only  expresses  them  in  a  little 
different  form,  for  he  expresses  them  for  a  different 
public;  I  mean  a  public  in  which  intellectual  tradi- 
tions are  deeply  rooted,  —  a  public  for  which  you 
cannot  simply  "  substitute "  utilitarian  dogmas  for 
theological  or  metaphysical  dogmas,  but  for  which 
you  must  subordinate  the  metaphysical  element  to 
the  pragmatic  element.  For  Le  Roy  the  value  of  a 
dogma  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  is  capable  of  being 
"  the  formula  of  a  rule  of  practical  conduct."  The 
efforts  that  have  been  made  to  separate  funda- 
mentally these  views  of  his  from  those  of  the 
Anglo-Saxon  pragmatists  seem  to  us  fruitless  and 
fine-spun. 


CHAPTER  II 

PRAGMATISM   OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES  AND  MODERN 
SCHOLASTICISM 

I.  Scholasticism  was  the  pragmatism  of  the  middle  ages:   phi- 

losophy buttressed  up  theology,  and  the  latter  sustained  the 
church  in  its  social  task.  The  emancipation  of  philosophy 
by  the  method  of  Descartes,  a  natural  method,  soon  made 
necessary  the  re-formation  of  a  pragmatic  philosophy;  for 
the  shock  to  the  beliefs  held  by  the  people  respecting 
religion  and  liberty  was  too  dangerous.  When  democracy 
triumphed  in  the  nineteenth  century,  and  philosophical 
speculations  became  accessible  to  all,  it  was  necessary  to 
hark  back  to  a  systematic  pragmatism;  pragmatism  is 
modern  scholasticism.  At  first  negative  pragmatism:  phil- 
osophers did  not  apply  philosophic  method  to  practical 
problems,  or  excused  themselves  from  doing  so  (Descartes, 
Locke,  Leibnitz). 

II.  Then  came  three  great  precursors  of  modern  pragmatism  — 
(positive  pragmatism):  Pascal  formulates  the  pragmatic 
paradox  in  his  Pensees  by  denying  the  rights  of  reason; 
Rousseau  opposes  his  pragmatism  to  the  "sensualist"  school 
of  the  eighteenth  century;  Kant,  after  having  killed  the 
practical  reason  by  pure  reason,  kills  pure  reason  by  the 
practical  reason,  solely  through  his  anxiety  to  safe-guard 
social  morality. 

III.  Why  the  utilitarianism  of  the  nineteenth  century  does  not 
suffice:  it  is  a  purely  persuasive  ethical  system  (no  one  can 
force  me  to  be  benevolent  toward  others) ;  the  people  need 
a  morality  based  on  authority,  a  sanctioned  morality;  they 
need  the  theological  moraUty  —  which  brings  back  prag- 
matism. 


i66  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

IV.  Superiority  of  the  pragmatism  of  Kant  to  that  of  Messrs. 

James  and  Schiller,  from  the  point  of  view  of  philosophy, 

V.  Superiority  of  the  scholastic  systems  to  the  modern  prag- 
matist  systems  from  the  point  of  view  of  philosophy. 


I 

Modern  pragmatism  —  I  mean  that  which  finally 
expanded  into  the  movement  over  the  destinies  of 
which  William  James  presides  —  harkens  back  to  the 
precise  period  when  the  Cartesian  philosophy  began 
to  make  a  breach  in  the  scholastic  philosophy. 

What  was  the  scholastic  philosophy?  Philosophy 
placed  at  the  service  of  theology,  ancilla  theologice; 
while  theology  itself  was  nothing  more  than  the  jus- 
tifier,  the  advocate  if  you  will,  of  the  church,  ancilla 
ecclesicB;  and  the  church,  in  its  turn,  proposed  to 
itself  the  enormous  and  delicate  task  of  civilizing, 
or,  more  specifically,  of  moralizing,  barbarian 
Europe,  —  a  task,  after  all,  which  it  accomplished 
in  as  admirable  a  way  as  was  possible,  humanly 
speaking.^ 

In  other  words,  the  church,  a  moral  institution, 
had  need  of  authority  to  restrain  the  barbarianism 
of  the  peoples  who  were  invading  the  Roman  Em- 
pire, and  this  authority  she  found  in  the  exploita- 

*  Here  again,  for  the  sake  of  clearness  in  the  exposition,  I  exclude 
the  psychological  element,  which  is  never  lacking  in  the  religion  of 
which  the  church  has  made  use  to  attain  her  ends,  —  an  element 
which,  mingled  with  the  other,  the  utilitarian,  seems  sometimes  to 
be  confounded  with  it  in  its  action,  but  still  remains  distinct  on 
analysis, 


PRAGMATISM   OF   THE   MIDDLE   AGES      167 

tion  of  the  religious  instincts  and  tendencies,  or  (if 
such  language  as  this  seems  too  irreverent)  let  us 
say  the  metaphysical  ignorance  of  the  peoples  whose 
destinies  she  wished  to  control.  Theological  dogmas 
were  needed  imposed  by  the  requirements  of  moral 
problems  and  which  the  dialectics  of  the  schools  had 
in  charge  to  expound,  justify,  demonstrate,  develop. 
And  since  cares  of  a  practical  kind  absorbed  the 
larger  part  of  the  energies  of  the  peoples,  this 
philosophy  of  utility  had  scarcely  a  rival.  Hence 
philosophy  was  pragmatic  in  its  very  essence. 
Scholasticism  is  the  pragmatism  of  the  middle  ages. 
The  middle  ages  are  the  epoch  of  pragmatism 
triumphant. 

And  now  what  I  have  in  mind  to  demonstrate, 
by  a  rapid  sketch  of  the  history  of  philosophy,  is 
that  we  may  invert  the  terms;  that  if  scholasticism 
is  the  pragmatism  of  the  middle  ages,  vice  versa 
pragmatism  is  modern  scholasticism. 

One  of  two  things  is  true:  either  mediaeval  the- 
ology and  natural  philosophy  were  in  true  and 
perfect  accord,  and  in  that  case  scholasticism  was  to 
be  more  and  more  recognized  as  the  truth;  or  else 
they  only  agreed  in  outward  appearance  and  phi- 
losophy, left  to  her  own  devices,  contradicted 
Catholic  theology. 

To  decide  the  matter  it  was  only  necessary  to 
emancipate  philosophy  and  see  if  it  would  still  ter- 
minate in  scholasticism.  This  is  just  what  was 
going  to  take  place  in  the  sixteenth  century.     But 


i68  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

in  the  first  place  it  would  be  false  to  say  that  our 
independent  philosophy  was  unknown  to  the  middle 
ages.  If  philosophy  had  not  occasionally  lifted  her 
head,  the  formula  credo  etsi  ahsurdum  would  not 
have  been  invented;  if  she  had  not  had  sometimes 
terrible  longings  herself  also  to  sit  in  the  seat  of 
supreme  authority,  the  dictum  credo  quia  ahsurdum 
would  not  have  been  proposed.  But  her  voice  was 
stifled  until  at  the  Renaissance  the  minds  of  men 
were  penetrated  and  inspired  by  a  great  spirit  of 
freedom.  And  finally  arrived  Descartes,  who  de- 
clared himself  unable  to  believe  against  his  reason 
and  proposed  a  credo  quia  rationale.  He  presented 
a  philosophic  method  (which  was  only  the  natural 
scientific  method  brought  back) ;  and  this  philo- 
sophic method,  supported  by  the  authority  of  Bacon 
in  England,  was  destined  by  the  substitution  of  ob- 
jectivism for  subjectivism  ^  to  reach  its  climax  in 
the  denial  of  scholastic  truth.  And  further,  it  must 
lead  to  a  belief  in  the  determinism  of  nature,  —  the 
sine  qua  non  of  science;  and  if  this  triumphed  it 
would  threaten  the  foundation  of  all  the  beliefs  on 
which  rested  the  moral  and  social  order. 

The  philosophers  understood  the  dangers  of  the 
*'  new  "  method.  They  heard  the  voice  of  the  prag- 
matic conscience  lift  itself  up  within  them,  crying 
for  quarter  to  the  philosophic  conscience.    One  after 

*  A  subjectivism  entirely  conscious  and  voluntary  in  scholasticism 
(though  not  avowed),  precisely  like  that  of  modern  pragmatism,  a 
thing  which  distinguishes  both  of  them  from  other  historic  subjrf^- 
tivisms. 


PRAGMATISM    OF   THE   MIDDLE    AGES      169 

another  and  the  greatest  among  them  compro- 
mised. Bacon  compromised,  Descartes  compro- 
mised, Hobbes  compromised,  Locke  compromised, 
Leibnitz  compromised,  Newton  compromised;  even 
Hume  compromised.  They  applied  the  philosophic 
method  (which  we  now  call  positivism)  to  mathe- 
matics, to  astronomy,  to  certain  physical  sciences 
having  only  a  slight  connection  with  theology  and 
ethics.  But  when  they  came  to  what  has  been  very 
well  styled,  even  up  to  our  day,  the  "  practical  phi- 
losophy," then  invariably,  some  a  little  sooner,  some 
a  little  later,  they  recanted,  for  they  foresaw  the 
formidable  social  cataclysm  for  which  they  would 
be  responsible  (and  of  w^hich  they  would  suffer 
themselves),  if  they  went  on  to  shatter  opinions 
accredited  as  true  and  regarded  as  indispensable  to 
the  moral  order.  Bacon,  while  combating  contem- 
porary superstitions,  still  did  not  wish  that  the 
church  should  cease  to  instruct  in  religious  beliefs, 
since  if  human  knowledge  depends  upon  the  senses 
it  is  natural  that  divine  truth  should  appear  to  us 
to  be  irrational.  Descartes  pretended  to  believe,  and 
perhaps  made  himself  think  that  he  believed,  that  the 
method  of  his  Discours  led  him  necessarily  from 
the  cogito  ergo  sum  to  the  existence  of  God,  to  God's 
moral  perfection,  and  to  the  immortality  of  the  soul. 
Hobbes,  author  of  The  Leviathan,  writes :  "  The 
truths  of  faith  must  be  swallowed  at  a  gulp,  like  salu- 
tary but  bitter  pills:  if  you  try  to  chew  them  you 
will  probably  spit  them  out."     Locke  is  drawn  by 


I70  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

reason  to  the  belief  in  the  existence  of  a  first  cause, 
or  God ;  but  as  to  the  attributes  of  God,  belief  in  the 
existence  of  an  immaterial  soul,  in  immortality,  in 
the  resurrection,  we  ought  to  allow  ourselves  to  be 
guided  by  the  church.  We  shall  return  to  Leibnitz 
further  on.  Spinoza  starts  from  a  purely  natural- 
istic conception  of  ethics  akin  to  that  of  the  homo 
homini  lupus  of  Hobbes  (that  man  agrees  to  moral- 
ity in  order  to  satisfy,  at  least  in  part,  his  egoistic 
instincts)  ;  but  finally  ends  by  recommending  the 
purely  persuasive  Christian  virtues  of  self-abnega- 
tion and  of  love  of  one's  neighbor,  Avhich  are  in 
glaring  contradiction  with  the  principles  laid  down. 
Finally,  Hume,  who  was  at  once  the  keenest  and 
most  magnificent  genius  and  the  most  pitiless  logi- 
cian perhaps  of  all  known  philosophers,  never  dared 
to  express  his  entire  thought  when  confronted  with 
the  problems  of  the  moral  nature,  but  rather  coun- 
selled men  to  abandon  themselves  in  religion  (which 
the  Anglo-Saxons  almost  always  confound  with 
morality),  to  the  sway  of  instinct  and  to  the  general 
opinion. 

All  this  is  negative  pragmatism — if  I  may  ven- 
ture to  make  use  of  this  term.  It  is  a  return  to  the 
credo  etsi  absurdum.  Yet  the  reader  will  observe 
that  at  every  new  stage  the  philosophic  method  of 
Descartes,  the  credo  quia  rationale,  advances  more 
and  more  in  the  direction  of  morality  and  finally 
encroaches  upon  its  domain.  After  Hume  there 
remained  only  one  step  to  take.    Auguste  Comte,  at 


PRAGMATISM    OF   THE    MIDDLE   AGES      171 

the  close  of  an  interruption  in  the  onward  march, 
was  to  take  this  step.  He  created  "  social  physics  "  ; 
that  is,  he  deliberately  introduced  into  moral  and 
social  studies  the  rigorous  method  of  science,  or 
social  determinism. 


II 

Nevertheless  there  was,  as  early  as  the  seven- 
teenth century,  a  thinker  whose  intellect  did  not 
abdicate  its  throne  so  readily  at  the  beck  of  the 
moral  or  religious  consciousness,  who  saw  distinctly 
that  not  only  did  the  philosophic  method  of  Des- 
cartes not  lead  to  the  moral  and  religious  truths  in 
the  presence  of  which  the  thinkers  whom  I  have 
cited  laid  down  their  arms,  but  that  it  was  incom- 
patible with  them.  He  saw  at  once  very  plainly  that 
reason  gives  us  an  unsatisfactory  reply  to  the  moral 
problem,  and  while  endeavoring  to  understand  the 
latter,  was  only  accumulating  new  and  insoluble 
questions.  Such  a  thinker  could  not  come  to  a  halt 
before  a  simple  "  No  admittance !  " ;  logic  must  have 
all  or  nothing;  he  said  "nothing";  one  must 
choose  between  moral  truth  and  intellectual  truth; 
the  former  is  more  important  to  us  than  the  latter; 
thus  the  irrational  shall  have  precedence  over  the 
rational.  Pascal  is  the  first  to  deliberately  formu- 
late in  modern  times  the  pragmatic  paradox.  And 
from  the  very  start  he  formulates  it  with  infinitely 
more  precision,   logic,  and  courage  than  any  one 


172  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

following  him,  James  himself  perhaps  included. 
The  more  we  allow  ourselves  to  be  guided  by  reason 
(he  says)  so  much  the  more  do  we  deviate  from 
moral  and  religious  truth,  and  so  much  the  more, 
then,  must  truth  be  irrational.  He  pushes  to  the 
limit  the  thesis  in  order  to  be  compelled  to  fall  back 
on  the  antithesis.  He  who  said  "  La  dignite  de 
rhomme  consiste  dans  la  pensee  "  will  only  make 
use  of  this  belief  in  order  to  bring  a  charge  of  de- 
ception against  human  reason  and  fall  back  upon 
truth  divine.    The  credo  quia  absurdum  is  revived.^ 

^  We  must  recollect  that  Pascal,  having  left  only  fragments  of  his 
great  work  on  the  Christian  religion,  and  so  being  always  seen  through 
the  medium  of  his  editors,  is  imperfectly  seen.  It  is  always  said  that 
Pascal  wanted  to  show  the  rationality  of  religion.  He  wanted  to  show 
the  very  opposite,  i.  e. :  Man  turns  toward  religion  because  his  reason 
does  not  furnish  him  the  truth  he  is  seeking  —  Does  that  prove  the 
rationality  of  religion?  A  man  must  "lay  a  wager"  that  religion 
is  true,  must  become  "stupid"  (s'abetir)  in  order  to  find  the  true  in 
religion;  the  mind  must  receive  "grace"  in  order  to  persuade  it  to 
accept  religion,  —  this  is  Pascal's  idea.  We  have  not  much  con- 
fidence in  the  testimony  of  his  contemporaries.  Take,  for  instance, 
the  famous  fragment  (ed.  Havet,  Art.  XXIV,  26):  "Men  despise 
religion;  they  hate  it  and  at  the  same  time  fear  that  it  may  be  true. 
To  remedy  this  state  of  things  we  must  begin  by  showing  that  religion 
is  not  contrary  to  reason;  then  that  it  is  worthy  of  reverence,  give 
it  our  respect ;  next  render  it  worthy  of  love,  make  men  ardently  wish 
that  it  were  true,  and  then  show  that  it  is  true.  Worthy  of  reverence 
in  that  it  has  so  well  understood  man ;  worthy  of  love  because  it  prom- 
ises him  welfare  and  happiness."  Is  it  possible  to  discover  a  more 
banal  vindication  of  religion?  Either  these  men  who  pretend  to 
have  received  these  revelations  from  Pascal  himself  did  not  rightly 
understand  him,  or  else  Pascal,  when  he  had  set  forth  his  scheme, 
had  not  yet  formulated  it  clearly  in  his  own  mind.  "Worthy  of 
reverence  in  that  it  has  so  well  understood  man;  worthy  of  love 
because  it  promises  him  welfare  and  happiness"  —  that  is,  to  be 
sure,  pragmatic,  but  hardly  original.  If  we  must  depend  on  this  to 
render  Pascal  profound,  what  a  quantity  of  profound  thinkers  the 
world  has  produced! 


PRAGMATISM    OF   THE    MIDDLE   AGES      173 

The  reason  is  our  natural  organism  of  thought 
and  instrument  of  knowledge;  hence  if  we  decline 
to  submit  to  it  there  must  be  special  motives.  In  the 
case  of  Pascal  eternal  preoccupation  of  the  infinite 
{le  totirment  de  rinfini)  was  undoubtedly  one  of 
these  (the  sentimental  element  in  religion)  ;  but 
there  were  also  utilitarian  predilections,  and  so  of 
a  pragmatic  kind,  which  led  him  to  his  credo  quia 
absitrdum.  I  should  even  venture  to  affirm  these 
to  have  been  the  determining  motives  since  he  went 
and  joined  himself  to  the  Jansenists  who  were 
chiefly  concerned  in  reacting  against  the  ethics  of 
Jesuits,  which  ethics  were  menacing  society  with 
anarchy. 

Pascal  is  the  author  of  the  Lettres  Provinciales 

as  well  as  of  the  Pensees;   in  his  own  day  he  was 

known   solely  as   the   author  of   the  Provinciales. 

The  idea  of  revolution  implied  in  the  method  of 

Descartes  had  made  but  a  slight  impression  on  a 

very  small  elite  of  thinkers;    the  church,  whether 

Catholic  or  Protestant,  remained  mistress  of  men's 

hearts ;  morality  sanctioned  by  religion  continued  to 

be  the  popular  philosophy ;   hence  the  Pensees  must 

be  regarded  as  a  kind  of  prophetic  book;    Pascal 

could  see  that  the  final  outcome  of  Descartes  was 

to  be  Comte  and  Spencer,  and  two  hundred  years 

in  advance  he  tried  to  parry  the  blow. 

*       * 
* 

Indeed,  after  Pascal,  science  —  which  is  nothing 

more  than  philosophy  applied  to  the  phenomena  of 


174  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

nature  —  could  not  but  acquire  an  ever-increasing 
consciousness  of  itself  and  of  its  power.  And  to 
every  forward  step  of  science  there  will  correspond 
a  pragmatic  reaction.  In  proportion  as  these  for- 
ward movements  become  more  formidable,  the  re- 
actions are  bound  to  become  more  decided,  since  the 
incompatibility  of  the  two  systems  is  thereby  thrown 
into  greater  prominence. 

The  first  manifestation  of  pragmatism,  which,  at 
the  time  it  appeared,  had  a  certain  degree  of  impor- 
tance, was  that  of  Bayle.  As  early  as  the  close  of 
the  seventeenth  century  the  premonitory  tokens  of 
the  impulse  toward  emancipation  which  was  to  char- 
acterize the  age  of  Voltaire  became  numerous. 
Catholicism  was  still  sufficiently  strong  to  resist; 
but  Protestantism,  which  rejected  the  idea  of  author- 
ity in  religious  and  moral  matters,  had  to  foresee 
the  approach  of  the  time  when  enemies  of  religion 
simply  by  drawing  out  to  their  legitimate  conclu- 
sions the  consequences  of  free  thought  —  another 
phrase  for  the  philosophic  method  of  Descartes  — 
were  going  to  conflict  with  dogma.  Protestantism 
took  refuge  in  revelation,  a  step  which  was  in  oppo- 
sition to  the  ecclesiastical  tradition  of  Catholicism 
on  the  one  hand  and  to  rationalism  on  the  other. 
Bayle  based  the  acceptance  of  this  "  revelation " 
on  the  pragmatic  paradox:  reason  leads  us  astray 
instead  of  guiding  us.  Taking  up  again  the  antin- 
omies of  Zeno  of  Elea,  he  showed  how  philosophy 
leads  to  scepticism.    Truth,  then,  must  be  a-rational 


PRAGMATISM    OF   THE   MIDDLE   AGES      175 

or  irrational  (it  amounts  to  the  same  thing)  ;  it 
must  be  revealed.  It  should  be  added,  however, 
that,  while  Bayle  was  very  pragmatic  in  his  objects, 
he  was  very  much  of  a  philosopher  by  temperament, 
and  he  allowed  himself  to  be  drawn  on  farther  than 
was  proper  for  his  purpose.  He  proved  too  much. 
He  proved  that  a  society  of  atheists  could  be  moral. 
Hence  his  system  seemed  as  dangerous  to  Protes- 
tants as  to  Catholics;  and  it  was,  in  the  long  run, 
the  rationalists  who  profited  by  his  penetrating  criti- 
cism. The  debt  of  Voltaire  to  Bayle's  Historical 
and  Critical  Dictionary  is  well  known. 

What  Bayle  accomplished  on  the  Continent 
Shaftesbury  accomplished  in  England,  where  Bacon, 
Hobbes,  and  Locke  were  disquieting  minds  of  a 
pragmatic  temperament.  Taking  up  for  his  own 
account  the  deductions  of  Bayle  (that  reason  only 
points  out  the  errors  in  our  philosophic  opinions, 
but  is  not  a  lamp  to  our  feet  in  practical  life,  is  in- 
deed dangerous  to  follow),  he  proposes  a  religion 
and  a  morality  based  on  a  rational  appreciation  of 
social  problems,  but  absolutely  independent  ration- 
ally from  every  question  of  principle,  i.  c,  ignoring 
philosophy  proper.  There  was  in  this  a  vague  anti- 
cipation of  the  system  of  the  two  reasons  —  the  pure 
and  the  practical  —  of  Kant,  whom  we  shall  now 
very  soon  reach. 


The  most  formidable  pragmatic  movement  before 
our  day  —  we  cannot  yet  see  how  far  the  one  in  the 


176  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

midst  of  which  we  are  living  will  lead  us  —  is  that 
of  the  second  half  of  the  eighteenth  century,  and 
the  greatest  pragmatist  was,  and  probably  always 
will  be,  Jean  Jacques  Rousseau.  The  movement 
at  that  time,  like  that  of  James,  owes  its  importance 
in  large  measure  to  the  historical  circumstances  amid 
which  it  was  produced.  The  old  social  edifice  was 
threatening  to  fall  in  ruins;  and  it  was  in  France 
that  the  great  attempt  to  repair  and  restore  it  was 
to  be  made,  for  the  abuses  of  the  ancien  regime  were 
there  manifesting  themselves  with  more  virulent 
power  than  elsewhere.  All  the  French  philosophy 
of  the  eighteenth  century  was  more  or  less  prag- 
matic. But,  generally  speaking,  thinkers  either  con- 
tented themselves  with  attacking  the  old  ideas  in 
their  theoretic  feebleness  or  in  their  consequences 
(the  Encyclopaedists  and  Voltaire)  ;  or  else  they 
proposed  political  theories,  while  leaving  in  the 
shade  the  moral  principles  which  ought  to  have  been 
the  foundation  of  said  theories  (Montesquieu)  ;  or, 
again,  they  drew  up  fine  theories  about  man,  king 
of  creation,  —  theories  which  had  only  distant  rela- 
tions with  concrete  problems  (Buffon).  Rousseau 
alone  squarely  and  clearly  laid  down  the  pragmatic 
question,  "  What  is  such  and  such  a  theory  good 
for  morally  f  Rousseau  starts  out  on  that  ques- 
tion in  his  very  first  Discourse  on :  "  Whether  the 
restoration  of  science  and  the  arts  has  helped  to  ele- 
vate morals?  "  (and  we  may  go  back  even  farther 
and  find  similar  ideas  in  the  work  of  his  youth,  now 


PRAGMATISM    OF   THE    MIDDLE   AGES      177 

printed  in  his  Complete  Works).  The  principle  of 
his  answer  is:  Judge  an  idea  by  its  social  conse- 
quences; choose  the  philosophy  you  are  going  to 
preach  to  the  people  by  its  moral  consequences :  by 
so  doing  you  will  get  the  truth.  The  same  theories 
inspire  from  one  end  to  the  other  and  with  unerring 
logic  the  Disc  ours  siir  VInegalite,  the  Lettre  siir  les 
Spectacles,  the  Noiwelle  Helo'ise  (the  two  parts  of 
which  contradict  each  other  diametrically,  except  on 
this  point),  Emile,  and  the  Contrat  social.  He  at- 
tacks the  civilization  of  the  past,  —  art,  literature, 
science  included,  —  for  it  has  resulted  in  inequality, 
and  consequently  in  war.  Then  in  the  case  of  those 
who  favored  this  inequality,  the  wealthy,  it  has 
resulted  in  the  taste  for  luxury  which  procures  false 
and  dangerous  joys;  in  the  case  of  others  it  has 
resulted  in  the  frequent  abandonment  of  the  peace- 
able and  natural  occupations  of  life;  it  has  killed 
out  everywhere  even  the  possibility  of  true  and 
healthful  pleasures.  The  theatre,  for  instance,  needs 
the  approval  of  the  people  in  order  to  live,  and,  to 
secure  this,  it  will  flatter  their  passions,  and,  by 
presenting  vice  in  amiable  colors  will  encourage  it; 
actors  will  accustom  themselves  to  imitating  feelings 
and  sentiments  instead  of  approving  of  them,  and 
this  is  hypocrisy;  etc.,  etc. 

On  the  other  hand,  Rousseau  attacks  the  philoso- 
phers of  his  time,  for  they  exhibit  man  as  necessarily 
the  sport  of  his  passions;  they  lead  us  to  determin- 
ism and  irreligion.     In  one  way  —  though  not  in 

12 


178  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

so  keen  a  way  as  Pascal  —  Rousseau  had  the  pro- 
phetic eye.  He  had  no  need  to  read  them ;  he  knew 
even  before  they  had  pubHshed  their  works  at  what 
goal  those  writers  would  arrive  who,  under  the  pre- 
text of  enlightening  men,  undermined  the  moral 
beliefs  necessary  to  good  order  and  the  happiness 
of  humanity,  —  such  authors,  I  mean,  as  Lamettrie 
{UHomme  machine,  1748),  D'Holbach  {Systeme 
de  la  Nature,  1771),  and  Helvetius  {De  rHomme, 
1771).  In  place  of  working  to  emancipate  the 
minds  of  men  together  with  them,  Rousseau  works 
against  them.  He  had  left  them  as  soon  as  he  had 
caught  a  glimpse  of  the  way  their  speculations  were 
going.  In  the  second  of  his  Dialogues,  —  his  su- 
preme work,  in  which  **  Rousseau  "  judges  "  Jean 
Jacques,"  —  he  says  of  himself,  "  I  never  saw  him 
listen  patiently  to  any  doctrine  that  he  believed  to 
be  hostile  to  the  public  good."  {CEuvres,  ix,  p.  94.) 
But  let  us  not  forget  that  he  toiled  to  replace  one 
slavery,  that  of  the  artificial  civilization  of  his  time, 
by  another  slavery,  that  of  morality,  which  seemed 
to  him,  not  without  reason,  to  be  less  dangerous  for 
the  people  than  that  of  knowledge. 

The  famous  first  phrase  in  Emile,  "  Everything  is 
good  as  it  leaves  the  hands  of  the  Creator;  every- 
thing degenerates  in  the  hands  of  man,"  is  only  a 
striking  application  of  the  pragmatic  principle,  for 
it  means  this:  Man,  as  he  leaves  the  hands  of  the 
Creator,  is  man  simple  and  unreflecting,  who  does 
not  concern  himself  anxiously  about  the  true  but 


PRAGMATISM   OF  THE   MIDDLE   AGES      179 

about  the  useful,  and  who  arranges  his  life  from  the 
practical  point  of  view.  The  civilized  man,  on  the 
contrary,  is  the  man  who  develops  his  understand- 
ing and  attains  to  the  determinist  philosophy  of 
causes  and  effects  in  the  domain  of  ideas,  and  to 
social  inequality  (the  cause  of  all  the  evils  of  civili- 
zation in  the  domain  of  morals).  For  Rousseau 
himself  affirmed  that,  unless  he  condemned  his  own 
understanding  to  inaction,  man  could  not  help  devel- 
oping the  very  civilization  which  he,  Rousseau, 
attacks. 

It  must  be  said  in  favor  of  Rousseau  —  or  was 
it  only  shrewdness  on  his  part  ?  —  that  he  never  con- 
demned science  itself,  but  only  its  vulgarization. 
And  that  is  a  point  in  which  he  was,  it  seems  to  me, 
much  superior  to  many  pragmatists  before  and  after 
his  time.  But  that  he  refrained  from  always  utter- 
ing all  his  thought  appears  to  me  to  be  clear.  In 
the  last  pages  of  the  first  Discourse,  for  instance, 
he  recognizes  that  the  science  and  the  arts  are  not 
bad  for  everybody,  and  that  surely  in  the  hands  of 
an  intellectual  elite  they  are  even  excellent  things. 
Quite  naturally,  people  did  not  understand  these 
reservations,  adroitly  made,  and  the  Discours  were 
attacked  as  though  they  were  not  to  be  found  in 
them.  Rousseau  returned  to  this  point  and  insisted 
on  it  in  the  discussion  that  followed,  —  ready,  how- 
ever, to  forget  it  again  in  writing  his  subsequent 
works,  the  Entile  particularly. 

Why  does  he  feel  the  necessity  of  returning  to 


i8o  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

this  question  again  in  the  Dialogues  f  "  People  per- 
sisted," he  says  in  the  third  dialogue,  "  in  accusing 
him  of  wanting  to  destroy  the  sciences,  the  arts,  the 
theatres,  the  academies,  and  to  immerse  the  world 
again  in  barbarism.  But,  on  the  contrary,  he  has 
always  insisted  on  preserving  existing  institutions, 
maintaining  that  their  destruction  would  only  re- 
move the  palliating  circumstances,  while  leaving  the 
vices  intact,  and  substitute  brigandage  for  corrup- 
tion." The  defence  is  quite  unfortunate.  It  is  very 
much  as  if  one  should  say  to  a  man  who  has  lamed 
himself  and  walks  with  crutches,  "  You  are  right 
in  walking  with  crutches,  for  under  the  present  cir- 
cumstances you  walk  better  so.  And  not  merely 
that,  but  you  have  done  well  to  break  your  legs,  for, 
if  you  had  not  had  this  misfortune  you  would  have 
had  to  go  without  crutches."  Was  Rousseau  him- 
self satisfied  with  his  statement?  It  would  be  sur- 
prising if  he  had  been;  but  he  had  somewhat 
changed  his  point  of  view  since  the  first  Discourse ; 
or  let  us  rather  say  he  had  become  better  aware  of 
the  true  spirit  of  his  philosophy,  and  now  realized 
that  he  had  to  choose  between  philosophy  and  prag- 
matism. His  pragmatic  work  was  then  put  above 
his  disinterested  solicitude  for  the  truth.  He  de- 
cided to  spread  abroad  useful  beliefs  and  to  relegate 
to  a  subordinate  place  the  logical  agreement  of 
thoughts.  It  is  perhaps  the  reason  that  explains 
why  he  gave  up,  as  early  as  1762  or  1763,  writing 
his  treatise  on  the  sensations  La  morale  sensitive  ou 


PRAGMATISM    OF   THE   MIDDLE   AGES      i8i 

le  materialisme  du  sage,  the  subject  of  which,  how- 
ever, fascinated  him  (see  the  Confessions,  ix).  He 
had  in  mind  to  show  in  it  how  much  our  ideas,  our 
sentiments,  our  moral  actions  depend  on  physical 
conditions  and  anterior  physiological  states.  He 
meant  to  affirm  that,  knowing  these  physical  and 
moral  relations,  man  would  be  better  able  to  manage 
his  passions,  or  master  them.  It  was  Condillac, 
whose  friend  he  had  been  and  with  whom  he  had 
associated  for  several  years,  —  and  to  whom  he 
perhaps  owned  his  theories  on  the  origin  of  lan- 
guage, —  who  succeeded  in  inspiring  him  with  the 
idea  of  writing  this  book.  But  as  he  went  on  far- 
ther along  the  road  of  pragmatism,  Rousseau  must 
have  feared  lest  such  a  ''  treatise "  might  demon- 
strate too  much,  —  that  is,  might  suggest  the  idea 
of  irresponsibility,  —  and  be  employed  to  establish 
the  foundation  of  "  social  physics,"  as  Comte  would 
one  day  phrase  it,  or  of  a  mere  "  science  of  morals," 
as  Levy-Briihl  would  say ;  in  short,  lest  it  should  be 
furnishing  arms  against  his  other  writings  and  the 
purpose  he  had  in  view  in  writing  them.  So  he  dis- 
missed it  from  his  mind  and  was  not  perhaps  very 
sorry  when  one  day  at  Motiers  he  discovered  that 
notes  which  he  had  already  begun  to  collect  for 
this  work  had  been  stolen  or  got  lost  during  the  pre- 
cipitate flight  from  Montmorency  after  the  condem- 
nation of  Emile. 

Thus  the  work  of  Rousseau  remains  pragmatic 
from   A.    to   Z.      And,    after   having   rejected    all 


i82  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

a-moral  or  immoral  philosophy  and  theology,  he 
draws  up  the  positive  creeds  of  these  in  the  Pro- 
fession of  Faith  of  the  Savoyard  Vicar,  which  will 
remain  the  profession  of  faith  of  the  pragmatists 
of  all  times.  It  affirms  as  a  fact  the  existence  of 
an  absolute  moral  law  which  makes  itself  known 
to  man  through  the  conscience  as  the  voice  of  God. 
Unless  it  observes  this  law  the  world  condemns  it- 
self to  anarchy.  Furthermore,  the  world  must, 
under  penalty  of  injustice,  be  completed  (that  is, 
have  an  epilogue)  elsewhere.  To  the  beliefs  just 
mentioned  must  be  added  belief  in  the  existence  of 
the  soul  and  of  the  continuance  of  the  personal  life 
after  the  death  of  the  body.^ 

Rousseau,  owing  to  special  circumstances,  ad- 
dressed his  pragmatic  doctrines  to  an  entire  people. 
In  Germany  matters  had  a  different  complexion. 
Civilization  had  been  slower  in  penetrating,  and 
the  first  thinkers  appeared  at  the  epoch  of  the 
Renaissance  and  of  the  Reformation,  a  weighty 
and  momentous  epoch  from  the  social  point  of  view, 
and  in  which  it  was  impossible  to  ignore  the  practi- 
cal circumstances  of  life.  The  early  German  phi- 
losophers are  almost  as  much  preoccupied  with  the 
moral  spirit  of  their  doctrines  as  with  the  theoretical 
aspect  of  them.     The  result  of  this  was  that  the 

*  The  Monist  for  October,  1909,  publishes  an  extensive  study  by 
the  author  on  Rousseau  a  Forerunner  of  Modern  Fra^matism. 


PRAGMATISM    OF   THE   MIDDLE   AGES      183 

conflict  between  philosophy  and  life  was  slower  in 
appearing.  And  when  it  did  appear  it  was  upon 
philosophic  ground.  Leibnitz  and  Wolf  are  the  two 
great  names  of  German  philosophy  in  the  eighteenth 
century.  Leibnitz  rose  into  the  highest  speculations 
in  pure  mathematics,  and  his  metaphysical  specula- 
tions are,  at  first,  of  a  character  purely  intellectual. 
But  he  forced  himself  to  bend  the  latter  to  the  exi- 
gencies of  a  practical  philosophy,  and  wrote  his 
pragmatic  Theodicy,  a  generous  attempt,  perhaps, 
but  which  wrought  more  evil  than  good  to  the  cause ; 
for  it  inspired  in  Voltaire  his  tragically  witty  Can- 
dide.  That  the  Theodicy  was  saluted  as  a  great 
work  in  Germany  tells  us  much  of  the  status  of 
mind  in  that  country;  evidently  that  sort  of  phi- 
losophy was  wanted  there.  But  the  typical  popular 
thinker  of  Germany  was  Wolf.  He  conceived  a 
philosophy  which  at  the  very  outset  should  satisfy 
at  once  theoretical  aspirations  and  practical  aspira- 
tion, and  show  how  we  do  not  wish  to  dispense  with 
the  former  and  ought  not  to  dispense  with  the 
latter.  Wolf  places  them  calmly  in  juxtaposition 
without  over  much  troubling  himself  whether  they 
work  well  in  harness  or  not.  Philosophy  is  the  sci- 
ence of  the  possible,  —  of  the  possible  ( i )  in  the 
domain  of  the  intellect;  that  is,  metaphysics  (ontol^ 
ogy,  cosmology,  psychology,  and  natural  theology)  ; 
and  (2)  in  the  domain  of  the  will;  that  is,  practical 
philosophy  (ethics,  political  economy,  politics). 
Morality,  then,  is  put  on  one  side,  and  psychology  on 


i84  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

the  other,  —  so,  since  we  hold  them  carefully  sepa- 
rated, they  will  not  clash.  Yet  the  penetrating  criti- 
cism of  Hume  ran  its  course  in  Germany,  sapping  at 
their  foundation  the  facile  combinations  of  Wolf. 
The  problem  of  the  relations  between  pure  reason  and 
the  practical  reason  was  then  bound  to  be  laid  down, 
but  it  was  to  be  strictly  upon  the  ground  of  philos- 
ophy this  time  —  not  as  in  France  in  the  writings 
of  Rousseau.  Kant  tackled  the  problem  with  his 
well-known  vigor;  after  having  been  inspired  by 
Hume  he  accepted  his  final  inspiration  from  Rous- 
seau. With  Hume  later  he  recognized  that  the 
maladroit  juxtaposition  of  the  determinism  of  natu- 
ral phenomena  and  of  the  contingency  of  moral 
phenomena  was  untenable.  Moral  and  natural  phe- 
nomena intersect  and  interlace  continually;  the 
phenomenal  world  is  one.  Is  it  determined  or  free? 
that  is  the  question.  Kant  replies :  the  world  seems 
to  us  strictly  determined  in  all  its  parts ;  more  than 
that,  our  understanding  cannot  conceive  of  the 
world  except  under  the  aspect  of  determinism  the 
most  absolute.  But  if  it  were  the  absolutely  true, 
the  consequences  would  be  such  that  we  cannot 
accept.  There  is  no  other  resource  except  to  declare 
that  the  determined  world  is  only  an  appearance 
(phenomenal),  but  that  behind  this  phenomenal 
world  there  is  another  world  that  our  intellect  must 
assume  (an  "intelligible"  world)  which  is  the  true 
one,  and  in  which  contingency  (i.  e.,  freedom)  is 
conceivable.   To  express  it  in  a  nutshell,  Kant,  after 


PRAGMATISM    OF   THE   MIDDLE   AGES      185 

having  slain  the  practical  reason  by  pure  reason, 
faces  about,  terrified,  to  now  slay  pure  reason  by  the 
practical  reason.  He  begins  by  abandoning  himself 
entirely  to  the  pure  reason,  and  this  by  virtue  of  its 
empty  nothingness  throws  him  back  into  the  arms 
of  the  practical  reason.  Like  Pascal  he  emphasizes 
the  thesis  (of  determinism)  in  order  to  be  forced 
to  throw  himself  back  into  the  (pragmatic)  anti- 
thesis :   credo  quia  absurdum. 

Kant  laid  down  in  immutable  terms  the  alterna- 
tive, pragmatism  or  philosophy,  not  pragmatism  and 
philosophy;  pure  reason  or  practical  reason,  not 
pure  reason  and  practical  reason.  If  the  intellectual 
"  noumenal  "  world  is  different  from  the  phenom- 
enal world  it  means  that  either  one  or  the  other  is  a 
deceptive  appearance;  if  one  is  true,  the  other  not 
in  harmony  with  it  is  false.  It  is  impossible  to  main- 
tain that  the  phenomenal  world  is  not  in  harmony 
with  the  intellectual  world,  but  the  latter  is  in  per- 
fect accord  with  the  former.  Kant  decides  in  favor 
of  the  intellectual  world,  in  favor  of  pragmatism; 
the  phenomenal  world  is  therefore  deceptive;  pure 
reason,  the  human  intellect,  is  sacrificed.  Kant  has 
tried,  however,  to  reconcile  them  by  his  Critic  of  the 
Judgment.  But  as  much  as  his  work  of  separation 
was  definitive  and  absolute,  as  much  was  his  attempt 
at  co-ordination  (though  perhaps  ingenious)  defec- 
tive. His  successors  have  seen  this  very  clearly  and 
have  taken  another  course. 

*      * 


i86  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

Fichte  proposed  a  plan  of  harmonization  by  the 
absorption  of  the  pure  reason  in  the  practical  reason. 
The  phenomenal  world  (determinist)  is  the  mode 
of  manifestation  freely  chosen  by  the  absolute  ego 
(intelligible).  Hence  freedom  is  before  the  world, 
determinism  prevails  after  the  ego  has  manifested 
itself,  —  but  never  pure  freedom  and  determinism 
together.  This  position  excludes  pragmatism,  for 
freedom  in  the  actual  world  is  precisely  what  it 
wishes,  the  rest  is  indifferent. 

Schelling  gropes  in  genial  fashion  in  the  super- 
sensible realms. 

Hegel  absorbs  the  practical  reason  in  the  pure 
reason.  The  transcendental  Idea  manifests  itself 
not  freely,  but,  on  the  contrary,  after  a  determined 
mode  (according  to  its  intrinsic  nature)  ;  but  to 
conscious  man  this  transcendental  idea  manifests 
itself  as  having  a  moral  or  intellectual  end.  The 
moral  character  of  the  Idea  (that  is  to  say,  so  under- 
stood by  the  human  intellect)  betrays,  in  the  anthro- 
pomorphic character  Hegel  attributes  to  it,  ineradi- 
cable pragmatic  prepossessions.  But  Schopenhauer 
did  to  death  these  pragmatic  fancies  by  declaring 
that  the  transcendental  idea  which  was  realizing 
itself  in  the  world  was  also  a-rational,  a  "  Will " 
without  moral  purpose,  indifferent  to  human  reason, 
to  man;  such,  said  he,  did  experience  reveal  it  to 
be.  Schopenhauer  thus  withers  up  the  last  roots  of 
metaphysical  optimism  and  moral  transcendentalism. 
Hartmann  rounds  out  the  subject  by  declaring  the 


PRAGMATISM    OF   THE    MIDDLE   AGES      187 

"  Will  "  of  Schopenhauer  to  be  unconscious.  The 
"  Unconscious "  is  a  step  in  advance  of  "  Will," 
simply  because  will  is  still  a  moral  term.  In  fact, 
by  denying  the  moral  element  of  Hegel's  Idea 
Schopenhauer  had  already  abandoned  the  pragmatic 
ground  of  ethics.  Hartmann,  by  calling  the  will 
"  unconscious,"  deprives  the  Absolute  even  of  its 
psychological  character;  that  is  to  say,  he  really 
removes  the  metaphysical  problem,  blots  it  out;  his 
metaphysical  "  Unconscious  "  is  as  vacuous  as  Spen- 
cer's ''  Unknowable."  Hartmann  soon  realized  this, 
and  he  abandoned  the  "  unconscious  "  for  a  simple 
"  Phenomenology  of  the  moral  consciousness " ; 
which  means  science,  or  psychology  of  morals,  pure 
and  simple. 

Thus  transcendentalism,  in  trying  to  save  some 
scraps  of  practical  reason  with  the  pragmatism  of 
Kant,  saw^  itself  obliged  to  abandon  its  positions  one 
by  one  in  order  to  arrive  at  its  own  proper  negation. 
And  so,  in  German  speculation  at  the  end  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  we  reach  this  result:  the  prac- 
tical reason  cannot  assert  its  rights  in  philosophy; 
either  it  remains  silent,  or  else  clings  to  the  pure 
reason.  Kant  was  right :  pragmatism  or  philosophy ; 
but  when  he  chose  pragmatism  he  took  the  wrong 
road,  intellectually  speaking. 


i88  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 


III 


Thus  we  have  so  far  three  great  pragmatic  mani- 
festations,—  that  of  Pascal  (in  opposition  to  what 
is  impHed  in  the  method  of  Descartes)  ;  that  of 
Rousseau  (in  opposition  to  the  sensuahstic  philos- 
ophies of  the  eighteenth  century) ;  that  of  Kant  (in 
opposition  to  Hume).  I  might  give  an  exposition, 
from  this  point  of  view,  of  the  philosophy  of  the 
nineteenth  century;  but  the  fluctuations  between 
pragmatism  and  philosophy  being  more  rapid,  are 
also  less  potent  and  have  not  the  same  importance. 
Let  me  mention,  in  passing,  the  French  spiritualistic 
and  eclectic  movement  ( Royer-Collard,  Maine  de 
Biran,  and  especially  Cousin)  against  the  menacing 
scientific  spirit;  the  reaction  against  the  German 
materialism  of  Biichner,  Vogt,  and  Moleschott,  — 
which  was  only  a  revival  of  the  theories  of  Lamet- 
trie,  D'Holbach,  and  Helvetius,  profiting  by  recent 
scientific  acquisitions,  —  a  reaction  on  the  part  of 
theologians,  philosophers  like  Lange  and  Ulrici,  or 
Lotze,  or  even  Fechner.  Lotze  is  the  modern  Leib- 
nitz, and  upon  a  conception  of  the  world  of  a 
mechanical  cast,  seeks  to  construct  a  teleological 
system.  Fechner  has  a  scientific  mind  thirsting  for 
mystery.  But  these  attempts  at  reaction  were  but 
as  dikes  of  sand  swept  away  without  effort,  one 
after  the  other  by  the  rising  flood,  formidable  and 
rapid,  of  the  scientific  movement  of  the  nineteenth 


PRAGMATISM    OF   THE   MIDDLE   AGES      189 

century.  The  philosophers,  in  their  task  of  syn- 
thesizing the  acquisitions  of  the  workers  in  science, 
every  day  more  numerous  and  indefatigable,  were 
scarcely  able  to  keep  up  with  them.  Comte  appeared 
and  formulated  the  aspirations  of  science  in  his 
great  work.  Taine  appeared,  and  Spencer.  And 
how  many,  like  Darwin  and  Wallace,  after  they  had 
done  so  much  to  promote  the  progress  of  science,  in 
the  sequel  made  attempts  to  block  it!  So  James, 
yesterday  the  author  of  Psychology,  to-day  the 
author  of  Pragmatism,  Yet  on  English  and  Anglo- 
Saxon  ground  the  struggle  against  the  scientific 
spirit  had  for  a  long  time  an  aspect  quite  different 
from  what  it  had  either  in  France  or  Germany.  It 
will  be  interesting  for  us  to  glance  at  this  for  a 
moment. 

From  the  time  of  the  Reformation,  philosophy 
in  those  countries  occupied  itself  with  the  practical 
life  more  than  in  France.  There  was  therefore  less 
need  of  strong  pragmatic  reaction  in  the  eighteenth 
century  than  in  France.  A  Rousseau  would  have 
been  superfluous;  a  Shaftesbury  and  a  Clarke  suf- 
ficed. And  when  Hume  spoke  he  did  not  create  in 
Great  Britain  a  philosophical  revolution  as  in  Ger- 
many ;  his  scepticism  was  simply  ignored.  Leaving 
critical  speculation  to  its  fate,  Anglo-Saxon  thinkers 
and  writers  developed  philosophy  on  its  practical 
side  exclusively.  The  Scotch  school  alone  had  tried 
to  reply.  The  real  pragmatic  reaction  against  Hume 
was  the  Utilitarianism  of  Bentham  (who  proposed, 


190  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

without  any  further  worry  about  the  principles  of 
philosophy,  the  maximum  of  enjoyment  and  the 
minimum  of  suffering  for  all  men),  and  allied  the- 
ories such  as  Malthusianism.  But  these  economic 
and  social  theories  were  not  set  in  formal  opposition 
to  those  of  Hume;  they  were  constructed  alongside 
and  independently  of  philosophy.  Even  in  the  writ- 
ings of  Mill,  who  later  resumed,  on  the  one  hand, 
Hume's  studies  of  the  theories  of  knowledge,  and, 
on  the  other,  the  utilitarian  doctrines  of  Bentham, 
the  relation  between  the  two  parts  of  the  fabric  is 
far  from  being  apparent  at  first  sight.  In  the  mean- 
while utilitarianism  did  not  succeed ;  for  utilitarian- 
ism is  pragmatism  based  on  the  persuasive  reason; 
that  is  to  say,  that  it  provides  no  sanction  for 
morality  apart  from,  or  higher  than,  man.  Tell  a 
man  in  practical  life  that  it  is  more  rational  for  him 
to  renounce  his  advantage  or  profit  in  such  and 
such  a  matter,  and  for  his  neighbor  to  do  the  same 
in  another  case,  or  tell  him  that  there  is  a  system 
of  equilibrium  involved  which  is  delightful  to  con- 
template from  the  intellectual  point  of  view,  and  he 
will  laugh  to  scorn  your  "  rational  "  and  your  "  in- 
tellectual." Or,  again,  urge  upon  him  that  some 
one  else  may  refuse  to  obey  the  moral  law  if  he  does 
not  see  him  doing  as  much,  and  it  is  clear  that  he 
will  not  feel  himself  obliged  to  do  more  than  ob- 
serve the  outward  appearances  of  morality;  if  that 
is  all  that  is  necessary  to  induce  another  to  live  the 
moral  life  he  will  submit  to  that.    The  only  trouble 


PRAGMATISM    OF    THE   MIDDLE    AGES      191 

is  that  the  other  man  will  reason  in  the  same  way, 
and  everything  will  crumble  to  pieces.  Utilitarian- 
ism has  no  reason  to  urge  to  hinder  me  from  put- 
ting my  interest  before  that  of  others,  or  to  make 
me  take  into  consideration  the  interest  of  another 
if  I  do  not  want  to,  or  to  ignore  his  interest  if  I 
have  the  power.  On  the  utilitarian  theory  a  Napo- 
leon is  entirely  justified.  Man  must  feel  above  him 
a  power  that  forces  him  to  be  just,  and  this  power 
must  speak  to  him  directly,  —  for  example,  through 
the  power  of  the  church,  —  or  indirectly  through 
the  voice  of  conscience,  which  has  no  force  unless 
it  represents  the  voice  of  God.  Utilitarianism  is 
perhaps  a  very  noble  ideal  of  character,  though  Uto- 
pian, as  is  also  Malthusianism,  —  and,  one  cannot 
help  adding,  an  ideal  conceived  by  men  a  bit  naive 
and  shallow.  Suppose  a  person  feels  that  he  is, 
and  really  is,  a  superior  person,  would  it  be  rational 
that  he  should  sacrifice  himself  to  an  inferior?  Evi- 
dently not.  It  would  be  idiotic  for  him  to  do  so, 
and  for  others  to  ask  it  of  him.  Utilitarianism, 
then,  only  offers  egoism  as  a  moral  principle,  —  ego- 
ism admissible  in  the  case  of  superior  persons,  re- 
grettable in  the  contrary  case.  It  exalts  anarchy 
into  a  principle. 

Hence  utilitarianism,  although  plainly  inspired 
by  pragmatic  ideas,  was  opposed  by  the  traditional 
morality  based  upon  religion,  —  and  that,  too,  in 
the  name  of  pragmatic  principles;  for  pragmatism 
without  religious  sanction  would  not  suffice. 


192  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

There  were,  it  is  true,  some  attempts  at  reconcili- 
ation, such  as  the  HegeHan  ethics  of  Green,  or  the 
emasculated  evolutionism  of  Sidgwick,  or  the  miti- 
gated utilitarianism  of  Leslie  Stephen.  But  these 
could  be  only  temporary  remedies.  The  always- 
rising  tide  of  science  swept  away  from  ethics  its 
every  sanction,  irresistibly  moving  on  until  it 
reached  deterministic  ground.  And  when  people 
saw  the  belief  in  the  old  popular  ethics  of  the  con- 
science, the  ethics  guaranteed  by  God  and  immortal- 
ity, menaced  as  it  had  been  a  century  previous  in 
France,  going  to  wreck  and  ruin,  swept  away  not 
merely  by  philosophical  criticism  but  by  the  affirma- 
tions of  scientists,  and  by  utilitarianism,  their  minds 
were  filled  with  a  kind  of  panic.  This  rocking  and 
quaking  ground  under  their  feet  must  absolutely  be 
abandoned ;  cost  what  it  might,  authority  in  morals 
must  be  secured.  Then  began  a  period  of  famous 
personal  conversions  to  Catholicism,  at  the  same 
time  that  there  was  manifested  in  the  bosom  of  the 
established  church  as  a  body  a  strong  tendency  to 
fraternize  with  Catholicism.  This  period  is  even 
to-day  not  yet  passed,  and  only  the  triumph  of 
pragmatism  might  perhaps  avail  to  arrest  it.  Then 
also  it  was  decided  to  lend  a  more  attentive  ear  to 
spiritists  and  occultists;  if  they  perchance  were 
right,  then  "materialism"  (for  this  is  the  name 
still  given  to  science  by  moralists  and  theologians) 
would  be  vanquished.  Some  great  names  were 
added  to  the  list  of  these  mystics,  —  such  as  Lord 


PRAGMATISM    OF   THE    MIDDLE   AGES      193 

Kelvin  and  William  James.  In  Anglo-Saxon  coun- 
tries the  founding  and  successful  carrying  on  of 
these  societies  for  physical  research  was  really  and 
pre-eminently  a  pragmatic  suggestion.  For  moral 
and  sentimental  reasons  they  set  their  hearts  on 
proving,  by  such  means,  immortality,  the  existence 
of  spirits,  and  God.  It  is  evident  that  these  societies 
do  not  exhibit  the  complete  disinterestedness  which 
we  find  in  the  researches  of  Frenchmen  like  Flam- 
marion,  Jules  Bois,  Richet,  or  Italians  like  Morselli 
and  Lombroso. 

Catholicism  is  a  refuge  for  very  exalted  intellects 
or  for  very  plain  ones,  for  a  Pasteur  or  for  a  Joan 
of  Arc.  We  live  in  an  epoch  of  intellectual  medi- 
ocrity, and  the  masses  begin  to  be  both  too  well  in- 
formed to  remain  Catholics  and  not  well  enough 
informed  —  and  never  will  be  —  to  become  such 
again  on  their  own  initiative.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  occult  sciences  advance  but  slowly;  people  can't 
wait  for  them ;  it  is  even  uncertain  whether  they  will 
ever  yield  entirely  reliable  results.  Hence,  entangled 
more  and  more  in  the  meshes  of  science,  there  was 
only  one  course  to  take:  the  pragmatic  spirit  must 
cease  to  act  on  the  defensive  and  assume  the  offen- 
sive. In  order  to  hinder  philosophy  from  absorb- 
ing ethics,  ethics  must  absorb  philosophy.  In  other 
words,  the  pragmatic  spirit  shall  set  up  as  a  system 
and  become  '*  Pragmatism  " ;  refuse  the  right  to 
exist  to  every  philosophy  that  is  not  expedient  from 
the  human  point  of  view;   cease  to  consider  ration- 

13 


194  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

ality  as  a  criterion  of  truth;  in  short,  declare  that 
a  doctrine  must  be  judged  by  its  practical  conse- 
quences. If  these  consequences  seem  good  for  the 
human  race,  the  doctrine  is  true;  if  the  conse- 
quences are  unfavorable  to  the  progress  of  society 
and  to  the  happiness  of  the  individual,  it  is  false. 
This  is  tantamount  to  reducing  the  philosophic 
reason  to  the  practical  reason.  Not  being  able  to 
vanquish  philosophy,  and  yet  not  being  willing  to 
allow  its  spirit  to  prevail,  pragmatism  is  trying 
to  do  precisely  what  the  church  in  the  middle  ages 
did  —  make  a  servant  of  philosophy.  Philosophy  is 
not  its  own  end;  it  must  simply  serve  the  interests 
of  humanity ;  and  if,  of  its  own  initiative,  it  showed 
a  tendency  to  deviate  from  this  way,  it  would  be 
necessary  to  force  it  to  return  to  the  road  of  oppor- 
tunism. Man  must  not  adjust  himself  to  philos- 
ophy, but  philosophy  adjust  itself  to  man. 

So  pragmatism  is,  in  fact,  as  I  have  said,  the 
modern  scholasticism.  It  is  only  a  new  way  of 
affirming  the  traditional  beliefs  necessary  to  human- 
ity, —  God,  freedom,  immortality.  When  scholas- 
tic pragmatism  was  finally  discomfited  and  beaten 
by  science  in  the  nineteenth  century,  the  Protestant 
pragmatism  was  formed.  And,  like  scholasticism, 
the  pragmatic  speculations  of  Messrs.  Dewey, 
Schiller,  and  James  are  only  attempts  to  harmonize 
natural  and  scientific  philosophy  with  the  pragmatic 
imperatives. 


PRAGMATISM   OF   THE   MIDDLE   AGES     195 


IV 

And  they  are  wholly  fruitless  attempts,  —  here 
once  more  this  is  perfectly  evident. 

For,  in  the  first  place,  I  must  repeat  now,  just  as  in 
the  case  of  scholasticism  and  of  Kant,  that  one  of 
two  things  is  true :  either  the  pure  reason  and  the 
practical  reason  (I  make  use  of  these  convenient 
terms)  do  not  intrinsically  contradict  each  other, 
and  in  that  case  there  is  no  need  of  pragmatism ;  or 
else  they  do  intrinsically  contradict  each  other,  and 
in  that  case  the  practical  reason  must  contradict 
pure  reason,  pragmatism  must  contradict  science. 

But  this  is  not  all.  Looking  attentively  at  the 
matter,  the  superiority  of  Kant  as  a  thinker,  that 
Kant  whom  the  pragmatists  so  affect  to  despise,  is 
dazzlingly  conspicuous.  For  his  part  he  had  very 
clearly  grasped  the  idea  of  the  irreducibleness  of 
the  dilemma  thus  stated,  and  that  practical  rea- 
son and  pure  reason  are  in  hopeless  contradiction. 
Hence  only  one  way  presented  itself  to  his  mind 
(and  only  one  way  could  present  itself)  by  which 
we  should  be  permitted  to  affirm  at  once  the  laws  of 
pure  reason  and  of  practical  reason,  and  that  is  that 
the  data  of  pure  reason  are  only  appearance  (seem- 
ing), that  there  lies  back  of  the  world  of  appear- 
ance (the  phenomenal  world)  a  real  (a  noumenal) 
world  where  freedom  houses,  and  in  the  existence 
of  which  we  are  led  to  believe  by  our  understanding; 


196  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

in  that  way  the  conflicts  between  the  pure  reason 
and  the  practical  reason  may  be  conceived  as  being 
only  in  appearance ;  thus  also  determinism  and  free- 
dom (with  the  corollary  doctrines  of  moral  con- 
science, immortality,  God)  are  not  absolutely  ex- 
cluded. Only  —  and  here  is,  of  course,  the  weak 
point  —  we  are  obliged  to  pass  out  of  the  phe- 
nomenal world  in  order  to  obtain  this  result;  it  is 
the  only  way.  And  the  pragmatists,  who  have 
clapped  themselves  on  the  back  in  admiration  of 
their  doughtiness,  modernity,  and  science  in  mak- 
ing uproarious  fun  of  metaphysics  and  the  noumenal 
world,  and  who  have  presumed  to  affirm  the  co- 
existence of  freedom  and  determinism  within  the 
world  of  phenomena,  have  entirely  forgotten  Kant's 
object  —  namely  that  he  assumed  the  existence  of 
the  noumenal  world  for  the  very  purpose  of  not 
being  obliged  to  end  up  either  with  determinism 
and  its  moral  consequences  or  with  absolute  scepti- 
cism in  the  phenomenal  world.  The  thing  is  as 
clear  as  it  can  be;  inasmuch  as  there  is  incom- 
patibility without  appeal  in  the  phenomenal  world 
between  pure  reason,  reason  reasoning,  scientific 
reason,  on  the  one  hand,  and  reason  non-reason- 
ing (reason  of  the  heart  that  reason  does  not  ac- 
knowledge or  take  cognizance  of,  as  Pascal  said), 
on  the  other  hand,  —  an  incompatibility  proved  by 
the  very  existence  of  a  pragmatic  philosophy  differ- 
ent from  philosophy  itself,  —  pragmatism,  by  reject- 
ing as  pure  twaddle  the  "  noumenal  world  "of  Kant, 


PRAGMATISM    OF   THE    MIDDLE   AGES      197 

is  in  consequence  obliged  to  choose  between  pure 
reason  and  practical  reason  in  the  phenomenal 
zvorld.  It  chooses  practical  reason,  or  reason 
non-reasoning,  and  rejects  pure  reason,  or  reason 
reasoning.  It  takes  as  its  philosophic  base  the 
a-rational,  or  irrational,  definitively,  deliberately, 
absolutely.  The  mere  title  of  an  essay  like  that  of 
Mr.  Dewey,  —  The  Logical  Conditions  of  a  Scien- 
tific Treatment  of  Morality,  —  is  a  defiance  of  good 
sense,  since  ethics,  if  it  enters  into  the  domain  of 
science,  has  no  special  logical  conditions,  and  if  it 
does  not  enter  there,  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  logic.'^ 
It  is  an  astonishing  exhibition  of  naivete,  when 
you  come  to  think  of  it,  the  desire  of  men  in  this 
day  to  reconcile  pragmatism  and  science.  It  amounts 
to  a  cool  denial  that  there  is  any  problem  of  philos- 
ophy, and  the  affirmation  that  common  sense  suffices 
to  solve  everything ;  that  all  the  scholasticism  of  the 
middle  ages  had  no  reason-for-being;  but  that  that 
imposing  monument  of  the  intellect  means  nothing, 
that  it  was  just  for  the  fun  of  it  that  for  generations 
intellects  like  Johannes  Scotus  Erigena,  Anselm, 
Abelard,  Bernard  de  Clairveaux,  Duns  Scotus,  and 
Thomas  Aquinas  grew  white-haired  in  studying  this 
problem  and  heaped  absurdities  on  absurdities.    Of 

^  Professor  Dewey  seems  to  realize  this  very  well.  He  says  "mo- 
rality" in  his  title,  not  "ethics."  As  a  matter  of  fact,  ethics  is  studied 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  practical  reason;  but  morality  may  be 
studied  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  practical  reason  and  from  the 
point  of  view  of  pure  reason;  as  a  part  of  ethics  or  as  a  part  of  the 
science  of  morals.  Now  Professor  Dewey  evidently  has  ethics  in 
view.    There  is  a  curious  hesitation  in  all  this. 


198  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

course !  all  they  had  to  do  was  to  hide  their  heads  in 
the  sand  and  they  would  not  have  seen  the  spectre 
of  determinism  peering  out  on  every  hand,  and  all 
would  have  been  said  and  done  —  only  the  problem 
would  have  remained.  This  reconciling  plan  of  the 
pragmatists  implies  that  Kant  is  a  madman,  and 
that  the  nineteenth  century,  which  almost  wholly 
subsisted  on  Kant,  was  affected  by  the  same  mad- 
ness. It  means  that  we  can  at  our  leisure  deny  all 
science.  In  a  word,  it  is  to  invert  all  philosophic 
thought.  William  James  is  right:  it  is  a  philo- 
sophic revolution.  But  when  he  tells  us  (Prag- 
matism, p.  170)  that  "common  sense"  is  the 
philosophy  adopted  by  pragmatism,  does  he  mean 
it  as  serious  doctrine,  or  is  it  a  pathetic  avowal 
concealed  under  a  fine  cloak  of  oratory? 

The  writer  of  these  lines  does  not,  however, 
accept  the  conclusions  of  the  philosophy  of  Kant  any 
more  than  William  James  does.  It  is  impossible  to 
establish  any  solid  thought-structure  whatever  upon 
the  "  noumenal  world."  Everything  we  affirm  of  it 
we  affirm  by  reasoning  upon  data  of  an  order  differ- 
ent from  that  of  pure  reason,  but  after  the  manner 
of  apprehending  of  pure  reason,  which,  as  we  have 
seen,  is  deceptive  from  the  point  of  view  of  absolute 
truth.  And  since  its  data  in  the  domain  of  pure 
reason  are  false  per  se,  which  is  the  only  domain  in 
which  we  see  it  really  at  work,  the  presumption  will 
naturally  be  against  those  data  as  respects  what  the 
pure  reason  shall  affirm  of  another  domain.     We 


PRAGMATISM   OF    THE   MIDDLE   AGES      199 

cannot  prove  that  its  assertions,  in  the  domain  of 
the  practical  reason  are  false,  since  the  real  data  of 
the  practical  reason  are  beyond  our  conception ;  but 
since  it  deceives  us  elsewhere  where  we  can  verify 
things,  its  verdicts  must  be,  to  say  the  least,  received 
with  caution  in  the  realm  where  we  cannot  verify 
anything  at  all. 

But  in  spite  of  everything,  it  remains  true  that  if 
Kant  was  not  to  sacrifice  the  practical  reason  en- 
tirely (pragmatism),  he  could  not  attain  his  ends 
without  calling  in  a  noumenal  world.  And  it  is 
consequently  also  true  that,  if  they  reject  this  nou- 
menal world,  and  yet  continue  to  maintain  the 
claims  of  practical  reason,  the  pragmatists  ought, 
logically,  to  reject  the  science  which  bases  itself  on 
pure  reason.  There  is  no  room  in  the  phenomenal 
world  alone  for  both  the  pure  reason  and  the  practi- 
cal reason;  to  adopt  one  is  to  reject  the  other,  to 
affirm  pragmatism  is  to  reject  science.  The  conclu- 
sion is  that  Kant  is  bad,  but  that  pragmatism  is  in- 
finitely worse.  Kant  proposes  a  solution  which  is 
not  satisfactory ;  but  the  pragmatists  can  no  longer 
even  propose  a  solution,  in  so  glaring  a  manner  does 
the  contradiction  between  the  two  terms  to  be  recon- 
ciled appear  in  the  way  they  are  forced  to  state  the 
problem.  To  get  rid  of  metaphysics  is  indeed  to  be 
in  agreement  with  the  spirit  of  our  times ;  but  since 
the  problem  to  be  solved  is  such  as  it  is,  and  since 
pragmatists  desire  to  solve  it  in  Kant's  way,  to  do 
away  with  metaphysics  is  equivalent  to  cutting  off 
the  branch  on  which  we  wish  to  sit. 


200  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 


VI 


Another  aspect  of  modern  pragmatism  calls  for 
criticisms  of  a  similar  nature.  In  their  desire  to 
avoid  certain  difficulties  encountered  by  pragmatists 
of  former  times,  modern  representatives,  while  gain- 
ing certain  positions,  have  lost  others,  which,  every- 
thing considered,  were  perhaps  more  important. 

I  have  shown  that  the  philosophy  of  Professor 
James  and  of  his  fellow-thinkers  is  really  a  modern 
scholasticism;  for  the  results  to  be  attained  were 
fixed  in  advance,  inasmuch  as  a  theory  is  judged 
by  its  moral  consequences.  But  I  should  perhaps 
rather  have  styled  it  a  Protestant  scholasticism;  for 
pragmatism  claims  to  be  rationalistic  in  its  religious 
or  metaphysical  conception  of  the  universe,  and  this 
rationalism  is  a  direct  product  of  the  religious  refor- 
mation of  the  sixteenth  century.  Catholic  scholasti- 
cism, taking  the  attitude  of  wise  reserve,  declared 
that  the  good  was  what  God  wished,  absolutely  so, 
man  having  no  right  of  supervision  whatever;  in 
fact  the  Church  handled  dogmas  and  discipline  in 
such  a  fashion  that  the  divine  will  should  appear  to 
correspond  to  the  needs  of  the  people's  social  organ- 
ization which  it  had  made  to  its  task  to  realize,  and 
to  whatever  else  was  desirable  for  the  benefit  of 
humanity.  In  spite  of  its  efforts,  however,  reality 
(the  expression  of  the  divine  will)  clashed  so  fre- 
quently with  reason  and  with  human  ideas  of  jus- 


PRAGMATISM    OF   THE    MIDDLE   AGES      201 

tice  that  justifiers  of  "  the  ways  of  God  to  men  " 
were  always  fain  to  declare  the  designs  of  Provi- 
dence inscrutable,  and  that  we  should  never  consider 
ourselves  obliged  to  attune  the  will  of  God  to  the 
human  reason.  Thus  a  "  Theodicy,"  or  "  justifica- 
tion of  God,"  from  the  point  of  view  of  human 
reason  (and  especially  Avhen  one  remembers  the 
numerous  difficulties  removed  by  the  acceptation  of 
the  dogma  of  original  sin)  was  considered  un- 
necessary, nay  blasphemous.  And  these  cautious 
reserves,  regarding  the  justice  of  the  Almighty, 
were,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  more  needed  in  the  middle 
ages,  in  which  society  was  but  slightly  organized 
in  comparison  with  our  modern  societies,  and  when 
crime  and  injustice  more  abounded.  Thus,  it  was 
only  at  the  epoch  of  the  Reformation  (after  the 
Catholic  church  had  often  dealt  a  little  too  much 
after  its  own  good  pleasure  with  its  supra-rational 
God)  that  people  began  to  ask  God  to  show  his 
credentials,  and  to  demand  of  him  that  he  should 
conform  to  the  moral  code  of  humanity.  There  was 
a  psychological  reason  for  that,  too.  In  Protes- 
tantism, which  does  away  with  the  church  as  an 
intermediary  between  God  and  man,  every  one  be- 
came his  own  priest  and  his  own  theologian.  God 
manifested  himself  by  the  voice  of  conscience.  But 
this  voice,  to  be  recognized  as  divine  and  pre- 
eminent, must  satisfy  the  intellect,  which  is  equiva- 
lent to  saying  that  God  must  be  judged  according 
to  man's  reason  and  according  to  man's  conception 


202  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

of  morality,  after  the  standard  of  the  creature. 
Only  in  case  God  would  guarantee  the  moral  order, 
such  as  man  conceived  it,  could  man  consent 
to  still  adore  him.  The  universe  is  divine,  said 
scholasticism;  the  universe  (or  the  divine)  must  be 
moral,  says  pragmatism;  philosophia  ancilla  theo- 
logies, said  the  middle  ages;  philosophia  ancilla 
ethicce,  says  the  contemporary  thinker.  The  era  of 
religious  rationalism  and  of  theodicies  was  opened, 
—  a  not  altogether  easy  task,  which  Protestantism 
was  forced  to  perform,  and  of  which  the  work  of 
Leibnitz  will  remain  the  most  typical  monument. 
In  vain  did  Voltaire  riddle  with  his  arrows  these 
interesting  attempts;  nothing  better  was  found  up 
to  the  time  of  the  new  theodicy  of  James,  who  is 
certainly  picturesque  and  original  with  his  doctrine 
of  a  strenuous  universe  preferable  for  man,  one  in 
which  man  can  heroically  take  "  risks,"  thus  account- 
ing for  certain  human  tragedies  while  reserving  to 
God  his  role  of  moral  sovereign  of  the  world.  Ac- 
cording to  our  modern  ideas,  his  theory  is  most  cer- 
tainly worth  those  of  Leibnitz  and  Wolf,  although 
still  of  precarious  foothold. 

Speaking  generally,  there  is  evidently  an  advan- 
tage in  the  Protestant  pragmatism  in  one  sense. 
If  religion  is  to  be  in  harmony  with  reason  it  will 
the  more  satisfy  rational  beings,  and  they  can  turn 
it  to  better  account  in  the  eyes  of  other  men,  and 
induce  them  to  accept  its  principles  and  practise 
them.    On  the  other  hand,  if  the  reason  is  authorized 


PRAGMATISM    OF   THE   MIDDLE   AGES     203 

to  take  a  hand  in  the  game,  and,  after  a  fashion, 
dictate  the  conditions  of  the  divine  action,  or  if  we 
judge  a  religion  as  acceptable  only  on  the  recom- 
mendation of  the  reason,  there  will  always  be  things 
absolutely  unacceptable,  even  with  the  theory  of 
"  risk."  One  cannot  see  how  little  children  who 
lack  bread,  and  are  dying  of  hunger  because  their 
father  has  been  killed  by  an  accident  in  the  mines 
and  because  the  mother  is  unable  to  make  head 
against  the  world,  have  had  the  benefit  of  any 
"  risk."  Was  not  the  laborer  himself  obliged  to 
take  the  risk  because  the  owner  of  the  mine  was  not 
pragmatic  enough  to  run  the  risk  himself?  And 
then  is  it  an  equitable  risk  to  impose  on  man  this 
struggle  against  the  forces  of  nature,  when  in  the 
face  of  them  he  finds  himself  as  helpless  as  a  little 
bird  in  a  cyclone?  A  man  may  have  all  the  genius 
of  Napoleon  and  be  stupidly  burned  in  a  San  Fran- 
cisco fire,  or  another  may  be  drowned  in  a  founder- 
ing ship  like  a  rat  in  a  trap,  or  be  buried  under  the 
lava  of  a  Mount  Pelee  or  a  Vesuvius.  To  account 
for  such  "  risks,"  and  so  many  more  of  a  similar 
kind  in  this  "  pragmatic "  fashion,  looks  like  a 
rather  poor  joke;  let  us  have  Voltaire  again;  we 
are  ready  for  another  Candide !  No.  In  such  cases 
faith  in  a  God  willing  and  acting  independently  of 
every  moral  consideration,  and  of  every  rational  stan- 
dard, is  infinitely  more  acceptable  to  man  than  the 
pragmatists'  God  who  is  supposed  to  guarantee  the 
moral  order.    If  from  our  point  of  view  we  cannot 


204  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

conceive  of  him  as  good,  at  least  we  are  not  forced 
to  conceive  of  him  as  wicked  and  odiously  unjust. 
He  is  a  God,  I  repeat,  who  can  be  the  object  of 
actual  faith.  The  God  of  pragmatism  only  corre- 
sponds to  a  spurious  something  called  a  ''  reason- 
able "  faith.  In  other  words,  if  we  are  consistent 
with  the  rationalist  principle  of  Protestant  scholasti- 
cism, —  namely,  pragmatism,  —  God  can  only  be 
worshipped  by  men  who  make  very  moderate  moral 
demands  upon  him;  but  this  was  not  necessarily 
so  in  the  case  of  mediaeval  scholasticism.  And  this 
explains  the  conversion  to  Catholicism  of  certain 
great  Protestant  souls  of  whom  I  have  spoken,  and 
makes  their  action  perfectly  logical.  Men  like  these 
are  not  able,  it  is  true,  to  conceive  of  a  moral  God 
governing  the  world,  since  moral  order  does  not 
exist;  yet  if  they  aspire  to  a  solution  of  the  mys- 
teries of  life,  nothing  hinders  them  from  adoring 
an  a-rational  (or  irrational),  an  a-moral  (or  im- 
moral) God.  Nemo  credit  nisi  volens,  St.  Augus- 
tine has  well  said. 

Unquestionably  we  shall  find  pragmatists  appeal- 
ing to  mystery  in  some  cases,  and,  vice  versa, 
scholastics  to  reason;  but  /  have  to  consider  these 
systems  under  their  logical  aspect;  and  it  is  evi- 
dent that  pragmatists  pass  beyond  the  limits  of  their 
system  in  having  recourse  to  the  divine  a-rational; 
and  scholastics  pass  beyond  theirs  in  having  re- 
course to  the  divine  rational.  In  practice  numbers 
of  Protestants  are  really  Catholics;  it  is  only  those 


PRAGMATISM    OF   THE    MIDDLE   AGES     205 

who  try  to  get  their  actions  into  harmony  with  their 
philosophy  who  care  for  a  conversion  in  the  presence 
of  a  notary,  if  I  may  venture  the  expression.  The 
small  people  will  remain  Catholics  or  Protestants 
according  to  their  place  of  birth,  or  will  only  change 
for  reasons  foreign  to  philosophic  discussions. 

It  must  be  admitted,  nevertheless,  that  for  the 
pragmatists  to  take  their  stand  upon  these  two  prop- 
ositions, (i)  the  rejection  of  metaphysics  and  (2) 
rationalism,  was  putting  themselves  in  full  agree- 
ment with  the  spirit  of  progress,  and  that  even  if,  in 
applying  them,  difficulties  as  great  as  those  of  the 
past,  or  greater,  rose  in  the  path  of  the  moralists, 
pragmatism  was  but  obeying  a  necessity  in  making 
them  hers.  In  short,  we  must  admit  that  pragma- 
tism, in  taking  the  course  it  did,  was  within  the  logic 
of  events.  Pragmatism  is,  willy-nilly,  a  struggle 
against  the  scientific  spirit,  which  causes  all  the 
actions  of  men  to  be  seen  in  a  determinist  light,  and 
is  therefore  capable  of  destroying  the  spirit  of  initi- 
ative; which  renders  inconceivable  the  voice  of  con- 
science as  it  is  commonly  interpreted;  inconceivable 
the  idea  of  a  moral  sanction,  on  the  part  of  God,  of 
the  actions  of  men;  inconceivable  the  idea  of  retri- 
bution or  punishment  after  death. ^     Now  the  prag- 

^  The  very  idea  of  retribution  is  inconceivable  in  the  determinist 
philosophy,  but  not,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind,  the  idea  of  life  after 
death.  The  warped  judgment  which  identifies  belief  in  the  survival 
of  the  soul  with  belief  in  retribution  is  a  proof  of  the  difficulty  we 
have  in  separating  the  logical  point  of  view  from  the  pragmatic  point 
of  view. 


2o6  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

matic  spirit,  which  sees  that  a  society  organized  with- 
out these  doctrines  ^  is  going  to  destruction  and 
death,  seeks  to  react.  And  in  this  reaction,  address- 
ing itself  as  it  does  to  the  human  reason,  it  will  have 
more  chance  of  triumphing  without  metaphysics  and 
with  rationalism  —  that  is  to  say,  by  making  use 
of  precisely  the  same  weapons  that  the  intellectual- 
ist  philosophers  employ,  and  by  attempting  to  attack 
them  on  their  own  ground;  the  struggle  on  meta- 
physical ground  had,  besides,  been  declined  by 
scientists. 

*  Even  if  these  doctrines  were  false,  James  says  it  in  very  plain 
terms;  I  recall  the  passage  of  The  Will  to  Believe  (p.  126):  "Just 
as  within  the  limits  of  theism  some  kinds  are  surviving  others  by 
reason  of  their  greater  practical  rationality ;  so  theism  itself,  by  reason 
of  its  practical  rationality,  is  certain  to  survive  all  lower  creeds. 
Materialism  and  Agnosticism,  even  were  they  true,  could  never  gain 
universal  acceptance,  for  they  both  alike  give  a  solution  of  things 
which  is  irrational  to  the  practical  third  of  our  nature  and  in  which 
we  can  never  volitionally  feel  at  home."    (Italics  are  mine.) 


PART    III 

PRAGMATISM    AND  TRUTH 

La  civilisation  a  He  de  tout  temps  une  csuvre  aristocratique^ 
maintenue  par  un  petit  nombre.  Uame  des  nations  est  une 
chose  aristocratique ;  aussi  cette  ante  doit  etre  guidee  par  un 
certain  nombre  de  pasteurs  officiels  formant  la  continuite  de 
la  nation.  Voila  ce  qu'une  dynastie  fait  a  merveille.  Un 
senat  comme  celui  de  Rome  ou  de  Venise  y  suffit  aussi.  Des 
institutions  religieuses,  sociales,  pedagogiques  comme  celles 
des  villes  grecques  mieux  encore.  —  Renan  {Lettre  a 
Berthelot). 

CHAPTER     I 

THE   TRIUMPH    OF    PRAGMATISM 

Pragmatism  will  triumph,  but  because  it  is  false,  not  because  it 
is  true ;  for,  from  the  social  point  of  view,  the  false  is  prefer- 
able to  the  true.  Proofs  of  this  by  facts.  Democracy  over- 
runs the  world  more  and  more;  America  is  to-day  where 
Europe  will  be  to-morrow.  How  is  it  in  America?  The 
intellectual  class  does  not  reproduce  itself;  immigrants, 
sprung  from  inferior  classes,  overspread  the  country  more 
and  more.  For  this  population  and  for  that  of  the  civilized 
world  of  the  future,  scientific  determinism  would  be  danger- 
ous ;  such  a  population  would  make  a  bad  use  of  the  truth. 
Truth  has  nothing  to  do  with  life. 

We  have  seen  that  pragmatism  is  in  accordance  with 
the  logic  of  events  as  far  as  the  history  of  philos- 
ophy is  concerned,  and  I  would  now  point  out  that 
its  success  is  in  the  same  way  in  accord  with  the 
logic  of  history  in  the  general  sense  of  that  word. 


2o8  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

I  have  already  pointed  out  that  the  American  en- 
vironment of  Professor  James  is  naturally  one  of 
pragmatic  aspiration.  Continuing  that  line  of 
thought,  I  wish  to  point  out  that  the  pragmatic 
spirit,  once  planted  in  a  community,  can  be  uprooted 
only  with  extreme  difficulty,  the  natural  evolution 
of  things  being  even  seconded  and  hastened  by  acci- 
dental circumstances.  And  so  it  is  that  I  come  to 
share  in  part  the  opinion  of  William  James  that 
pragmatism  as  a  philosophy  will  not  be  in  fact  so 
transitory  as  other  systems,  and  that  it  has  "  come 
to  stay."  Only,  while  he  thinks  the  reason  of  it  to 
be  that  pragmatism  is  truer  than  other  philosophies, 
I  believe  it  is  for  precisely  the  opposite  reason  that 
pragmatism  will  stay,  namely,  because  it  is  false  — 
which  I  now  proceed  to  explain. 

One  will  have  observed  that  pragmatism,  if  not 
in  the  case  of  its  originators  at  least  in  virtue  of  its 
triumphs  in  the  public  mind,  seems  from  the  very 
start  to  correspond  essentially  to  the  needs  or  the 
desires  of  Anglo-Saxon  peoples,  while  intellectual- 
ism  is  more  favored  by  the  Latin  nations.  Pascal 
himself,  as  author  of  the  Pensees,  is  a  favorite  of 
Protestant  writers,  and  Rousseau  is  infinitely  more 
relished  in  Germanic  than  in  Latin  countries.^  One 
might  then  be  tempted  at  first  sight  to  make  prag- 
matism a  question  of  race.     Yet  the  belief  in  race- 

*  The  only  exception  as  far  as  modern  originators  are  concerned 
would  be  the  Italian  Papini.  I  have  shown  elsewhere  how  erroneous 
it  was  to  count  men  like  Poincare  as  pragmatists. 


THE  TRIUMPH   OF  PRAGMATISM       209 

stocks  goes  on  crutches  in  these  days,  and  it  seems 
that  we  are  rapidly  coming  to  the  idea  that  in  the 
greater  number  of  cases  races  may  well  be  effects 
rather  than  causes.  So  it  seems  to  me  wise  to  give 
over  speculations  of  this  kind.  The  more  so  that 
the  explanation  by  race  in  our  special  subject  would 
propound  more  problems  than  it  could  settle.  Some 
one  may  say  that  the  Anglo-Saxon  is  individualis- 
tic, the  Latin  not.  But  it  happens  that  all  the  great 
minds  of  the  sixteenth  century  in  France  were  open 
and  receptive  to  the  individualistic  spirit,  which  at 
that  time  manifested  itself  in  religious  reforms,  and 
in  many  other  departments  of  thought  and  life 
showed  more  individualism  than  has  been  found  in 
Germany  and  in  England  even  up  to  our  day,  —  in 
the  domain  of  thought,  at  least.  And,  conversely, 
you  will  find  among  Germanic  peoples  a  much 
greater  respect  for  hierarchical  (artificial)  superi- 
ority, in  the  political,  social,  and  religious  domain, 
than  among  Latin  peoples.  Germany  is  still  the 
most  aristocratically  organized  of  all  the  countries 
that  have  taken  part  in  the  march  of  civilization; 
England  is  the  land  where  the  nobility  has  best  pre- 
served its  prestige;  and,  with  regard  to  America, 
as  all  strangers  who  sojourn  here  for  any  length  of 
time  are  amused  to  observe,  it  would  sometimes  seem 
as  if  no  people  has  a  more  superstitious  regard  for 
titles  and  reputations. 

Similarly   it   is   generally  thought  that  southern 
climes  render  men  more  passionate  than  those  of  the 

14 


2  lo  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

north,  —  and  this  is  probably  true ;  but  in  this  case 
it  would  seem  to  follow  that  the  southern  races 
would  need  the  more  vigorous  moral  restraint  that 
pragmatism  offers,  while  the  people  of  the  north, 
colder,  more  the  masters  of  themselves,  might  better 
do  without  it.  Yet  the  very  opposite  is  the  case; 
the  Latins  have  felt  themselves  very  little  drawn 
toward  pragmatism ;  they  have  left  it  to  the  Anglo- 
Saxons.  So  in  order  to  account  for  the  actual  con- 
ditions and  philosophical  preferences  of  the  various 
peoples  of  to-day,  let  us  take  our  stand  simply  upon 
clear,  verifiable,  purely  objective  circumstances. 

Some  of  the  following  remarks  have  been  made 
before;  but  it  is  indispensable  to  formulate  them 
once  more  together  with  the  new  ones  in  order  to 
give  clearness  to  the  demonstration. 

When  the  Renaissance  aroused  the  minds  of  men 
and  favored  individualism  of  thought,  and,  indi- 
rectly, of  action,  the  Latin  nations  had  already 
produced  very  advanced  civilizations  and  acquired 
deep-rooted  traditions ;  their  social  organization  was, 
in  a  way,  definitively  arrested  (Italy),  or  else  was 
to  still  develop  in  the  same  direction  as  in  the  past, 
the  bud  being  there  and  the  flower  contained  in  the 
bud  (France).  The  consequences-  of  this  awakening 
of  thought  of  the  sixteenth  century  were  therefore 
of  a  relative  importance  only  in  the  social  sphere,  — 
of  relative  importance,  I  say,  not  null  and  void,  for 
the  religious  wars  in  France  show  clearly  that  things 


THE   TRIUMPH    OF   PRAGMATISM        211 

were  not  yet  so  firmly  settled  that  they  were  safe 
from  all  shock.  From  the  intellectual  point  of  view, 
the  opposite  was  true ;  for  the  Latin  peoples,  being 
organized,  and  organized  according  to  the  principles 
of  authority  exerted  by  the  intellectual  element  over 
the  people  at  large,  free  thought,  even  at  the  time 
of  its  appearance,  remained  almost  isolated  among 
the  elite  in  its  effect.  Hence  philosophers  had  no 
need  of  being  too  timid  in  their  thought,  and  the 
church  had  sufficient  power  to  counterbalance  in  the 
masses  the  effect  of  their  ideas  when  they  went  too 
far,  and  often,  indeed,  dealt  with  them  with  great 
severity. 

The  Germanic  races,  on  the  contrary,  were  just 
beginning  to  take  part  in  the  forward  movement  of 
civilization  at  this  critical  moment  when  European 
thought  was  renewing  itself.  In  organizing  them- 
selves they  took  as  their  guide  the  principle  put  for- 
ward by  the  Reformation ;  namely,  that  nations  were 
composed  of  individually  responsible  units,  and  that 
as  respects  their  moral  life,  they  were  entrusted  to 
their  own  individual  authority  under  the  name  of 
conscience,  representing  the  voice  of  God.  Under 
these  conditions  the  question  of  consequences,  the 
pragmatic  question,  became  of  primordial  impor- 
tance for  the  philosopher,  and  he  had  to  take  it  into 
account  in  his  speculations.  The  result  was  an  intel- 
lectual atmosphere  of  a  special  sort  (mitigation  of 
pure  thought  and  pragmatic  preoccupation)  from 
which  even  philosophers  of  the  stamp  of  Kant  could 


2 1 2  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

not  escape.  England,  in  its  island,  carried  forward 
still  farther  the  system  of  individualism  and  with  it 
its  consequences.  The  masses  with  their  low  level  of 
individualism  need  authority  to  hinder  them  from 
going  astray,  and  it  was  necessary  to  bolster  up  the 
authority  of  the  Protestant  churches,  so  loose  by 
principle  in  this  regard,  by  a  personal  ethics  ad  hoc} 
Writers  like  Sterne,  Richardson,  Addison,  and  all 
the  religious  authors,  and  the  authors  of  the  roman- 
tic, or  emotional,  school,  of  the  eighteenth  century 
in  England,  toiled  at  this  task,  while  the  philosophers 
tried  not  to  mar  their  efforts. 

But  this  was  not  all.  Still  another  revolution  took 
place,  corresponding  to  the  religious  reformation. 
Society  reorganized  itself  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Atlantic,  shaking  off  even  the  few  "Latin"  tradi- 
tions which  had  so  far  been  able  to  pass  over  into 
Germany  and  England  through  art  and  philosophy. 
In  the  New  World  democratic  ideas  were  freer  to 
manifest  themselves  than  anywhere  else ;  the  "  plain 
people  "  affirmed  their  rights  more  and  more,  and 
the  social  equilibrium  ceased  almost  wholly  to  de- 
pend upon  an  elite  whom  the  masses  were  supposed 
to  follow ;  the  balance  of  power  passed  over  to  these 
masses  themselves.  This  change  in  the  social  centre 
of  gravity  was  of  the  highest  importance ;   pragma- 

*  I  am  here  reverting  in  thought  to  the  luminous  pages  of  Leslie 
Stephen  in  his  History  of  English  Thought  in  the  Eighteenth  Century^ 
in  which  he  admirably  elucidates  the  well-known  love  of  compromise 
between  pure  thought  and  practical  thought  that  characterizes  Eng- 
lish thinkers  (I,  p.  85).    See,  e.  g.,  IX,  iv,  43  (vol.  II,  pp.  357-369)- 


THE   TRIUMPH   OF   PRAGMATISM        213 

tism  recommended  itself  more  and  more  as  the  phi- 
losophy to  adopt,  since  it  is  for  the  masses  now  that 
a  philosophy  is  needed. 

And  now,  mark  it  well,  this  renovation  did  not 
occur  once  for  all,  at  the  epoch  (rather  long,  by  the 
way)  of  the  organization  of  the  representative  mod- 
ern nation,  but  it  is  a  change  always  going  on.  Not 
only  would  it  be  difficult  to  maintain  that  the  Ameri- 
can civilization  has  definitely  shaped  itself ;  not  only 
have  the  few  representatives  of  European  aristoc- 
racy long  ago  disappeared,  but  the  families  of  those 
who  founded  the  nation  are  rapidly  disappearing; 
and  even  American  families  of  several  generations 
are  barely  holding  their  own.  This  is  a  fact  only 
too  well  known  to-day,  and  the  fiery  homilies  of 
President  Roosevelt  upon  the  "  suicide  of  the  race" 
are  still  fresh  in  all  memories.  Yet  we  must  note 
that  it  is  especially  the  cultivated  classes  who  have 
few  or  no  children,^  and  the  university  authorities 
have  occasionally  sounded  the  alarm  (for  example, 
Ex-President  Eliot  of  Harvard  University).  The 
author  of  these  pages  knows  intimately  an  institu- 
tion of  higher  education  having  thirty-seven  profes- 
sors (without  counting  a  pretty  large  number  of 
tutors,  lecturers,  and  assistants,  none  of  whom,  how- 
ever, are  married)  ;   of  the  thirty-seven  professors 

*  If  I  am  supported  in  my  opinion  that  the  intellectual  classes  are 
more  desirable  in  a  nation  than  others,  then  the  problem  of  depopula- 
tion seems  to  me  infinitely  more  serious  in  America  than  in  France. 
We  forget  far  too  often  this  element  of  the  subject  in  our  discussions. 
Coarse  pennies  and  pieces  of  gold  are  precisely  equivalent  in  the  eyes 
of  our  economists.    What  a  singular  aberration  of  mind ! 


214  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

twenty-two  are  celibates;  and,  of  the  fifteen  mar- 
ried, three  have  two  children,  three  have  one  child, 
nine  no  children  at  all.  The  small  salaries  are  one 
of  the  principal  causes  of  this  state  of  things,  and 
the  slight  esteem  in  which  the  people  hold  thinkers 
is  responsible  for  the  small  salaries.  But  in  any 
event,  even  if  Americans  of  family  and  the  culti- 
vated classes  should  nearly  hold  their  own  in  births, 
their  relative  importance  would  not  the  less  on  that 
account  constantly  diminish  for  (i)  the  families 
of  the  people  are  increasing,  and  (2)  the  popula- 
tion grows  only  through  immigration.  Viscount 
d'Avenel  has  recently  given  us  some  pieces  of  infor- 
mation at  first-hand  in  his  article  in  the  Revue  des 
Deux  Mondes  of  January  i,  1908.  We  see  by  it 
how  rapidly  the  changes  are  taking  place,  and  how 
soon  that  which  is  called  "  American  "  in  the  popu- 
lation of  the  United  States  threatens  to  be  submerged. 
Before  1880  there  were  only  280,000  immigrants  a 
year;  after  1902,  800,000;  after  1905  the  million 
mark  was  passed;  in  1907  the  number  reached  a 
million  and  a  half.^  In  the  great  majority  of  cases 
these  immigrants  belong  to  the  uncultivated  classes, 
who  in  their  native  land  have  been  used  to  looking  at 
life  in  its  material  aspect  of  a  relentless  "  struggle 
for  existence,"  a  conception  which  the  new  environ- 

*  I  have  before  me  extracts  from  the  statistics  of  New  Hampshire. 
In  1870  this  state  had  318,000  inhabitants,  of  whom  273,000  were  of 
American  birth  and  45,000  of  foreign  birth.  In  1900  the  natives  num- 
ber only  243,000  and  the  foreigners  168,000.  Figures  are  cited  of  a 
typical  village  in  which  there  were  registered,  for  the  year,  29  mar- 
riages, 25  births,  and  40  deaths. 


THE   TRIUMPH    OF   PRAGMATISM        215 

ment  rather  seems  to  sanction.  To  all  this  must  be 
added  that  the  quality  of  the  immigrants  instead  of 
growing  better  seems  rather  to  deteriorate.  For- 
merly the  Irish,  coarse  perhaps,  but  intelligent,  and 
the  Germans,  possibly  poor  but  well  educated,  formed 
a  large  proportion  of  the  new  comers.  From  1840 
to  i860  there  were  counted  in  one  hundred  immi- 
grants forty-three  Irish  and  thirty-five  Germans; 
to-day  (1901-1906)  in  every  hundred  immigrants 
only  five  per  cent  are  of  those  nationalities.  On  the 
other  hand,  immigration  from  other  countries,  up 
to  that  time  scarcely  represented  at  all,  increases 
steadily.  From  1901  to  1906,  28  per  cent  are  Ital- 
ians, 2.^  per  cent  Austrians  from  the  more  remote 
provinces,  and  20  per  cent  Russians  and  Poles.  Of 
course,  the  latent  virile  energy  of  these  people  pro- 
duces even  to-day  superb  results.  But  they  cannot 
escape  the  action  of  the  environment  upon  them; 
and,  as  certain  ones  of  them  reach  in  their  turn  the 
top  of  the  social  ladder,  they  become  sterile  in  their 
turn.  The  result  of  this  invasion  of  the  inferior 
element,  gaining  a  sort  of  refinement  naturally  pro- 
duced by  comfort  and  wealth,  but  never  arriving  at 
the  degree  of  culture  and  distinction  that  the  human- 
itarian civilization  of  Europe  gives  to  the  chosen 
few,  James  expresses  in  these  words :  "  Never  were 
as  many  men  of  a  decidedly  empiricist  proclivity  in 
existence  as  there  are  at  the  present  day."  {Prag- 
matism, p.  14.) 

The  repercussion   of  all  this  is  that   liberty  of 


2i6  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

thought  is  less  to-day  than  formerly,  for  the  reason 
set  forth  above;  namely,  that  in  an  environment 
v^hich  only  seeks  in  ideas  means  of  action,  and  of 
action  with  a  view  to  success  in  practical  life,  there 
are  certain  ideas  that  ought  not  to  be  thrown  into 
circulation.  Conclusion :  we  must  muzzle  thought. 
The  great  era  of  the  American  nation,  in  political 
power,  in  social  importance,  is  probably  still  to  come ; 
we  have  as  yet  seen  only  its  preliminary  manifesta- 
tions; to-morrow  will  eclipse  to-day  as  to-day  has 
eclipsed  yesterday.  But  the  classic  period,  from  the 
intellectual,  literary,  and  philosophic  point  of  view 
(we  may  except  perhaps  painting,  sculpture,  archi- 
tecture, the  arts  where  thought  is  not  expressed  di- 
rectly and  need  have  no  bearing  on  social  morals), 
is  very  likely  passed.  Even  an  Emerson,  a  brilliant 
genius  perhaps,  but  thoroughly  commonplace,  has 
an  influence  to-day  only  because  he  is  dead.  If  he 
should  return  and  propose  his  undogmatic  ideas,  he 
would  scarcely  succeed.  Or  if  a  pastor  should  sud- 
denly decide  to  leave  the  church,  as  Emerson  did, 
and  preach  lay  sermons,  had  such  an  one  the  same 
charm  of  speech,  the  same  fetching  eloquence  that 
Emerson  had,  he  would  certainly  come  to  grief.  Or 
at  most  he  would .  be  asked  to  give  some  lectures 
before  the  bourgeois  public  of  the  "  societies  for 
ethical  culture."  The  man  who  has  succeeded  in 
getting  a  large  following  is  Lyman  Abbott,  who 
preaches  active  Christianity,  Christianity  disencum- 
bered of  secondary  dogmas,  but  which  preserving 


THE   TRIUMPH    OF   PRAGMATISM        217 

all  the  pragmatic  dogmas,  which  since  Kant  are 
called,  in  philosophic  terms,  the  postulates  of  the 
"  practical  reason.'' 

There  is  in  all  this  one  piece  of  testimony  that 
cannot  be  refuted :  the  churches  are  not  breaking  up, 
ethical  societies  are  no  success.  I  repeat  myself ;  but 
the  reason  is  that  if  others  find  it  to  their  advantage 
to  leave  this  very  patent  fact  in  the  shade,  I  find  it 
mine  not  to  let  it  be  forgotten.  Let  us,  however,  be 
conscientious,  and  remember  that  one  of  the  most 
famous  books  in  the  conflict  between  faith  and 
science  has  been  published  in  i\merica,  —  J.  W. 
Draper's  History  of  the  Conflict  Betzveen  Religion 
and  Science  (1875).  But  there  is  no  doubt  that 
this  book  never  had  in  America  the  success  it  had  in 
Europe;  it  would  not  be  published  to-day  and  it 
would  never  be  written  to-day.^ 

^  Perhaps  some  one  may  mention,  in  opposition  to  this  statement, 
the  name  of  Robert  G.  Ingersoll,  the  eloquent  lawyer  who  for  some 
years  travelled  about  America  giving  noisy  lectures  against  Christian- 
ity and  religion.  He  is  an  exception  that  proves  the  rule.  He  was 
eloquent,  and  people  liked  to  hear  him.  But  he  hardly  had  any  fol- 
lowing, and  was  completely  forgotten  immediately  after  his  death  in 
1899.  If  you  ask  to-day  for  one  of  his  books  you  will  hardly  be  able 
to  find  it.  I  made  a  study  of  his  work  in  the  Revue  de  Theologie  et 
de  Philosophie,  of  1899  (Vol.  32,  p.  512). 

With  regard  to  Andrew  D.  WTiite's  famous  History  of  the  Warfare 
of  Science  with  Theology  (1896),  it  does  not  by  any  means  belong  to 
the  same  class  as  Draper's  book  although  this  confusion  is  oftentime 
made  even  by  educated  people.  As  plainly  stated  in  the  "Introduc- 
tion," White's  purpose  is,  in  fighting  against  Dogmatism,  to  help  the 
cause  of  religion.  "My  hope  is  to  aid,  and  even  if  it  be  but  a  little, 
in  the  gradual  and  healthful  dissolving  away  of  this  mass  of  unreason, 
that  the  stream  of  religion  pure  and  undejiled  may  flow  on  broad  and 
clear,  a  blessing  to  humanity  "  (p.  vi).    And  got  only  religion  but 


2i8  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

All  this  indicates :  first,  that  an  objective  philoso- 
phy grows  more  and  more  impossible;  second,  that 
America  herself  will  choose  another  kind  —  one 
non-objective  —  through  social  interest;  and,  third, 
that  it  is  better  she  should  so  choose,  for,  under  the 
circumstances,  and  considering  human  nature,  it  is 
better  for  man  to  feel  responsible  for  his  actions  and 
be  bitted  and  curbed  by  religion  in  order  that  society 
may  escape  anarchy.  I  wish  to  emphasize  this :  I 
fully  agree  with  William  James  that  materialism  and 
agnosticism,  even  if  they  were  true,  would  "  never 
be  universally  adopted."  {Will  to  Believe,  p.  126.) 
I  understand  very  well  the  solicitude  of  intelligent 
people,  and  of  upright  magistrates  of  all  countries, 
who  see  not  without  terror  the  ideas  of  responsibility 
and  of  moral  conscience  being  dissipated  by  the  mod- 
ern criticism  which  is  maladroitly  put  at  the  dispo- 
sition of  the  masses;  for  it  is  the  church's  loss  of 
influence  that  disorganizes  the  machinery  of  society, 
renders  men  indifferent  to  commercial  honesty,  to 
the  moral  obligation  of  the  marriage  bond,  which 

Christianity  he  defends  heartily:  "Far  from  wishing  to  injure  Christi- 
anity, we  .  .  .  hoped  to  promote  it"  (p.  vii).  He  himself  distinguishes 
his  book  from  Draper's  by  saying:  "He  (Draper)  regarded  the 
struggle  as  one  between  Science  and  Religion.  I  believed  then,  and  I 
believe  now,  that  it  was  a  struggle  between  Science  and  Dogmatic 
Theology"  (p.  ix).  Finally:  "My  conviction  is  that  Science,  though 
it  has  evidently  conquered  Dogmatic  Theology  based  on  biblical 
texts  and  ancient  modes  of  thought,  will  go  hand  in  hand  with  Re- 
ligion. .  .  .  Thus,  may  the  declaration  of  Micah  as  to  the  require- 
ments of  Jehovah,  the  definition  by  St.  James  of  pure  religion  and 
undefiled,  and  above  all  the  precepts  and  ideals  of  the  blessed  Founder 
of  Christianity  himself  be  brought  to  bear  more  and  more  efifectively 
on  mankind "  (p.  xii).  .       .  .    ■ 


THE   TRIUMPH    OF    PRAGMATISM        219 

develops  social  egoism  and  frivolity.  Life  belongs 
not  to  the  philosopher  who  says  primo  philosophari 
deinde  vivere,  but  to  humanity  which  says,  as  a  mass, 
primo  vivere  deinde  philosophari.  And  why  should 
the  philosopher  —  and  it  is  above  all  of  the  prag- 
matic philosopher  that  I  am  speaking  —  not  accept 
this?  What  right  has  he  to  force  truth  on  people? 
Why  should  he  meddle  with  their  discussions  ? 

What  silly  prejudice  is  this  that  truth  has  any- 
thing whatever  to  do  with  practical  life?  It  was 
necessary  to  have  reached  our  epoch  of  artless  de- 
mocracy to  be  able  seriously  to  affirm  such  enormi- 
ties that  a  man  can  be  at  the  same  time  popular  and 
profound,  and  that  all  that  is  beautiful  is  good. 
No!  it  is  not  a  crime  to  propose  expediency  as  the 
principle  of  life :  the  conflict  begins  only  when  it  is 
positively  proposed  to  harmonize  philosophy  and 
life.  If  humanity  can  be  happier  without  philos- 
ophy, it  has  good  warrant  for  scorning  philosophy. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  should  be  clearly  understood 
that  the  man  who  is  to  bear  worthily  the  name  of 
philosopher  is  he  who  looks  the  problem  in  the  face, 
in  its  "  philosophic  "  aspect ;  it  is  the  man  who:  per- 
emptorily refuses  to  play  the  role  of  making  his 
confreres  believe,  and  perhaps  himself  too,  that,  truth 
is  lie  and  that  lie  is  truth;  and  finally,  if  I  must 
speak  out  my  whole  thought,  it  is  he  who  declares 
pragmatism,  in  so  far  as  it  poses  as  a  philosophy,  to 
be  a  hoax. 

It  would  perhaps  be  more  agreeable  to  think  that 


220  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

life  and  truth  go  hand  in  hand ;  but  if,  after  all,  such 
is  not  the  case,  is  it  the  fault  of  man  ?  Pragmatism 
seems  to  make  philosophy  responsible  in  the  matter. 
What  prodigious  naivete!  Philosophy  states  the 
facts,  that  is  all.  And  if  there  are  people  —  and 
there  evidently  are,  their  number  is  legion  —  of  too 
sensitive  intellect  to  endure  this  lack  of  harmony 
between  philosophy  and  practical  experience,  be- 
tween truth  and  pragmatism,  what  good  does  it  do 
to  talk  to  them  about  it?  A  soldier  may  be  a  hun- 
dred times  as  intelligent  as  his  superior,  yet,  for 
reason  of  discipline,  it  is  highly  desirable  that  he 
should  act  as  if  he  believed  in  him.  Leaving  to  one 
side  ideas  of  God  and  of  immortality,  concerning 
which  we  can  know  nothing,  and  which  belong  to 
the  domain  of  faith,  let  us  suppose  that  the  philoso- 
pher reaches  the  conviction  that  all  our  fine  notions 
of  duty,  of  conscience,  of  honor,  are  intrinsically  only 
words  and  fool-traps  —  I  say,  let  him  keep  the  thing 
to  himself.  Nothing  obliges  him  to  propagate  his 
conviction.  In  fact,  it  would  be  wrong  for  him  to 
do  so,  for  he  would  suggest  to  people,  who  otherwise 
would  not  have  dreamed  of  doing  it,  to  go  and  inves- 
tigate the  matter  and  worry  over  ideas  that  make 
them  unhappy.  The  half -philosophers  who  are  really 
conscientious  will  be  much  happier  in  remaining  ig- 
norant of  all  these  things;  and  the  unscrupulous  half- 
philosophers  will  be  less  mischievous  in  not  knowing 
them.  As  to  the  philosopher  himself  he  will  lose  his 
freedom  because  he  wanted  to  think  aloud. 


THE   TRIUMPH    OF   PRAGMATISM        221 

This  is  the  thing  that  it  is  important  we  should 
get  well  into  our  heads  —  that  it  is  not  the  philoso- 
phers, but  the  pragmatists  who  insist  at  all  hazards 
on  consecrating  as  "truth  "  simple  principles  of  social 
conduct.  How  much  better  it  would  be  if  they 
would  only  remain  pragmatists  root  and  branch  and 
to  the  end  of  the  chapter !  Why  burden  themselves 
with  philosophy  which  asks  nothing  of  them  ?  Why 
ask  that  philosophy  permit  them  to  organize  life 
on  the  plan  of  "  expediency  "  ?  Indeed,  if  they  obey 
what  it  tells  us  it  will  prohibit  them  from  so  organiz- 
ing it.  But  why  should  that  concern  them?  Let 
them  not  lose  their  time  in  trying  to  reconcile  at  any 
price  the  irreconcilable.  Let  them  be  pragmatic; 
that  is  well,  it  is  human,  it  is  Christian;  but  let 
them  not  try  to  be  pragmatic  philosophers,  for  that 
cannot  be. 

To  sum  up:  pragmatism  will  carry  the  day,  not 
because  it  is  true,  —  for,  whatever  in  other  respects 
the  true  may  be,  pragmatism  certainly  is  false,  — 
but  because  it  is  desirable.  And  I  do  not  fear  to  cite 
here  the  dictum  of  Boutroux  in  his  volume  Science 
et  Religion.  "  The  victory  does  not  go  to  that  one 
of  two  living  men  who  best  knows  how  to  string 
syllogisms  together,  but  to  him  whose  vitality  is 
the  strongest"  (p.  343).  The  want  creates  the 
means.  Pragmatism  put  itself  forward  as  a  system 
of  morals  for  the  masses,  and  probably  will  continue 
to  impose  itself  more  and  more.  Professor  James 
and  his  fellows  have  formulated  it,  they  have  ren- 


222  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

dered  us  a  service.  They  afterwards  sanctioned  it, 
and  they  were  not  wrong.  They  finally  consecrated 
it  as  truth:  there  they  violated  logic,  they  insulted 
truth,  and  discredited  their  own  proper  work.^ 

*  Let  me  add  also  that  tJie  examination  of  the  pragmatic  idea  in 
religion  has  its  well-marked  place  in  James's  work  on  the  psychology 
of  religion  (cf.  The  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,  xviii,  pp.  443- 
445).  But  to  consider  the  excellence  of  the  moral  results  of  religious 
pragmatism  as  a  proof  of  its  theological  value  will  never  be  a  sufficient 
argument  from  the  logical  point  of  view. 


CHAPTER    II 

SALVATION   FROM   PRAGMATIC   PHILOSOPHY  POSSIBLE 
BUT  NOT  PROBABLE 

Final  question:  Was  it  necessary  that  matters  should  go  so  far? 
Perhaps  not.  The  Latin  civilizations  had  observed  the  prin- 
ciple of  intellectual  inequality  which  separated  the  social 
strata.  Philosophy  remained  the  appanage  of  an  elite  and 
without  much  danger.  Even  in  the  nineteenth  century  after 
the  French  Revolution,  tradition  maintained  pretty  well 
the  distinction  between  the  intellectuals  and  the  people  — 
even  in  the  domain  of  art.  A  Victor  Hugo,  for  instance,  will 
counterbalance  a  Balzac  or  a  Stendhal.  Yet  to-day  the 
clamor  about  the  superiority  of  the  Anglo-Saxons  which  is 
interpreted  as  meaning  the  superiority  of  democracy  to  intel- 
lectual aristocracy  will,  if  it  carries  the  day,  force  humanity 
to  lay  its  own  head  under  the  axe. 

I  HOPE  I  have  clearly  explained  that  what  has  forced 
the  introduction  of  pragmatism  among  us  is  a  false 
conception  of  individualism,  —  a  conception  which 
has  reached  its  climax  in  that  absurdity,  social  de- 
mocracy. For  the  sake  of  an  ideal,  generous  withal, 
though  Utopian,  —  that  of  elevating  all  men  to  the 
dignity  of  thinking  beings,  —  and  which  ends  by  de- 
claring the  non-responsible,  responsible  thinking  is 
not  only  not  forbidden  to  the  masses,  not  only  is 
permitted  to  them,  but  is  imposed  upon  them.  The 
result  of  this  is  that,  in  order  to  safeguard  this  fine 
ideal  on  the  one  hand  and  social  order  on  the  other, 
thinkers  have  had  to  confine  themselves  to  a  philos- 


224  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

ophy  accessible  to  the  crowd.  In  other  words,  in 
order  to  allow  thought  to  those  who  have  no  business 
with  it,  we  are  obliged  to  take  it  from  those  in  whose 
hands  it  would  not  only  be  harmless,  but  occasionally 
very  desirable  for  the  sake  of  the  general  welfare. 
In  this  sense,  therefore,  James  is  perhaps  not  wrong 
in  saying  that  pragmatism  has  come  to  stay,  even  in 
philosophy.  It  is  not  impossible  that  the  thinker  will 
take  into  account  more  and  more  social  needs,  that 
he  will  not  decry  pragmatism  but  will  simply  hold 
to  peace. 

It  would  be  difficult  for  a  philosopher  to  cease  to 
think ;  but  at  least  he  would  abstain  henceforth  from 
expressing  the  result  of  his  meditations. 

But  was  it  necessary  that  things  should  come  to 
such  a  pass  as  this?  No,  not  necessary!  At  the 
farthest  we  might  say  it  was  inevitable. 

That  which  men  have  agreed  in  modern  time  to 
call  the  Latin  civilizations  had  developed,  I  have  ex- 
plained why,  a  social  organization  in  which  human 
rights  could  be  safeguarded  and  philosophy  not  be 
sacrificed.  They  were  in  advance  of  the  civiliza- 
tions of  antiquity  in  that  they  had  recognized  the 
moral  equality  of  men,  in  the  sense  in  which  this 
can  be  and  ought  to  be  recognized.  In  principle  the 
church  considered  the  humble,  the  feeble,  the  simple- 
minded  as  having  the  same  rights  in  life  as  the 
great,  the  strong,  the  intelligent,  —  a  doctrine  which 
it  expressed  by  opening  the  gates  of  paradise  to  all 
indifferently.     But,  on  the  other  hand,  while  grant- 


SALVATION   POSSIBLE,    NOT    PROBABLE     225 

ing  these  moral  rights  to  all,  she  remained  faithful 
to  the  great  principle  of  Aristotle,  the  inequality  of 
men  —  in  fact,  to  a  simple  observation  of  the  gifts 
of  nature.  Those  privileged  by  nature  must  have 
more  occasions  to  develop  their  talents,  hence  more 
freedom,  and,  in  a  sense,  more  rights.  But  this 
larger  number  of  rights  was  only  a  result  of  a  larger 
number  of  duties  laid  upon  the  select  few.  On  the 
part  of  society  that  was  tantamount  to  placing  re- 
sponsibilities where  in  equity  they  ought  to  be  placed. 
The  church  of  the  middle  ages  had  even  favored 
the  formation  of  classes  according  to  rank  of  birth ; 
and  one  must  be  blinded  by  our  "  progressive " 
modern  ideas  not  to  see  what  there  was  fundamen- 
tally just  in  this  conception,  and  one  must  also  for- 
get all  that  science,  of  which  we  are  so  proud,  and 
which  assures  us  in  every  possible  way  of  the  in- 
fluence of  physical  and  moral  heredity,  of  environ- 
ment, of  education,  etc.  At  the  beginning  of  a 
society,  of  course,  the  strongest  acquire  nobility 
not  by  right  of  birth,  but  in  virtue  of  natural  supe- 
riority ;  yet  afterwards  these  qualities  may  be  trans- 
mitted from  parents  to  children;  and,  while  we 
admit  the  possibility  of  very  numerous  exceptions, 
it  was  but  natural  that  the  descendants  of  those 
strong  men  of  the  early  days  should  be  puissant  in 
their  turn,  and,  after  numbers  of  happily  arranged 
marriages,  should  in  the  lapse  of  time  form  a  select 
class.  It  was  natural  again,  and  not  unjust,  that 
those   less   highly   endowed   by  nature   should   re- 

15 


226  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

linquish  to  the  nobles  some  privileges  from  the 
exercise  of  which  all  would  derive  profit.  The 
middle  ages,  moreover,  did  not  ignore  the  caprices 
of  heredity,  especially  in  the  realm  of  the  intellect; 
it  renewed  this  intellectual  class,  as  indicated,  by  cir- 
cumstances, garnering  recruits  everywhere,  among 
the  poor  and  the  rich,  the  powerful  and  the  humble, 
and  rearing  up  all  in  common  in  its  schools.  In  a 
word,  the  principle  of  selection  was  as  methodically 
and  as  equitably  observed  as  possible.  It  was  a  deli- 
cate task,  but  they  took  account  of  everything,  — 
the  fundamental  inequality  of  men,  the  facts  of 
heredity,  and  conditions  of  environment.  They 
were  at  all  times  ready  to  elevate  exceptional  men 
and  women  from  unfavorable,  humble  conditions 
of  existence;  and  it  is  a  vain  boast  to  affirm  that  the 
world  had  to  wait  until  the  nineteenth  century  be- 
fore welcoming  superior  minds  of  all  classes  into 
the  aristocracy  of  man.  Men  like  Froissart,  Amyot, 
Rabelais,  Boileau,  Voiture,  Voltaire,  Rousseau,  are 
there  in  France  to  prove  the  contrary.  Think  of  the 
court  of  Margaret  of  Navarre,  of  the  Hotel  de 
Rambouillet,  of  the  "  salons "  of  the  seventeenth 
and  eighteenth  centuries.  And  if  even  the  noblesse 
had  been  absolutely  exclusive  (it  was  often  so,  that 
was  human),  it  is  certainly  not  necessarily  so,  and 
the  principle  would  not  be  injured  by  its  non- 
observance.  Again,  if  those  who  tried  to  be  fair  to 
all  were  frequently  baffled  by  difficulties,  at  least  the 
sensible  idea  was  there.    There  is  some  truth  in  this 


SALVATION   POSSIBLE,    NOT    PROBABLE     227 

word  of  Barbey  d'Aurevilly :  "  The  middle  ages 
have  not  agitated  the  question  of  the  organization 
of  labor,  because  they  possessed  that  organization." 
The  masses  did  not  interfere  with  the  elite  nor  the 
elite  with  the  masses ;  rather  they  aided  each  other, 
the  masses  doing  for  the  elite  that  which  asked  only 
mediocre  talents,  and  the  elite  doing  for  the  masses 
that  which  asked  a  certain  superiority.  A  concep- 
tion, this,  much  higher  in  principle  at  least,  to  the 
indolent  method  of  our  day,  which  consists  in  not 
aiding  nature  in  anything,  under  the  pretext  of  not 
thwarting  her;  the  result  of  which  is  that  you  have 
continually  to  begin  again  at  the  beginning  in  the 
formation  of  an  elite,  and  that  the  brain  of  human- 
ity, if  I  may  so  say,  is  constantly  maintained  at  the 
level  attained  at  the  time  when  the  democratic  ideal 
came  into  vogue.  We  who  make  so  great  a  boast  of 
understanding  nature  better  than  the  middle  ages, 
we  act  as  if  we  had  not  the  shadow  of  a  true  idea 
about  it.  Suppose,  please,  for  a  moment  that  the 
social  organization,  such  as  adopted  before  the 
French  Revolution,  had  continued  and  still  existed 
in  our  day ;  and  suppose  —  to  return  to  our  special 
topic  —  that  free  thought  had  reached  (as  in  fact 
it  has)  the  idea  of  determinism  in  nature;  it  would 
not  have  to  deny  itself  and  deliver  itself  over  to 
the  acrobatic  feats  of  pragmatism  in  order  to  per- 
suade itself  that  it  is  mistaken,  because  these  prin- 
ciples are  dangerous  for  the  masses;  it  would  have 
accepted  the  consequences,  and,  from  the  practical 


228  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

point  of  view,  would  have  formulated  a  rule  of  con- 
duct adapted  to  these  masses,  —  a  rule  which  would 
have  satisfied  the  said  masses,  and,  at  the  same  time, 
have  sacrificed  in  no  respect  either  the  dignity  of 
thought  or  the  pragmatic  advantages  which  would 
have  resulted  therefrom  for  all. 

All  this  (an  opponent  might  say)  is  perhaps  very 
fine  in  theory,  but  the  experience  of  the  ages  is 
against  it.  I  reply  that  experience  has  here  no  argu- 
mentative force  whatever.  If  a  physicist  does  not 
know  how  to  deal  with  the  law  of  gravity,  does  that 
imply  that  the  law  does  not  exist?  If  a  poet  does 
not  succeed  in  making  good  verses  by  the  rules  of 
prosody,  shall  we  draw  the  conclusion  that  these 
rules  are  bad?  It  remains  certain  that  the  system 
of  aristocracy  is  based  upon  data  of  nature  which 
we  cannot  change,  —  the  inequality  of  men,  for  ex- 
ample, —  while  the  system  of  democracy  is  in  oppo- 
sition to  these  same  data  of  nature.  That  society 
has  not  succeeded  in  adapting  its  organization  to 
these  facts  does  not  abolish  the  facts ;  and  it  is  hard 
to  see  how,  if  men  have  not  succeeded  with  a  system 
basing  itself  on  facts,  they  will  succeed  better  with 
a  system  that  ignores  them.  That  under  the  sway 
of  past  aristocracies  there  were  formidable  abuses 
we  do  not  dream  of  disputing,  —  sickening,  disgust- 
ing abuses,  arising  from  the  fact  that  the  great  and 
the  powerful  abused  privileges  which  they  could 
have  employed  for  the  benefit  of  all,  but  which  they 
employed   solely   for  their  own   selfish  advantage. 


SALVATION   POSSIBLE,    NOT    PROBABLE     229 

But  if  there  had  been  a  hundred  times  more  abuses, 
it  would  still  prove,  after  all,  only  that  the  powerful 
are  unscrupulous,  or  that  the  measures  taken  to 
secure  privileges  to  a  true  elite  were  not  sufficiently 
severe,  or  that  the  application  of  the  principle  is  less 
easy  than  had  been  thought,  —  by  no  means,  how- 
ever, that  the  principle  is  wrong.  The  way  people 
usually  argue  on  this  point  is  this :  "  A  large  num- 
ber of  apples  on  the  tree  are  decayed ;  therefore  the 
tree  can  only  produce  decayed  fruit  " ;  and  so  the 
tree  was  cut  down.  How  childish!  The  French 
Revolution  was  perhaps  not  wrong  in  saying  that 
the  line  of  demarcation  then  existing  between  the 
elite  and  the  crowd,  and  which  was  the  product  of 
historical  development,  was  false  —  or,  rather,  falsi- 
fied (warped  from  its  true  course)  ;  but  it  vastly 
overstepped  the  conclusions  of  the  premises  by  assur- 
ing men  that  there  was  no  need  of  separation,  and 
by  replacing  aristocracy  by  democracy.  What  was 
needed  was,  not  to  reject,  but  to  better  interpret,  the 
data  of  nature  and  the  conception  of  aristocracy ;  to 
deny,  perchance,  the  aristocracy  of  birth,  but  to 
maintain  the  aristocracy  of  the  intellect,  in  the  broad 
sense  of  that  word  (in  politics  and  commerce  as  well 
as  in  the  sciences,  the  arts,  and  philosophy).  We 
can  perfectly  well  conceive  of  the  French  Revolu- 
tion reaching  an  excellent  result  without  terminat- 
ing in  democracy.  And  I  am  not  sure  but  that  an 
intellectual  aristocracy  might  not  even  have  emerged, 
after  the  shock  of  the  Revolution,   from   the  old 


230  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

aristocracy ;  only  for  that,  it  would  have  been  neces- 
sary for  a  calmer  examination  of  existing  conditions 
at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  to  have  pre- 
vailed. As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  aristocracy  of  the 
gown  was  already  an  aristocracy  of  the  intellect, 
which  had  taken  its  place  beside  that  of  the  ancien. 
regime,  while  the  noblesse  of  the  sword  itself,  which 
for  a  long  time  had  had  no  reason-for-being,  might 
perhaps  have  been  transformed.  The  nobility  had 
the  leisure  and,  consequently,  the  power  to  cultivate 
itself;  it  was  there  that  the  ground  was  most  favor- 
able to  bring  about  an  intellectual  aristocracy,  which 
might  have  again  more  or  less  corresponded  to  one 
of  birth.  Freedom  from  harrassing  cares  about 
material  things,  in  the  case  of  a  well-born  person, 
goes  that  much  towards  the  development  of  the 
superior  faculties,  and  after  some  generations,  this 
circumstance  alone  bestows  some  exquisite  refine- 
ment that  is  not  acquired  in  the  first  generation. 
Compare  the  work  of  Vigny  or  of  Lamartine  with 
that  of  Hugo  or  Balzac.  In  the  first  two  you  feel 
the  true  aristocracy  of  mind ;  in  the  two  latter,  there 
is  something  strong,  perhaps,  but  unpolished.  One 
may  object :  "  But  it  is  a  fact  that  previous  to  the 
nineteenth  century  the  intellectual  class  has  not 
sprung  from  the  aristocracy;  the  great  names  in 
France,  for  example,  are  Rabelais,  Corneille,  Mol- 
iere,  Voltaire,  Rousseau."  Very  well.  And  yet 
we  must  not  forget  Montaigne,  D'Aubigne,  Des- 
cartes,  Saint-Simon,   Mme.   de  Sevigne,   Retz,   La 


SALVATION   POSSIBLE,    NOT   PROBABLE     231 

Rochefoucauld,  Montesquieu,  Buffon,  and  how  many 
others,  less  popular  only  because  more  refined.  And 
then  don't  the  plebeians  owe  anything  to  the  nobil- 
ity? Yes,  almost  everything.  They  are  indebted 
to  them  for  a  public;  and  that  is  something  inesti- 
mable, for,  in  order  to  write,  there  must  be  two,  — 
the  author  and  the  reader.  Compare  the  literature 
that  aristocratic  France  has  given  to  the  world  with 
that  of  democratic  America,  where  the  two  most 
original  authors,  Edgar  Poe  and  Walt  Whitman, 
are  the  very  ones  that  are  taboo. 

But  let  us  resume  our  argument.  In  France 
tradition  was  strongly  entrenched  withal,  and  the 
triumph  of  democracy  was  not  immediate;  after 
the  Revolution  of  1789  there  was  needed  that  of 
1830,  of  1848,  of  1 87 1,  in  the  sphere  of  politics. 
Again,  from  the  social  point  of  view,  with  the  assist- 
ance of  Catholic  tradition,  a  kind  of  equilibrium  was 
established  and  such  Utopian  geniuses  as  Saint- 
Simon,  Fourier,  and  Cabot  forced  the  leaders  of  the 
nation  to  bestow  more  and  more  attention  upon  the 
masses,  without,  however,  going  as  far  as  to  place 
them  in  power.  Finally,  in  the  intellectual  sphere, 
there  above  all,  a  tacit  agreement  had  very  soon  been 
reached  and  was  long  maintained  (is  even  to-day 
not  wholly  abandoned)  by  which  it  is  understood 
that  superior  minds  shall  be  left  undisturbed  in  their 
speculations,  and  that  inferior  individuals  shall  have 
as  guides  popular  leaders  of  a  pragmatic  tendency. 
There  was  even  established  a  bourgeois  literature. 


232  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

an  art  adapted  to  mediocre  understandings,  a  popu- 
lar science,  etc.  A  Victor  Hugo  was  the  ransom 
for  a  Taine  or  a  Renan,  an  Alexandre  Dumas  was 
made  good  by  a  Stendhal  or  a  Barbey  d'Aurevilly, 
a  Coppee  was  to  be  tolerated  in  exchange  for  a 
Leconte  de  Lisle  or  a  Guyau,  a  Jules  Verne  balanced 
a  Claude  Bernard  or  a  Berthelot.  Clear  across  the 
nineteenth  century  the  two  currents  hold  their  par- 
allel course.  This  was  very  well,  and  every  one  was 
satisfied.  The  one  class  was  free  to  develop  the 
faculties  that  honor  man,  was  free  to  think;  the 
other  received  panem  et  circenses  in  larger  and 
larger  amounts,  and  even  (if  they  desired  it)  the 
semblance  of  thought.^  Nothing  hindered  men 
from  profiting  by  all  the  advantages  of  material 
civilization,  the  discoveries  of  science,  the  simpli- 
fication of  life,  etc.  A  society  thus  organized  could 
go  far ;  it  allowed  for  the  natural  inequalities  among 
men,  thus  rendering  the  passage  from  one  class  to 
another  easy;  it  could  satisfy  every  one;  it  did  not 
make  necessary  the  pragmatic  lie,  it  did  not  in  any 
way  whatever  sacrifice  a  select  class  to  the  inferior 
part  of  humanity. 

"  Then  you  propose  the  system  of  castes?  "  Yes, 
why  not,  if  it  is  in  all  points  preferable  to  the  other? 
Are  we  going,  because  the  democratic  ideal  is  per- 
haps more  alluring,  —  namely,  the  theory  that  all 
men  are  alike  superior  in  intelligence,  —  to  adopt 

*  Those  ideas  are  further  developed  in  Appendix  B,  "Literature 
and  the  Moral  Code." 


SALVATION   POSSIBLE,    NOT   PROBABLE     233 

it  forever  when  it  completely  ignores  reality  and 
has  the  most  disagreeable  consequences,  condemn- 
ing the  human  race  to  cut  its  own  head?  And,  in- 
deed, are  we  not  at  this  point  more  pragmatic  than 
the  pragmatists?  The  prejudice  against  certain 
lines  of  social  demarcation  is  solely  due  to  a  false 
association  of  ideas.  We  are  still  basing  ourselves 
on  that  superficial  principle  of  the  French  Revolu- 
tion, that  a  master  is  necessarily  bad  and  that  a  ser- 
vant is  necessarily  good.  Such  silly  theories  as 
these  may  answer  to  the  purpose  of  a  Victor  Hugo 
or  of  demagogues.  But  certainly  nobody  would 
ask  proof  of  the  fact  that  a  good  master  is  as  much 
within  the  natural  possibilities  of  things  as  a  bad 
servant  or  slave.  The  principle  of  equality  was 
never  so  frankly,  so  radically,  proclaimed  as  in  the 
United  States,  when  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth 
century  they  emancipated  the  negro  race ;  and  since 
then  the  question  is  which  to  choose  of  two  solu- 
tions of  the  enormous  difficulty  created  by  this  re- 
grettable act:  whether  to  get  rid  of  the  blacks  or 
reduce  them  again  to  slavery  (without  giving  the 
name  "slave"  to  the  thing).  Whichever  solution 
is  chosen  it  is  a  confession  of  the  impossibility  of 
consistent  democracy. 

I  have  already  alluded  to  the  circumstance  that 
the  countries  where  the  democratic  principle  did  not 
prevail  produced,  intellectually  speaking,  superior 
civilizations.  As  to  moral  superiority,  we  are  still 
waiting  to  see.    This  passage  from  one  of  the  popu- 


234  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

lar  articles  of  Professor  James  on  pragmatism  would 
be  in  good  place  again  here :  "  Democracy  is  on  its 
trial,  and  no  one  knows  how  it  will  stand  the  ordeal. 
Abounding  about  us  are  pessimistic  prophets.  .  .  . 
Who  can  be  absolutely  certain  that  failure  may  not 
be  the  career  of  democracy?  Nothing  future  is  quite 
secure;  states  enough  have  inw^ardly  rotted;  and 
democracy  as  a  whole  may  undergo  self-poisoning. 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  democracy  is  a  kind  of  reli- 
gion, and  we  are  bound  not  to  admit  its  failure.  .  .  . 
Utopias  are  the  noblest  exercise  of  human  reason, 
and  no  one  with  a  spark  of  reason  in  him  will  sit 
down  fatalistically  before  the  croakers  picture." 
(McChtre's  Magazine,  February,  1908,  pp.  420, 
421.)  Is  not  this  a  sort  of  confession?  ^  In  fact,  is 
not  pragmatism  a  movement  which  is  looked  to  to 
remedy  the  evils  of  democracy,  —  ''  bossism,"  com- 
mercial dishonesty,  the  breaking  up  of  family  life 
and  indifference  to  the  marriage  bond?  It  would 
not  be  very  hard  to  show  that  the  difficulties  in  which 
the  great  pragmatic  nation  is  floundering  to-day  all 
come  from  persistent,  wilful,  and  blind  ignorance 
of  the  inequalities  of  men,  and  from  the  refusal  to 
bow  to  any  social  system  which  recognizes  aristoc- 
racy as  a  fact  that  cannot  with  impunity  be  denied. 
Instead  of  submitting  to  nature,  they  are  positively 

^  Other  leaders  of  the  American  people  have  occasionally  discussed 
democracy  in  these  latter  years,  often  less  optimistic  than  James,  — 
Bishop  Potter,  of  New  York,  for  instance.  In  April,  1908,  Bishop 
Mackay-Smith  of  Philadelphia  created  a  great  excitement  by  a  speech 
made  at  an  important  club  of  the  city  in  which  he  exercises  his  function. 


SALVATION   POSSIBLE,    NOT   PROBABLE     235 

bent  on  forcing  her  to  submit  to  us  at  the  very  point 
where  we  are  weakest,  or,  at  any  rate,  where  we  are 
least  disposed  to  act  (the  artificial  selection  of  the 
species,  physically  and  morally).  What  is  "boss- 
ism  "  ?  It  is  the  triumphing  of  the  aristocratic  prin- 
ciple, in  spite  of  democracy,  which  attempts  to  stop 
it  with  its  ''  No  admittance."  This  particular  form 
of  it  is  attended  by  such  disastrous  results  only  be- 
cause the  "  boss  "  is  neither  recognized  by  law  nor 
responsible  to  the  law;  and  so  rogues  can  play  the 
role  as  well  as  others.  What  does  the  commercial 
dishonesty  of  the  masses  mean?  It  means  that 
mediocre-minded  people,  in  place  of  believing  in  a 
moral  and  religious  consciousness,  believe  in  democ- 
racy, —  that  is  to  say,  every  one,  whether  he  is 
stupid  or  intelligent,  may  violate  the  regulations  or 
the  laws,  whereas,  in  fact,  only  superior  minds  are 
above  artificial  human  legislation;  regulations  are 
invented  for  the  crowd;  if  everybody  was  intelli- 
gent enough  to  behave  himself  without  them,  these 
rules  would  not  exist.  What  means  also  this  relax- 
ing of  the  moral  life  of  the  family  (not  specially 
meaning  by  that  sensuality)  ?  It  means  that  people 
who  are  not  fit  to  manage  their  lives  themselves 
nevertheless  arrogate  to  themselves  that  right,  and 
disorganize  society  (without,  by  the  way,  attaining 
more  happiness).  To  put  it  briefly:  it  is  every- 
where regarded  as  very  natural  to-day  to  bestow 
upon  the  croivd  those  privileges  of  which  the  aris- 
tocracy of  former  times  was  accused  of  not  knowing 
how  to  make  good  use. 


236  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

And,  finally,  what  shall  be  said  of  the  problem  of 
corporations  or  trusts  in  democracies?  Nowhere 
more  than  in  this  matter  are  the  contradictions  of 
our  present  social  faith  more  glaring.  We  have 
seen  a  man  of  good  intentions,  at  the  head  of  his 
great  people,  all  astray  in  pitiable  and  inextricable 
difficulties ;  by  nature  he  would  have  been  a  believer 
in  aristocratic  individualism,  and  would  have  fought 
for  the  freedom  of  action  of  the  great  financial 
leaders  of  his  country;  but  as  a  servant  of  the 
people  who  believed  himself  convinced  of  the  supe- 
riority of  democracy,  he  waged  war  against  those 
financiers  to  the  utmost  of  his  power;  the  lack  of 
a  rational  basis  of  action  has  rendered  him  a  fanatic 
in  this  matter  (it  has  always  done  so  everywhere)  ; 
he  moves  in  a  vicious  circle,  like  all  his  people. 

The  key  to  the  problem  lay  in  the  adoption  of  the 
principle  of  the  natural  inequality  of  men.  The 
great  ought  not  to  be  subjected  to  the  same  laws  as 
the  small;  they  must  be  given  prvileges  instead  of 
having  such  taken  away  from  them  —  and  that  for 
the  good  of  all.  We  could  share  in  the  honor  of 
forming  great  men  by  standing  up  for  them;  we 
prefer  to  form  criminals  by  laying  down  everywhere 
laws  which  these  select  natures  must  violate  if  they 
wish  to  give  the  full  measure  of  their  superiority, 
if  they  wish  to  remain  the  exceptional  beings  that 
nature  has  made  them.  Our  society  is  responsible 
for  the  so-called  crookedness  of  characters  like 
Rockefeller  and  Harriman,  as  it  was  responsible  for 
the  cruelty  toward  the  galley  slave,  Jean  Valjean. 


SALVATION   POSSIBLE,    NOT   PROBABLE     237 

A  certain  young  American  economist  (Ghent), 
who  is  also  a  sociaHst,  has  opened  his  eyes,  and 
has  reached  the  conclusion  that  democracy,  in  order 
to  escape  its  contradictions,  must  come  to  establish 
something  that  he  characterizes  by  a  phrase  which 
is  a  definition  of  his  theory,  —  benevolent  feudalism. 
Apart  from  the  details  of  the  concrete  social  organi- 
zation which  he  proposes,  the  principle  is  eminently 
just :  to  separate  the  classes,  to  permit  the  elite  to 
assert  themselves,  only  insisting  that  they  feel  their 
responsibilities ;  to  put  in  place  of  the  purely  author- 
itative feudalism  of  the  middle  ages  a  more  en- 
lightened feudalism,  more  humanitarian ;  to  do  this 
is  to  recognize  the  rights  of  superiority  and  to  make 
the  serfs  themselves  happier.  But  Ghent  was  not 
listened  to  any  more  than  was  Mallock,  author  of 
a  work  replete  with  sound  and  just  ideas,  Aristoc- 
racy and  Evolution.  The  people  preferred  democ- 
racy, and  were  obliged  to  fall  back  on  pragmatism. 


CHAPTER    III 

IS   WILLIAM   JAMES  A   PRAGMATIST? 

The  coexistence  in  William  James  of  pragmatic  thought  and  pure 
thought.  Two  reasons  have  finally  made  the  balance  in- 
cHne  to  the  side  of  pragmatism:  i.  social  environment;  2. 
academic  environment.  William  James  reacts  against  a 
pseudo-pragmatism,  opposing  a  higher  pragmatism  to  a  lower 
pragmatism.    The  system  of  two  truths. 

This  question  may  seem  impertinent;  yet  it  is  not 
irrelevant. 

I  have  felt  obliged  to  attack  the  ideas  of  a  man 
whom  I  deem  to  be  one  of  the  most  awake  thinkers 
of  our  epoch;  but  in  arguing  against  him  as  the 
most  brilliant  representative  of  pragmatism,  I  have 
more  than  once  asked  myself  whether  James  really 
belongs  to  that  class  of  philosophers  whose  flag  he 
flies.  Let  me  attempt  to  handle  this  little  psycholog- 
ical problem  —  necessarily  involving  some  personal 
remarks  —  without  infringing  the  laws  of  good 
breeding. 

William  James  is  the  son  of  Henry  James,  who 
attached  himself  first  to  the  Presbyterian  faith,  and 
afterwards,  on  becoming  a  Swedenborgian,  wrote 
Society  the  Redeemed  Form  of  Man;  he  is  the 
author  of  this  saying  which  contains  virtually  the 
whole  of  pragmatism :   "  The  true  is  worthy  of  rev- 


IS    WILLIAM    JAMES   A   PRAGMATIST?      239 

erence  only  so  far  as  it  is  in  the  service  of  the 
good  "  (cited  by  Bargy :  La  religion  dans  la  Societe 
anx  Etats-Unis,  p.  146). 

So  we  are  to  think  of  William  James  as  reared  in 
a  graciously  austere  and  mildly  mystical  New  Eng- 
land atmosphere.  But  later,  as  a  young  man,  he 
took  up  the  study  of  the  exact  sciences,  —  undoubt- 
edly becoming  much  interested  in  them  for  he  took 
the  degree  of  doctor  of  medicine;  and  later  began 
by  teaching  anatomy.  But  a  conflict  was  not  long 
in  breaking  forth  between  his  mystical  tendencies 
and  his  scientific  tendencies.  It  is  interesting  to 
note  that  a  part  of  James's  professional  prepara- 
tion was  made  in  Geneva,  where,  while  studying 
anatomy,  physiology,  and  geology,  he  lived  in  that 
atmosphere  of  ingrained  Protestantism  which,  with- 
out being  as  sour  as  people  sometimes  please 
themselves  in  thinking  it  to  be,  knows  how  to  win 
everybody  over  to  moral,  or  pragmatic,  preoccupa- 
tions ;  it  is  the  same  milieu  out  of  which  issued  Jean 
Jacques  Rousseau.  When  he  returned  to  America, 
Professor  James,  as  I  have  just  said,  taught  the 
natural  sciences;  then  he  instructed  in  psychology, 
which  brought  him  into  close  relations  with  philoso- 
phy. After  a  term  of  years  he  published  his  great 
work.  The  Principles  of  Psychology,  which  reveals, 
side  by  side  with  a  very  sincere  love  of  objective 
science,  deep-running  moral  and  teleological  predi- 
lections. It  is  easy  to  see  that  Mr.  James  avoids 
giving  his  judgment  for  a  mechanical  conception  of 


240  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

life,  though  deep  down  this  must  be  his  idea.  Maril- 
lier,  in  the  last  of  the  studies  he  made  of  the  work, 
in  the  Revue  Philosophiqiie  (February,  1893),  well 
said :  "  The  teleological  character  of  the  system  is 
at  first  very  striking,  and  one  must  penetrate  beyond 
the  literal  sense  of  the  phrases  to  perceive  that  very 
frequently  he  means  some  kind  of  mechanical  selec- 
tion in  nature  rather  than  an  intentional  choice. 
William  James  never  flatly  affirms  that  anywhere, 
perhaps  because  he  has  not  decided  in  favor  of  one  of 
the  two  conceptions  but  oscillates  constantly  between 
them  without  distinctly  acknowledging  it  "  (p.  182). 

Professor  James  could  not  remain  always  in  this 
equivocal  position.  The  very  loyalty  and  generosity 
of  his  fine  nature  were  opposed  to  it.  In  the  essays 
and  volumes  penned  by  him  after  the  Psychology, 
his  teleological  predilections  kept  augmenting  up  to 
the  time  when  he  decided  to  make  pragmatic  ideas  a 
part  of  his  intellectual  capital.  Two  paramount  in- 
fluences seem  to  me  to  have  been  at  work,  apart  from 
what  I  might  call  personal  predispositions. 

First,  the  pragmatic  atmosphere  of  America, 
which  I  have  talked  about  sufficiently  in  the  preced- 
ing pages  to  make  it  unnecessary  for  me  to  recur  to 
the  subject  here.  Nobody  can  entirely  free  himself 
from  the  influence  of  the  environment  in  which  he 
lives,  and  William  James  is  morally  too  human,  and 
intellectually  too  penetrating,  not  to  comprehend  the 
worth  of  pragmatism  in  the  life  of  a  nation  such  as 
the  people  of  the  United  States  form,  and  not  to 


is    WILLIAM    JAMES    A   PRAGMATIST?      241 

approve  it  and  even  endeavor  to  help  to  establish  it 
on  a  solid  basis.  (Let  me  observe,  by  the  way,  that 
the  brother  of  William,  the  novelist  Henry  James, 
who  has  entirely  given  up  living  in  America,  has  be- 
come a  pure  intellectualist,  and  is  even  more  such  in 
his  latest  novels  than  in  his  earliest. ) 

But  a  second  influence  operated  in  an  entirely  dif- 
ferent way.  It  is  less  apparent,  but  I  believe  it  to  be 
a  real  one  and  very  important :  I  mean  a  sort  of 
pseudo-philosophy,  nay,  even  pseudo-pragmatism, 
invading  on  this  side  and  on  that  the  domain  of 
thought,  and  against  which  James  felt  the  necessity 
of  a  reaction.  Let  me  explain :  In  the  natural  sci- 
ences America  conducts  researches  as  disinterested 
and  as  objective  as  any  country  whatever ;  and  one 
may  indeed  say  that  this  is  so  as  long  as  the  relations 
between  science  and  practical  life  are  quite  loose. 
But  when  these  relations  become  closer  it  is  different. 
Two  classes  of  investigators  are  then  formed: 

1.  Those  who  take  their  stand  resolutely  upon 
practical  ground,  without  caring  whether  or  not  the 
philosophical  verities  at  the  base  of  their  practical 
theories  are  valid  from  the  point  of  view  of  pure 
reason.     These  are  the  political  economists. 

2.  Those  who  insist  upon  basing  the  social  and 
moral  organization  of  life  on  philosophical  prin- 
ciples, and  who  therefore  can  never  be  confronted 
with  any  philosophical  theory  without  at  once  weigh- 
ing its  practical  conclusions. 

As  respects  the  class  of  disinterested  philosophers, 
16 


242  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

it  is  extremely  restricted  in  number,  that  is  to  say, 
of  those  who,  while  they  know  very  well  that  there 
are  relations  between  scientific  or  philosophic  truths 
and  life,  yet  study  the  former  without  any  preoccu- 
pation as  to  their  practical  application,  just  as,  for 
instance,  an  astronomer  might  study  the  stars,  or  a 
biologist  the  phenomena  of  physiological  regenera- 
tion, or  a  mathematician  space  of  four  dimensions. 
In  general,  we  may  say  that  in  the  wake  of  the  diffu- 
sion of  instruction  in  our  modern  democracies  has 
followed  the  further  idea  that  all  the  instruction  we 
receive  ought  to  serve  as  a  practical  guide  in  our 
active  life;  the  idea  that  philosophic  speculations 
and  the  higher  mathematics,  not  to  speak  of  Greek 
and  Latin  and  the  humanities,  shall  help  men  to 
better  success  in  the  conduct  of  life,  —  just  as  a 
knowledge  of  reading,  writing,  and  arithmetic  pre- 
pares an  economic  person  not  to  be  deceived  by  a 
dishonest  merchant.  Now  it  is  not  only  a  mark  of 
superficiality  to  believe  innocently  in  the  possibility 
of  applying  any  and  every  scientific  and  philosophic 
truth  to  life ;  nay,  it  involves  a  positive  danger.  In 
fact,  it  is  fanaticism,  with  all  its  attendant  evils,  its 
cruelties  and  its  stupidities;  for,  precisely,  fanati- 
cism consists  in  blindly  applying  a  principle  without 
considering  the  circumstances  which  either  impose 
restrictions  upon  it  or  render  every  application  of 
it  mischievous.  Science  laid  under  contribution  in 
this  way  is  a  social  plague.  And  this  plague  rages 
fiercely  in  the  country  of  William  James.     Let  no 


IS   WILLIAM    JAMES   A   PRAGMATIST?     243 

one  object  that  I  am  contradicting  myself  because 
I  showed  above  that  the  people  were  pragmatic.  I 
simply  note  the  fact  that  side  by  side  with  the 
masses,  and  beneath  a  small  and  select  class  of  true 
scholars  and  scientists,  there  is  a  numerous  class  of 
pseudo-savants,  controlled  by  certain  university 
men,  and  especially  composed  of  teachers.  These 
persons,  at  the  time  of  the  great  scientific  awakening 
in  the  United  States,  some  twenty  years  ago,  in 
order  that  they  might  take  a  hand  in  the  sport,  tem- 
porarily abandoned  their  posts  to  go  and  drink  of 
the  poisoned  spring,  setting  their  wits  to  w^ork  to 
apply,  all  athwart  and  counter,  the  new  philosophic 
and  scientific  ideas ;  and,  finding  the  masses  still  less 
prepared  than  they  to  assimilate  these  ideas,  they  too 
frequently  succeeded,  in  their  misguided  enthusi- 
asm, in  putting  preposterous  principles  into  circula- 
tion. For  reasons  easily  comprehended,  psychology 
lent  itself  to  this  form  of  exploitation  more  than 
any  other  science;  and  its  speedy  application  to 
ethics,  and  still  more  to  pedagogy,  produced  ridicu- 
lous results,  sometimes  positively  disastrous  in  un- 
skillful hands,  even  if  it  had  only  been,  as  President 
Butler  of  Columbia  University  once  very  correctly 
observed,  the  frittering  away  of  the  youthful  days 
of  innumerable  children,  subjected  in  the  name  of 
"science"  (innocent  victims  of  this  fatal  zeal)  to 
ever  new  methods  of  education.  Nothing  is  better 
adapted  to  prevent  the  germination  of  the  seed  sown 
in  the  mind  and  to  put  the  brains  of  young  people 


244  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

into  irremediable  confusion;  a  single  mediocre 
method  of  instruction  systematically  carried  out 
would  produce  infinitely  better  fruit  than  a  thou- 
sand excellent  methods  (and  how  many  of  these 
methods  are  excellent?)  tried  on,  one  after  the  other. 
Through  this  disconcerting  mingle-mangle  of  sci- 
ence and  practical  predilections,  education  tinkerers 
finally  attained  to  inconceivable  puerilities/  The 
thing  was  carried  to  such  a  pitch  that  superb  psy- 
chological laboratories  in  which  many  believed  they 
saw  the  "  open  sesame  "  of  the  millenium  have  to- 
day a  reputation  not  always  merited  of  charlatanry. 
I  remember  hearing  some  years  ago  Professor 
Miinsterberg,  the  director  of  the  psychological  labo- 
ratory at  Harvard,  make  a  determined  attack,  in  the 
presence  of  an  academic  audience,  upon  experi- 
mental psychology  as  it  is  popularly  conceived. 

Now  William  James,  as  the  author  of  the  com- 
prehensive work  which  best  sums  up  the  aspirations 
of  our  modern  psychology,  was  better  situated  than 
any  one  else  to  realize  the  shallowness  of  all  these 
crudities  and  puerilities,  and  he  frequently  made  use 
of  pragmatism  to  protest  against  them.  It  may  be 
said  that  one  of  the  objects  of  James  was  to  offset 
a  narrow,  low  pragmatism  by  an  intelligent,  lofty 
pragmatism.  Of  course  (he  would  say  to  the 
pseudo-philosophers)  we  must  take  cognizance  of 
the  consequences  of  a  theory  in  practical  life;    but 

*  In  all  this  it  will  be  easily  understood  why  the  author  does  not 
wish  to  quote  names. 


IS   WILLIAM   JAMES    A   PRAGMATIST?      245 

still  we  must  be  quite  sure  that  the  speculative  con- 
clusions we  may  reach  have  enough  importance  in 
themselves  to  be  worth  the  trouble  of  making  syste- 
matic applications  of  them  to  the  concrete  life. 
Moreover,  you  make  observations  for  the  most  part 
in  some  isolated  department  of  thought,  and  then, 
as  if  the  salvation  of  the  world  depended  on  it,  you 
will  overturn  everything  for  the  pleasure  of  making 
use  of  your  little  truth.  If  you  will  take  hold  of 
philosophy  on  its  practical  side,  then  applications 
are  more  important  than  the  principles  or  natural 
laws  you  formulate;  then,  indeed,  we  must  create 
social  principles,  as  political  economists  are  already 
seeking  to  propound  them,  and,  as  far  as  that  is  con- 
cerned, the  politicians,  and  even  the  priests.  But 
it  is  only  your  ignorance  that  makes  you  so  bold  as 
to  want  to  reach  that  goal  by  the  road  of  philosophy ; 
you  will  always  be  baffled  by  the  reality.  You  set 
up  to  be  little  Gods ;  but  in  reality  you  are  the  very 
counterpart  of  children  who  wrap  a  stick  of  wood 
in  a  rag  and  believe  they  have  made  a  baby,  or  you 
are  like  little  boys  bestriding  gravely  their  broom- 
stick horse.  You  are  pragmatic,  but  in  an  abom- 
inable way ;  you  are  going  counter  to  the  very  end 
you  propose  to  yourself.  An  understanding  great 
and  acute  enough  to  follow  up  by  conscientious 
analysis,  even  to  its  minutest  details,  the  formidable 
mix  of  causes  and  effects  in  nature  would  be  super- 
human. Certain  grand  geniuses  appear  at  irregular 
intervals,  —  monsters  of  genius,  in  truth,  — who  are 


246  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

endowed  with  extraordinary  powers  of  divination 
that  unconsciously  guide  them ;  and  even  the  great- 
est have  never  accounted  for  more  than  the  merest 
fraction  of  the  motives  that  impel  them  to  act.  Of 
course,  every  sensation,  every  thought,  every  action, 
is  per  se  analyzable  by  psychology,  but  as  a  matter 
of  fact  never  will  be  analyzed  by  minds  as  limited  as 
ours,  or  analyzed  in  such  a  way  that  the  analysis 
shall  be  for  us  of  a  pragmatic  value.  Let  us  ponder 
these  words  of  Auguste  Comte  in  the  second  lecture 
of  his  Coiirs  de  philosophie  positive:  "  It  is  evident 
that,  having  conceived  in  a  general  way  of  the  study 
of  nature  as  serving  as  a  rational  basis  for  action 
upon  nature,  the  human  mind  ought  to  go  on  in 
theoretic  researches,  in  doing  away  wholly  with  any 
kind  of  practical  consideration;  for  our  means  of 
discovering  truth  are  so  imperfect  that  if  we  do  not 
concentrate  them  exclusively  upon  this  object,  and 
if,  in  our  search  for  the  truth,  we  impose  upon  our- 
selves the  extraneous  condition  of  finding  in  it  an 
immediate  practical  utility,  it  would  be  almost  im- 
possible for  us  to  attain  to  it."  ^  And  vice  versa,  let 
US'  cease  to  burden  with  scientific,  philosophical,  or 
psychological  analyses  the  creative  genius  of  the 
artist,  for  example,  or  even  in  a  more  modest  sphere, 
the  practical  good  sense  which  guides  us  in  real  life. 
Philosophy  frequently  leads  us  astray  because  we 

*  Compare  with  this  sentence  in  William  James's  recent  Pluralistic 
Universe:  "Philosophy  should  seek  this  kind  of  living  [intuitional] 
understanding  of  the  movement  of  reality,  not  follow  science  in  vainly 
patching  together  fragments  of  its  dead  results"  (p.  264). 


IS   WILLIAM    JAMES   A   PRAGMATIST?     247 

have  at  command  only  our  own  philosophy,  which  is 
always  limited.  Now  if  we  wish  really  to  create 
pragmatic  philosophy,  we  must  be  more  radical ;  we 
must  be  practical  above  all.  —  In  such  a  way  as  this 
William  James  has  opposed  to  the  bourgeois  prag- 
matism of  the  pygmy  scientists  around  him  a  prag- 
matism wiser  and  profounder,  and  one  conscious  of 
its  ignorance ;  and  I  should  like  to  draw  a  very  clean 
and  sharp  line  of  demarcation  between  it  and  the 
pragmatism  of  his  followers  in  philosophy,  Messrs. 
Schiller,  for  instance,  or  Papini.  He  is  pragmatic 
in  the  superior  sense  of  the  word,  not  in  the  sense 
accepted  by  the  majority,  whether  adherents  or  not 
of  pragmatism.  It  is  to  draw  attention  to  this  fun- 
damental difference  that  I  have  entitled  this  chapter 
"Is  James  a  Pragmatist?"  He  radically  sepa- 
rates theory  and  practice.  For  instance,  his  attitude 
toward  occultism  (*^  metapsychics  "  as  Richet  has 
termed  it)  seems  to  me  extremely  correct.^  Even 
should  you  prove  to  me  a  hundred  times  that  a  phe- 
nomenon of  hallucination  or  of  telepathy  is  theoreti- 
cally explicable  by  auto-suggestion  or  by  some  other 
natural  reason,  you  would  still  not  have  proved  any- 
thing, for  you  have  not  proved  that  your  explana- 
tion is  the  true  one.  "  There  is  more  in  heaven  and 
earth,  Horatio,  than  is  dreamed  of  in  your  philoso- 
phy."    There  are  a  thousand  ways  of  theoretically 

*  Even  though,  as  I  have  said,  this  attitude  seems  to  me  to  have 
been  suggested  to  him  by  his  desire  to  prove  immortality  and  the  reli- 
gious doctrines  which  gravitate  around  it. 


248  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

accounting  for  any  phenomenon.  Even  a  phenome- 
non as  simple  as  the  fall  of  a  stone  may  have  many 
different  causes.  It  way  be  detached  from  a  cliff, 
proceed  from  the  explosion  of  a  mine  or  a  volcano, 
or  tumble  from  a  roof;  it  may  have  been  thrown 
into  the  air  by  a  child  or  what  not ;  it  may  even  fall 
from  the  sky.  You  may  sometimes  think  you  have 
the  true  explanation,  when  really  you  only  have  one 
of  several  possible  explanations.  Remember  the 
story  of  the  negro  Rahan  and  the  apple  in  The 
Arabian  Nights;  it  is  a  veritable  apologue.  And 
the  more  complex  the  phenomena  become,  the  more 
possible  become  the  errors.  Now  science,  after  all, 
hardly  goes  deeper  than  the  possible  explanation. 
"  Science,"  says  James,  in  his  Will  to  Believe,  "  has 
organized  her  mental  processes  into  a  regular  tech- 
nique, her  so-called  method  of  verification;  and  she 
has  fallen  so  deeply  in  love  with  the  method  that  one 
may  even  say  she  has  ceased  to  care  for  truth  by 
itself  at  all.  It  is  only  truth  that  is  technically  veri- 
fi,ed  that  interests  her.  The  truth  of  truths  might 
come  in  merely  affirmative  form,  and  she  would  de- 
cline to  touch  it"  (p.  21 ).  Elsewhere  William 
James  expresses  his  personal  opinion  in  these  words : 
"  The  negative,  the  alogical,  is  never  wholly  ban- 
ished. Something  —  call  it  fate,  chance,  freedom, 
spontaneity,  the  devil,  what  you  will  —  is  still  wrong 
and  other  and  outside  and  unincluded,  from  your 
point  of  view,  even  though  you  be  the  greatest  of 
philosophers"  (p.  viii). 


IS    WILLIAM   JAMES    A   PRAGMATIST?      249 

Let  me  cite  also  the  last  words  of  Varieties  of 
Religions  Experience  : 

**  The  total  expression  of  human  experience,  as  I 
view  it  objectively,  invincibly  urges  me  beyond  the  nar- 
row '  scientific '  bounds.  Assuredly  the  real  world  is 
of  a  different  temperament,  —  more  intricately  built 
than  physical  science  allows.  So  my  objective  and  my 
subjective  conscience  both  hold  me  to  the  over-belief 
which  I  express.  Who  knows  whether  the  faithfulness 
of  individuals  here  below  to  their  own  poor  over-beliefs 
may  not  actually  help  God  in  turn  to  be  more  effectively 
faithful  to  his  own  greater  tasks  ?  " 

In  the  last  phrase,  as  in  all  the  theological  opinions 
of  the  book  from  which  I  have  taken  this  citation, 
Air.  James  has  gone  beyond  his  premises,  and  on  that 
ground  he  could  no  more  succeed  than  those  who 
became  pragmatists  from  mere  pettiness  of  mind.^ 
But  the  groundwork  of  his  thought,  the  meaning  — 
conscious  or  unconscious  —  of  his  pragmatic  writ- 
ing, after  all  is  said,  is  this :  to  ask  for  what  I  have 
myself  also  called  for,  —  the  separation  of  science 
or  philosophy  from  life;  the  difference  between  us 
being  solely  that,  while  he  fears  to  see  life  absorbed 
by  philosophy,  I  fear,  should  he  succeed,  to  see 
philosophy  absorbed  by  life.  For,  in  order  to  attain 
his  ends,   William  James  has  yielded  precisely  to 

^  Marcel  Hebert  notes  also  in  James  as  a  pragmatist  that  trace 
of  faltering  I  had  called  attention  to  in  his  Psychology.  "He  (James), 
after  he  has  demolished  everything,  excels  in  reconstructing  all  by 
unexpected  over-beliefs.^*    {Le  Pra^matisme^  p.  97.) 


2SO  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

that  temptation  to  confront  the  absorption  of  life 
by  philosophy  with  the  absorption  of  philosophy  by 
life. 

As  to  myself,  I  propose  a  compromise.  My  reason 
cannot  abdicate  her  throne,  nor  can  I  agree  to  give 
up  philosophy  for  the  sake  of  life.  Besides,  since 
it  would  be  in  the  name  of  reason  that  I  should  con- 
demn the  value  of  reason,  what  would  this  condem- 
nation be  worth?  We  cannot  get  away  from 
our  own  shadow.  On  the  other  hand,  since  it  is 
dangerous  to  allow  life  to  be  absorbed  by  philoso- 
phy, dangerous  from  the  social  point  of  view,  I  pro- 
pose to  adopt  for  practical  reasons  the  systems  of 
two  truths,  —  a  philosophic  truth,  independent  of 
consequences,  and  a  pragmatic  truth,  which  shall  be 
our  social  philosophy  of  the  people,  for  the  benefit 
of  society.  William  James,  in  order  not  to  break 
completely  with  philosophy,  and  to  preserve  at  one 
and  the  same  time  certain  incontestable  scientific 
data  and  pragmatism,  has  been  forced  to  formulate 
his  philosophic  creed  as  pluralism:  I  propose  a 
"  dualism  "  for  practical  reasons.  For  there  cannot 
be  contradiction  in  truth  (as  pluralism  impliedly 
admits),  but  nothing  hinders  us  from  acting  as  if 
there  were  two  truths.  To  frankly  recognize  that 
humanity  is  right  in  basing  its  ethics  on  false  prin- 
ciples would  only  be  base  if  we  were  responsible  for 
the  fact  that  truth  is  mischievous  and  the  lie  advan- 
tageous. What  has  always  distinguished  the  true 
philosopher  is  moderation,  —  which,  however,  must 
not  be  confounded  with  cowardice. 


IS    WILLIAM    JAMES   A    PRAGMATIST?      251 

But  once  more,  pragmatism,  as  a  philosophic 
method  and  as  a.  philosophic  system,  only  begins  when 
you  cease  to  make  a  distinction  between  philosophy 
and  life  (or,  if  you  will,  ethics),  and  it  seems  clear 
to  me  that  it  is  this  distinction  which  is  with  Wil- 
liam James  the  important  thing.  I  am  certain  that 
he  would  defend  this  portion  of  his  doctrines  to  the 
last  ditch;  I  am  not  so  certain  that  he  would  very 
vigorously  insist  on  defending  this  quite  different 
idea,  that  pragmatism  is  philosophic  truth.  In  the 
chapter  he  has  devoted  to  the  definition  of  truth, 
the  phrase  "  absolute  truth  "  occurs  several  times. 
It  does  not  much  matter  just  what  he  means  by  this ; 
but  it  must  be  something  else  than  pragmatic  truth. 


CONCLUSION 

In  order  that  his  readers  may  more  easily  grasp  the 
real  meaning  of  his  work,  an  author  sometimes  feels 
the  need  of  summing  up  its  central  idea  in  a  preface. 
It  has  been  done  here.  I  therefore  esteem  it  to  be 
superfluous  to  add  a  special  conclusion;  but  I  shall 
take  the  liberty  of  begging  the  conscientious  reader 
to  re-read  the  few  pages  at  the  beginning  of  this 
volume,  and  of  which  he  will  now  be  better  able  to 
grasp  the  whole  meaning. 

Yet  if  I  were  asked  to  sum  up  in  a  sentence  the 
thesis  I  have  tried  to  defend  it  would  be  this : 

I  am  in  perfect  sympathy  with  the  social  work 
which  pragmatism  proposes  to  itself,  which  is,  in 
short,  to  render  humanity  as  happy  as  possible. 
But  I  do  not  believe  that  the  means  adopted  —  the 
bending  of  philosophy  to  its  needs  and  developing 
the  spirit  of  democracy  as  it  is  conceived  to-day  — 
are  the  only  possible  ones,  or  even  the  best.  Above 
all,  I  do  not  believe  they  are  the  most  worthy  means, 
for  they  rest  on  a  double  philosophic  error,  —  the 
agreement  of  scientific  truth  with  human  aspirations, 
and  the  intellectual  and  social  equality  of  individuals. 


APPENDIX  A 
ANSWERS  TO  SOME  CRITICISMS 

"Owe  must  play  the  game  of  philosophy  with  the 
cards  all  on  the  tabled  —  J.  E.  Creighton. 

The  Argument  of  Silence.  Mr.  Schiller's  Criticism.  Pragmatic 
Method  and  Pragmatic  Theories.  Intellectual  Aristocracy 
and  the  Masses.  Science  and  Morality.  Anti -Pragmatism 
and  Hyper-Pragmatism. 

The  Argument  of  Silence.  —  Although  the  least 
convincing,  it  is  much  in  favor  among  pragmatists; 
and  this  is  why  I  feel  called  to  discuss  it  here  before 
any  other.  Pragmatists  will  acknowledge  receipt  of 
criticisms,  but  they  usually  make  one  of  the  three  fol- 
lowing answers,  or  all  three  together:  I.  You  fail  en- 
tirely to  understand  us,  or  II.  Your  argument  shows 
that  you  fail  to  appreciate  the  real  issue,  or  III.  You 
ascribe  to  us  theories  which  we  never  expressed,  nor 
cared  to  express.  This  seems  to  settle  the  case  for 
them ;  ^  it  does  not  for  others. 

^  Under  the  title  Discussion,  Professor  Moore  writes  an  article  on 
Anti-Pragmatism  which  contains  these  words:  "Into  the  issue  itself 
we  cannot  go;  "  and  Professor  Dewey,  who  thinks  nothing  good  what- 
soever of  the  volume  under  discussion,  is  careful  in  his  account  of  it 
not  to  seize  the  occasion  to  explain  in  what  he  was  so  thoroughly  mis- 
understood; for,  when  he  comes  to  speak  of  the  chapter  concerning 
him  especially,  he  remarks:  "A  becoming  modesty  forbids  my  deal- 
ing with  it."  This  we  may  take  as  profound  irony  .  .  .  but  then  it 
may  be  asked  why  Professor  Dewey  took  the  trouble  of  writing  an 


254  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

I.  Suppose  for  one  moment  that  their  claim  be  true 
and  that  really  nobody  understands  pragmatism:  — 
then,  whose  fault  is  it?  It  seems  to  me  that  so  far 
philosophers  have  succeeded  in  making  themselves 
understood  by  their  fellow  students;  else  they  did 
their  opponents  the  honor  of  telling  where  the  mis- 
understanding was. 

Or  is  pragmatism  so  terribly  deep  that  only  the  few 
elect  can  live  up  to  it  ?  —  Why  then  take  the  trouble 
of  spreading  it  abroad,  writing  books,  giving  popular 
lectures  about  it?  If  it  is  not  so  extremely  profound, 
and  pragmatists  will  agree  that  others  might  penetrate 
the  arcana  of  the  new  philosophy,  then  I  can  see  only 
one  reason  for  not  opposing  arguments  to  objections, 
namely,  the  difficulty  in  offering  any. 

II.  With  regard  to  the  second  claim  that  opponents 
of  pragmatists  do  not  appreciate  the  point  at  issue,  the 
following  remarks  will  not  be  out  of  place : 

I.  Besides  minor  objections,  there  is  one  that  was 
made  to  pragmatists  over  and  over  again,  in  all  sorts 
of  forms,  namely,  that  they  substitute  for  the  one  great 
philosophical  problem  of  organic,  logical,  continuous 
truth,  a  quantity  of  unconnected  problems ;  or  that 
they  substitute  for  the  epistemological  problem  of  truth 
a  moral,  if  not  utilitarianist,  conception  of  truth ;  or 
again  that  they  replace  objective  truth  by  subjective 
truth ;  —  they  are  all  one  and  the  same  accusation  — 
why  not  use  William  James's  frank  expression,  and 
say,  with  him,  that  pragmatists  are  trying  to  substitute 

account  of  the  wretched  book  unless  it  be  that  he  was  afraid  lest  others 
should  think  differently  in  reading  it.  Personally,  I  much  prefer  the 
attitude  of  Professor  James  who  declined  to  discuss  publicly  Anti- 
Pragmatism. 


ANSWERS    TO    SOME    CRITICISMS        255 

a  midtiverse  for  a  imiverse?  I  have  added  to  the  text 
of  this  edition  a  long  note  to  the  central  passage  of  my 
own  criticism  (where  I  point  out  the  confusion  between 
what  I  called  the  *'  scientific  pragmatism  ''  and  the 
"  moral  pragmatism  "),  quoting  from  two  of  the  fore- 
most critics  of  pragmatism  in  America :  Messrs.  Hibben 
and  Creighton.  Professor  Creighton  adds  to  the  pas- 
sage reproduced  a  few  lines  (which  I  like  to  reproduce 
now)  to  the  effect  that  ''  it  is  somewhat  remark- 
able that  those  who  uphold  the  teleological  or  instru- 
mental view  of  knowledge  have  as  yet  devoted  almost 
no  attention  to  answering  the  serious  and  legitimate 
objections  that  have  been  strongly  urged  against  their 
position  from  many  sides  "  {Philosophical  Review,  Vol. 
XIII,  pp.  294,  295)  ;  and  several  names  are  given, 
among  them  Professor  Seth's  (who,  by  the  way,  has 
renewed  the  charges  in  a  review  of  William  James's 
Pluralistic  Universe  {Philosophical  Review,  Septem- 
ber, 1909).  This  was  in  1904,  and  in  January,  1909, 
Dr.  Cams  could  still  write  in  Monist,  "  It  is  strange 
that  all  his  critics  agree  in  misunderstanding  Professor 
James's  conception  of  truth"  (pp.  85,  86). 

2.  In  discussing  Anti-Pragmatism  all  the  reviewers 
that  offered  more  than  a  few  lines'  account  have  very 
well  agreed  on  this  central  passage  (distinction  between 
"  scientific  "  pragmatism  and  *'  moral  "  pragmatism)  ; 
even  those  who  would  strongly  differ  from  the  author's 
personal  ideas  would  still  admit  that  the  case  there  was 
good  (e.  g.,  A.  Naviller,  in  Semaine  Litteraire,  fimile 
Faguet,  in  Idees  Modernes,  the  anonymous  reviewer  in 
Revue  de  Metaphysique  et  de  Morale).^ 

^  As  we  go  to  press,  the  article  of  M.  G.  Compayrd,  ex- rector  of  the 
University  of  Lyon  and  professor  of  philosophy,  comes  in;   referring 


256  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

3.  We  were  three  in  France  who  wrote  up  pragmat- 
ism at  the  same  time,  and  not  knowing  anything  of 
each  other,  we  all  three  pointed  out  the  necessity  for 
this  distinction  sometimes  in  remarkably  similar  terms ; 
see  Anti-Pragmatism,  pp.  26-37;  Chantecor,  L'Annee 
psychologique,  1908,  Le  Pragmatisme,  pp.  377,  378, 
especially;  and  A.  Rey,  La  philosophie  moderne 
(Flammarion,  1908),  pp.  70,  71,  75-79,  137,  138,  330, 

331.' 

Thus,  as  the  same  objection  is  brought  against  prag- 
matists  from  all  quarters,  may  it  not  pertinently  be 
asked  whether  they  are  not  perhaps  the  ones  who  fail 
or  refuse  to  appreciate  the  point  at  issue? 

III.  Not  much  need  be  said  regarding  the  third  jus- 
tification offered  by  pragmatists  who  use  the  argument 
of  silence,  namely,  that  ideas  are  asc»-ibed  to  them, 
the  paternity  of  which  they  refuse  to  endorse.  Their 
attitude  here  is  almost  naive  in  thus  quietly  refusing  to 
consider  disturbing  consequences  implied  in  their 
premises  and  denying  us  the  right  to  answer :  "  No, 
you  did  not  say  so  explicitly,  of  course;  but  you  can- 
not not  say  it  if  you  say  such  other  thing." 

While  I  was  correcting  the  proofs  of  this  chapter,  I 
received  the  new  book  by  Professor  James,  The  Mean- 
ing of  Truth.     I  am  sorry  to  find  that  he  cultivates 

to  the  claim  of  Poincare  by  the  pragmatists:  **M.  Schinz  en  d^montre 
avec  force  la  faussete"  {La  Revue,  Sept.  15,  1909). 

*  Rey  shows,  on  pp.  75-79  among  others,  the  important  distinc- 
tion that  exists  between  Poincar6's  theories  and  those  of  pragmatism; 
and  this  suggests  an  interesting  remark,  namely,  that  William  James 
seems  to  have  by  himself  given  up  his  claims  on  Poincare  and  re- 
placed him  almost  entirely  by  Bergson  in  Pluralistic  Universe.  This 
is  much  better.  Indeed,  the  clever  and  delusive  books  of  Bergson  re- 
mind one  very  much  of  James's  way  of  apprehending  problems. 


ANSWERS    TO   SOME    CRITICISMS         257 

there  the  argument  of  silence  on  a  great  scale.  Among 
the  critics  he  does  not  "  pretend  to  consider "  even 
the  names  of  such  men  "  as  Messrs.  Taylor,  Lovejoy, 
Gardiner,  Bakewell,  Creighton,  Hibben,  Parodi,  Salter, 
Carus,  Lalande,  Mentre,  McTaggart,  G.  E.  Moore  and 
others,  especially  not  Professor  Schinz,  who  has  pub- 
lished under  the  title  Anti-Pragmatisjne  an  amusing 
sociological  romance."  (I  am  glad  to  have  contrib- 
uted to  Professor  James's  merriment,  and  I  am  sure, 
of  course,  that  a  colleague  —  whose  name  was  just 
barely  mentioned  in  the  above  list,  and  who  is  evidently 
jealous  of  the  large  space  allotted  to  me  —  was  wrong 
when  he  commented  on  my  "  special  "  mention :  "  You 
must  have  hit  him.")  The  opponents  after  Professor 
James's  heart  are  men  like  Mr.  J.  B.  Pratt,  "  for  .  .  . 
[Mr.  Pratt]  .  .  .  admits  all  my  essential  contentions" 
(p.  169). 

Why  does  Professor  James  not  consider  the  criticism 
of  men,  among  whom  appear  almost  all  the  leading 
philosophers  of  America  ?  Two  reasons  are  given :  ( i ) 
"  These  critics  seem  to  labor  under  an  inability  almost 
pathetic  to  understand  the  thesis  which  they  seek  to 
refute."  Their  case  may  be  "  pathetic  " ;  but  at  the 
same  time  it  is  strange  that,  with  the  mastery  of  Eng- 
lish style  possessed  by  Professor  James,  he  should  not 
be  able  to  formulate  pragmatism  so  that  other  intellects 
can  understand  it  and  accept  it.  May  it  not  be,  after 
all,  that  something  is  wrong  with  pragmatism? 

(2)  The  other  reason  is  that  Professor  James  does 
not  wish  to  add  ''  more  repetition  to  the  fearful  amount 
that  is  already  there."  —  Well,  yes!  that  is  just  the 
trouble,  "  the   fearful  amount  of  repetition."     When 

17 


258  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

pragmatists  repeat  the  same  things  all  the  time,  how  can 
they  expect  that  a  simple  change  in  the  way  of  dress- 
ing their  ideas  will  make  any  impression  upon  serious 
critics?  Would  it  not  be  better  to  meet  the  criticism 
addressed  to  them  from  all  quarters,  which  is  summar- 
ized in  these  words:    Pragmatism  is  Subjectivism? 

In  short,  the  argument  of  silence  will  not  do  —  no 
more  than  that  of  irony,  by  the  way.  Pragmatists  can 
surely  not  complain  that  philosophers  have  not  endeav- 
ored conscientiously  to  understand  them.  We  may 
have  all  failed,  but  then,  if  pragmatists  insist  upon  not 
telling  us  at  last  what  pragmatism  is,  of  course  we  will 
never  know ;  —  if  they  will  not  tell,  who  will  ? 

Mr.  Schiller's  Criticism.  —  The  above  remarks 
do  not  apply  to  Mr.  Schiller,  who,  on  the  contrary,  has 
proved,  as  far  as  the  author  is  concerned,  a  loyal  oppo- 
nent in  spite  of  his  amusing  bluntness.  He  has  taken 
up  the  discussion  and  frankly  met  our  criticisms.  He 
deserves  credit  for  it  not  only  because  his  attitude  is 
more  normal,  but  also  because  he  so  fearlessly  commits 
pragmatism  to  irrationalism,  and  thus  renders  things 
much  easier.  I  quoted  his  sentence :  "  If  one  had  to 
choose  between  Irrationalism  and  Intellectualism, 
there  would  be  no  doubt  that  the  former  would  have  to 
be  preferred."  {Humanism,  p.  6.)  He  tries  to  get 
out  of  the  difficulty  now  by  saying  that  the  sentence 
was  meant  as  a  "  sarcasm."  {Mind,  July,  1909, 
p.  420. )  Very  well ;  but  then  the  case  appears  to  me 
thus :  Either  Mr.  Schiller  maintains  his  statement  seri- 
ously, or  he  does  not.  If  he  does,  then  he  condemns 
the  logical  character  of  pragmatism  —  that  is  what 
I  accuse  him  of.    If  he  does  not  maintain  it,  then  once 


ANSWERS    TO    SOME   CRITICISMS        259 

more  I  ask :  In  what  does  pragmatism  differ  from  any 
other  philosophy  which  conforms  to  the  rules  of  logic?* 

Here  are  the  words  by  which  Mr.  Schiller  defends 
himself :  "  Surely  prudence  as  well  as  candor  should 
have  urged  Mr.  Schinz  to  read  a  few  lines  further. 
I  own  that  Pragmatism  vindicates  the  rationality  of 
Irrationalism,  without  becoming  itself  irrational;  it 
restrains  the  extravagance  of  Intellectualism,  without 
losing  faith  in  the  intellect^'  Will  the  reader  kindly 
weigh  these  words :  "  Pragmatism  vindicates  the  ra- 
tionality of  Irrationalism  without  becoming  itself  irra- 
tional " ;  let  us  be  "  candid  "  about  it ;  can  they  mean 
anything  else  but :  "  the  rationality  of  being  irrational, 
without  being  irrational "  ?  I  do  not  see  it ;  words 
have  a  meaning,  I  suppose.  But  is  not  this  taxing  our 
"  candor  "  rather  high !  ^ 

As  to  the  second  part  of  the  phrase,  it  adds  nothing 
to  the  point  in  question :  "  Pragmatism  restrains  the 
extravagance  of  Intellectualism  without  losing  faith  in 
the  intellect."  Did  ever  an  intellectualist  make  it  a 
point  to  advocate  extravagances  of  the  intellect  ?  I  am 
not  aware  of  it;   and  even  if  some  did,  intellectualism 

^  Let  me  take  this  opportunity  to  point  out  the  vagueness  of  Mr. 
Schiller's  method.  Here  is  another  case  parallel  to  the  one  just 
quoted:  In  Stiidies  in  Humanism,  p.  360,  "What  right  have  we  to 
assume  that  even  'ultimate'  truth  must  be  one  and  the  same  for  all? 
The  assumption  is  no  doubt  convenient,  and  in  a  rough  and  ready 
way  it  works.  .  .  ."  Is  that  meant  as  "sarcasm"  also?  At  any  rate, 
we  should  like  to  know,  does  it  or  does  it  not  work? 

^  Mr.  Schiller's  words  are  echoed  by  William  James,  who  in  Plur- 
alistic Universe  asks  us  to  "think  in  non-conceptualized  terms"  (!) 
(p.  290).  And  even  by  Professor  Dewey  who,  in  his  criticism  of 
Anti-Pragmatisme  suggests  that  there  might  be  "a  pragmatic  inter- 
pretation of  the  principle  of  contradiction."  {Philosophical  RevieWf 
July,  1909,  p.  447.)     Indeed,  that  would  be  interesting! 


26o  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

ought  not  to  be  condemned  for  that  man's  extrava- 
gance. Without  losing  faith  in  the  intellect  —  why, 
then,  if  one  adopts  the  requirements  of  the  intellect, 
part  company  with  intellectualism  ?  Always  and  ever 
we  are  brought  back  to  the  dilemma  on  which  rests 
my  whole  criticism :  Pragmatism  can  be  different  from 
philosophy  as  understood  up  to  this  day,  i.  e.,  rational 
or  intellectual  philosophy,  only  by  being  irrational; 
Pragmatism  has  to  be  irrational  or  not  be  at  all. 
This  is  positively  implied  in  the  premises  of  their 
affirmations.  Mr.  Schiller  wants  to  "  reform  logic  " 
(loc.  cit.  p.  426)  ;  but  nobody  can  "  reform  "  logic;  we 
find  logic  in  us,  we  do  not  make  it.  Aristotle  himself 
would  never  claim  that  he  invented  logic.  ...  I  am 
sure  I  run  very  little  risk  in  predicting  that  Mr. 
Schiller  in  his  future  book  may  possibly  violate  logic, 
but  he  surely  can  never  "  reform  "  it.  The  "  psycho- 
logical pragmatism  "  he  refers  to  in  his  criticism,  and 
which  would  serve  as  a  link  between  what  I  called  "  sci- 
entific "  and  ''  moral "  pragmatism,  will  be  of  no  avail ; 
it  can  simply  juxtapose  both;  it  can  ignore  their  in- 
compatibility, but  it  will  never  do  away  with  it. 

By  the  way,  regarding  this  question  of  the  irration- 
alism  of  pragmatism.  Prof.  Wm.  James  is  as  outspoken 
in  his  last  volume  as  we  may  desire :  "  For  my  own 
part  I  have  finally  found  myself  compelled  to  give  up 
logic  fairly,  equally,  and  irrevocably  .  .  ."  or  again, 
"  So,  I  prefer  bluntly  to  call  it,  if  not  irrational,  then  at 
least  non-rational  in  its  constitution."  (Pluralistic 
Universe,  pp.  212,  213.)  I  isolate,  of  course,  those  pas- 
sages from  all  sorts  of  reservations  made  with  a  view 
to  make  us  swallow  the  real  pragmatic  pills;  a  good 
deal   would   be   gained,    for   instance,   if   pragmatists 


ANSWERS    TO    SOME    CRITICISMS        261 

would  tell  us  once  what  difference  they  make  between 
irrational  and  non-rational ;  because  "  candid  "  people 
do  not  see  any,  at  least  when  the  words  are  used  in  such 
a  context.^  See  now  how  less  openly  M.  Schiller  says 
the  same  thing :  "  Reason  may  of  course  enter  into  the 
rational  act  [the  may  is  pretty!],  but  it  is  by  no  means 
indispensable  [ !  !  !],  and  even  when  it  does  occur  [are 
we  not  glad  to  hear  that  it  occasionally  does  occur  that 
"  reason  enters  into  the  rational  act "  ?]  it  only  forms 
a  small  part  of  the  total  process."  ^  {Studies  in  Hu- 
manism, p.  355.)  Between  the  two  ways,  the  "  direct  " 
way  of  William  James  is  still  preferable. 

Another  criticism  of  Mr.  Schiller  is  to  the  effect  that 
there  are  pragmatic  writings  which  I  do  not  quote  and 
which  undoubtedly  I  have  not  read.  I  plead  guilty; 
there  are  many  pragmatic  writings  which  I  did  not 
take  the  trouble  of  looking  up.  But  I  maintain  that  it 
was  not  necessary.  When  one  has  found  pragmatists 
using  ten,  fifteen,  twenty  times  the  same  deceiving 
argument  in  trying  to  throw  logic,  what  is  the  use  of 
keeping  up  reading?  There  comes  a  time  when  an 
investigator  can  feel  satisfied  that  no  new  argument 
can  possibly  be  offered.  This  I  felt  decidedly  before 
sitting  down  and  writing  Anti-Pragmatism  —  and  I 
have  seen  no  new  argument  coming  up  in  the  discus- 
sion of  the  book  either ;  not  even  in  Mr.  Schiller's  crit- 
icism in  Mind. 

^  Here  again  I  have  an  opportunity  to  refer  to  the  authority  of 
Professor  Seth.  See  the  latter's  criticism  of  a  passage  of  William 
James's  Pluralistic  Universe,  similar  to  those  of  Schiller  discussed 
here  in  Philosophical  Review^  September,  1909,  the  last  page. 

'  Italics  are  mine. 


262  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

Finally,  my  contention  that  there  is  a  connection 
which  was  well  worth  indicating  between  pragmatism 
and  modern  conditions  of  social  life  (not  especially  the 
American  national  character)  is  not  accepted  by  Mr. 
Schiller.  But  he  bases  his  objection  on  the  fact  that 
philosophers  are  opposed  to  pragmatism  as  a  rule; 
now,  I  say  that  pragmatism  would  be  a  philosophy  well 
adapted  for  the  people  of  our  generation.  Thinkers 
will  some  day  realize  that  a  philosophy  may  be  excel- 
lent socially,  although  not  true  in  itself.  I  distinguish 
very  sharply  —  altogether  too  sharply  in  the  eyes  of 
most  of  my  critics  —  between  pragmatism  and  prag- 
matic philosophy ;  Mr.  Schiller  does  not  give  me  credit 
for  it. 

Pragmatic  Method  and  Pragmatic  Theories. — 
There  is  something  so  disconcerting  in  the  claims  of 
pragmatism  that  probably  many  may  still  feel  like  Mr. 
Bertaud,  who  says  in  the  International  Journal  of 
Efthics,  in  his  criticism  of  Anti-Pragmatisme  (April, 
1909,  p.  396)  :  "  One  point  remains  obscure,  however, 
in  all  that:  the  relation  of  the  pragmatic  method  to 
the  pragmatic  theories  obtained  by  the  method.  Schinz 
seems  to  consider  them  inseparable.  James  has  ob- 
jected to  it.  And,  in  fact,  we  can  conceive  very  well 
of  a  man  using  the  pragmatic  method  and  being  an 
atheist ;  if  in  his  eyes  society  might  be  better  organized 
on  atheistic  than  on  religious  principles,  he  could  hold 
this  view  and  still  be  a  pragmatist." 

The  answer  to  the  query  is  made  by  Mr.  Bertaud 
himself;  in  the  last  words  of  the  above  lines  he  em- 
phasizes my  very  criticism  and  that  of  most  opponents 
of  pragmatism,  namely,  that  the  new  "  method "  by 
itself  leads  nowhere    (or  everywhere  —  the  result  is 


ANSWERS    TO    SOME    CRITICISMS         263 

the  same)  ;  and  this  is  the  very  reason  why  pragma- 
tism is  of  no  avail:  it  leads  the  one  to  theism,  the 
other  to  atheism,  and  in  both  cases  the  decision  is 
true  to  the  pragmatic  criterion  of  usefulness. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  answer  does  not  depend  on 
the  pragmatic  method  at  all,  but  rather  on  the  solution 
of  another  preliminary  question,  in  this  case :  "  Which 
society  is  preferable,  the  theistic  one  or  the  atheistic 
one  ?  "  According  to  what  you  think  about  it  person- 
ally you  then  choose  the  one  or  the  other  reply;  but 
the  pragmatic  element  comes  in  too  late  to  offer  the 
determining  factor  in  the  decision  and  to  be  of  avail.^ 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  so  happens  by  a  mere 
accident  that  WiUiam  James  and  his  followers  are 
religiously  inclined;  and  therefore  as  they  have  de- 
cided for  themselves  that  theism  was  better  for  man 
than  atheism,  they  were  bound,  in  applying  the  prag- 
matic method,  to  decide  that  theism  was  true;  there 
was  a  necessary  relation  between  the  method  and  the 
theory. 

One  might  express  this  very  well  by  a  short  for- 
mula: pragmatic  philosophy  distinguishes  itself  from 
intellectualistic  philosophy  by  substituting  personal 
rationalism  for  impersonal  rationalism. 

To  sum  up :  there  is  not  in  itself  any  organic  connec- 
tion between  pragmatism  and  rehgion ;  William  James 
has  a  right  to  claim  that.  But,  the  opinions  of  a  man 
being  such  or  such,  a  specific  connection  becomes  im- 
perative. Now,  as  one  of  the  chief  purposes  of  Aftti- 
Pragmatism  was  to  show  that  the  pragmatic  method 
was  the  (conscious  or  unconscious)  result,  on  the  part 

'  This  was  shown  very  well  by  Professor  Pratt,  What  is  Pragma- 
tism, Lecture  V. 


264  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

of  the  representatives  of  pragmatism,  of  a  desire  to 
uphold  certain  ethical  and  religious  views  desirable  for 
society,  I  had  a  right  to,  and  I  did,  emphasize  this 
connection  between  pragmatism  and  theism. 

Intellectual  Aristocracy  and  the  Masses.  — 
I  come  now  to  the  discussion  of  criticism,  directed 
against  my  own  ideas. 

In  reading  of  the  distinction  I  have  established  be- 
tween the  pragmatic  problem  (a  social  problem)  and  a 
pragmatic  philosophy,  several  no  doubt  have  been  in- 
clined to  interpret  my  theories  as  does  Professor  Moore 
in  the  Journal  of  Philosophy  (May  2y,  1909,  p.  291). 
"  The  thinking  class  as  such  is  a  law  unto  itself.  It 
needs  render  no  account  to  the  others  (the  masses). 
But  the  others  must  render  an  account  to  the  thinkers. 
For  the  thinker  finds  it  no  less  difficult  to  live  by 
thought  alone  than  by  bread  alone.  .  .  ."  Professor 
Moore  does  not  quote  my  words,  but  evidently  that  is, 
according  to  him,  the  way  I  ought  to  think  with  my 
theories.  I  am  not  afraid  to  accept  the  consequences 
implied  in  my  premises ;  still  one  may  question  here 
whether  really  such  things  are  implied.  I  say  no. 
Certainly  it  is  my  opinion  that  the  aristocracy  of  the 
intellect  (which  does  not  necessarily  imply  all  philoso- 
phers) ought  to  lead;  and,  furthermore,  I  do  believe 
that  this  aristocracy  "  need  render  no  account  to  the 
people " ;  for,  when  one  consents  to  render  account 
to  some  one,  this  implies  a  belief  in  the  superiority  of 
the  judger;  now,  for  the  aristocracy  of  the  mind  to 
take  the  masses  as  judges  would  be  both  foolish  and 
unwise.  But  this  does  not  mean  that  aristocracy  ought 
not  to  take  the  masses  into  account;   on  the  contrary, 


ANSWERS   TO    SOME    CRITICISMS         265 

noblesse  oblige.  I  maintain,  for  instance,  that  parents 
"  need  not  render  account "  to  their  children,  but  I  do 
not  mean  to  say  that  parents  need  not  act  in  taking 
their  children  into  consideration,  —  and  not  on  account 
of  fear  but  possibly  on  account  of  love.  Concerning 
the  social  problem  before  us,  my  point  of  view  is  just 
opposed  to  that  ascribed  to  me  by  Professor  Moore, 
not  a  little  loftier  than  he  probably  expects,  and  at  the 
same  time  in  perfect  logical  agreement  with  all  my 
other  ideas.  In  two  words  it  is  this :  Masses  have 
rights  and  no  duties,  aristocracy  has  duties  besides 
rights.  —  I  use  the  word  "  duties "  for  lack  of  a 
better;  it  would  lead  me  too  far  to  go  into  more  de- 
tailed explanation  here. 

One  of  my  critics  has  understood  that  part  of  Anti- 
Pragmatism  very  well;  it  may  not  be  out  of  place  to 
oppose  his  interpretation  of  my  ideas  to  those  of  Pro- 
fessor Moore :  "  Science  rests  entirely  on  the  idea  of 
determinism  of  phenomena,  which  of  course  is  bound 
to  kill  energy  and  all  sense  of  responsibility  in  the 
people.  Now  society  is,  after  all,  more  important  than 
scientific  truth.  Therefore,  let  us  choose  society  with 
untruth  rather  than  truth  with  anarchy.  The  reason 
why  Schinz  calls  his  book  Anti-Pragmatisme  is  there- 
fore not  because  he  objects  to  a  pragmatic  philosophy; 
the  masses  need  it  on  the  contrary.  He  only  objects 
to  having  this  philosophy  called  true  philosophy.  He 
deplores  that  we  should  be  forced  to  keep  truth  from 
the  people,  but  sees  in  it  a  necessary  result  of  modern 
conditions  or  more  plainly  of  democracy.  .  .  .  There 
is,  he  says,  an  automatic  law  to  the  effect  that  the  more 
democratic  we  become,  the  more  it  will  be  necessary 


266  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

to  conceal  truth  from  the  people;  the  freer  people  be- 
come, the  less  free  philosophy  will  be."  (Bertaud,  in 
Intern.  Journal  of  Ethics,  April,  1909,  pp.  395,  396.^) 

Science  and  Morality.  —  One  of  my  critics.  Pro- 
fessor A.  Naville,  of  Geneva  (Switzerland),  has  raised 
a  very  interesting  problem  (Semaine  Litter  aire,  March 
6,  1909),  namely:  If  the  vulgarization  of  science,  with 
its  basis  of  determinism,  is  harmful  to  the  morality  of 
the  masses,  killing  energy  and  resistance  to  lower  in- 
stincts, this  same  argument  ought  to  hold  also  for  the 
representatives  of  intellectual  aristocracy;  because, 
after  all,  no  matter  how  intelligent  or  well  educated 
a  man  may  be,  he  remains  human. 

I  was  well  aware  of  the  question  in  writing,  but  I 
had  several  reasons  for  not  going  into  a  discussion; 
chiefly  this  one:  The  fact  that  the  objection  could  be 
raised  on  moral  grounds,  and  that,  naturally,  educated 
or  able  people  would  not  escape  the  consequences  if 
they  became  conscious  of  the  determinism  of  phe- 
nomena, will  not  render  determinism  less  true. 

In  as  far,  however,  as  the  question  is  raised,  I  will 
say  a  word  regarding  it.  The  suggestion  of  Professor 
Naville  is:  Ought  we  not,  accepting  Mr.  Schinz's 
theories,  to  stop  science  altogether,  if,  anyway,  studying 
would  be,  to  say  the  least,  of  no  good  consequences? 

To  give  an  answer,  one  ought  first  to  solve  this  other 
question :  Is  morality  an  end  by  itself  in  life,  or  is  it 
only  a  means  to  reach  some  other  goal?  If  it  is  an 
end  by  itself,  then  of  course  science  would  better  be 
left  alone.     But  if  morality  is  only  a  means  to  render 

*  I  have  answered  Professor  Moore's  article  more  fully  in  Journal 
of  Philosophy,  August  5,  1909. 


ANSWERS   TO    SOME    CRITICISMS         267 

possible  social  life,  and  social  life  itself  has  an  end,  e.  g., 
we  will  say,  human  happiness,  then  the  only  way  to 
reach  a  solution  would  be  to  weigh  the  advantages  and 
disadvantages  of  science  regarding  human  happiness. 
My  opinion  in  this  case,  briefly  expressed,  would  be 
that  science  or  knowledge  (kept,  of  course,  from  the 
masses)  can  give  us  more  happiness  (in  the  form  of 
physical  comfort,  or  artistic  and  scientific  enjoyment 
of  all  kinds)  with  the  moral  disadvantages  connected 
with  it,  than  ignorance  would  give  us  with  a  higher 
moral  standard. 

This  is  as  much  as  I  care,  for  the  present,  to  discuss 
this  important  topic. 

Anti-pragmatism  and  Hyper-pragmatism.  — 
M.  Fred.  Paulhan,  in  a  long  discussion  of  the  social 
ideas  explained  in  this  volume,  suggests  in  the  Revue 
Philosophique  of  June,  1909,  that  I  am  rather  hyper- 
pragmatist  than  anti-pragmatist.  M.  Faguet,  in  I  dees 
Modernes  of  March,  1909,  writes :  "  And  I  wish  to 
call  attention  to  the  fact  that  his  conclusions  are  not 
anti-pragmatic,  but,  on  the  contrary,  ultra-pragmatic  " ; 
Professor  Moore  in  his  turn  {Journal  of  Philosophy, 
May  2y,  1909)  points  out  that  "  Professor  Schinz's 
defense  of  intellectualism  is  openly  (what  the  pragma- 
tist  would  insist  it  must  implicitly  be)  pragmatic  in 
its  method,"  while  Professor  Dewey  {Philosophical 
Review,  July,  1909)  speaks  of  the  author's  "  prag- 
matic suggestion  to  anti-pragmatists."  ^ 

Those  statements  are  not  altogether  incorrect.  I 
am  certainly  more  pragmatic  than  pragmatists  when 
I  carry  the  "  expediency  "  argument  so  far  as  to  admit 

*  See  also  M.  G.  Compayre  in  his  article  in  La  Revue  (ancienne 
Revue  des  Revues)^  Sept.  15,  1909. 


268  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

that  we  ought  to  preach  untruth,  if  untruth  is  morally 
useful  while  truth  would  be  sad  and  the  acquaintance 
with  the  latter  might  discourage  or  kill  resistance 
to  low  passions.  Yes,  this  is  Hyper-pragmatism. 
Yet  the  book  means  Anti-pragmatism,  too,  for  the 
author  considers  pragmatic  theories  as  merely  socially 
advisable;  he  never  claims  that  they  are  true.  The 
purpose  of  the  first  part  of  the  volume  is  precisely  to 
expose  various  attempts  to  persuade  us  that  because 
some  idea  is  morally  useful,  it  is  for  this  reason  true. 
Philosophers  ought  not  to  indulge  in  the  logic  of  ro- 
mantic poets,  who,  finding  that  life  would  be  too  hor- 
rible if  there  was  no  immortality,  infer  that  therefore 
immortality  must  be  true.  Immortality  may  be  true, 
but  the  argument  of  pragmatists  and  poets  has  no 
philosophic  value. 


APPENDIX   B 
LITERATURE   AND    THE   MORAL   CODE.^ 

"  Verite  en  dec  a  des  Pyrenees,  erreur  au  dela.*' 

Pascal. 

Two  conceptions  possible  as  to  the  relations  of  art  and  morals, 
the  one  aesthetic  (art  for  art's  sake),  the  other  didactic  (art 
as  a  means  of  promoting  a  social  ideal).  The  former  pre- 
vails among  Latin  nations,  the  latter  among  Anglo-Saxons. 

The  didactic  point  of  view  implies :  i.  that  art  must  adapt  itself 
to  the  intellectual  level  of  the  masses;  2.  that  our  present 
moral  code  is  final.  The  first  theory  is  disastrous  for  art, 
the  second  is  scarcely  maintainable.  The  Anglo-Saxon 
point  of  view  is  legitimate  in  that  it  takes  into  account  the 
well-being  of  society,  but  false  in  that  it  ignores  the  rights 
of  art ;  while  the  Latin  point  of  view  safeguards  freedom  of 
thought  at  the  expense  of  public  morality. 

It  is  useless  to  try  to  reconcile  these  two  conceptions ;  they  cannot 
be  reduced  to  the  same  terms.  But  why  these  difi"erences  of 
conception?  Because  the  circumstances  are  different.  The 
Anglo-Saxon  have  only  one  public,  the  great  public,  the 
popular  public,  to  take  into  account;  the  French  have  two 
of  them,  —  the  popular  public  and  the  intellectual  public. 
(Before  the  Revolution  there  was  only  one  in  France  also, 
the  public  of  the  higher  class,  the  "^lite. ")  This  difference 
of  publics  explains  in  great  part  the  superiority  of  the  Latin 
literary  class  (artists),  more  favored  because  freer. 

*  These  pages,  which  discuss  a  very  concrete  aspect  of  the  moral 
and  social  problems  started  by  the  general  subject  of  pragmatism, 
were  first  published  in  the  International  Journal  of  Ethics,  July,  1906, 
under  circumstances  indicated  in  the  first  paragraph. 


270  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

Will  they  always  have  this  advantage  ?  It  is  doubtful ;  the  flood 
of  democracy  sweeps  all  before  it ;  the  Latin  peoples  will  be 
to-morrow  where  the  Anglo-Saxons  are  to-day. 

It  is  now  some  years  ago  that  one  or  two  English 
authors  (allusion  is  especially  made  to  Pinero  and 
Shaw)  put  on  the  stage  plays  which  were  strongly 
censured  by  the  critics  of  England  and  America  for 
the  freedom  which  they  allowed  themselves  in  discuss- 
ing moral  problems.  This  is  unusual,  for  it  is  gener- 
ally French  writers  who  arouse  criticism  on  that  score. 
The  stir  created  by  these  plays  in  Anglo-Saxon  coun- 
tries makes  it  appear  timely  to  discuss  the  respective 
attitudes  of  Anglo-Saxon  and  of  Latin  races  in  such 
matters.^ 

No  attempt  will  be  made  in  the  present  paper  to 
show  that  one  side  is  right  and  the  other  wrong;  nor 
is  it  intended  to  offer  a  compromise.  On  the  contrary, 
the  purpose  of  this  appendix  is  to  show  that  the  two 
standpoints  are  not  reducible  to  the  same  terms,  to 
show  why  they  are  bound  to  clash  and  why  there  can 
be  no  reconciliation.  An  attempt  will  be  made  to  make 
the  problem  thus  presented  better  understood. 

First  of  all  we  must  make  a  clear  distinction  between 
the  two  attitudes  —  the  attitude  of  literature  toward 
morality,  and  another  which  can  by  no  means  be  iden- 
tified with  it,  although  one  must  admit  that  there  is 
some  connection  between  the  two.  Some  writers  main- 
tain that  art  has  its  aim  in  itself;    it  is  the  theory  of 

*  I  use  these  terms  "Latin"  and  "Anglo-Saxon";  but  to  whoever 
has  read  attentively  certain  passages  in  the  body  of  this  book,  it  will 
be  clear  that  I  attach  to  the  words  only  a  geographical  meaning 
without  implying  by  that  any  belief  on  my  part  in  a  profound  influ- 
ence of  races. 


LITERATURE   AND    MORAL   CODE        271 

art  for  the  sake  of  art,  which  is  a  distinctly  Latin  ideal. 
Others,  the  great  majority  of  Anglo-Saxon  writers, 
maintain  that  art  must  be  only  a  means  to  an  end.  One 
ideal  is  purely  aesthetic,  the  other  purely  didactic. 

But  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  infer  that  Latin  writers 
ignore  moral  problems,  and  that  art  for  the  sake  of 
art  is  their  only  ideal.  It  would  be  decidedly  erroneous 
to  believe  that  this  is  the  most  common  attitude  among 
French  artists.  All  sorts  of  practical  problems  are 
treated  as  they  are  in  Anglo-Saxon  countries,  but  the 
difference  lies  in  the  way  they  are  approached.  The 
respective  positions  can  be  described  about  as  follows : 
The  Anglo-Saxons  say  that  literature  must  be  kept 
within  the  limits  of  the  ethical  laws  that  govern  us, 
must  insist  upon  the  beauty  of  those  laws,  and  encour- 
age their  observance  by  the  public.  The  Latins  say 
that  literature  has  no  such  obligation  in  treating  moral 
problems. 

Let  us  first  examine  the  Anglo-Saxon  standpoint. 
Eliminating  all  rhetoric  from  the  discussion,  the  argu- 
ment may  be  summed  up  as  follows :  Society  rests 
upon  certain  moral  and  social  principles  which  assure 
order ;  to  suggest  doubts  as  to  the  excellence  of  those 
principles  means  to  shake  society  to  its  foundations, 
to  breed  disorder  and  anarchy.  The  very  fact  that 
some  persons,  thanks  to  special  gifts  of  nature,  hold 
a  position  of  leadership  places  upon  them  increased 
responsibilities.  Authors,  therefore,  ought  not  to  dis- 
cuss problems  of  ethics  in  such  a  fashion  as  to  mislead 
the  public.  This  attitude  is  perfectly  reasonable,  but 
at  the  same  time  there  are  some  consequences  which 
must  be  recognized. 

It  implies,  first,  that  no  art  must  be  cultivated  except 


272  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

that  which  is  accessible  to  the  masses  and  suited  to 
their  inteUigence.  It  should  be  remembered  that  the 
problem  of  freedom  of  thought  in  the  treatment  of 
moral  questions  is  a  comparatively  modern  one  in  art 
and  literature.  There  was  a  time  when  books  were  not 
accessible  to  all  as  they  are  to-day.  Instruction  was 
the  privilege  of  a  few  and  literature  was  confined  to 
the  educated  classes.  From  the  present  moral  point  of 
view,  the  literatures  of  past  centuries  were  much  freer 
than  ours.  Of  course  no  one  in  our  day  would  be 
likely  to  suffer  imprisonment  or  torture  or  death  for 
expressing  ideas  disapproved  by  political  or  ecclesi- 
astical authorities ;  but  the  restriction  now  imposed  by 
moral  obligations,  by  what  is  called  "  public  opinion," 
is  in  fact  even  greater  than  the  physical  coercion  of 
past  centuries.  We  are  not  concerned  here  with  the 
question  whether  the  present  standpoint  is  better  or 
worse  than  the  old.  But  that  democracy  is  responsible 
for  the  limitation  of  freedom  of  speech  and  thought 
that  hampers  modern  authors  is  certain.  This  is  rec- 
ognized by  some  of  those  who  have  come  forward 
lately  protesting  against  liberty  in  literature.  The 
writer  recently  attended  a  large  meeting  of  one  of  the 
important  literary  clubs  in  this  country,  where  the 
chief  speaker,  a  well-known  professor  of  ethics,  said 
that  if  no  protest  is  made  against  the  too  free  treat- 
ment of  certain  questions  in  novels  or  on  the  stage, 
our  democracy  will  be  seriously  threatened. 

The  attempt  to  restrict  moral  discussion  has  another 
consequence.  It  is  an  assumption  that  our  present 
moral  code  is  final.  Now,  in  the  progress  of  centuries, 
as  every  one  knows,  ethical  standards  have  changed. 
Our  modern  conception  of  marriage,  our  duties  toward 


LITERATURE   AND    MORAL   CODE        273 

children,  our  moral  attitude  toward  inferior  races,  and 
so  forth,  have  undergone  complete  transformation. 
On  what  ground,  then,  can  we  claim  to  have  reached 
the  definitive  truth  in  those  matters?  Certainly  not  on 
the  ground  that  the  practical  results  are  ideal.  Let  us 
take  the  country  where  modern  principles  have  been 
allowed  most  freedom  to  develop  unhampered  by  tra- 
ditions —  America.  As  the  outgrowth  of  our  concep- 
tion of  marriage  we  have  the  fact  that  the  world  over 
America  is  called  the  *'  land  of  divorce  " ;  as  the  out- 
growth of  our  conception  of  civil  freedom  we  have 
*'  bossism."  To  accept  as  permanent  a  social  system 
which  yields  such  results  would  not  be  encouraging.^ 

We  allow  liberty  of  thought  in  philosophical,  in 
economic,  and  in  scientific  problems,  to  a  certain  ex- 
tent in  religious  problems,  —  why  this  exception  in  the 
case  of  moral  problems?  What  if  the  idea  of  the 
sacredness  of  the  moral  code  then  in  existence  had  been 
successfully  enforced  in  the  time  of  Socrates,  Buddha, 
Christ,  Luther,  W^esley,  even  of  Emerson  ?  The  moral- 
ists who  would  forbid  a  perfectly  free  discussion  of 
such  topics  as  Mr.  Bernard  Shaw's  plays  deal  with 
are  concerned  first  of  all  with  the  welfare  of  modern 
democracy.  They  do  not  discuss  literary  art ;  they 
merely  aim  to  defend  democracy  against  a  too  free  art. 

Our  conclusion  is  this :  The  Anglo-Saxon  point  of 
view  is  right  in  that  it  takes  into  consideration  our 

^  One  might  answer  that  these  are  not  necessary  results  of  modern 
conceptions.  This  is  perhaps  true ;  but  then,  let  other  social  systems 
have  the  benefit  of  this  argument.  The  cruelty  of  masters,  for  instance, 
is  not  a  necessary  result  of  slavery;  in  fact  everybody  agrees  that 
many  slave  owners  were  excellent  masters.  Yet  even  though  they 
were  all  good  masters,  no  one  would  be  in  favor  of  slavery  again.  The 
same  holds  good  in  other  cases. 

18 


274  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

modern  social  ideals,  and  wrong  in  that  it  does  not 
take  art  into  consideration.  The  problem  is  not  solved ; 
one  of  its  elements  is  simply  denied  recognition. 

We  need  not  explain  at  length  the  Latin  point  of 
view,  since  it  is  exactly  the  reverse  of  the  Anglo-Saxon. 
The  French  seems  to  care  nothing,  or  very  little,  about 
the  immediate  consequences  of  theories  expressed  in 
works  of  art  which  are  within  reach  of  the  general 
public.  They  act  as  if  the  mediocre-minded  masses 
did  not  exist  at  all,  or  as  if  they  ought  to  be  at  least 
wise  enough  to  leave  alone  what  they  cannot  under- 
stand. Therefore,  if  an  author  has  some  valuable  idea 
to  propose,  whatever  it  may  be,  he  expresses  it  regard- 
less of  consequences,  the  result  being  that  it  may  do 
a  great  deal  of  harm;  for  some  will  twist  ideas,  or 
quote  an  author  to  justify  their  greed,  their  lust,  their 
passions. 

While  the  Anglo-Saxon  point  of  view,  as  we  have 
seen,  safeguards  public  morality  at  the  expense  of 
freedom  of  art  and  of  thought,  the  French  point  of 
view,  z-'ice  versa,  safeguards  freedom  of  thought,  some- 
times at  the  expense  of  public  morality. 

When  once  this  truth  has  been  fully  grasped  with 
its  logical  consequences  in  practical  life,  the  contention 
made  in  our  introductory  remarks  can  hardly  be  denied, 
namely,  that  the  two  points  of  view  are  irreducible,  at 
least  as  long  as  the  supporters  of  either  remain  consis- 
tent ;  for,  either  you  take  the  ground  that  views  which 
are  socially  dangerous  should  be  suppressed,  or  you 
recognize  the  rights  of  free  thought  as  more  impor- 
tant than  any  moral  harm  which  may  result  from  the 
expression  of  such   views.     In  the  former  case  you 


LITERATURE   AND    MORAL    CODE        275 

necessarily  limit  the  freedom  of  literature,  in  the  latter 
you  disregard  the  welfare  of  modern  democracy. 

But  why  is  it  so?  How  is  it  that  two  countries 
should  adopt  such  widely  different  attitudes  in  their 
conception  of  art? 

The  kind  of  literature  produced  will  depend  greatly, 
as  we  have  seen,  upon  what  the  reading  public  want; 
and  where  there  are  wide  contrasts  in  culture,  educa- 
tion, and  social  conditions,  the  public  must  be  different. 
It  is  futile  to  criticize  authors  from  an  abstract  point 
of  view ;  their  works  should  be  judged  with  reference 
to  the  special  public  for  which  they  were  written. 

Now  in  comparing,  for  instance,  two  countries  like 
America  and  France,  one  will  be  struck  by  this  essen- 
tial difference :  in  America  there  is  held  to  be  only  one 
general  public,  while  in  France  this  unity  does  not 
exist;  there  is  more  than  one  public.  It  is  true  that 
before  the  Revolution  there  was  only  one  public  for 
literature,  namely,  the  cultivated  public;  the  mass  of 
the  people  did  not  even  know  how  to  read  or  write. 
But  after  the  Revolution  conditions  changed;  democ- 
racy soon  created  a  demand  for  popular  literature  and 
it  was  supplied.  At  the  same  time  many  authors 
(Stendthal,  Merimee,  and  others)  objected  to  lowering 
literature  to  the  level  of  social  democracy,  keeping  up 
the  traditions  of  a  literature  for  an  intellectual  aris- 
tocracy. The  struggle  continued  all  through  the  nine- 
teenth century  (think  of  men  like  Baudelaire,  Barbey 
d'Aurevilly,  Flaubert,  Leconte  de  ITsle,  Villiers  de 
ITsle  Adam).  Even  after  the  democratic  ideals  had 
conquered  in  political  and  social  life,  a  strong  protest 
was  made  against  their  acceptance  in  literature,  the 
group  of  authors   known  as   "  Symbolists ''   proving 


276  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

especially  fierce  in  their  attacks  against  the  invasion 
of  the  bourgeois  spirit.  Their  efforts  have  not  been  in 
vain ;  as  a  consequence,  there  are  still  in  France  two 
literatures :  the  old,  traditional,  artistic  literature  which 
requires  culture  on  the  part  of  the  reader;  and  popu- 
lar literature.^  Writers  are  not  compelled  to  strike 
the  unhappy  medium  of  mediocrity  and  remain  within 
the  reach  of  all  classes  in  order  to  find  readers.  They 
generally  choose  at  the  beginning  of  their  careers  either 
to  write  "  up  "  or  ''  down."  A  sufficient  amount  of 
literature  is  supplied  fitted  for  the  masses  (exciting 
slum  stories  like  de  Kock's,  fighting  stories  like  "  The 
Three  Musketeers,"  love  stories  like  "  L'Abbe  Con- 
stantin  ")  ;  and  others  who  approach  a  subject  seriously 
and  treat  it  thoroughly  have  another  public  that  under- 
stands them ;  of  course,  a  rather  small  public,  the 
truly  educated  public. 

There  are  a  few  sporadic  cases  of  authors  of  the 
higher  type  who  are  read  also  by  the  general  public,  as, 
e.  g.,  Zola  and  Maupassant,  whose  art  in  telling  stories 
can  be  thoroughly  enjoyed  by  people  who  do  not  in 
the  least  care  for,  or  understand  their  philosophy,  just 
as  the  fables  of  La  Fontaine  are  enjoyed  both  by  chil- 
dren and  by  the  deepest  thinkers.  Another  exceptional 
case  is  Victor  Hugo;  on  the  one  hand  his  philosophy 
is  commonplace,  and  on  this  account  he  is  very  popular 
with  the  masses  while  very  much  despised  by  profes- 
sional critics;  but  on  the  other  hand  his  admirable 
mastery  of  the  French  tongue  wins  praise  even  from 
the  most  exacting  readers. 

*  I  have  given  a  short  sketch  of  the  history  of  this  struggle  between 
the  two  literatures  in  France  since  the  time  of  the  French  Revolution 
up  to  our  own  day  in  an  article  in  The  Bookman  (New  York), 
November,  1902. 


LITERATURE   AND    MORAL    CODE        277 

If  one  comes  to  look  at  things  from  this  standpoint, 
and  regards  the  public,  not  as  a  kind  of  neutral  entity, 
but  as  a  living  agent  which  responds  to  literature  and 
art  according  to  different  degrees  of  culture  and  intel- 
lectual attainment,  the  whole  problem  is  transformed. 
The  question  cannot  be  settled  once  for  all  from  a 
merely  theoretical  point  of  view  and  sub  specie  aeter- 
natis;  the  truth  is  that  a  work  of  art  —  novel,  drama, 
painting,  etc.  —  may  be  considered  excellent  in  one 
country  and  bad  in  another,  and  may  be  judged  in  like 
manner  with  reference  to  two  different  publics  in  the 
same  country.  The  famous  words  of  Pascal,  "  Verite 
en  dega  des  Pyrenees,  erreur  au  dela,"  cannot  yet  be 
used  in  a  purely  ironical  sense;  they  express  actual 
condition. 

We  are  not  then  surprised  at  the  attitude  taken  in 
regard  to  French  literature  or  to  the  writings  of  Ber- 
nard Shaw  by  the  majority  of  moralists  in  America; 
they  read  French  authors  and  judge  them  bad  because 
their  books  are  not  suited  for  the  general  American 
public,  especially  for  the  masses.  But  in  France  the 
educated  portion  of  society  forms  a  separate  circle 
which  allows  not  only  the  treatment  of  topics  that 
would  be  objectionable  for  the  masses,  but  a  treatment 
of  them  from  another  than  the  conventional  point  of 
view. 

When  one  remembers  that  nearly  all  the  orthodox 
views  of  to-day  were  once  heterodox,  it  may  easily 
follow  that  the  moral  standards  held  at  present  will 
in  time  give  place  to  others.  Nev/  conceptions  work 
slowly ;  but  ideas  advanced  by  the  educated  strata 
of  society  gradually  filter  down  to  the  uneducated. 
Therefore,    in   the   writer's   opinion,   an   "  aristocratic 


278  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

intellectuelle "  is  necessary,  and  in  the  long  run  will 
contribute  to  the  general  welfare. 

The  Anglo-Saxons,  in  trying  to  keep  from  the 
masses  ideas  which  are  not  easily  understood,  admit 
the  existence  of  a  sphere  of  thought  above  the  compre- 
hension of  the  general  public.  They  thereby  concede 
the  value  of  an  independent  elite.  It  is  remarkable 
that  they  pay  special  attention  to  the  higher  literature 
in  France,  and  write  about  it  in  papers  and  periodicals. 
But  an  unexpected  result  is  that  in  this  way  the  litera- 
ture for  the  elite  in  France  is  brought  before  the  gen- 
eral public  in  America  —  for  which  it  was  not  intended 
and  is  not  suitable.  Hence  the  severe  judgments,  from 
a  moral  point  of  view,  which  are  passed  upon  prod- 
ucts of  French  literature.  Such  criticisms  would  be 
right  only  if  these  works  had  been  meant  for  the 
general  public. 

From  what  has  been  said,  it  appears  that  really  good 
writers  in  France,  because  of  their  freedom  to  deal 
with  all  subjects  —  even  with  those  that  touch  the  most 
questionable  social  relations  —  are  because  of  their 
freedom,  in  an  unusually  favorable  position  as  com- 
pared with  writers  of  some  other  countries.  Among 
American  authors,  for  instance,  literary  art,  to  its  dis- 
advantage, is  confined  to  narrower  limits.  But  can  it 
be  expected  that  the  favorable  conditions  that  prevail  in 
France  will  continue  ?  French  authors  have  been  com- 
plaining bitterly  in  recent  years  of  the  forced  "  demo- 
cratization "  of  literature  and  art  —  but  especially  of 
literature  —  that  is  following  closely  upon  the  triumph 
of  democracy  in  social  life.  Many  have  gone  so  far 
as  to  deny  the  blessings  of  democracy  because  they 
see  in  the  modern  conceptions  of  life  the  doom  of  their 


LITERATURE   AND   MORAL   CODE        279 

artistic  ideals,  and  they  are  unwilling  to  pay  that  price 
for  social  progress.  To  them  there  is  a  real  incom- 
patibility between  art  and  democracy.  In  the  writer's 
opinion,  however,  these  protests  are  useless ;  to  try  and 
stop  the  formidable  wave  of  democracy  is  to  build  a 
wall  of  sand  against  the  tides  of  the  ocean.  Renan, 
who  was  much  concerned  with  this  problem,  struck 
what  seems  to  be  the  most  reasonable  attitude.  He 
pointed  out  how  idle  was  the  attempt  to  oppose  the 
inevitable.  He  thought  that  the  modern  social  evolu- 
tion should  be  allowed  to  pursue  its  course  without 
interference.  As  for  the  few  incorrigible  social  dream- 
ers and  literary  idealists,  he  said  they  should  try  to 
be  content  without  endeavoring  to  convert  the  world 
to  their  views.  If  they  would  leave  the  world  alone 
they  would  be  left  alone  in  their  turn,  and  might  be 
much  happier  in  their  solitude  than  they  think. 

In  this  resignation  advocated  by  Renan  there  is,  no 
doubt,  a  note  of  deep  pessimism.  One  may  neverthe- 
less take  a  more  hopeful  view.  Alongside  of  the 
growth  of  democracy,  another  tendency,  directly 
springing  from  it,  is  gaining  ground  every  day,  namely, 
cosmopolitanism,  and  in  the  effects  of  this  tendency  will 
surely  be  felt  in  the  higher  spheres  of  life  as  elsewhere. 
The  educated  classes  of  different  countries  instead  of 
each  remaining  almost  completely  isolated  should  come 
into  closer  relations  and  understanding  and  assert  their 
vitality  and  permanence  in  the  moral  leadership  of  the 
world.  In  fact,  signs  are  not  lacking  which  indicate 
a  slow  movement  in  that  direction. 


APPENDIX   C 
COMMON    SENSE   AND   PHILOSOPHY* 

"Per  gemeine  Ver stand  hat  in  Sachen  der  Philosophic  gar  keine 
Anspruche,  als die  welche  jeder  Gegenstand  der  Untersuchung 
hat  volkommen  erkl'drt  zu  werden.  Es  ist  nicht  etwa  darum  zu 
thun,  zu  beweisen  dass  wahr  sei  was  er  fur  wahr  halt,  son- 
dern  nur  darum  die  Unvermeidlichkeit  seiner  Tduschungen 
aufzudecken." — Schelling  (System  des  Transcendentalen 
Idealismus). 

Philosophy,   abandoned   for   "common  sense,"   partly  because 
some  think  we  ought  to  put  thought  on  the  level  of  a  demo- 

^  These  pages,  written  in  1897  as  an  opening  speech  to  a  course  of 
lectures  upon  the  History  of  Positivism  before  the  "  Faculte  des 
lettres  "  of  the  University  of  Neuchatel,  Switzerland  (and  published 
in  the  Revue  Philosophigue,  Jan.,  1900),  will  not  be  out  of  place  in 
this  volume. 

I  had  just  ended  my  studies;  had  sought  to  come  in  contact  with 
the  great  representatives  of  science  of  to-day,  and  it  seemed  to  me  that 
philosophy  was  hesitating  to  face  the  problems  with  which  circum- 
stances made  it  imperative  for  it  to  grapple;  that  it  was  seeking 
excuses  not  to  follow^  out  the  route  which  it  was  incumbent  upon  it  to 
follow.  A  new  eclecticism  seemed  to  me  to  be  looming  up  menac- 
ingly on  the  horizon,  not,  as  three  quarters  of  a  century  ago,  to  react 
against  the  great  transcendental  systems  of  the  German  thinkers, 
but  to  set  itself  m  opposition  to  the  invasion  of  the  scientific  spirit. 
I  had  taken  a  stand  in  opposition  to  this  attitude  of  reserve,  this  timid 
reaction  in  the  name  of  common  sense  against  the  new  spirit.  But 
I  hardly  suspected  that  at  the  very  moment  when  I  was  writing  this 
inaugural  lecture  in  a  small  university  city  of  French  Switzerland, 
William  James  —  whom  I  had  learned  to  know  as  the  author  of 
Psychology  —  was  beginning  to  give  shape  to  the  essays  of  his  volume, 
The  Will  to  Believe,  the  first  step  toward  the  pragmatism  of  to-day, 
and  that  "pluralism,"  a  philosophic  conception  allied  to  eclecticism, 


COMMON   SENSE   AND    PHILOSOPHY     281 

cratic  public  and  partly  because  scholars  wish  to  protest 
against  the  old  metaphysics. 

I.  Vanity  of  common  sense  trying  to  solve  questions  that  belong 
to  the  sphere  of  science,  such  as  the  animal  origin  of  man. 
Common  sense  denpng  facts  (unconscious  reasoning) ;  de- 
claring the  true  to  be  absurd  (rotundity  of  the  earth) ;  con- 
tradicting itself  (notion  of  space ;  relations  of  cause  and  effect). 

n.  Common  sense  facing  vital  problems:  the  problem  of  evil; 
problem  of  the  di\ine  love. 

III.  Absurdities  promulgated  by  common  sense  in  the  history 
of  human  thought.  Common  sense  offers  practical  and  pro- 
visional solutions  of  the  problems  presented  to  man;  these 
different  solutions  contradict  one  another;  common  sense 
never  co-ordinates  them;  a  grotesque  philosophical  chaos 
results  from  such  attempts.  If  common  sense  sufficed  to 
solve  the  problems,  it  would  never  have  been  necessary  for 
philosophy  to  be  born.  Common  sense  will  constantly  sug- 
gest new  problems  while  putting  in  line  incoherent  answers, 
but  never  solve  any  of  them. 

rV.  Error  of  the  philosophers  of  the  common  sense  method,  — 
namely,  that  the  same  one  that  does  not  know  and  asks 
(common  sense)  is  the  one  that  professes  to  answer,  hence 
to  know.  Solution  of  the  difficulty:  common  sense  asks  a 
reply  from  science ;  philosophy  appeals  from  poorly  informed 
reason  to  better  informed  reason.  Philosophy  effects  a 
synthesis  of  the  results  of  science  by  verifying  the  results 
reached  by  learned  men  in  the  different  departments  of  in- 
quiry, and  by  comparing  them  with  each  other;  and  little 
by  little  building  them  up  into  a  complete  system  of  knowl- 

was  going  to  be  systematically  formulated  by  a  man  of  such  soaring 
power  and  breadth  of  wing. 

But  it  appears  that  my  unpretending  manifesto,  the  work  of  a 
young  professor,  was  a  refutation  of  pragmatism  in  advance;  for 
pragmatism  is  the  philosophy  of  common  sense.  Let  me  add  that 
certain  arguments  that  I  could  not  allow  myself  to  make  in  chapters 
referring  to  the  concrete  affirmations  of  William  James  and  other 
members  of  his  school,  I  would  naturally  offer  them  at  that  former 
occasion,  and  that  therefore  Common  Sense  and  Philosophy  is  both  a 
complement  of  the  preceding  pages  and  a  resume  of  the  main  problem 
broached  in  this  volume. 


282  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

edge;  being  furthermore  aware  to-day  of  the  limits  of  the 
human  reason,  it  no  longer  shows  a  tendency  to  rise  into 
the  sphere  of  metaphysics. 

Philosophy,  as  an  object  of  independent  study,  is 
passing  through  a  critical  period  of  neglect.  It  is  not 
even  attacked  any  more.  It  is  barely  discussed  now 
and  then.  It  is  laid  aside  like  an  old  sword.  Even  the 
name  of  it  is  not  always  respected.  Thus  in  America, 
where  at  first,  in  accordance  with  English  usage,  phi- 
losophy signified  natural  science,  the  word  is  reserved 
now  for  metaphysics;  philosophers  there  are  the  kind 
of  people  who  occupy  themselves  with  insoluble  and 
empty  problems,  or  people  who  balance  the  world  on 
the  point  of  a  pin,  or,  may  be,  theologians.  To  call  a 
psychologist  a  philosopher  is  almost  an  insult. 

What  has  happened?  For  ages  past  men  have  ad- 
dressed themselves  to  philosophy  for  the  solution  of 
the  problems  that  lay  nearest  their  hearts ;  how  is  it 
that  they  suddenly  profess  they  can  do  without  it? 
The  object  of  philosophy  has  been  much  discussed; 
yet,  in  a  general  way,  all  admit  that  it  seeks  to  intro- 
duce unity  into  our  knowledge  and  our  ideas.  Now, 
there  have  never  before  been  so  many  branches  of 
knowledge  and  so  many  ideas  requiring  to  be  co- 
ordinated and  subordinated  the  one  to  the  other,  as  at 
the  present  time.  The  scientists,  busied  with  their  spe- 
cialties, rarely  trouble  themselves  about  this.  As 
Comte  and  Mill  have  already  said,  the  specialization 
of  work  produces,  in  this  respect,  effects  that  are  to  be 
regretted.  Imagine  a  young  student  of  our  days  face  to 
face  with  the  jumbled  and  confused  edifice  of  science. 
Leaving  a  course  in  theology,  in  which  he  has  heard  the 
Children  of  Israel  spoken  of  according  to  the  tradi- 


COMMON   SENSE   AND    PHILOSOPHY     283 

tional  chronology  which  places  the  origin  of  the  world 
at  five  or  six  thousand  years  before  Christ,  he  next 
attends  a  course  on  geology,  and  there  learns  that  the 
epoch  of  the  origin  of  the  world  must  be  carried  back 
millions  of  years ;  and,  finally,  at  a  course  in  anthro- 
pology he  learns  that  the  appearance  of  man  himself 
upon  the  earth  ought  probably  to  be  placed  a  million 
years  back.  In  a  laboratory  of  chemistry  they  have 
told  him  that  the  world  is  composed  —  or,  for  the  pur- 
poses of  science,  must  be  conceived  as  being  composed 
—  of  elements  infinitely  small;  then  in  a  course  on 
philosophy  or  logic  it  is  proved  to  him  in  the  most 
unequivocal  way  that  the  infinitely  small,  as  well  as  the 
infinitely  great,  is  inconceivable  or  unthinkable.  A 
spiritualistic  psychologist  sets  forth  and  develops  the 
idea  of  the  superiority  of  mind,  which  dominates  the 
body  and  rules  it  as  it  pleases :  emotion  takes  posses- 
sion of  us,  the  body  sheds  tears;  the  intellect  decides 
that  such  or  such  an  action  is  expedient,  the  will  inter- 
venes and  the  body  obeys  its  orders.  But  a  physiolo- 
gist comes  along  and  proves  that  a  man  gifted  with  a 
large  brain,  or  a  brain  creased  with  many  crinkled  con- 
volutions is  more  intelligent  than  a  man  with  a  small 
brain  or  a  brain  slightly  fretted  with  grooves ;  that  a 
man  whose  body  contains  a  certain  quantity  of  alcohol 
suddenly  loses  his  reason ;  that  a  woman  who  has  no 
bust  and  little  hair  has  an  irresistible  proneness  to 
lubricity;  that  a  man  who  has  passed  into  the  condi- 
tion of  a  eunuch  becomes  a  woman  in  character  —  in 
short,  that  there  are  no  inner  states  of  man  that  are 
not  the  echo  of  a  physical  state.  Again,  a  professor 
of  history  points  out  the  influence  of  great  individu- 
alities upon  the  course  of  human  affairs,  either  dedi- 


284  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

eating  a  kind  of  worship  to  these  providential  arrivals 
on  the  planet,  such  as  Carlyle  or  Comte,  or  else  cursing 
them,  as  Proudhon  did  Napoleon  I,  or  even  recon- 
structing history,  like  Renouvier  in  his  Ouchronie; 
but  then  at  the  same  time  an  ethnologist  or  a  sociolo- 
gist affirms  that  the  great  personalities  of  history  are 
only  the  children  of  circumstances,  that  chance  favored 
their  greatness.  —  And  so  one  might  go  on  a  long  time 
multiplying  illustrations  like  these  and  showing  that 
efforts  the  objects  of  which  should  be  to  convert  this 
chaos  into  order  would  be  far  from  useless,  and  that 
never  have  men  had  so  great  need  of  philosophy  as 
to-day. 

It  is  quite  true  that  it  is  just  this  state  of  things  that 
has  caused  discouragement  in  many.  Amid  so  many 
divergent  opinions,  and  data  contradicting  the  reason 
itself,  how  open  up  a  road  to  the  truth  ?  Yet  men  will 
never  willingly  remain  in  doubt,  or  at  least  only  a  very 
small  minority  could  endure  such  a  state.  Our  mind 
is  so  constituted  that  it  will  invent  solutions  rather  than 
stand  before  an  open  problem.  Besides,  the  old 
dilemma  of  Aristotle  is  the  echo  of  a  voice  that  makes 
itself  heard  in  every  person  who  thinks :  "  If  we  must 
philosophize,  why  then,  we  must  philosophize;  if  we 
ought  not  to  philosophize,  we  must  still  philosophize 
(to  demonstrate  it)  ;  so  we  must  always  philosophize." 
If,  then,  scepticism  is  the  attribute  of  very  few  men, 
what  is  it  that  has  taken  the  place  of  philosophy?  I 
answer  without  circumlocution,  it  is  that  vague  thing 
called  ''  common  sense,"  which  to-day  enjoys  the 
authority  formerly  vested  in  the  greatest  geniuses  of 
humanity  alone ;  it  is  supposed  that  the  reply  to  so 
many  questions,  which  is  often  sought  for  in  regions 


COMMON   SENSE   AND    PHILOSOPHY     285 

remote  and  often  inaccessible,  is  not  so  very  far  from 
us;  it  must  be  within  us.  Let  us  only  not  stifle  our 
reason  beneath  subtleties  and  sophisms  and  it  will 
spontaneously  offer  us  a  means  of  remedying  the  con- 
fusion and  embarrassment  that  philosophers  have  cre- 
ated by  strewing  the  ground  with  the  debris  of  former 
thoughts  and  beliefs. 

The  idea  of  appealing  to  common  sense  is  not  a  new 
one.  Socrates  did  so  for  the  sake  of  disabusing  the 
Athenians  of  their  errors ;  and  after  him  the  Sophists 
did  the  same.  Yet  it  was  for  them  a  defensive  weapon ; 
they  did  not  make  use  of  it  so  much  for  the  purpose  of 
constructing  a  philosophy  as  for  ruining  one  that 
seemed  to  them  bad.  With  certain  Encyclopaedists 
(Voltaire  at  their  head),  the  Scotch  and  the  Eclectics 
in  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries,  it  is  differ- 
ent. Common  sense  is  by  them  clearly  and,  so  to 
speak,  officially  declared  to  be  the  source  of  truth.  An 
article  by  Jouffroy  (in  his  Melanges)  bears  this  very 
term  as  title.  And  to-day  (a  still  more  remarkable 
spectacle)  we  see  philistine  and  savant  wearing  the 
same  caps.  Of  course,  it  is  not  exactly  the  same  kind 
of  motives  that  inspire  these  two  classes  of  persons. 
One  class  replaces  philosophy  by  common  sense  be- 
cause, in  our  democratic  age,  they  experience  the  need 
of  bringing  down  to  their  level  what  they  have  been 
persuaded  is  accessible  to  all ;  the  other  works  by  re- 
action —  explicable  in  some  degree,  but  nevertheless 
fatal  —  against  a  certain  philosophic  temper  that  mani- 
fested itself  in  an  epoch  relatively  near  our  own. 

My  aim  in  these  pages  is  to  set  myself  against  this 
dethronement  of  philosophy,  and  to  protest  against  a 
misunderstanding  that  authorizes  any  kind  of  a  person 


286  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

to  set  up  as  an  impromptu  philosopher  by  arming  him- 
self with  common  sense,  like  Don  Quixote  of  old  with 
his  pasteboard  helmet.  I  believe  the  enemy  to  be  more 
dangerous  than  he  appears.  If  some  of  my  reasonings 
seem  a  little  too  unsophisticated  to  appear  here,  my 
hearers  will  pardon  me  when  they  reflect  that  common 
sense  cannot  be  better  refuted  than  by  common  sense 
itself. 


Common  sense,  left  to  itself,  settles  nothing. 

In  the  first  place,  there  are  cases  in  which  the  ques- 
tion is  solely  one  of  facts;  and  here  it  is  not  even 
necessary  to  give  examples.  Thus,  as  far  as  relates 
to  discussions  on  the  age  of  the  globe  we  inhabit,  or 
the  age  of  the  human  race,  it  is  evident  that  no  one 
can  dream  of  solving  such  problems  by  common  sense 
alone.  They  are  questions  of  science;  we  either 
know  or  do  not  know.  Yet  it  would  be  a  mistake  to 
think  that  common  sense  has  never  shown  a  desire 
to  intermeddle  in  the  fields  of  pure  science:  have  we 
not  all  heard  of  very  respectable  people  disposed  to 
reject  in  the  name  of  "  common  sense  "  the  somewhat 
disconcerting  assertion  that  man  is  descended  from  the 
lower  animals? 

There  are  questions  in  which  the  futility  of  such  an 
attitude  is  still  more  manifest  and  yet  in  which  com- 
mon sense  has  been  made  to  intervene,  such  as  the 
why  and  wherefore  of  the  laws  of  nature.  For  ex- 
ample here  is  the  law  of  inertia  in  physics.  It  states 
that  movement  takes  place,  first,  in  a  straight  line,  and 
secondly,  at  a  uniform  rate  of  speed.    Now  (says  com- 


COMMON   SENSE    AND   PHILOSOPHY      287 

mon  sense)  if  movement  takes  place  in  a  straight  line, 
it  is  because  the  moving  object,  not  having  any  reason 
to  deviate  to  one  side  or  the  other,  naturally  keeps  on 
its  way  in  a  straight  line.  Yet  the  insufficiency  of  this 
professed  explanation  appears  at  the  first  glance.  In  the 
first  place,  how  do  we  know  whether  or  not  the  moving 
object  has  a  reason  for  deviating;  and,  secondly,  even 
if  it  were  proved  that  it  has  no  reason  for  deviating, 
has  it,  by  the  same  token,  any  more  reason  for  going 
in  a  straight  line  ?  A  man  who  is  walking  without  any 
other  end  than  that  of  walking,  finds  himself  con- 
fronted by  three  roads,  one  in  front  of  him,  one  to  the 
right  and  one  to  the  left.  If  he  has  no  motive  for 
taking  the  right  hand  road  or  the  left,  does  it  there- 
fore follow  that  he  has  one  for  taking  the  road  that 
faces  him?  None  —  or  at  the  most  that  of  not  want- 
ing to  take  the  trouble  to  turn  to  the  right  or  the  left : 
but  this  is  just  verifying  the  law  of  inertia,  not  ex- 
plaining it.  The  existence  of  the  law  of  inertia  is  a 
matter  of  observation,  and  the  desire  to  account  for 
it  by  common  sense  is  illusory.  The  best  proof  of  it 
is  that  before  Kepler  had  laid  down  this  law,  the  con- 
tinuation in  a  straight  line  of  a  moving  object  was  by 
no  means  admitted  to  be  natural  a  priori.  On  the 
contrary,  Aristotle  deemed  the  circle  to  be  the  simplest 
and  most  perfect  line ;  hence  his  individual  common 
sense  —  which  v;as  certainly  not  a  mediocre  one  —  told 
him  that  normal  motion  was  circular  motion ;  and  the 
geometers  of  to-day  are  on  Aristotle's  side.^ 

^  Hobbes  was  still  uncertain  whether  the  straight  line  or  the  curved 
line  is  the  line  of  normal  motion  (cf.  Tonnies:  Hobbes,  Leben  und 
Lehre,  p.  139).  The  symbolic  role  played  by  the  circle  and  the  sphere 
in  Frobel's  system  is  well  known.    With  him  the  sphere  is  the  symbol 


28S  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

The  same  is  true  of  the  second  part  of  the  law,  uni- 
form movement. 

Hence  common  sense  plays  a  very  silly  role  when  it 
professes  to  account  for  facts  that  we  can  only  accept 
such  as  nature  presents  them  to  us. 

There  are  phenomena  in  the  presence  of  which  com- 
mon sense  realizes  its  own  insufficiency ;  but  as  the 
confession  would  cost  it  dear,  it  executes  a  flank  move- 
ment around  the  difficulty.  The  duly  authenticated 
facts  are  simply  denied,  such  as,  for  instance  (in  psy- 
chology), unconscious  or  subconscious  thought  and 
reasoning.  Indeed,  the  devotee  of  common  sense  im- 
agined to  turn  into  ridicule  this  latest  "  discovery,"  or 
to  excommunicate  it  ex  cathedra  out  of  science.  And 
yet  it  is  clearly  ascertained  that  we  often  think  and 
reason  without  knowing  it.  People  have  fallen  foul 
of  a  word:  to  reason  (they  say)  presupposes  con- 
sciousness, and  to  reason  without  knowing  it  is  an 
absurd  and  contradictory  notion.  They  don't  see  that 
in  saying  this  they  are  affirming  what  is  precisely  the 
point  at  issue.  They  claim  that  the  ability  to  reason 
pertains  solely  to  the  conscious  mind;  they  do  not 
prove  it.  It  has  become  almost  a  commonplace  thing 
to  allude  to  the  convincing  experiments  upon  hypno- 
tized or  anaesthetized  persons;  but  let  us  mention 
briefly  two  of  the  most  striking. 

A  person  is  trying  to  think  of  a  word  very  familiar 
to  him  but  which  he  cannot  at  the  moment  recall.  He 
has  one  arm  anaesthetized ;  I  mean  by  that  everything 
that  takes  place  in  that  arm  is  foreign  to  the  conscious- 
ness.    During  the  investigation  you  slip  a  pencil  into 

of  unity;    the  child  must  begin  by  playing  with  a  ball;    the  cube, 
which  succeeds  the  ball,  is  the  symbol  of  diversity  in  unity. 


COMMON   SENSE   AND   PHILOSOPHY     2S9 

the  anaesthetized  hand ;  the  hand  will  write  the  word 
that  is  sought;  when  placed  before  the  eyes  of  the 
subject  he  will  immediately  recognize  it. 

Another  example  will  show  us  that  not  only  do  we 
think  unconsciously,  but  that  our  intellect  actually 
works  without  our  suspecting  it.  Conceal  the  anaes- 
thetized hand  behind  a  screen,  and  by  guiding  it,  cause 
it  to  write  down  figures  in  a  column  as  if  for  addition. 
The  conscious  subject  thus  knows  nothing  of  the  fig- 
ures ;  but  ask  him  to  mention  any  number  whatever 
and  he  w411  give  you  for  answer  the  sum  of  the  written 
figures.  What  is  this  if  not  unconscious  calculation? 
The  subject  undoubtedly  performs  a  pretty  compli- 
cated intellectual  operation.  Common  sense  may  pro- 
test as  it  pleases,  it  will  never  make  out  that  what 
exists  does  not  exist.  And  I  do  not  even  mention  the 
post-hypnotic  phenomena,  each  one  of  which  alone 
constitutes  an  irrefutable  proof  of  the  existence  of  our 
ability  to  think  and  will  unconsciously. 

However,  there  is  no  need  of  going  so  far  afield; 
we  can  establish  the  fact  of  unconscious  reasoning 
every  day  and  in  the  case  of  any  person.  Many  mer- 
chants, while  adding  up  their  accounts  with  perfect 
accuracy,  are  thinking  of  all  kinds  of  subjects  besides 
their  figures.  Everyone  who  writes  without  making 
mistakes  in  orthography  applies  incessantly  rules  of 
grammar  of  which  he  is  entirely  unconscious  at  the 
moment  of  writing ;  in  many  cases  you  would  very 
much  embarrass  him  if  you  asked  him  to  state  them. 
In  children  also  one  finds  numbers  of  good  illustra- 
tions. You  set  down  a  rule  of  three :  "  A  merchant 
buys  cloth  for  35  francs,  receiving  for  that  sum  175 
metres;   how  many  metres  will  he  get  for  55  francs?  " 

19 


290  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

The  child  does  not  understand,  and  to  assist  him  you 
propound  a  similar  problem  in  a  simpler  form :  "  If 
you  get  three  apples  for  two  cents,  how  many  will  you 
get  for  four  cents  ?  "  He  replies  at  once,  "  Six."  — 
"  How  did  you  do  it  ?  "  you  then  ask.  Almost  never 
does  the  child  know  how  to  answer.  I  have  tried  this 
experiment  myself  a  hundred  times.  The  child  has 
solved  the  problem,  but  he  does  not  know  how.  We 
call  this  unconscious  reasoning.  A  master  trained  after 
the  tenets  of  the  current  philosophy  of  common  sense 
will  be  vexed,  will  threaten  the  pupil,  punish  him,  for 
not  performing  the  same  operation  with  larger  figures. 
It  is  unjust  for  all  that;  for,  although  the  calculation 
has  positively  been  made,  still  the  child  knows  nothing 
of  the  operations  to  which  he  has  had  recourse;  then 
how  ask  him  to  repeat  them  with  other  figures?^ 

I  pass  now  to  a  class  of  examples  in  which  we  shall 
find  common  sense  showing  still  more  evidently  its 
complete  insufficiency;  it  no  longer  merely  denies  the 
truth,  it  declares  it  to  be  absurd.  No  one  in  this  day 
is  ignorant  of  the  fact  that  the  earth  is  not  the  centre 
of  the  universe,  nor  even  of  the  solar  system,  and  that 
it  is  round  and  inhabited  in  almost  every  part.^  But 
these  facts  fly  in  the  face  of  the  most  elementary  com- 
mon sense.     If  you  explain  clearly  to  the  first  child 

*  A  similar  observation  has  been  made  by  Morgan,  Introduction 
to  Comparative  Psychology,  London  and  New  York,  1896,  p.  229. 
He  solves  the  problem  by  supposing  the  intervention  of  a  marginal 
consciousness.  Apart  from  the  words,  the  point  of  view  of  Morgan 
is  the  same  as  mine. 

^  The  facts  that  militate  against  the  theory  of  Laplace  are  not  to  be 
taken  into  account  here,  for  they  do  not  touch  upon  the  sphericity  of 
the  terrestrial  globe.  See  a  few  words  on  these  objections  in  Certitude 
Logique,  G.  Milhaud,  second  ed.,  Paris,  F.  Alcan,  1898,  pp.  104-106. 


COMMON   SENSE  AND   PHILOSOPHY     291 

you  meet  the  consequences  of  his  belief,  namely,  that 
at  the  antipodes  men  are  so  situated  that  relatively  to 
us  they  hang  with  head  down  and  feet  up,  the  child 
will  laugh  in  your  face.  It  is  of  no  use  for  you  to 
point  out  that  "  down  "  means  toward  the  centre  of 
the  earth,  and  that  if  you  start  from  there  you  are 
rising  whatever  direction  you  take,  for  the  relative 
position  of  the  body  sticks  in  the  mind,  and  common 
sense  continues  to  rebel  against  the  truth.^  And  let 
me  not  to  be  reproached  for  selecting  the  common  sense 
of  a  child.  Common  sense  is  the  same  everywhere ;  if 
it  were  not  so  it  would  no  longer  be  common  sense. 
Moreover,  I  should  have  no  trouble  in  proving  it  in 
the  elementary  case  we  are  considering: 

"Is  it  possible,"  cries  Lactantius  (one  of  the  Fathers  especially 
hostile  to  philosophers),  "that  men  can  be  absurd  enough  to 
believe  that  the  har\'ests  and  the  trees  hang  downward  in  the 
empty  air  on  the  other  side  of  the  earth  and  that  men's  feet  are 
above  their  heads  ?  If  you  ask  them  how  they  prove  these  mon- 
strous assertions  and  how  it  is  that  objects  do  not  tumble  off 
into  space  on  that  other  side,  they  reply  that  things  are  so  by 
nature,  that  hesivy  bodies  tend  toward  the  centre  (of  the  earth), 
as  the  spokes  of  a  wheel  to  the  hub,  while  light  bodies,  like  clouds, 
smoke,  fire,  tend  from  the  centre  toward  the  sky  in  all  parts.  Now 
really  I  don't  know  what  to  say  of  people  who,  once  they  have 
gone  astray,  obstinately  persevere  in  their  madness,  and  bolster 
up  one  absurd  opinion  by  another." 

This  proves,  then,  that  the  most  serious  common  sense 
can  brand  with  madness  the  most  incontestable  truth. 

*  It  is  interesting  to  know  that  J.  J.  Rousseau  remembered  in  later 
life  having  had  this  very  experience  here  mentioned;  his  father,  he 
says,  tried  in  vain  to  explain  to  him  the  problem  of  the  antipodes. 
(See  Ritter,  Famille  et  Jeunesse  de  J.  J.  Rousseau,  pp.  149-150.) 


292  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

They  could  not  plead  anything  further  than  this  same 
madness,  some  centuries  later,  against  such  men  as 
Columbus,  Vasco  da  Gama  and  Magellan. 

Let  me  here  indulge  further  in  a  short  parenthesis, 
to  the  effect  that  those  who  are  fond  of  appealing  to 
common  sense  against  their  adversaries  find  very  little 
trouble  in  dispensing  with  it  when  the  matter  in  hand 
is  the  establishing  of  their  own  positions.  Thus  Saint 
Augustine,  who  professes  for  the  partisans  of  the 
sphericity  of  the  earth  the  same  scornful  pity  as  Lac- 
tantius,  among  other  arguments  for  the  flatness  of  the 
earth  adds  the  two  following :  "  It  is  impossible  that 
there  are  inhabitants  on  the  other  side  of  the  earth 
since  no  race  among  the  descendants  of  Adam  is  men- 
tioned in  the  Scriptures  as  being  there."  And  besides : 
"  At  the  Judgment  Day  the  men  on  the  other  side  of 
the  globe  could  not  see  the  Lord  descending  through 
the  air." 

Common  sense  has  so  far  explained  nothing,  or  con- 
tradicted the  facts.  I  shall  now  examine  whether  com- 
mon sense  does  not  sometimes  contradict  itself.  If 
it  does  do  so,  then  unless  we  admit  that  truth  itself  is 
contradictory,  or  that  there  are  several  truths  inde- 
pendent one  of  the  other,  we  shall  be  authorized  to 
definitively  reject  the  intrusion  of  common  sense  into 
the  fabric  of  our  knowledge. 

Let  us  apply  our  common  sense  to  the  idea  of  space. 
Space,  considered  as  a  whole,  naturally  comprises  the 
different  parts  of  space.  In  other  words,  add  together 
all  the  parts  of  space  and  you  must  naturally  obtain 
space  in  its  totality.  Suppose,  then,  that  you  estimate 
the  parts  of  space  known  to  you,  and  the  parts  beyond, 


COMMON   SENSE  AND   PHILOSOPHY     293 

in  cubic  feet :  space  will  be  a  fixed  and  precise  whole, 
—  enormous,  if  you  will,  but,  after  all,  a  total  calcu- 
lable (by  figures)  in  cubic  feet;  it  will  be  a  finite 
whole.  I  do  not  claim  that  we  can  measure  it;  but  in 
itself  it  is  measurable.  For  if  you  add  one  to  the  other 
finite  quantities,  you  will  always  obtain  a  new  finite 
quantity.  Suppose,  however,  you  transport  yourself 
to  the  confines  of  this  space,  the  sum  total  of  finite 
spaces,  beyond  it  what  will  you  find  ?  New  space.  Try 
a  second,  a  third  contingent  of  cubic  metres,  you  will 
still  obtain  a  limit  between  two  spaces,  but  not  a  limit 
of  space  —  and  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  think  that  it 
can  ever  be  otherwise.  It  is  your  common  sense  that 
teaches  you  this,  just  as  a  moment  ago  you  said  that 
in  adding  together  finite  parts  of  space  you  would  nec- 
essarily obtain  a  totality  of  space.  So  space  is  finite,  — 
datum  of  common  sense ;  space  is  infinite,  —  datum 
of  common  sense.  The  first  position  has  the  same 
thrust  of  inexorableness  as  the  second,  and  the  second 
as  the  first.  Common  sense  contradicts  common  sense. 
From  this  contradiction,  which  springs  out  of  the 
simple  operations  of  our  mind,  we  get  the  explanation 
of  the  fact,  so  astonishing  at  first  glance,  that  certain 
so-called  sophisms,  put  forth  by  the  philosophers  of 
antiquity,  have  not  yet  been  refuted.  For  example,  the 
celebrated  argument  about  the  hare  and  the  tortoise, 
in  the  writings  of  Zeno.  Before  he  has  got  over  the 
last  half  of  the  space  that  separates  him  from  the  tor- 
toise, the  hare  will  not  have  outstripped  his  rival.  Now 
space,  being  infinitely  divisible,  there  never  will  be  a 
last  half ;  the  remaining  space  will  always  be  divisible 
into  two  parts.  It  is  impossible  to  find  a  sense  more 
"  common "    than    that    which    dictated   this    famous 


294 


ANTI-PRAGMATISM 


speculation  of  Zeno;  and  it  is  only  the  people  who 
think  that  common  sense  is  the  "  open  sesame "  to 
every  problem  who  are  astonished  that,  from  Aristotle 
to  Hegel  (after  whom  no  one  seriously  tried,  unless 
we  admit  as  a  solution  that  proposed  by  M.  Renouvier, 
who  declares  that  what  Kant  called  contradictory  is 
simply  incomprehensible),  no  one  has  succeeded  in 
refuting  Zeno. 

Perhaps  some  one  will  object  that  I  am  exploiting 
regions  of  thought  too  remote  from  reality.  Let  me 
choose,  then,  a  more  concrete  example;  for,  even  in 
the  most  ordinary  phenomena,  common  sense  can  be 
caught  red-handed  in  the  very  act  of  contradiction. 
Every  phenomena  has  a  cause ;  that  is  the  law  of  laws. 
The  cause  precedes  the  effect;  such  is  the  datum  of 
common  sense.  Now  how  can  we  know  which  is  cause 
and  which  is  effect?  Evidently  (still  repHes  common 
sense)  it  only  needs  that  we  see  which  one  of  the  phe- 
nomena precedes;  it  is  the  cause;  the  other,  the  one 
that  follows,  is  the  effect.  I  rub  a  match  on  a  box  pre- 
pared for  the  purpose ;  it  is  lighted ;  I  put  my  finger 
to  the  fire;  I  experience  pain.  From  this  I  conclude 
quite  naturally  that  the  cause  of  the  pain  is  the  fire; 
the  cause  of  the  fire  the  combustion  of  the  match ;  the 
cause  of  the  combustion,  the  chemical  preparation,  etc., 
—  and  not  the  contrary,  that  my  pain  is  the  cause  of 
the  fire,  the  fire  the  cause  of  the  rubbing  of  the  match 
on  the  box,  etc.  It  seems  to  common  sense  that  all  this 
is  so.  But  let  us  take  another  example.  I  am  a  para- 
lytic; I  live  near  enough  to  a  military  ground  to  see 
and  hear  from  my  window  the  manoeuvres  of  the 
soldiers ;  yet  the  distance  is  so  great  that  I  always  see 
the  soldiers  manoeuvre  first  and  only  afterwards  hear 


COMMON  SENSE  AND   PHILOSOPHY     295 

the  command  of  the  officer.  I  therefore  conclude  it 
is  the  manoeuvre  that  is  the  cause,  and  the  voice  of  the 
officer  is  the  effect. 

Then  common  sense  says,  "  Get  yourself  conveyed 
near  to  the  soldiers  and  each  phenomena  will  assume 
its  proper  place." 

''  On  the  contrary,  the  result  will  be  that  my  head 
will  be  completely  bewildered.  Am  I  to  believe  in  the 
way  things  take  place  when  I  am  at  my  window  or 
when  I  am  right  on  the  drill-ground  ?  " 

"  In  the  latter,  because  the  propagation  of  light  is 
more  rapid  than  the  propagation  of  sound." 

"  But  still,  whence  shall  I  derive  the  information  ? 
From  experience,  doubtless.  But  is  it  not  by  experi- 
ence that  I  perceive  that  the  movements  of  the  soldiers 
precede  the  voice  of  the  officer?  Why  should  one 
experience  be  truer  than  another  ?  " 

"  Because  your  experience  is  an  exception,  and  all 
others  in  the  domain  of  physics  invalidate  it.  Return 
home  and  you  perceive  the  movements  of  the  servant 
following  the  orders  of  the  mistress  of  the  house ;  you 
yourself,  if  any  one  asks  a  service  of  you,  consider 
your  action  as  the  effect  and  not  the  cause  of  the  re- 
quest that  has  been  made  of  you." 

"  Granted  again.  But  does  it  never  happen  that 
some  one  speaks  after  having  seen  something,  for  the 
purpose  of  noting  a  fact?  A  person  perceives  a  horse 
passing  and  says,  '  A  horse.'  I  am,  of  course,  allowed 
to  apply  this  to  the  officer  without  spoiling  the  vraisem- 
blance,  and  I  interpret  things  thus:  I  see  the  soldiers 
manoeuvring ;  the  officer  marks  the  evolutions  and  says 
'march!'  'halt!'  'right!'  Meft!'" 

But  enough.    Even  if  it  is  proved  to  me  that  I  am 


296  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

wrong  in  believing  so  naively  in  what  is  only  an  illu- 
sion of  my  senses,  what  has  been  proved  after  all  if  not 
just  this,  that  common  sense  by  itself  is  absolutely  in- 
sufficient to  pass  judgment  upon  phenomena  in  a  sane 
and  accurate  manner  ? 


II 

If  it  be  now  granted  that  there  are  contradiction  in 
the  judgments  of  common  sense,  still  some  one  may 
say  that  after  all  these  petty  contradictions  are  of  little 
importance.  In  such  cases  as  that  of  the  last  illustra- 
tion I  grant  it.  Yet  it  is  always  vexatious  to  see  people 
persist  in  giving  their  confidence  to  a  guide  so  untrust- 
worthy especially  when  they  profess  to  fathom  the 
profoundest  human  problems  in  its  name.  Then  again, 
can  one  be  quite  sure  that  the  consequences  of  the 
errors  prompted  by  common  sense  are  never  danger- 
ous? It  would  be  rather  strange  if  it  were  Hmited  to 
self-deception  in  questions  of  secondary  importance. 
A  continuation  of  the  investigation  I  have  begun  will 
reveal  the  circumstance  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
voice  of  common  sense  may  in  certain  cases  be  singu- 
larly distracting  when  men  trust  themselves  to  it.  Phi- 
losophers are  sometimes  accused  of  flinging  out  into 
the  world  revolutionary  theories.  Let  us  admit  the 
fact;  but  it  is  equally  true  that  in  trusting  ourselves 
to  common  sense  we  shall  reach  conclusions  that  may 
give  points  to  the  most  dangerous  doctrines  that  have 
ever  been  enunciated  by  the  most  daring  speculators. 

It  cannot  be  denied  that  it  is  common  sense  that  lays 
down  the  problem  of  the  freedom  of  the  will,  first 


COMMON   SENSE   AND   PHILOSOPHY     297 

affirming  it  and  then  denying  it  with  irresistible  force. 
Now  it  has  been  shown  profusely  that  this  is  not  a 
question  of  slight  importance.  Even  philosophers  most 
convinced  of  the  truth  of  determinism  have  in  this 
matter  (with  few  exceptions)  made  a  concession  to 
common  sense  by  slipping  freedom  into  their  system 
by  some  secret  door  and  masking  it  more  or  less  skil- 
fully under  the  guise  of  determinism.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  what  becomes  of  ethics?  What  becomes  of  the 
idea  of  responsibility  ?  What  is  sin  ?  —  I  commit  a 
fault,  I  steal ;  why  ?  "  On  account  of  a  propensity  for 
it,"  replies  common  sense.  Whence  do  I  get  this  pro- 
pensity? From  my  character.  And  this  comes  from 
where  ?  "  From  God,"  instantly  replies  common  sense ; 
or  rather,  I  cannot  make  God  responsible  for  my  wicked 
act,  I  get  my  character  from  my  parents  through  hered- 
ity. "  But  whence  do  my  parents  get  it  ?  "  says  com- 
mon sense  once  more.  "  From  their  own  parents  —  " 
and  so  on,  back  as  far  as  the  first  man.  Who  created 
the  first  man?  "God,"  says  common  sense;  or  else 
it  says,  "  Why  did  Adam  sin  ?  Was  he  not  free  not 
to  do  so  ?  "  But  that  is  the  very  question.  God  did 
not  want  him  to  sin,  you  say;  in  that  case  was  it  not 
God's  part  to  create  him  strong  enough  to  resist  the 
temptation?  .  .  .  The  partisans  of  common  sense  may 
well  despair,  but  above  all  let  them  not  forget  to  make 
responsible  for  this  impasse  that  common  sense  which 
they  reproach  philosophers  so  energetically  with  not 
sufficiently  respecting. 

I  have  just  spoken  of  God.  In  our  day  it  is  quite 
often  the  theologians  who  invoke  common  sense  with 
the  most  thorough  conviction.  I  shall  therefore  choose 
a  second  example  in  the   domain   of  religion.     Ac- 


298  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

cording  to  common  s^nse,  God  is  the  being  who  pos- 
sesses the  highest  perfections;  in  one  word  he  is 
Love,  which  means  he  is  good  by  nature,  he  cannot 
help  being  good;  and  if  he  were  not,  we  should  not 
worship  him.  "  But,"  says  common  sense,  replying  to 
itself,  '*  if  God  cannot  help  being  good,  if  he  is  good 
by  nature,  what  merit  is  there  in  that?  or,  rather,  is 
this  any  longer  being  good?  The  sheep  is  also  gentle 
by  nature;  do  we  admire  this  quality  in  it  as  a  merit 
for  which  it  deserves  great  credit?  Or,  inversely,  do 
we  find  the  tiger  to  blame  because  he  is  cruel?  On 
the  contrary;  if  he  were  not  cruel  he  would  not  be  a 
tiger.  Then  what  does  the  divine  goodness  turn  out 
to  be?  Every  one  of  us,  according  to  this  reckoning 
(that  is,  if  we  could  not  possibly  do  any  wrong),  would 
be  the  most  perfect  being  imaginable.  Hence,  also,  if 
we  human  beings  sometimes  do  a  good  act  which  cost 
us  a  good  deal,  we  do  more  than  God,  better  than  God, 
we  are  better  than  he.  —  Who  of  us  has  never  thought 
of  this  ?  It  is  so  simple !  In  this  case  you  forbid  your- 
self to  think  what  you  consider  a  blasphemy.  But  can 
you  do  so  long?  And  if,  in  spite  of  yourself,  these 
thoughts  drift  into  your  mind  anew,  is  it  common  sense 
that  will  banish  them  forever?  No,  because  here 
again  it  is  precisely  common  sense  that  has  introduced 
them  and  given  them  shape. 

Were  they  really  much  inferior  to  our  shallow 
modern  rationalists,  we  ask  ourselves,  —  those  early 
fathers  of  the  Church  when  they  stoutly  affirmed  their 
Credo  etsi  absiirdum,  made  more  emphatic  by  Ter- 
tullian  in  his  credo  quia  ahsurdumf  .  .  .  Mortuus  est 
Dei  Filitis,  credible  est  quia  ineptiim  est;  et  sepultus 
resurrexit,  certum  est  quia  impossible  est?  .  .  . 


COMMON   SENSE  AND   PHILOSOPHY     299 


III 

I  hope,  after  what  precedes,  that  without  fear  of 
being  too  presumptuous,  I  may  venture  to  declare  that 
common  sense  is  incapable  of  solving  the  questions 
we  ask  when  face  to  face  with  reality.  Even  from  my 
illustrations,  and  especially  the  last  ones  I  made  use  of, 
we  may  draw  the  conclusion  that  common  sense,  so  far 
from  solving  problems,  propounds  new  ones,  and  that, 
too,  in  the  clearest  and  most  ineluctable  way.  To  ob- 
stinately persist  in  sticking  to  common  sense  is  to 
condemn  oneself  a  priori  to  dwell  eternally  before  the 
problems  without  ever  becoming  master  of  them.  It 
is  not  common  sense  that  discovered  in  the  sphere  of 
natural  philosophy  that  fire,  water,  earth,  and  air  are 
not  elements,  but  composite  bodies ;  it  is  not  common 
sense  that  discovered  that  the  sun  does  not  revolve 
around  the  earth,  but  that  the  contrary  is  true;  and 
it  is  not  common  sense  that  will  ever  give  an  expla- 
nation of  unconscious  thought;  and,  finally,  it  is  not 
common  sense  that  will  ever  solve  the  old  strangling 
problem  of  free  will,  and  so  many  others  of  a  like  im- 
portance. In  all  these  realms  of  thought  it  is  only 
stupid,  and  neither  Darwin  nor  Lombroso,  nor  even 
Nietzsche,  will  ever  be  refuted  if  we  oppose  to  them 
only  this  everlasting  common  sense.  It  is  indeed  pass- 
ing strange  that  any  one  should  ever  have  conceived 
the  idea  of  appealing  to  it.  What  does  such  an  appeal 
mean  if  not  that  the  reason  of  a  child  or  an  ignorant 
person  is  by  nature  empowered  to  pass  judgment  on 
the  results  of  the  researches  of  all  the  choicest  minds 


300  ANTI-PRAG  MATISM 

that  humanity  has  produced?  For,  what  really  is 
common  sense?  It  is  the  child  that  strikes  the  piece 
of  furniture  against  which  it  has  stumbled;  it  is  the 
savage  who  worships  the  river  that  fertilizes  his  fields, 
or  the  sun  that  ripens  his  crops ;  it  is  the  great  oriental 
monarch  who  scourges  and  fetters  with  chains  the 
ocean  that  has  the  audacity  not  to  comply  with  his 
caprices  as  absolute  autocrat. 

And  if  you  observe  common  sense  at  work  in  the 
domain  of  science,  it  reveals  itself  as  not  less  super- 
ficial. It  is  Anaximmes  who  asserts  that  the  air  is  the 
vital  principle,  for  if  you  place  your  hand  over  a  man's 
mouth  to  hinder  him  from  breathing,  life  departs.  Or 
it  is  Heraclitus  who  claims  that  fire  is  the  funda- 
mental element  of  all  things,  the  dry  state  being  prefer- 
able to  the  humid  state,  as  appears  from  the  fact  that 
a  man  overcome  by  wine  loses  his  reason.  Common 
sense  is  Chrysippus,  the  stoic,  denying  that  the  brain 
is  the  seat  of  the  soul;  it  must  be  the  breast  for  the 
voice  that  gives  outward  expression  to  the  thought, 
issues  from  the  breast  and  not  from  the  head.  It  is 
Epicurus  who  will  have  it  that  the  stars  are  exactly  of 
the  same  size  they  appear  to  be,  on  the  plea  that  if 
distance  diminished  their  size  it  would  also  diminish 
the  intensity  of  the  light.  It  is  the  grave  and  immortal 
Lucretius,  who,  in  order  to  account  for  the  lion's 
fright  at  the  crowing  of  the  cock,  thinks  that,  from  the 
body  of  the  latter  atoms  are  given  off,  which,  entering 
the  lion's  eye,  cause  it  such  acute  pain  that  its  courage 
quails.  It  is  Sextus  Empiricus  who  classes  rats  among 
animals  produced  by  spontaneous  combustion,  because 
they  come  out  of  the  ground ;  so  likewise  frogs  are 
generated  out  of  the  mud,  and  worms  from  the  dung- 


COMMON   SENSE  AND   PHILOSOPHY     301 

heap ;  and,  finally,  bees  are  produced  in  the  same  way 
from  the  carcasses  of  lions  or  from  the  carrion  of 
horses.  Common  sense  is  Pliny,  holding  it  to  be  cer- 
tain that  gold  and  the  diamond,  being  substances  of 
equal  value,  must  be  found  in  the  same  regions  of  the 
earth.  It  is  perchance  Origen,  who  reveres  the  obscur- 
ity of  the  Bible,  the  apostles  having  made  it  so  on  pur- 
pose, "  so  that  studious  men  and  lovers  of  wisdom  who 
should  come  after  them  would  have  to  buckle  hard  to 
their  task  and  find  in  it  the  inspiration  for  their  flashes 
of  genius."  It  is  even  a  Galileo,  who  affirms  that,  if 
water  rises  in  the  pump  it  is  because  nature  abhors  a 
vacuum.  Again  (to  come  down  to  recent  times)  com- 
mon sense  is  pastor  Sack,  of  Berlin,  who  thinks  that  if 
cherries  don't  grow  in  winter  it  is  because  we  don't 
like  them  so  well  in  the  cold  season ;  and  that  if  grapes 
fail  to  ripen  before  autumn  it  is  for  the  reason  that  the 
new  wine  would  be  spoiled  by  the  heat  of  summer.  It 
is  even  Hegel  himself,  who,  having  established  his 
quaternary  system  of  the  planets,  declares  the  earth 
to  be  the  most  perfect  of  the  group  to  which  it  belongs, 
because  it  alone  is  accompanied  by  a  satellite,  etc.,  etc. 
Finally,  as  I  mentioned  at  the  start,  men  have  even 
tried  to  construct  formal  systems  of  philosophy  on 
common  sense.  Reid  and  his  disciples  and  successors 
have  pitiably  failed.  This  was  fairly  to  be  expected. 
If  common  sense  sufficed  to  settle  all  problems,  there 
never  would  have  been  any  philosophy;  there  would 
have  been  no  need  of  it;  problems  bringing  reason 
into  conflict  with  reason  could  never  have  appeared. 
The  mere  fact  of  the  possibility  of  a  philosophy  con- 
demned at  the  very  start  the  strange  undertaking  of 
Reid.     This  accounts  for  the  fact  that  philosophy  of 


302  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

"  common  sense "  was  soon  transformed  into  eclecti- 
cism. It  was  Cousin  in  France  who  bestowed  on  his 
country  this  bastard  thing  which  only  gets  from  phi- 
losophy the  name,  and  the  echoes  of  which  reverberate 
to  this  day  in  books,  possibly  eloquent  books,  but  in 
which  there  is  not  a  spark  of  the  critical  spirit  that  is 
the  father  of  philosophy.  In  fact,  eclecticism  is  the 
philosophy  of  opportunism ;  that  is  to  say,  a  philos- 
ophy which  can  arrive  only  at  casual  truth.  Moral 
freedom  seems  necessary  to  us,  in  order  to  account 
for  the  phenomena  of  the  moral  consciousness,  the 
voice  of  duty  and  the  sentiment  of  responsibility. 
Very  well;  you  affirm  moral  freedom.  But  you  have 
nothing  to  do  with  this  freedom  if  the  matter  in  hand 
is,  for  example,  the  punishing  of  a  wrongdoer;  for 
if  he  is  obliged  (in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word)  to 
preserve  his  freedom  of  choice  in  the  face  of  all  the 
different  motives  to  action  that  present  themselves  to 
his  mind,  the  motives  that  you  adduce  for  his  doing 
right  can  never,  without  clashing  with  your  hypothesis, 
influence  him  more  forcibly  than  any  other.  Hence 
your  work  is  in  vain.  You  may  possibly  punish  an 
individual  for  a  past  fault,  but  can  never  do  anything 
to  prevent  him,  when  given  over  to  his  own  devices, 
from  lapsing  again  into  the  old  fault.  Very  well 
again;  we  will  discuss  subjects  relating  to  the  treat- 
ment of  wrongdoers  (and  in  general  every  question  of 
education)  by  starting  with  the  assumption  of  moral 
determinism. 

The  idea  of  the  finite  is  indispensable  in  science  in 
order  to  conceive  of  physical  phenomena  under  the 
form  of  laws ;  without  this  idea  of  finiteness  any  kind 
of  natural  philosophy  is  impossible.     Hence  the  uni- 


COMMON  SENSE  AND   PHILOSOPHY     303 

verse  must  be  regarded  under  the  concept  of  the  finite. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  metaphysics,  the  infinite  is  the 
first  condition  for  speaking  of  the  absolute;  you  must 
therefore  declare  the  universe  infinite.  To  be  obliged 
to  accept  contradictory  data  —  such  will  undoubtedly 
be  the  fate  of  every  philosophy  which  asks  the  help  of 
common  sense  to  remove  the  difficulties  caused  by  the 
different  notions  or  data  of  plain  reason.  Common 
sense  governs  its  actions  in  accordance  with  the  fac- 
tors that  are  immediately  within  its  scope,  and  exam- 
ines every  problem  on  its  own  merits  and  as  if  it  were 
independent  of  all  the  phenomena  with  which  it  is  not 
directly  connected. 

Common  sense  is  thus  a  kind  of  practical  sense, 
which,  in  every  occurrence,  succeeds  in  narrowing  its 
inquiry  in  order  to  find  a  solution  appropriate  to  the 
special  case.  In  virtue  of  this  it  may  evidently  be  a 
very  useful  thing,  but  it  none  the  less  begets  a  merely 
provisional  philosophy  or  science.  Now  a  perfect  sci- 
ence, a  science  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word,  is  one 
that  takes  account  of  all  the  phenomena  conjointly  and 
simultaneously.  It  cannot  be  restricted  to  certain  phe- 
nomena independently  of  others  without  being  un- 
faithful to  its  mission.  Voltaire,  who  has  all  sorts  of 
good  reasons  for  speaking  respectfully  of  common 
sense,  is  none  the  less  compelled  to  recognize  that  it 
has  not  a  very  profound  intrinsic  value.  "  Common 
sense,"  he  says  in  his  Philosophical  Dictionary,  "  means 
simply  good  sense,  coarse  common  reason,  the  begin- 
ning of  reason,  the  first  notion  of  ordinary  things, 
an  intermediate  state  between  stupidity  and  genius 
{esprit).  'That  man  has  not  common  sense'  is  a 
gross  insult.     '  That  man  has  common  sense '  is  also 


304  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

an  insult;  it  means  that  he  is  not  wholly  stupid  and 
that  he  yet  lacks  what  we  call  esprit." 

We  must  never  forget  three  things : 

First,  that  truth  is  one. 

Second,  that  the  solutions  of  concrete  questions  are 
always  derived  from  the  solutions  of  more  general 
problems.  It  is,  on  the  whole,  a  profound  mistake  of 
the  partisans  of  common  sense  to  pretend  that  they 
appeal  to  common  sense  only :  they  really  appeal  to  a 
superficial  and  confused  science  which  they  have 
acquired,  and  to  which  they  unconsciously  trust. 
Whether  this  science  comes  to  them  from  their  educa- 
tion, their  environment,  or  otherwise,  matters  little. 
Jouffroy,  who  does  not  seem  to  me  to  have  contributed 
much  to  illuminate  the  question,  nevertheless,  in  his 
article  on  the  subject  has  given  this  very  accurate 
definition :  "  Common  sense  is  nothing  more  than  a  col- 
lection of  solutions  of  the  questions  that  trouble  philos- 
ophers; it  is  therefore  another  philosophy  anterior  to 
philosophy  properly  so  called,  inasmuch  as  it  occurs 
spontaneously  in  the  ground-work  of  all  minds,  inde- 
pendently of  any  scientific  research  on  their  part." 
(Melanges,  1838,  p.  145.)  Common  sense,  then,  itself 
speaks  in  the  name  of  this  anterior  philosophy  or  this 
anterior  science.  Hence,  if  it  really  wishes  to  claim 
some  value,  these  foundation  principles  —  which  it 
does  not  establish,  but  takes  for  granted  —  must  them- 
selves be  safe  from  all  criticism.  For  instance,  if  some 
one  asks  us  to  decide  between  two  types  of  men,  as  to 
which  acts  in  accordance  with  truth,  —  the  one  who 
rejoices  at  the  birth  of  a  child  or  the  one  who  in  the 
same  circumstances  laments,  we  shall,  of  course,  decide 
in  accordance  with  common  sense;  but  common  sense 


COMMON  SENSE  AND   PHILOSOPHY     305 

will  itself  reply  according  to  the  reply  to  an  anterior 
problem,  —  the  problem  of  what  life  is  worth,  and 
which  for  yourself  you  consider  as  settled;  and  it  is 
because  you  consider  the  former  as  settled  that  you  can 
reply  to  the  latter  according  to  what  you  call  your 
common  sense;  the  former  problem  being  solved  by 
different  nations  in  a  diametrically  opposite  way,  com- 
mon sense  will  also  produce  opinions  diametrically 
opposite.  Just  so  far,  then,  as  Jouffroy  is  right  in  his 
definition,  so  far  is  he  wrong  when  (in  conformity, 
by  the  way,  to  the  school  to  which  he  belongs)  he 
claims  that  common  sense  and  truth  are  always  iden- 
tical. To  make  this  acceptable,  two  contrary  opinions 
would  have  to  be  true  at  the  same  time. 

Thirdly,  neither  must  we  forget  when  it  is  desired 
to  appeal  to  common  sense,  that,  if  problems  can  be 
separated  theoretically,  it  is  otherwise  with  reality. 
Hence,  so  long  as  you  allow  yourself  to  be  guided  in 
each  special  case,  by  common  sense,  philosophical  con- 
flicts are  inevitable.  Doubtless  you  may  in  one  chap- 
ter on  ethics  develop  the  idea  of  duty  which  calls  for 
the  sacrifice  of  your  happiness,  and,  in  another  the 
idea  that  man  always  seeks  his  own  happiness  and 
always  finds  it  in  the  fulfilling  of  duty.  You  may, 
I  say,  theoretically  solve  the  relations  of  duty  and  hap- 
piness in  these  two  diametrically  opposite  ways.  All 
you  have  to  do  is  to  forget  in  one  chapter  what  you 
have  said  in  another.  But  philosophically  you  cannot 
employ  both  the  principles  at  once.  It  remains  that 
either  duty  is  the  renouncement  of  happiness,  or  that 
duty  is  the  means  of  happiness.  It  is  in  vain  for  you 
to  say  that  there  is  real  happiness  and  imaginary  hap- 
piness;  you  are  forced  to  recognize  that  there  is  only 


3o6  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

one  true  and  it  is  about  that  that  you  must  speak.  In 
the  same  way,  if  you  distinguish  between  temporal 
happiness  and  eternal  happiness,  one  only  is  happiness 
in  the  positive  sense  of  the  word,  and  you  would  con- 
tradict yourself,  if  embodying  two  different  ideas  at 
the  same  time  in  the  same  term,  you  should  adopt  now 
one  meaning  and  now  another,  according  to  the  con- 
venience of  the  discussion.  In  natural  history  it  is 
the  same.  Suppose  you  agree  that  there  is  a  qualita- 
tive difference  between  the  animal  kingdom  and  the 
vegetable  kingdom;  theoretically  you  may  very  prop- 
erly assign  the  protozoa  to  a  course  in  botany;  and 
another  professor  can  just  as  conveniently  present 
them  in  a  course  on  zoology;  the  protozoa  have  the 
characteristics  of  each  kingdom.  But  if  there  is  a  real 
difference  between  the  two  kingdoms;  that  is  to  say, 
if  a  vegetable  is  not  an  animal,  and  vice  versa  if  an 
animal  is  not  a  vegetable,  the  same  individual  cannot 
be  both  at  the  same  time.  In  the  history  of  science  we 
have  a  famous  example  of  this  process  in  the  astro- 
nomical system  of  Tycho  Brahe,  who  tried  to  unite 
in  one  system  the  Ptolemaic  doctrine  and  the  Coper- 
nican  doctrine  of  the  relative  motions  of  the  earth  and 
the  sun. 


IV 

But  it  is  now  time  to  make  a  remark  that  doubtless 
the  reader  has  long  ago  made  on  his  own  account.  If 
it  be  agreed  that  common  sense  settles  nothing;  that, 
on  the  contrary,  it  incessantly  gives  rise  to  new  prob- 
lems, and,  if  we  listen  to  it,  it  gets  us  into  more  inex- 
tricable confusion,  how  is  it  then  with  philosophy?  — 


COMMON   SENSE   AND   PHILOSOPHY     307 

for,  as  a  matter  of  course,  it  is  this  we  are  thinking  of 
putting  in  the  place  of  the  caput  mortuum.  What  is 
common  sense  after  all  but  simply  reason?  and  to 
what  do  we  wish  to  appeal  in  the  search  for  truth  if 
not  to  reason?  Hence  if  the  common  sense  —  or  the 
reason,  since  they  are  one  —  pitiably  fails,  is  not  philos- 
ophy condemned  to  precisely  the  same  fate  when  it 
puts  its  shoulder  to  the  wheel  in  its  turn  ? 

It  is  true  that  reason  and  common  sense  are  not  very 
different  from  each  other,  and  that  even  if  we  reserve 
the  word  "  reason "  for  scientists,  and  "  common 
sense  "  for  the  argumentation  of  the  masses,  still  com- 
mon sense,  more  exempt  from  prejudice  in  many 
things  than  is  the  thought  of  the  most  conscientious 
scientist,  often  reasons  more  accurately  than  the  rea- 
son itself.  To  conclude,  then,  it  must  be  true  —  how 
shall  we  escape  from  this  result?  —  that  philosophy 
will  become  bankrupt  as  well  as  common  sense;  but 
only  so,  however,  if  what  is  asked  of  her  is  a  response 
to  the  problems  the  existence  of  which  she  herself,  or 
common  sense,  has  revealed  to  us  in  so  imperious  a 
way.  But  indeed  perhaps  such  response  is  not  at  all 
what  philosophy  pretends  to  give.  We  only  seek  for 
something  when  we  have  not  got  it  ourselves.  In  case 
we  already  possess  it  there  is  no  need  of  any  search. 
And  here  I  put  a  finger  right  on  the  error  of  the 
method  extolled  by  the  philosophers  of  common  sense. 
With  them  the  last-named  function  of  the  mind  must 
play  at  the  same  time  the  role  of  asker  and  answerer. 
Now  this  is  illogical  —  I  hope  that  common  sense  itself 
will  grant  that,  —  that  the  same  faculty  that  knows 
not  and  asks,  should  pretend  to  reply,  —  that  is,  to 
know. 


3o8  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

Philosophy  must  take  care  not  to  fall  into  the  snare 
laid  for  her  by  reason,  in  whose  name  she  acts.  "  Phi- 
losophia  non  ipsa  sapientia  (said  Lactantius,  who, 
thinking  to  deal  a  mortal  blow  at  philosophy,  only  ex- 
pressed a  fact  which  does  not  in  the  least  disturb  us), 
sed  quaerit  sapientiam."  Once  more,  then,  if  philos- 
ophy does  seek  the  truth,  it  is  to  say  clearly  enough 
that  she  does  not  pretend  to  offer  it  to  anybody. 

But  from  whom  shall  she  seek  it?  From  science; 
or  rather,  from  the  different  sciences.  If  common 
sense  deceives  herself,  it  is  because  she  appeals  to  the 
partial  and  imperfect  science  that  individual  men  pos- 
sess ;  it  is  this  science  that  must  be  corrected  and  com- 
pleted. And  for  the  sake  of  clearness,  I  remark  that 
in  science  I  put  psychology,  ethics,  aesthetics,  even  the 
theory  of  knowledge  and  logic.  It  is  the  relics  of  an 
old-fashioned  terminology  and  method  of  thought  that 
make  us  generally  consider  the  just  mentioned  four 
sciences  as  species  under  the  genus  philosophy.  Every 
science  has  a  precise  object,  a  separate  and  limited 
domain  of  truth  to  investigate.  And  such  is  certainly 
the  case  with  psychology,  ethics,  aesthetics,  and  logic. 
If  we  insist  on  regarding  these  as  branches  of  philos- 
ophy, then  mechanics,  botany,  and  physiology  have  as 
good  a  right  to  the  title.  The  meaning  that  I  com- 
mend for  the  word  "  philosophy  "  is  the  one  that  long 
prevailed  in  former  centuries ;  namely,  that  philosophy 
has  no  special  object,  she  aims  at  the  truth  in  its  en- 
semble. It  is  not  proper,  however,  to  identify  philos- 
ophy with  a  universal  science  of  which  the  separate 
sciences  should  only  be  parts.  In  that  way  we  should 
fall  into  the  error  pointed  out  in  the  case  of  the  com- 
mon sense  philosophy:    philosophy  would  be  seeking 


COMMON    SENSE   AND   PHILOSOPHY     309 

what  it  already  possessed.  Thus  conceived,  moreover, 
it  would  be  destined  to  exist  only  in  a  far-removed  and 
very  problematical  future,  when  nature  would  have  for 
us  no  further  problem. 


The  role  of  philosophy,  as  I  figure  it  out,  may  be 
defined  in  the  following  way : 

1.  It  creates  science,  in  so  far  as  it  shows  its  neces- 
sity. Indeed,  while  stating  problems  —  and  we  have 
seen  that  it  need  not  take  much  trouble  to  do  so  —  the 
reason  asks  for  their  solution.  Philosophy  and  science 
had  the  same  origin  in  point  of  time.  This  is  but 
natural,  since  the  latter's  task  was  the  elucidation  of 
the  enigmas  propounded  by  the  former.  So  in  ancient 
times  the  philosopher  and  the  man  of  science  were 
generally  one  and  the  same.  But  a  moment  was  to 
come  when  this  task  would  be  beyond  the  powers  of 
science.  In  her  domain  one  problem  solved  would 
bring  on  others  the  difficulty  and  number  of  which 
would  go  on  ever  increasing.  Science,  which  had  to 
correspondingly  divide  up  her  powers,  demanded  the 
entire  attention  of  man,  while  the  task  of  philosophy 
was   correspondingly   extended   and    complicated. 

2.  Philosophy  has  to  bring  to  bear  a  large  part  of 
her  energy  in  removing  everything  which  is  of  such  a 
nature  as  to  trammel  the  progress  of  science,  either  in 
blocking  its  road  or  in  contesting  its  positive  results 
in  the  name  of  prejudices,  or  in  introducing  elements 
which,  so  far  from  explaining,  on  the  contrary  hinder 
its  progress  toward  the  truth.     Philosophy,  following 


3IO  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

out  the  same  line  of  thought,  must  also  set  aside  with- 
out ceremony  a  certain  number  of  problems  which  at 
the  very  start  we  can  declare  to  be  insoluble  by  the 
knowing  faculties  with  which  we  are  endowed.  Al- 
though logically  this  is  one  of  the  first  functions  she 
has  to  perform,  yet  philosophy  did  not  acquire  a  knowl- 
edge of  this  part  of  her  activity  until  after  all  the 
others.  This  can  be  very  naturally  explained,  how- 
ever; the  insoluble  enigmas  are  the  greatest,  and  are 
also  the  first  that  human  reason  will  propose  to  solve. 
He  solves  them  in  a  very  gross  way;  then  he  corrects 
his  explications  as  fast  as  necessity  requires,  up  to  the 
time  when  he  sees  that  contradictions,  far  from  disap- 
pearing, keep  ever  accumulating.  It  is  only  after  cen- 
turies of  trial  that  he  gives  up,  and  that  at  last  (with 
Kant)  he  gets  so  far  as  to  demonstrate  that  they  are 
a  priori  insoluble ;  that  is  to  say,  that  the  contradiction 
lies  in  the  laws  of  thought  itself. 

3.  Philosophy  examines  the  explanations  that  scien- 
tific men  hand  over  to  us  in  response  to  the  problems 
given  them  and  declares  whether  they  are  satisfactory 
or  not.  They  are  frequently  found  to  be  in  disagree- 
ment with  reality.  It  is  then  the  part  of  the  philoso- 
pher to  dismiss  them  and  declare  their  attempt  at  reply 
to  be  null  and  void.  It  happens  none  the  less  fre- 
quently that  an  explanation  made  in  a  certain  depart- 
ment of  science  is  in  conflict  with  an  explanation  made 
in  another  department  of  science.  In  this  case  again, 
the  learned  investigator,  being  wholly  absorbed  in  the 
special  study  he  is  pursuing,  it  falls  to  the  philosopher 
to  intervene  and  point  out  to  each  worker  the  objection 
with  which  he  is  confronted  in  consequence  of  the  dis- 
coveries of  his  competitor.    The  same  duty  is  his,  in 


COMMON   SENSE   AND   PHILOSOPHY     311 

the  case  of  a  single  department  when  the  results  of 
special  researches  are  irreconcilable. 

Furthermore,  the  role  of  philosophy  is  not  always 
purely  negative,  as  might  seem  to  be  the  case  after 
what  has  been  said.  It  frequently  happens  that  phi- 
losophy is  in  a  position  to  determine  the  cause  of  the 
conflict,  or  even  to  prevent  possible  disputes  between 
savants.  Her  constant  object  is  this:  to  direct  scien- 
tific activity  and  put  on  the  right  road  the  science  that 
is  going  astray. 

4.  Finally,  in  virtue  of  its  independent  position  and 
its  task  of  collecting  all  the  replies  of  science,  and  com- 
paring them  first  with  reality  and  then  with  each  other, 
philosophy  encounters  still  another  piece  of  work  of 
considerable  value,  —  that  of  drawing  attention  to  the 
close  relations  possible  between  two  departments  of 
human  thought  which  frequently  seem  strangers  to 
each  other,  and  in  which,  in  consequence  of  the  special- 
ization of  scientific  work,  each  had  lost  sight  of  the 
other.  Thus  it  is  the  intervention  of  philosophy  that 
has  brought  about  the  close  union  between  the  science 
of  the  law  and  alienists  in  medicine;  it  is  philosophy 
also  who  has  effected,  and  not  without  difficulty,  con- 
sidering the  prejudices  she  had  to  conquer,  that  work- 
ing alliance,  so  powerful  and  fertile  in  results  to-day, 
between  physiology  and  psychology. 

To  sum  up  all  in  a  sentence,  philosophy  is  coming 
to  the  aid  of  science  in  her  laborious  task  of  partu- 
rition. Socrates  practised  obstetrics  upon  individuals ; 
philosophy,  better  aware  of  her  powers  to-day,  and 
conscious  of  the  grandeur  of  science,  is  practising  upon 
the  latter  this  delicate  art.  In  this  way  (and  not  like 
the  2o<j!)ia  of  Valentinian  gnosticism,  which  is  consumed 


312  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

with  love  for  the  pv66<s^  or  abysm,  and,  seeing  her 
passion  unrcturned,  absolutely  desires  to  give  birth  to 
a  child  all  alone,  and  ends  by  bringing  into  the  world 
an  cK  rptu/Att  or  shapeless  abortion) — in  this  way,  I 
repeat,  philosophy  may  hope  to  arrive  some  day  at  the 
solution  of  the  very  problems  that  have  given  birth  to 
herself.  In  other  words,  our  entire  investigation  may 
be  expressed  thus :  philosophy  appeals  from  poorly  in- 
formed reason  to  better  informed  reason. 

Comte,  in  the  first  lecture  of  his  Cours  de  philosophie 
positive,  has  written  a  page  which  I  beg  to  recall  to 
your  memory : 

"  Let  there  be  a  new  class  of  scientists,"  he  says,  "  prepared 
by  a  suitable  education,  who,  without  giving  themselves  up  to 
the  special  cultivation  of  any  particular  branch  of  natural  philos- 
ophy, shall  occupy  themselves  solely  in  considering  the  different 
positive  sciences  in  their  present  state,  in  determining  the  pre- 
cise spirit  of  each  of  them,  in  discovering  their  relations  and 
their  concatenation,  in  summing  up,  if  possible,  all  their  individ- 
ual principles  in  a  less  number  of  common  principles,  while 
always  conforming  to  the  fundamental  maxims  of  the  positive 
method.  At  the  same  time,  let  the  other  scientists,  before  giving 
themselves  up  to  their  respective  specialties,  be  henceforth  fitted 
by  an  education  acquired  with  reference  to  the  ensemble  of  the 
positive  branches  of  knowledge,  to  at  once  profit  by  the  light 
diffused  by  those  savants  who  are  devoted  to  the  study  of  general- 
izations, and  to  mutually  correct  the  results  of  their  labors,  — 
a  state  of  things  to  which  the  scientists  of  our  time  are  visibly 
approximating  from  day  to  day.  .  .  .  With  a  distinct  class,  ever 
checked  or  controlled  by  all  the  others,  the  special  and  permanent 
function  of  which  would  be  to  relate  each  new  special  discovery 
to  the  general  system,  we  should  have  no  longer  to  fear  that  a 
too  great  attention  bestowed  on  details  would  ever  hinder  the 
perception  of  the  whole"  (pp.  27,  28). 


COMMON   SENSE   AND   PHILOSOPHY     313 

All  this  is  excellent,  and  Comte  himself  magnifi- 
cently illustrated  it  in  the  six  volumes  of  Coiirs  de 
philosophie  positive.  It  is  not  just  that  the  scientists 
themselves  should  be  burdened  with  a  task  that  grows 
heavier  every  day;  they  have  enough  to  do  in  their 
own  special  domain.  Only,  Comte  is  wrong  in  speaking 
of  a  nezu  class.  He  wrongly  saw  in  his  predecessors 
only  obstinate  metaphysicians,  and  judged  them  too 
much  without  studying  them;  true  philosophers  have 
only  become  very  rare  for  quite  a  while.  But  Fichte, 
in  several  of  his  more  important  treatises,  and  Hegel 
and  Schelling  everywhere  (to  select  the  most  incrimi- 
nated) were  neither  more  nor  less  than  philosophers 
of  the  exact  kind  dreamed  of  by  Comte.  Schelling 
above  all,  is  remarkable  from  this  point  of  view.  His 
aim  was  always  to  reach  a  grand  synthesis  of  the  dif- 
ferent branches  of  human  knowledge.  Doubtless 
questions  of  metaphysics  are  more  resolutely  shunned 
to-day.  For  a  long  time  now  we  have  not  seen  a  com- 
plete synthesis,  a  rounded-out  system;  but  it  is  not 
because  unity  in  the  domain  of  thought  has  been  given 
up,  but  only  because  it  is  not  considered  that  it  can  be 
so  easily  attained ;  it  is  not  by  choice,  but  by  necessity. 

Let  us  here  call  to  mind  that  there  are  many  more 
chances  of  impartiality  in  the  results,  if  we  secure  this 
special  class  of  philosophical  scientists,  since  the  temp- 
tation to  give  more  credit  and  weight  to  one  class  of 
facts  than  to  another  is  in  this  way  avoided.  More- 
over, a  disinterested  philosopher  has  more  chance  of 
gaining  general  confidence  than  have  specialists,  — 
particularly  in  our  day,  when,  it  must  be  admitted,  that 
while  vigorous  and  profound  thought  is  more  fre- 
quently found  on  the  side  of  the  natural  sciences,  often 


3 14  ANTI-PRAGMATISM 

destructive  arguments  are  upheld  by  specialists  in 
these  branches  of  knowledge  in  a  manner  rather  intimi- 
dating to  those  who  do  not  ordinarily  move  in  their 
sphere.  Scientific  men  themselves  should  joyfully  wel- 
come the  restoration  of  this  class  of  workers.  It  is  easy 
to  understand  their  prejudice  against  philosophers, 
who,  during  centuries,  have  held  them  in  check.  But 
is  there  anything  less  scientific  than  to  repulse  the  spec- 
ulations of  the  philosophers  of  the  future  on  the  plea 
that  those  of  the  past  (formed,  too,  under  very  differ- 
ent conditions)  are  not  up  to  the  mark  of  the  scientific 
acquirements  of  to-day? 


INDEX 


Abbott,  Lyman,  216 

Adler,  Felix,  137,  150 

Agnosticism,  218 

American  mind  analyzed  (its  prag- 
matism), 1 1 5-123 

Arabian  ISlights,  248 

Aristocracy  of  the  intellect  v. 
democracy,  Part  III,  Chap.  2. 

Bacon,  Lord,  169 

Bayle,  174,  175 

Bargy,  135,  239;  his  book  on  Re- 
ligion in  Society  in  the  United 
States,  133 

Bentham,  Jeremy,  190 

Bergson,  H.,  39,  note 

Bertaud,  262,  266 

Bible,  The,  138,  142 

Boutroux,  Emile,  23,  note;  81, 
note;  221 

Bradley,  161 

Carus,  Dr.,  255 

Caste,  232 

Catholicism,  reaction  toward  (the 

"Oxford  movement"),  192,  193 
Compajnre,  M.  G.,  255,  note;   267, 

note 
Condillac,  181 
Conscience,  129 

Consciousness,  marginal,  290,  note 
Converse,     Mr.,     Pres.     Baldwin 

Locomotive  Works,  144,  145 
Credo  quia  absurdum,  168-172 
Creighton,  Prof.  J.  E.,  36,  37;   44, 

note;    61,  note;   85,  note;    255 

D'AvENEL,  Viscount,  214 
Democracy  an  absurdity,  223,  and 

Part  III,   Chap.  2,  passim;    on 

trial,  234-236 


Descartes,  169 

Dewey,    Prof.     John,    29,    note; 

Chap.    2,    passim;    253,    note; 

267 
Dogmas,  reUgious,  133-136 
Draper,  J,  W.,  217,  218,  note 
Durkheim,  Emile,  105 

Education,  pseudo,  243,  244 
£lite.  The  American,  defined,  114, 

115 
Emerson,  216 
Mmile,  178 
Ethical  Culture  Societies,  30,  note; 

136,  137 
Ethics,  128 

Faguet,  M.,  267 

Families,  small  size  of  cultivated 

American,  213-215 
Fichte,  186 

Fouillee,  Alf.,  quoted,  128 
Foxes'  tails,  83 
France,  intellectual  aristocracy  of, 

230,  232 

Gailord,  Mrs.,  141,  142 

Ghent  (socialist),  237 

God,  a  punitive,      152,      iSS-iS7; 

asked  to  show  his  credentials, 

201 

Harriman,  IIS 

Hartmann,  Von,  187 

Hebert,  Marcel,  23,  note;  66,  251 

Hegel,  186 

Heliocentric  theory,  44-48 

Hibben,  Prof.  J.  G.,  43,  note;   52, 

note 
Hindooism    and    Buddhism,    83, 

oote 


3i6 


INDEX 


Hobbes,  169 
Hoeffding,  H.,  81,  note 
Homo  homini  lupus,  127 
Hugo,  Victor,  230-233;    276 
Hume,  170 

Ingersoll,  R.  G.,  217,  note 
Irwin-King,  71-73,  76 

Johnson,  Dr.  Samuel,  63 
James,  William,  The  typical  prag- 
matist  and  protagonist  of  prag- 
matism, 78-79  note;  his  an- 
thropomorphism (idea  of  God), 
81-83,  86;  Social  Value  of  the 
College-bred,  quoted,  122;  his 
personal  religion,  152;  on  re- 
ligion in  general,  152-159;  as  a 
psychic  researcher,  193;  on 
democracy,  234 ;  biographical 
notes  on,  238-252;  a  pragma- 
tist  in  the  superior  sense  of  the 
word,  247;  the  difference  be- 
tween his  philosophy  and  the 
author's  stated  in  a  nut-shell,  249 
James  Henry,  cited,  238 

Kelvin,  Lord,  193 

Kant,  184,  185,  187,  195,  196 

Lalande,  a.,  23,  note;  71,  72 
Leibnitz,  183 

Le  Roy,  43,  note;   163,  164 
Levy-Brlihl,  L.,  105-107 
Locke,  quoted,  63 

Mackay-Smith,  Bishop,  234,  note 
Materialism,   155,   218;    scientific, 

ii8 
Meliorism  of  James,  48,  83,  J20, 

121 

Moore,  Professor,  253,  note;    264, 

267 
Munsterberg,  Professor,  244 

Naville,  a.,  106,  note;  266 
New  Hampshire,  religion  in,  149; 

statistics  of,  214,  note 
New  York  City,  religion  in,5i37-i47 


Opportunism,  47-49 

Panic  of  1907  in  Wall  Street,  139- 

147 

Papini,  Giovanni,  24,  51,  78-79, 
note;  125-127 

Pascal,  1 71-173 

Paulhan,  M.  Fred.,  267 

Peirce,  Charles,  founder  of  modern 
pragmatism,  23,  note;  108 

Persuasive  ideal,  128 

Phelps,  Professor,  142 

Philadelphia,  religion  in,  146,  147 

Philosophers,  how  they  all  com- 
promised with  pragmatic  scho- 
lasticism, 168-173 

Philosophy  and  science  not  always 
applicable  to  life,  242  ff. 

"Pluralism,"  119 

Pluralistic  Universe,  A.,  73 

Poe,  Edgar,  231 

Poincare,  Jules  Henri,  39,  40,  43 
and  note;  45 

Pragmatism,  definitions  of,  23,  24; 
main  principles  of.  Chap.  I, 
passim;  its  pretensions,  53; 
limits  of,  57;  and  intellectualism 
contrasted,  52-61;  and  Berke- 
leyism,  79-81 ;  its  great  strong- 
hold is  America,  in  flf. ;  Ameri- 
can, 1 1 5-1 23;  English,  123- 
125,  159-162;  Italian,  125-127; 
German,  182-187;  ^  ^^^Y  of 
theology,  162;  is  the  product  of 
a  philosophic  temperament,  163; 
as  modem  scholasticism  and  the 
ancilla  iheologice  et  ecclesice, 
166  flf. ;  making  a  servant  of 
philosophy,  194;  and  science, 
197;  come  to  stay,  208;  not  a 
question  of  race-stocks,  209 

Pragmatism  and  The  Will  to  Be- 
lieve compared,  68,  69 

Pragmatists,  the  three  main  argu- 
ments of,  23-31;  reference  to 
list  of,  39,  note;  scientific  and 
ethical,  62-66,  and  Chap.  II, 
passim;  their  profession  of 
faith,  182 


INDEX 


317 


Pratt,  J.  B.,  257 
Pratt,  Professor,  263,  note 
Pratt,  Sereno  S.,  139-141 
Princeton  University,  147,  note 
Protagoras,  54 

Psychic  research,  inspired  by  prag- 
matism, 193 
Ptolemaic  system,  44-48 
Punitive  God,  A,  152 

"Quick  Service  for  Business 
Men,"  143 

Race  suicide,  213-215 

Religion  in  America,  130-147; 
needed  as  a  sanction,  130-151; 
in  Wall  Street,  139-147;  in 
Philadelphia,  146;  in  New 
Hampshire,  149;  not  moribund, 
217 

Rod,  Edouard,  134 

Rousseau,  Jean  Jacques,  62,  176- 
182;  291,  note 

Sabatier,  134 

Schelling,  186 

Schiller,  G.,  xi,  xvii,  note;  Chap.  I, 
passim;  30,  note;  vindicates  the 
"rationality     of    irrationalism," 


50,   note;    123,    159-162,    258- 

262 
Schopenhauer,  186,  187 
Seth,  Professor,  255 
Shaftesbury,  175 
Small,  Prof.  A.  W.,  115 
Spencerianism,  118,  119 
Spinoza,  170 
Stephen,  Leslie,  212,  note 

Theodicy,     the    new    Jacobean, 

202-204 
True,  the,  238 
Truth,  120 
Truths,  the  author's  system  of  two, 

250.  251 

Unitarianism,  136,  note 
Universities,   American,    130,    131, 

note 
Utilitarianism,  190,  191 

Wall  Street   and   the   Panic   of 

1907,  139-145 
White,  Andrew  D.,  217,  note 
Whitman,  Walt,  231 
Will  to  Believe,  The,  68,  69 
Wolf,  183 

Zeno,  antinomies  of,  174 


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